Arquivo da tag: Violência

Violência no futebol argentino – fim de semana de 18 e 19 de agosto de 2012

Incidentes en Chicago: dos policías baleados (Clarín)

También hay dos efectivos con traumatismos, debido al enfrentamiento que se produjo con un sector de la barra que quiso ingresar al estadio por la fuerza. Fueron detenidas dos personas.

20/08/12 – 21:00

Otra vez la violencia en el fútbol. Por tercer día consecutivo un partido queda manchado por los violentos. En el primer partido en su estadio en su regreso a la B Nacional, Nueva Chicago no pudo festejar ni adentro del campo de juego (igualó 0-0 con Gimnasia de Jujuy), ni afuera: un sector de la barra brava se enfrentó con la policía y hay dos oficiales heridos de bala, además de dos efectivos con traumatismos (uno en el cráneo), que fueron trasladados al Hospital Churruca.

El conflicto se originó por una interna entre dos facciones de la barra de Nueva Chicago. Es que a unos 150 barras del barrio Villegas, cercanos al sector de la barra denominado Los Perales, les aplicaron el derecho de admisión. Mientras que a los de Las Antenas, el grupo antagónico, tuvieron libre acceso a la cabecera local.

En la cancha de Chicago los de Las Antenas se ubican en una cabecera y los de Los Perales en la de enfrente. Los de Villegas quisieron ingresar al estadio por la fuerza y se enfrentaron con la Policía. Comenzaron las corridas en las afueras del estadio detrás del barrio Los Perales, hacia donde se dirigieron los efectivos policiales y según testigos se escucharon varias detonaciones. Allí habrían sido heridos dos efectivos policiales que fueron trasladados al Churruca. Hay dos detenidos a los que les fueron incautadas armas de fuego y son apuntados por la policía como los presuntos agresores.

Asimismo, cuando terminó el primer tiempo hubo nuevamente corridas, las cuales se repitieron en el desarrollo del segundo tiempo en la parte baja de una tribuna del estadio. Casi sobre la hora del partido el árbitro debió suspender el juego durante más de cinco minutos, ya que volvieron a producirse incidentes entre la policía y los barras.

En enero, Agustín Alejo Rodríguez, de 27 años, fue asesinado en el polideportivo del club. Rodríguez, miembro del sector de Los Perales, acudió al club por una supuesta reunión conciliatoria entre las dos facciones de la barra. Pero los de Las Antenas los habrían emboscado. En busca de venganza, los miembros de Los Perales ingresaron por la fuerza al Hospital Santojanni donde se encontraba herido el presunto asesino. El hecho sigue sin ser esclarecido.

El sábado hubo incidentes en Santa Fe entre la policía local y los hinchas de Belgrano. Juan Carlos Olave fue detenido tras el partido y procesado por una supuesta agresión a un oficial de policía y a un bombero. El arquero del Pirata intentó calmar a los hinchas cordobeses ante la represión policial.

Por otro lado, en Victoria, hubo un enfrentamiento entre los hinchas de River y la policía. Y después fue la barra brava de Tigre la que se enfrentó con las fuerzas de seguridad. Hubo un patrullero incendiado y un alto jefe de la Bonaerense sufrió una herida grave y debió ser operado de urgencia. Se trata de Daniel Herrera, Comisario Mayor Jefe de la Departamental Conurbano Norte, que recibió una pedrada en la cabeza y fue sometido a una cirugía reconstructora que le dejó 27 puntos de sutura.

Esta mañana, en la sede de Independiente sobre la calle Boyacá, en Flores, miembros de la barra brava del Rojo habrían arrojado una bomba molotov que incendió una marquesina. Además, el presidente del club, Javier Cantero, enfrentado con la barra, denunció un intento de robo en el estadio de Independiente, presuntamente por miembros de la barra de Independiente.

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Pelea en Mataderos: Dos policías baleados en un choque con barras de Chicago (Clarín)

POR SEBASTIÁN VARELA DEL RÍO

Uno fue herido en el hombro y otro en una pierna. Hubo otros dos policías lesionados. El conflicto estalló porque los barrabravas intentaron eludir el derecho de admisión e ingresar sin entradas.

Mal momento. Un policía intenta controlar a los hinchas más exaltados. Hubo dos detenidos por portar armas de fuego. El enfrentamiento se produjo fuera del estadio y duró casi dos horas.

21/08/12

Llora Mataderos. Lo hace un poco por la costumbre impotente de vivir en un infierno. Lagrimea también por el infame gas que se ha vuelto habitual en cada uno de los episodios de una película de incidentes y asesinatos. El de ayer fue uno más de los capítulos de unahistoria que sigue derramando sangre . Una de las facciones de la barra de Chicago se enfrentó con la policía y dejó a dos efectivos heridos de bala . Otros dos fueron hospitalizados por diferentes traumatismos. Una larga batalla campal que puso la lupa nuevamente en los problemas de seguridad en las canchas argentinas en un fin de semana plagado de hechos de violencia. En la cancha de Colón la policía reprimió a los hinchas de Belgrano y el arquero Olave terminó detenido. En Independiente tiraron una bomba molotov contra la persiana de la sede social de Flores. Además, robaron computadoras del estadio. El fútbol, cada vez más oscuro.

En el barrio de Mataderos se sabía que algo iba a ocurrir. El rumor sobre posibles incidentes era habitual ya en la tarde del domingo.

“Cuidate si vas a la cancha que parece que mañana se pudre” , se podía escuchar de boca de los que en Mataderos conocen la interna. El primer partido como local en la vuelta a la B Nacional era una jornada para temer. El antecedente inmediato eran los incidentes en el portón de la tribuna visitante de Defensa y Justicia, hace una semana. Allí, a los barrabravas les cerraron el ingreso y hubo corridas. Varios habrían entrado al encuentro con armas de fuego y por temor a una masacre adentro de la popular, las dos facciones de la barra, Los Perales y Las Antenas no se enfrentaron.

El operativo de seguridad del partido de ayer ante Gimnasia de Jujuy estuvo lleno de incertidumbre. Sobre las 11 (el encuentro estaba programado para las 15) no se sabía la manera en la que se habilitarían las tribunas. De apuro, cerca del mediodía se decidió darle una cabecera a cada facción de la barra. La popular del lado del Barrio Manuel Dorrego para Los Perales . La tribuna “Mercado de Hacienda” estaba destinada a Las Antenas. Incluso se modificaron los corredores habituales de entrada del público visitante para prevenir un enfrentamiento.

Los problemas comenzaron en el portón de la tribuna donde se ubicaban los de Los Perales . Una facción de dicha hinchada, conocida como Los de Villegas, intentó ingresar corriendo y sin entradas. Cabe aclarar que Chicago viene implementando la modalidad de canje de entradas para socios, los únicos habilitados para concurrir a los partidos. La Policía, que identificó a varios que integran la lista de 90 personas sobre las que pesa el derecho de admisión, los frenó. A partir de eso se desencadenó una pelea que duró casi 100 minutos . Mientras el partido se jugaba, afuera había balas de goma, gases lacrimógeno y proyectiles.

Adentro del estadio, los miembros de la facción de Los Perales que estaban en la tribuna querían salir para sumarse a la pelea. La Policía formó un cordón policial para impedírselo. Las familias que estaban en la misma popular lograron pasar hacia un playón que comunica con la platea para apartarse.

En un momento del enfrentamiento, los barrabravas se replegaron hacia los edificios del barrio. Los efectivos seguían disparando balas de goma.

Los violentos respondieron con proyectiles de plomo que hirieron a dos policías.

Uno en el hombro y el otro en una pierna. Ambos están fuera de peligro, igual que otros dos con traumatismos en el cráneo.

Dos hombres quedaron detenidos por el hecho.

El 2012 fue sangriento para el club. En enero, un encuentro en el Polideportivo terminó con el asesinato de Agustín Rodríguez, de L os Perales . Su grupo fue a buscar venganza al hospital Santojanni, lugar en el que se encontraba internado por una puñalada Aldo Barralda, jefe de Las Antenas . La historia terminó con una batalla por los pasillos del hospital. Barralda falleció unos días después.

La historia de la interna está enmarcada por los puntos de contacto deLas Antenas con el kirchnerismo y de Los Perales con la pata peronista del macrismo.

Las Antenas quiere tomar el poder y contaría con la aprobación de sectores de la política. El uso de los barrabravas como fuerza de choque en los actos políticos no es nuevo.

Los jugadores de Chicago se mostraron enojados por los incidentes. Julio Serrano aseguró: “La Presidenta se tiene que hacer cargo. Los dirigentes políticos mantienen vivos a los barrabravas”. Daniel Ferreiro, secretario del club, afirmó preocupado: “Todos los integrantes de mi familia recibimos muchas amenazas por día”.

Por ahora, no se habla de sanciones a la institución. La posibilidad de no jugar más en Mataderos fue un rumor que circuló. Pero nada más.

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Imágenes de los incidentes en Mataderos (TyC Sports)

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BASTA DE VIOLENCIA (Olé)

De mal en peor

La Infantería ingresó a la tribuna de Chicago y se armó feo...

La Infantería ingresó a la tribuna de Chicago y se armó feo…

La facción de Los Perales de Chicago se trenzó con la Policía, que terminó con dos oficiales heridos de bala.

Faltaban tres horas para el inicio del partido y todavía no se conocía la distribución de tribunas para albergar a las dos facciones de la barra de Chicago: Los Perales (de Mataderos) y Las Antenas (de provincia). Como ayer anticipó Olé , el operativo policial tenía grietas profundas y desde la CD de la institución deslindaron responsabilidades hacia la Fuerza … El entorno del partido estuvo mal parido desde un principio, se esperaba una tarde nefasta. Y ocurrió. El saldo de la batalla entre Los Perales y la policía fue: dos oficiales con impactos de arma de fuego (uno en un hombro y otro en una pierna) internados en el Hospital Churruca, otros tres con contusiones. Habría dos barras detenidos, a los que se les incautaron armas.

La semana pasada, en la cancha de Defensa, Los Perales dejó afuera a Las Antenas. Hasta el domingo el plan del Ministerio de Seguridad era ubicarlos a todos juntos en la cabecera Calero y Persi. Un peligro latente. Con el correr de la mañana de ayer, se decidió separarlos. Pasadas las 12, se determinó que la barra de Capital ocupara la cabecera lindante a su barrio y en la popular de enfrente (originalmente estarían los jujeños, que fueron a la pequeña tribuna del costado de la platea), cercana a la General Paz, estuvo la gente de Provincia.

A los 43´ del PT se escucharon balazos de goma en el ingreso a la tribuna de Los Perales. Oficialmente el club y la Policía coincidieron en el argumento “quisieron ingresar sin entradas”. Por otro lado, se indica que el hecho se desató porque se les prohibió entrar a 50 barras que tienen derecho de admisión y se armó la gresca en las afueras del estadio y se extendió al barrio Manuel Dorrego. Durante el entretiempo continuaron los disparos, Infantería tiró gas lacrimógeno y produjo que los hinchas ubicados en esa popu se desplazaran hasta el playón.

La calma parecía haber llegado. Pero … Iban 22’ del complemento y volvieron a escucharse las detonaciones. El partido siguió al compás de los balazos. Hasta que a los 44´, increíblemente, una formación de Infantería transitó la tribuna y hubo otro choque, esta vez dentro del estadio. El juego se detuvo y los jugadores pidieron calma. El partido pudo culminar, pero Chicago quedó aún más herido.

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B NACIONAL/ CHICAGO 0 – GIMANSIA (J) 0 (Olé)

Torito en problemas

Nueva Chicago y Gimnasia (J) igualaron sin goles en Mataderos. El partido se vio opacado por incidentes protagonizados por un sector de la hinchada local con la policía.

En Mataderos, Nueva Chicago, uno de los equipos recién ascendidos a la categoría, se midió ante Gimnasia y Esgrima de Jujuy. El partido, sin mayores sucesos, finalizó igualado sin goles. Repartieron puntos ambos. Pero, por desgracia, lo lamentable estuvo en las tribunas en donde se sucedieron una serie de incidentes entre la policía y una facción de la hinchada local.

Cuando el primer tiempo estaba por llegar a su fin, el grupo de Los Perales intentó ingresar al estadio sin entradas. Como resultado, los efectivos policiales los frenaron, desatando una pelea que se extendió a lo largo de los minutos, incluso con el segundo tiempo del partido disputándose.

A los 44 minutos del ST, a punto de que finalizara el choque, la policía entró en la cancha y hubo más incidentes con otros simpatizantes locales en una de las tribunas. Como resultado, el partido estuvo detenido por unos instantes. Se finalizó, aunque con los sucesos de violencia aún latentes. Una historia lamentable. Otra vez, incidentes.

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Violencia, violencia y más violencia (Clarín)

POR GUSTAVO RONZANO

Otro fin de semana de violencia en el fútbol. Esta imagen pertenece al partido entre Colón y Belgrano. (Hugo Pascutti)

21/08/12 – 13:13

Aquella reunión del Comité Ejecutivo de AFA no fue una más. Como cada martes, aquel 29 de mayo volvieron a juntarse los dirigentes en el edificio de Viamonte 1366. Y el tenso cruce entre dos de ellos marcó a fuego esa noche: “Preocupate por tu club, que las cosas no están tan bien. Dejá a Boca fuera de todo esto”, le dijo el vice de Boca, Juan Carlos Crespi, a Javier Cantero. ¿Qué había dicho el presidente de Independiente? “En Boca todos se sacan fotos con la barra brava”.

La discusión tuvo un segundo round, pocas horas después, afuera de aquellas cuatro paredes. “No voy a andar discutiendo por los medios. El, yo y las treinta personas que estuvimos ahí sabemos lo que pasó, pero los problemas de vestuario quedan en el vestuario”, indicó Cantero. “Somos un buen ejemplo para todos. Somos un club muy bien administrado y por suerte no tenemos problemas como otros. En vez de criticar, deberían preguntarnos por qué no tenemos problemas. Esa es la manera de ayudar, y no pasearse por los canales de televisión. Espero que lo haya entendido, porque manejar un club no es igual que manejar un country, sin desmerecer a los countries”, contratacó Crespi. Y remató: “Yo no soy artista como algunos: Si tengo un problema lo resuelvo puertas para adentro”.

No hubo, claro, un antes y un después de ese episodio. Al cabo, día a día la dirigencia del fútbol argentino parece rendirle pleitesía a esa frase de cabecera que luce en su anillo Julio Grondona: Todo Pasa. Y así pasó otro fin de semana cargado de sinrazón. Un fin de semana largo, en este caso, que incluyó en el menú violencia en Santa Fe, el sábado; violencia en Tigre, el domingo; violencia en Mataderos, el lunes. Y una bomba molotov en la sede que tiene Independiente en Flores, en la madrugada del lunes. “Vamos a incrementar el derecho de admisión, no nos van a doblegar”, insiste Cantero, a quien sus pares del fútbol nacional siguen viendo como el auténtico sapo de otro pozo.

Es evidente que si no hay una política de Estado, una decisión en serio, profunda y sincera, los violentos continuarán formando parte de ese engranaje poderoso que no quiere sacar los pies de un plato demasiado grande y tentador. La presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner elogió el 31 de julio a los barras porque “no miran el partido; arengan, arengan, arengan, la verdad, mi respeto para todos ellos”. Este martes, Aníbal Fernández, por si acaso, aclaró que no debe opinar de esas declaraciones porque “no soy ningún exégeta” de la Presidenta.

El senador nacional y presidente de Quilmes, en definitiva, no hizo más que sumar para la gran certeza: Cantero siempre estuvo solo.

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Más repercusiones que soluciones (Clarín)

POR DAVID FLIER

El día después del fin de semana largo a puro descontrol en el fútbol argentino todo sigue igual. No habría quita de puntos para sancionar a los clubes involucrados.

21/08/12 – 12:32

Hasta ahora, los hechos de violencia que se sucedieron el último fin de semana en el fútbol argentino dejaron sólo repercusiones. Es que, mientras varios se han pronunciado al respecto de los incidentes ocurridos en Santa Fe, Victoria, Maraderos o en la sede de de Independiente en Flores, aún no se han aplicado sanciones al respecto.

“No es algo que sorprenda lo que ocurrió el fin de semana, siempre pasa algo”, señaló este martes Mónica Nizzardo, titular de la ONG Salvemos al Fútbol, en diálogo con Clarín. Y recordó el discurso de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en el cual restó trascendencia a la influencia de las barra bravas en hechos de violencia.

También sobre la Presidenta recayó la diputada nacional de Unión por Todos, Patricia Bullrich. “Este nuevo incidente reafirma la gravedad de los dichos de la Presidenta de la Nación donde apañó, ponderó y justificó el accionar y la existencia de los barras en el fútbol”, dijo la legisladora en referencia a la bomba que había explotado en la sede de Independiente en Flores. La investigación acerca de este incidente es llevada a cabo por la Comisaría 50ª.

A su vez, aún no se han levantado voces oficiales para confirmar sanciones sobre Tigre o Chicago. Sobre los incidentes en Victoria, donde todos los demorados fueron liberados ayer, Luis Morales, titular del ApreViDe (Agencia de Prevención de Violencia en el Deporte) había señalado a Clarín que debían realizar el informe en base “a lo que mostraran las cámaras de seguridad”. Se trata del primer fin de semana de fútbol desde que el nuevo organismo asumió en reemplazo del CoProSeDe. “Siempre es lo mismo. Cambian la figurita y se escudan en que necesitan tiempo”, sostuvo Nizzardo, quien recordó que entre tanto recambio se suman víctimas de la violencia.

No es la primera vez en el año que los hinchas de Tigre se ven envueltos en hechos de violencia cerca de su estadio. En abril, luego de escupir a Clemente Rodríguez y a Santiago Silva, se tomaron a golpes con jugadores de Boca tras el encuentro que el equipo de Julio Falcioni perdió como visitante.

Mientras tanto, en Mataderos sólo existen rumores en relación a la sanción que recibirá Nueva Chicago. Se especula que el club no sufrirá quita de puntos, pero no hay precisiones todavía sobre qué pasará con su estadio. Algo muy probable es que los demás clubes de la B Nacional pidan jugar sin hinchas visitantes cuando reciban al equipo de Mataderos.

Lejos del área metropolitana de Buenos Aires, en Córdoba continúan las repercusiones acerca de los incidentes del sábado en Santa Fe. Por un lado, la dirigencia de Belgrano omitió en su reclarmo cualquier referencia a Juan Carlos Olave. El arquero había señalado que “fue oportuna la intervención de los jugadores, hasta el arbitro lo agradeció”. Olave, acusado de golpear a un bombero, se había defendido al decir que todo fue producto de un forcejeo por una manguera para que dejaran de tirar agua sobre la hinchada.

Sin embargo, lo curioso es que a pesar de la bronca entre los simpatizantes cordobeses, uno de ellos denunció que la parcialidad de Belgrano fue la que inició el conflicto en el estadio. “Es la primera vez que voy a la cancha y no puedo dejar de hacer la denuncia de lo que vi. Todo comenzó cuando un hincha de Belgrano se subió al alambrado y se robó una bandera de Colón. Ahí los locales se pusieron violentos y comenzaron a tirar piedras”, expresó el hincha cordobés, cuyo nombre no trascendió.

Lo cierto es que quedan muchas cuestiones por investigarse para que, esta vez, no siga todo como si nada hubiese ocurrido.

Politics and Prejudice Explored (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 20, 2012) — Research has associated political conservatism with prejudice toward various stereotyped groups. But research has also shown that people select and interpret evidence consistent with their own pre-existing attitudes and ideologies. In this article, Chambers and colleagues hypothesized that, contrary to what some research might indicate, prejudice is not restricted to a particular political ideology.

Rather, the conflicting values of liberals and conservatives give rise to different kinds of prejudice, with each group favoring other social groups that share their values. In the first study, three diverse groups of participants rated the ideological position and their overall impression of 34 different target groups.

Participants’ impressions fell in line with their ideology. For example, conservatives expressed more prejudice than liberals against groups that were identified as liberal (e.g., African-Americans, homosexuals), but less prejudice against groups identified as conservative (e.g., Christian fundamentalists, business people).

In the second and third studies, participants were presented with 6 divisive political issues and descriptions of racially diverse target persons for each issue. Neither liberals’ nor conservatives’ impressions of the target persons were affected by the race of the target, but both were strongly influenced by the target’s political attitudes.

From these findings the researchers conclude that prejudices commonly linked with ideology are most likely derived from perceived ideological differences and not from other characteristics like racial tolerance or intolerance.

Journal References:

J. B. Luguri, J. L. Napier, J. F. Dovidio. Reconstruing Intolerance: Abstract Thinking Reduces Conservatives’ Prejudice Against Nonnormative GroupsPsychological Science, 2012; 23 (7): 756 DOI:10.1177/0956797611433877

J. B. Luguri, J. L. Napier, J. F. Dovidio. Reconstruing Intolerance: Abstract Thinking Reduces Conservatives’ Prejudice Against Nonnormative GroupsPsychological Science, 2012; 23 (7): 756 DOI:10.1177/0956797611433877

 

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Prejudice Comes from a Basic Human Need and Way of Thinking, New Research Suggests

ScienceDaily (Dec. 21, 2011) — Where does prejudice come from? Not from ideology, say the authors of a new paper. Instead, prejudice stems from a deeper psychological need, associated with a particular way of thinking. People who aren’t comfortable with ambiguity and want to make quick and firm decisions are also prone to making generalizations about others.

In a new article published in Current Directions in Psychological Science, a journal of the Association for Psychological Science, Arne Roets and Alain Van Hiel of Ghent University in Belgium look at what psychological scientists have learned about prejudice since the 1954 publication of an influential book, The Nature of Prejudice by Gordon Allport.

People who are prejudiced feel a much stronger need to make quick and firm judgments and decisions in order to reduce ambiguity. “Of course, everyone has to make decisions, but some people really hate uncertainty and therefore quickly rely on the most obvious information, often the first information they come across, to reduce it” Roets says. That’s also why they favor authorities and social norms which make it easier to make decisions. Then, once they’ve made up their mind, they stick to it. “If you provide information that contradicts their decision, they just ignore it.”

Roets argues that this way of thinking is linked to people’s need to categorize the world, often unconsciously. “When we meet someone, we immediately see that person as being male or female, young or old, black or white, without really being aware of this categorization,” he says. “Social categories are useful to reduce complexity, but the problem is that we also assign some properties to these categories. This can lead to prejudice and stereotyping.”

People who need to make quick judgments will judge a new person based on what they already believe about their category. “The easiest and fastest way to judge is to say, for example, ok, this person is a black man. If you just use your ideas about what black men are generally like, that’s an easy way to have an opinion of that person,” Roets says. “You say, ‘he’s part of this group, so he’s probably like this.'”

It’s virtually impossible to change the basic way that people think. Now for the good news: It’s possible to actually also use this way of thinking to reduce people’s prejudice. If people who need quick answers meet people from other groups and like them personally, they are likely to use this positive experience to form their views of the whole group. “This is very much about salient positive information taking away the aversion, anxiety, and fear of the unknown,” Roets says.

Roets’s conclusions suggest that the fundamental source of prejudice is not ideology, but rather a basic human need and way of thinking. “It really makes us think differently about how people become prejudiced or why people are prejudiced,” Roets says. “To reduce prejudice, we first have to acknowledge that it often satisfies some basic need to have quick answers and stable knowledge people rely on to make sense of the world.”

Journal Reference:

Arne Roets and Alain Van Hiel. Allport’s Prejudiced Personality Today: Need for Closure as the Motivated Cognitive Basis of PrejudiceCurrent Directions in Psychological Science, (in press)

 

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Ironic Effects of Anti-Prejudice Messages

ScienceDaily (July 7, 2011) — Organizations and programs have been set up all over the globe in the hopes of urging people to end prejudice. According to a research article, which will be published in an upcoming issue of Psychological Science, a journal of the Association for Psychological Science, such programs may actually increase prejudices.

Lisa Legault, Jennifer Gutsell and Michael Inzlicht, from the University of Toronto Scarborough, were interested in exploring how one’s everyday environment influences people’s motivation toward prejudice reduction.

The authors conducted two experiments which looked at the effect of two different types of motivational intervention — a controlled form (telling people what they should do) and a more personal form (explaining why being non-prejudiced is enjoyable and personally valuable).

In experiment one; participants were randomly assigned one of two brochures to read: an autonomy brochure or a controlling brochure. These brochures discussed a new campus initiative to reduce prejudice. A third group was offered no motivational instructions to reduce prejudice. The authors found that, ironically, those who read the controlling brochure later demonstrated more prejudice than those who had not been urged to reduce prejudice. Those who read the brochure designed to support personal motivation showed less prejudice than those in the other two groups.

In experiment two, participants were randomly assigned a questionnaire, designed to stimulate personal or controlling motivation to reduce prejudice. The authors found that those who were exposed to controlling messages regarding prejudice reduction showed significantly more prejudice than those who did not receive any controlling cues.

The authors suggest that when interventions eliminate people’s freedom to value diversity on their own terms, they may actually be creating hostility toward the targets of prejudice.

According to Dr. Legault, “Controlling prejudice reduction practices are tempting because they are quick and easy to implement. They tell people how they should think and behave and stress the negative consequences of failing to think and behave in desirable ways.” Legault continues, “But people need to feel that they are freely choosing to be nonprejudiced, rather than having it forced upon them.”

Legault stresses the need to focus less on the requirement to reduce prejudices and start focusing more on the reasons why diversity and equality are important and beneficial to both majority and minority group members.

Story Source:

The above story is reprinted from materials provided byAssociation for Psychological Science, via EurekAlert!, a service of AAAS.

A desigualdade social na Argentina (Luis Nassif)

Enviado por luisnassif, sex, 17/08/2012 – 14:17

Argentina demanda políticas públicas sociais unificadas que efetivem os direitos humanos

Por Maíra Vasconcelos, especial para o blog

O expressivo crescimento econômico experimentado pela Argentina, entre 2003 e 2007, passada a crise de 2001/2002, não representou em igual escala desenvolvimento social ao país. Ainda que indicadores socioeconômicos demonstrem algumas melhorias nos índices de pobreza e indigência, especialistas destacam a necessidade da construção de projetos de políticas públicas que unifiquem as demandas sociais e visem o cumprimento total dos direitos humanos.

Cerca de 33% das crianças e adolescentes na Argentina, menores de 18 anos, nos centros urbanos e rurais encontram-se na linha de pobreza, e 8,5% em estado de indigência. Respectivamente, ambos indicadores referentes a 2011, representam queda de 7,2% e 4,5% em relação a 2010. Os dados foram apresentados no último dia 14 de agosto, no informe “A Infância Argentina Sujeito de Direito”, do Observatório da Dívida Social Argentina (ODSA), na sede da Pontifícia Universidade Católica Argentina (UCA).

De acordo com a investigadora Laura Pautassi, membro do Conselho Nacional de Investigações Científicas e Técnicas (Conicet), e do Instituto de Investigações Jurídicas e Sociais A. Gioja, da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Buenos Aires (UBA), falta integração nas políticas sociais do Estado, para que o funcionamento em conjunto desses programas possa suprir as carências não só no que diz respeito ao ingresso econômico.

“Temos um conjunto de melhorias econômicas importantes, após a crise de 2001, mas as políticas públicas estão muito divididas. Uma para assalariados formais e outro tipo são as políticas assistenciais, onde há muitos projetos, alguns de transferência de ingresso, e outros mais globais como pode ser considerada a “Asignação Universal por Filho”, afirmou Pautassi.

O projeto “Asignação Universal por Filho” foi criado em 2009, durante o primeiro mandato da presidente Cristina Kirchner, hoje, em torno de 3,5 milhões de crianças e jovens são beneficiados.

Entre os resultados divulgados pelo ODSA, em relação à infância e adolescência, um destaque é o salto significativo no acesso à internet, que passou de 29,3%, em 2007, para 52,7%, em 2011, entre os adolescentes de13 a17 anos.

Por outro lado, a estrutura familiar marca sérios problemas como, por exemplo, as agressões físicas sofridas em casa saltaram de 31,6%, em 2007, para 36,4% em 2011, no total de aproximadamente 12,3 milhões de crianças e adolescentes.

Indicadores de Direitos Humanos

Instrumentalizar a medição da pobreza e indigência com indicadores não apenas socioeconômicos, mas que permitam visualizar os resultados do cumprimento dos direitos humanos na sociedade. Para combater e erradicar a pobreza e indigência na Argentina, investigadores afirmam que apenas a “visão monetária” limita a percepção das demandas para obtenção de ferramentas de trabalho que contribuam à formulação de exigências e propostas ao Estado.

Segundo a investigadora Laura Pautassi, recentemente a Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) aprovou um instrumento para controlar o cumprimento das obrigações, por parte das 16 nações que ratificaram o “Protocolo de São Salvador”. Assim, deverão ser desenvolvidos indicadores específicos, que não englobam apenas dados socioeconômicos, mas também permitem mesurar o cumprimento ou violação dos direitos humanos.

“Hoje podemos ver desigualdades que antes não eram medidas, a desigualdade étnica, socioeconômica, de gênero. Mas as variáveis consideradas para avaliar os direitos humanos são diferentes daquelas dispostas para medir índices socioeconômicos, pois o que avaliam é a efetiva execução dos direitos”, ressaltou Pautassi.

Climate change and the Syrian uprising (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

BY SHAHRZAD MOHTADI | 16 AUGUST 2012

Article Highlights

  • A drought unparalleled in recent Syrian history lasted from 2006 to 2010 and led to an unprecedented mass migration of 1.5 million people from farms to urban centers.
  • Because the Assad regime’s economic policies had largely ignored water issues and sustainable agriculture, the drought destroyed many farming communities and placed great strain on urban populations.
  • Although not the leading cause of the Syrian rebellion, the drought-induced migration from farm to city clearly contributed to the uprising and serves as a warning of the potential impact of climate change on political stability.

Two days short of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, Al Jazeera published anarticle, headlined “A Kingdom of Silence,” that contended an uprising was unlikely in Syria. The article cited the country’s “popular president, dreaded security forces, and religious diversity” as reasons that the regime of Bashar al-Assad would not be challenged, despite the chaos and leadership changes already wrought by the so-called Arab Spring. Less than one month later, security forces arrested a group of schoolchildren in the Syrian city of Dara’a, the country’s southern agricultural hub, for scrawling anti-government slogans on city walls. Subsequent protests illustrated the chasm between the regime’s public image — encapsulated in the slogan “Unity, Freedom and Socialism” — and a reality of widespread public disillusion with Assad and his economic policies.

Among the many historical, political, and economic factors contributing to the Syrian uprising, one has been devastating to Syria, yet remains largely unnoticed by the outside world. That factor is the complex and subtle, yet powerful role that climate change has played in affecting the stability and longevity of the state.

The land now encompassed by Syria is widely credited as being the place where humans first experimented with agriculture and cattle herding, some 12,000 years ago. Today, the World Bank predicts the area will experience alarming effects of climate change, with the annual precipitation level shifting toward a permanently drier condition, increasing the severity and frequency of drought.

From 1900 until 2005, there were six droughts of significance in Syria; the average monthly level of winter precipitation during these dry periods was approximately one-third of normal. All but one of these droughts lasted only one season; the exception lasted two. Farming communities were thus able to withstand dry periods by falling back on government subsidies and secondary water resources. This most recent, the seventh drought, however, lasted from 2006 to 2010, an astounding four seasons — a true anomaly in the past century. Furthermore, the average level of precipitation in these four years was the lowest of any drought-ridden period in the last century.

While impossible to deem one instance of drought as a direct result of anthropogenic climate change, a 2011 report from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration regarding this recent Syrian drought states: “Climate change from greenhouse gases explained roughly half the increased dryness of 1902-2010.” Martin Hoerling, the lead researcher of the study, explains: “The magnitude and frequency of the drying that has occurred is too great to be explained by natural variability alone. This is not encouraging news for a region that already experiences water stress, because it implies natural variability alone is unlikely to return the region’s climate to normal.” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that global warming will induce droughts even more severe in this region in the coming decades.

It is estimated that the Syrian drought has displaced more than 1.5 million people; entire families of agricultural workers and small-scale farmers moved from the country’s breadbasket region in the northeast to urban peripheries of the south. The drought tipped the scale of an unbalanced agricultural system that was already feeling the weight of policy mismanagement and unsustainable environmental practices. Further, lack of contingency planning contributed to the inability of the system to cope with the aftermath of the drought. Decades of poorly planned agricultural policies now haunt Syria’s al-Assad regime.

An unsustainable history. Hafez al-Assad — the father of the current president, Bashar al-Assad — ruled Syria for three decades in a fairly non-religious and paradoxical way. To some degree, he modernized the nation’s economy and opened it to the outside world; at the same time, his regime was infamous for repression and the murder of citizens. The elder al-Assad relied on support from the rural masses to maintain his authority, and during his rule, the agricultural sector became one of the most important pillars of the economy. In a 1980 address to the nation, he said: “I am first and last — and of this I hope every Syrian citizen and every Arab outside of Syria will take cognizance — a peasant and the son of a peasant. To lie amidst the spikes of grain or on the threshing floor is, in my eyes, worth all the palaces in the world.” Hafez al-Assad assured the Syrian people of their right to food security and economic stability, granting subsidies to reduce the price of food, oil, and water. The regime emphasized food self-sufficiency, first achieved with wheat in the 1980s. Cotton, a water-intensive crop requiring irrigation, was heavily promoted as a “strategic crop,” at one point becoming Syria’s second-largest export, after oil. As agricultural production swelled, little to no attention was paid to the environmental effects of such short-term, unsustainable agricultural goals.

With a steadfast emphasis on quick agricultural and industrial advancements, the Baathist regime did little to promote the sustainable use of water. In the two decades before the current drought, the state invested heavily in irrigation systems — yet they remain underdeveloped, extremely inefficient, and insufficient. The majority of irrigation systems use groundwater as their main source, because the amount of water from rivers is inadequate. As of 2005, the government began requiring licenses to dig agricultural wells. There are claims that the regime wishes to keep the Kurdish-majority region in the northeast of the country underdeveloped and has denied licenses to some farmers in the region. Whatever the reasons, well licenses are generally difficult to obtain; as a result, more than half the country’s wells are dug illegally and are therefore unregulated. Groundwater reserves PDF in the years leading up to the drought were rapidly depleted.

Unheeded warnings. In 2001, the World Bank warned PDF, “The (Syrian) Government will need to recognize that achieving food security with respect to wheat and other cereals in the short-term as well as the encouragement of water-intensive cotton appear to be undermining Syria’s security over the long-term by depleting available groundwater resources.” With energy and water heavily subsidized by the state, farmers were further encouraged to increase production rather than set sustainable goals.

The price of wheat skyrocketed in 2005, and an overconfident Syrian government sold much of its emergency wheat reserve. In 2008, due to the drought, the Syrian government was forced to concede that its policy of self-sufficiency had failed, and for the first time in two decades it began importing wheat. Meanwhile, nearly 90 percent of the barley crop failed, doubling the price of animal feed in the first year of the drought alone. Small livestock herders in the northeast have lost 70 percent and more of their herds, and many have been forced to migrate. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, one-fourth of the country’s herds were lost as a result of the drought.

In recent years, Assad’s promises of food security have vanished; the United Nationsreports that the diet of 80 percent of those severely affected by the drought now consists largely of bread and sugared tea. For those who have remained in the nearly deserted rural communities of Syria’s northeast, food prices have skyrocketed, and 80 percent of residents in the drought-stricken regions are living under the poverty threshold. In 2003, agriculture accounted for one-fourth of Syria’s gross domestic product; in 2008, a year into the drought, that fraction was just 17 percent. The government’s drought management has been reactive, untimely, poorly coordinated, and poorly targeted, according to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. PDF

The chaotic result. Since the drought began, temporary settlements composed largely of displaced rural people have formed on the outskirts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and Dara’a — the latter city being the site of the first significant protest in the country in March 2011. This migration has exacerbated economic strains already caused by nearly two million refugees from neighboring Iraq and Palestine. A confidential cable from the American embassy in Damascus to the US State Department, written shortly after the drought began, warned of the unraveling social and economic fabric of Syria’s rural farming communities due to the drought. It noted that the mass migration “could act as a multiplier on social and economic pressures already at play and undermine stability in Syria.” Reporting during the uprising in late 2011, the late New York Times correspondent Anthony Shadid recounts: “There’s that sense of corruption in the society itself, that the society itself is falling apart, being pulled apart; that the countryside is miserable; that there’s nothing being done to make lives better there.” Reports show that the earliest points of unrest were those that were most economically devastated by the drought and served as migratory settlement points.

“The regime’s failure to put in place economic measures to alleviate the effects of drought was a critical driver in propelling such massive mobilizations of dissent,” concludes Suzanne Saleeby, a contributor to Jadaliyya, a digital magazine produced by the Arab Studies Institute. “In these recent months, Syrian cities have served as junctures where the grievances of displaced rural migrants and disenfranchised urban residents meet and come to question the very nature and distribution of power.”

The considerations that impel an individual to protest in streets that are known to be lined by armed security forces extend beyond an abstract desire for democracy. Only a sense of extreme desperation and hopelessness can constitute the need — rather than a mere desire — to bring change to a country’s economic, political, and social systems. A combination of stress factors resulting from policies of economic liberalization — including growing income disparities and the geographic limitations of the economic reforms — shattered the Syrian regime’s projected image of stability. Even if it was not the leading cause of the Syrian rebellion, the drought and resulting migration played an important role in triggering the civil unrest now underway in Syria.

The drought in Syria is one of the first modern events in which a climactic anomaly resulted in mass migration and contributed to state instability. This is a lesson and a warning for the greater catalyst that climate change will become in a region already under the strains of cultural polarity, political repression, and economic inequity.

No Vale do Ribeira, Defensoria Pública defende comunidades tradicionais contra corrupção e mercado de carbono (Racismo Ambiental)

Por racismoambiental, 24/06/2012 11:45

Tania Pacheco*

“Posto diante de todos estes homens reunidos, de todas estas mulheres, de todas estas crianças (sede fecundos, multiplicai-vos e enchei a terra, assim lhes fora mandado), cujo suor não nascia do trabalho que não tinham, mas da agonia insuportável de não o ter, Deus arrependeu-se dos males que havia feito e permitido, a um ponto tal que, num arrebato de contrição, quis mudar o seu nome para um outro mais humano. Falando à multidão, anunciou: “A partir de hoje chamar-me-eis Justiça”. E a multidão respondeu-lhe: “Justiça, já nós a temos, e não nos atende”. Disse Deus: “Sendo assim, tomarei o nome de Direito”. E a multidão tornou a responder-lhe: “Direito, já nós o temos, e não nos conhece”. E Deus: “Nesse caso, ficarei com o nome de Caridade, que é um nome bonito”. Disse a multidão: “Não necessitamos de caridade, o que queremos é uma Justiça que se cumpra e um Direito que nos respeite”. José Saramago (Prefácio à obra Terra, de Sebastião Salgado).

O trecho acima foi retirado de uma peça jurídica. Um mandado de segurança com pedido de liminar impetrado no dia 6 de junho pelos Defensores Thiago de Luna Cury e Andrew Toshio Hayama, respectivamente da 2ª e da 3ª Defensorias Publicas de Registro, São Paulo, contra o Prefeito de Iporanga, região de Lageado, Vale do Ribeira. Seu objetivo: impedir que, seguindo uma prática que vem se tornando constante no estado, a autoridade municipal expulse comunidades tradicionais e desaproprie vastas extensões de terras, transformando-as em Parques Naturais a serem transacionados no mercado de carbono.

Para ganhar dinheiro a qualquer custo, não interessa investigar se nessas terras há comunidades tradicionais, quilombolas e camponeses. Não interessa se o Direito à Consulta Prévia e Informada estipulado pela Convenção 169 da OIT foi respeitado. Não interessa, inclusive, se, caso audiências públicas tivessem sido realizadas, as comunidades teriam condições de entender plenamente o que estava sendo proposto e decidir se seria de seu interesse abandonar seus territórios, suas tradições, suas gentes, uma vez que nesse tipo de unidade de conservação integral não pode haver moradores. Em parcerias com empresas e ONGs fajutas, o esquema é montado; de uma penada decretado; e o lucro é garantido e dividido entre os integrantes das quadrilhas.

Mas não foi bem assim que aconteceu em Iporanga. A Defensoria Pública agiu, e agiu pela Justiça e pelo Direito, de forma indignada, culta, forte, poética e, sempre, muito bem fundamentada nas leis. E coube ao Juiz Raphael Garcia Pinto, de Eldorado, São Paulo, reconhecê-lo em decisão do dia 11 de junho de 2012.

Este Blog defende intransigentemente a “democratização do sistema de Justiça”. E tanto no mandado como na decisão é um exemplo disso que temos presente: da prática da democracia pelos operadores do Direito. Por isso fazemos questão de socializá-los, não só como uma homenagem aos Defensores Thiago de Luna Cury e Andrew Toshio Hayama (e também ao Juiz Raphael Garcia Pinto), mas também como um exemplo a ser seguido Brasil afora, como forma de defender as comunidades e honrar a tod@s nós.

Para ver o mandado de segurança clique AQUI. Para ver a decisão clique AQUI. Boa leitura.

* Com informações enviadas por Luciana Zaffalon.

Rooting out Rumors, Epidemics, and Crime — With Math (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 10, 2012) — A team of EPFL scientists has developed an algorithm that can identify the source of an epidemic or information circulating within a network, a method that could also be used to help with criminal investigations.

Investigators are well aware of how difficult it is to trace an unlawful act to its source. The job was arguably easier with old, Mafia-style criminal organizations, as their hierarchical structures more or less resembled predictable family trees.

In the Internet age, however, the networks used by organized criminals have changed. Innumerable nodes and connections escalate the complexity of these networks, making it ever more difficult to root out the guilty party. EPFL researcher Pedro Pinto of the Audiovisual Communications Laboratory and his colleagues have developed an algorithm that could become a valuable ally for investigators, criminal or otherwise, as long as a network is involved. The team’s research was published August 10, 2012, in the journal Physical Review Letters.

Finding the source of a Facebook rumor

“Using our method, we can find the source of all kinds of things circulating in a network just by ‘listening’ to a limited number of members of that network,” explains Pinto. Suppose you come across a rumor about yourself that has spread on Facebook and been sent to 500 people — your friends, or even friends of your friends. How do you find the person who started the rumor? “By looking at the messages received by just 15-20 of your friends, and taking into account the time factor, our algorithm can trace the path of that information back and find the source,” Pinto adds. This method can also be used to identify the origin of a spam message or a computer virus using only a limited number of sensors within the network.

Trace the propagation of an epidemic

Out in the real world, the algorithm can be employed to find the primary source of an infectious disease, such as cholera. “We tested our method with data on an epidemic in South Africa provided by EPFL professor Andrea Rinaldo’s Ecohydrology Laboratory,” says Pinto. “By modeling water networks, river networks, and human transport networks, we were able to find the spot where the first cases of infection appeared by monitoring only a small fraction of the villages.”

The method would also be useful in responding to terrorist attacks, such as the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, in which poisonous gas released in the city’s subterranean tunnels killed 13 people and injured nearly 1,000 more. “Using this algorithm, it wouldn’t be necessary to equip every station with detectors. A sample would be sufficient to rapidly identify the origin of the attack, and action could be taken before it spreads too far,” says Pinto.

Identifying the brains behind a terrorist attack

Computer simulations of the telephone conversations that could have occurred during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were used to test Pinto’s system. “By reconstructing the message exchange inside the 9/11 terrorist network extracted from publicly released news, our system spit out the names of three potential suspects — one of whom was found to be the mastermind of the attacks, according to the official enquiry.”

The validity of this method thus has been proven a posteriori. But according to Pinto, it could also be used preventatively — for example, to understand an outbreak before it gets out of control. “By carefully selecting points in the network to test, we could more rapidly detect the spread of an epidemic,” he points out. It could also be a valuable tool for advertisers who use viral marketing strategies by leveraging the Internet and social networks to reach customers. For example, this algorithm would allow them to identify the specific Internet blogs that are the most influential for their target audience and to understand how in these articles spread throughout the online community.

How Computation Can Predict Group Conflict: Fighting Among Captive Pigtailed Macaques Provides Clues (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 13, 2012) — When conflict breaks out in social groups, individuals make strategic decisions about how to behave based on their understanding of alliances and feuds in the group.

Researchers studied fighting among captive pigtailed macaques for clues about behavior and group conflict. (Credit: iStockphoto/Natthaphong Phanthumchinda)

But it’s been challenging to quantify the underlying trends that dictate how individuals make predictions, given they may only have seen a small number of fights or have limited memory.

In a new study, scientists at the Wisconsin Institute for Discovery (WID) at UW-Madison develop a computational approach to determine whether individuals behave predictably. With data from previous fights, the team looked at how much memory individuals in the group would need to make predictions themselves. The analysis proposes a novel estimate of “cognitive burden,” or the minimal amount of information an organism needs to remember to make a prediction.

The research draws from a concept called “sparse coding,” or the brain’s tendency to use fewer visual details and a small number of neurons to stow an image or scene. Previous studies support the idea that neurons in the brain react to a few large details such as the lines, edges and orientations within images rather than many smaller details.

“So what you get is a model where you have to remember fewer things but you still get very high predictive power — that’s what we’re interested in,” says Bryan Daniels, a WID researcher who led the study. “What is the trade-off? What’s the minimum amount of ‘stuff’ an individual has to remember to make good inferences about future events?”

To find out, Daniels — along with WID co-authors Jessica Flack and David Krakauer — drew comparisons from how brains and computers encode information. The results contribute to ongoing discussions about conflict in biological systems and how cognitive organisms understand their environments.

The study, published in the Aug. 13 edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, examined observed bouts of natural fighting in a group of 84 captive pigtailed macaques at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center. By recording individuals’ involvement — or lack thereof — in fights, the group created models that mapped the likelihood any number of individuals would engage in conflict in hypothetical situations.

To confirm the predictive power of the models, the group plugged in other data from the monkey group that was not used to create the models. Then, researchers compared these simulations with what actually happened in the group. One model looked at conflict as combinations of pairs, while another represented fights as sparse combinations of clusters, which proved to be a better tool for predicting fights. From there, by removing information until predictions became worse, Daniels and colleagues calculated the amount of information each individual needed to remember to make the most informed decision whether to fight or flee.

“We know the monkeys are making predictions, but we don’t know how good they are,” says Daniels. “But given this data, we found that the most memory it would take to figure out the regularities is about 1,000 bits of information.”

Sparse coding appears to be a strong candidate for explaining the mechanism at play in the monkey group, but the team points out that it is only one possible way to encode conflict.

Because the statistical modeling and computation frameworks can be applied to different natural datasets, the research has the potential to influence other fields of study, including behavioral science, cognition, computation, game theory and machine learning. Such models might also be useful in studying collective behaviors in other complex systems, ranging from neurons to bird flocks.

Future research will seek to find out how individuals’ knowledge of alliances and feuds fine tunes their own decisions and changes the groups’ collective pattern of conflict.

The research was supported by the National Science Foundation, the John Templeton Foundation through the Santa Fe Institute, and UW-Madison.

Should Doctors Treat Lack of Exercise as a Medical Condition? Expert Says ‘Yes’ (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 13, 2012) — A sedentary lifestyle is a common cause of obesity, and excessive body weight and fat in turn are considered catalysts for diabetes, high blood pressure, joint damage and other serious health problems. But what if lack of exercise itself were treated as a medical condition? Mayo Clinic physiologist Michael Joyner, M.D., argues that it should be. His commentary is published this month in The Journal of Physiology.

Physical inactivity affects the health not only of many obese patients, but also people of normal weight, such as workers with desk jobs, patients immobilized for long periods after injuries or surgery, and women on extended bed rest during pregnancies, among others, Dr. Joyner says. Prolonged lack of exercise can cause the body to become deconditioned, with wide-ranging structural and metabolic changes: the heart rate may rise excessively during physical activity, bones and muscles atrophy, physical endurance wane, and blood volume decline.

When deconditioned people try to exercise, they may tire quickly and experience dizziness or other discomfort, then give up trying to exercise and find the problem gets worse rather than better.

“I would argue that physical inactivity is the root cause of many of the common problems that we have,” Dr. Joyner says. “If we were to medicalize it, we could then develop a way, just like we’ve done for addiction, cigarettes and other things, to give people treatments, and lifelong treatments, that focus on behavioral modifications and physical activity. And then we can take public health measures, like we did for smoking, drunken driving and other things, to limit physical inactivity and promote physical activity.”

Several chronic medical conditions are associated with poor capacity to exercise, including fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome and postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome, better known as POTS, a syndrome marked by an excessive heart rate and flu-like symptoms when standing or a given level of exercise. Too often, medication rather than progressive exercise is prescribed, Dr. Joyner says.

Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center researchers found that three months of exercise training can reverse or improve many POTS symptoms, Dr. Joyner notes. That study offers hope for such patients and shows that physicians should consider prescribing carefully monitored exercise before medication, he says.

If physical inactivity were treated as a medical condition itself rather than simply a cause or byproduct of other medical conditions, physicians may become more aware of the value of prescribing supported exercise, and more formal rehabilitation programs that include cognitive and behavioral therapy would develop, Dr. Joyner says.

For those who have been sedentary and are trying to get into exercise, Dr. Joyner advises doing it slowly and progressively.

“You just don’t jump right back into it and try to train for a marathon,” he says. “Start off with achievable goals and do it in small bites.”

There’s no need to join a gym or get a personal trainer: build as much activity as possible into daily life. Even walking just 10 minutes three times a day can go a long way toward working up to the 150 minutes a week of moderate physical activity the typical adult needs, Dr. Joyner says.

Why Are Elderly Duped? Area in Brain Where Doubt Arises Changes With Age (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 16, 2012) — Everyone knows the adage: “If something sounds too good to be true, then it probably is.” Why, then, do some people fall for scams and why are older folks especially prone to being duped?

An answer, it seems, is because a specific area of the brain has deteriorated or is damaged, according to researchers at the University of Iowa. By examining patients with various forms of brain damage, the researchers report they’ve pinpointed the precise location in the human brain, called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, that controls belief and doubt, and which explains why some of us are more gullible than others.

“The current study provides the first direct evidence beyond anecdotal reports that damage to the vmPFC (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) increases credulity. Indeed, this specific deficit may explain why highly intelligent vmPFC patients can fall victim to seemingly obvious fraud schemes,” the researchers wrote in the paper published in a special issue of the journal Frontiers in Neuroscience.

A study conducted for the National Institute of Justice in 2009 concluded that nearly 12 percent of Americans 60 and older had been exploited financially by a family member or a stranger. And, a report last year by insurer MetLife Inc. estimated the annual loss by victims of elder financial abuse at $2.9 billion.

The authors point out their research can explain why the elderly are vulnerable.

“In our theory, the more effortful process of disbelief (to items initially believed) is mediated by the vmPFC, which, in old age, tends to disproportionately lose structural integrity and associated functionality,” they wrote. “Thus, we suggest that vulnerability to misleading information, outright deception and fraud in older adults is the specific result of a deficit in the doubt process that is mediated by the vmPFC.”

The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is an oval-shaped lobe about the size of a softball lodged in the front of the human head, right above the eyes. It’s part of a larger area known to scientists since the extraordinary case of Phineas Gage that controls a range of emotions and behaviors, from impulsivity to poor planning. But brain scientists have struggled to identify which regions of the prefrontal cortex govern specific emotions and behaviors, including the cognitive seesaw between belief and doubt.

The UI team drew from its Neurological Patient Registry, which was established in 1982 and has more than 500 active members with various forms of damage to one or more regions in the brain. From that pool, the researchers chose 18 patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 21 patients with damage outside the prefrontal cortex. Those patients, along with people with no brain damage, were shown advertisements mimicking ones flagged as misleading by the Federal Trade Commission to test how much they believed or doubted the ads. The deception in the ads was subtle; for example, an ad for “Legacy Luggage” that trumpets the gear as “American Quality” turned on the consumer’s ability to distinguish whether the luggage was manufactured in the United States versus inspected in the country.

Each participant was asked to gauge how much he or she believed the deceptive ad and how likely he or she would buy the item if it were available. The researchers found that the patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex were roughly twice as likely to believe a given ad, even when given disclaimer information pointing out it was misleading. And, they were more likely to buy the item, regardless of whether misleading information had been corrected.

“Behaviorally, they fail the test to the greatest extent,” says Natalie Denburg, assistant professor in neurology who devised the ad tests. “They believe the ads the most, and they demonstrate the highest purchase intention. Taken together, it makes them the most vulnerable to being deceived.” She added the sample size is small and further studies are warranted.

Apart from being damaged, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex begins to deteriorate as people reach age 60 and older, although the onset and the pace of deterioration varies, says Daniel Tranel, neurology and psychology professor at the UI and corresponding author on the paper. He thinks the finding will enable doctors, caregivers, and relatives to be more understanding of decision making by the elderly.

“And maybe protective,” Tranel adds. “Instead of saying, ‘How would you do something silly and transparently stupid,’ people may have a better appreciation of the fact that older people have lost the biological mechanism that allows them to see the disadvantageous nature of their decisions.”

The finding corroborates an idea studied by the paper’s first author, Erik Asp, who wondered why damage to the prefrontal cortex would impair the ability to doubt but not the initial belief as well. Asp created a model, which he called the False Tagging Theory, to separate the two notions and confirm that doubt is housed in the prefrontal cortex.

“This study is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the False Tagging Theory is correct,” says Asp, who earned his doctorate in neuroscience from the UI in May and is now at the University of Chicago.

Kenneth Manzel, Bryan Koestner, and Catherine Cole from the UI are contributing authors on the paper. The National Institute on Aging and the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke funded the research.

Psychopaths Get a Break from Biology: Judges Reduce Sentences If Genetics, Neurobiology Are Blamed (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 16, 2012) — A University of Utah survey of judges in 19 states found that if a convicted criminal is a psychopath, judges consider it an aggravating factor in sentencing, but if judges also hear biological explanations for the disorder, they reduce the sentence by about a year on average.

The new study, published in the Aug. 17, 2012, issue of the journalScience, illustrates the “double-edged sword” faced by judges when they are given a “biomechanical” explanation for a criminal’s mental disorder:

If a criminal’s behavior has a biological basis, is that reason to reduce the sentence because defective genes or brain function leave the criminal with less self-control and ability to tell right from wrong? Or is it reason for a harsher sentence because the criminal likely will reoffend?

“In a nationwide sample of judges, we found that expert testimony concerning the biological causes of psychopathy significantly reduced sentencing of the psychopath” from almost 14 years to less than 13 years, says study coauthor James Tabery, an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Utah.

However, the hypothetical psychopath in the study got a longer sentence than the average nine-year sentence judges usually impose for the same crime — aggravated battery — and there were state-to-state differences in whether judges reduced or increased the sentence when given information on the biological causes of psychopathy.

The study was conducted by Tabery; Lisa Aspinwall, a University of Utah associate professor of psychology; and Teneille Brown, an associate professor at the university’s S.J. Quinney College of Law.

The researchers say that so far as they know, their study — funded by a University of Utah grant to promote interdisciplinary research — is the first to examine the effect of the biological causes of criminal behavior on real judges’ reasoning during sentencing.

Biological Explanation of Psychopathy Helps Defendant

The anonymous online survey — distributed with the help of 19 of 50 state court administrators who were approached — involved 181 participating judges reading a scenario, based on a real Georgia case, about a psychopath convicted of aggravated battery for savagely beating a store clerk with a gun during a robbery attempt.

The judges then answered a series of questions, including whether they consider scientific evidence of psychopathy to be an aggravating or mitigating factor that would increase or decrease the sentence, respectively, and what sentence they would impose. They were told psychopathy is incurable and treatment isn’t now an option.

While psychopathy isn’t yet a formal diagnosis in the manual used by psychiatrists, it soon may be added as a category of antisocial personality disorder, Tabery says. The study cited an expert definition of psychopathy as “a clinical diagnosis defined by impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt or remorse; pathological lying; manipulation; superficial charm; and the persistent violation of social norms and expectations.”

The researchers recruited 207 state trial court judges for the study. Six dropped out. Twenty others were excluded because they incorrectly identified the defendant’s diagnosis. That left 181 judges who correctly identified the defendant as a psychopath, including 164 who gave complete data on their sentencing decisions.

The judges were randomly divided into four groups. All the judges read scientific evidence that the convicted criminal was a psychopath and what that means, but only half were given evidence about the genetic and neurobiological causes of the condition. Half the judges in each group got the scientific evidence from the defense, which argued it should mitigate or reduce the sentence, and half the judges got the evidence from the prosecution, which argued it should aggravate or increase the sentence.

Judges who were given a biological explanation for the convict’s psychopathy imposed sentences averaging 12.83 years, or about a year less than the 13.93-year average sentence imposed by judges who were told only that the defendant was a psychopath, but didn’t receive a biological explanation for the condition. In both cases, however, sentencing for the psychopath was longer than the judges’ normal nine-year average sentence for aggravated battery.

Even though the year reduction in sentence may not seem like much, “we were amazed the sentence was reduced at all given that we’re dealing with psychopaths, who are very unsympathetic,” Brown says.

Aspinwall notes: “The judges did not let the defendant off, they just reduced the sentence and showed major changes in the quality of their reasoning.”

The study found that although 87 percent of the judges listed at least one aggravating factor in explaining their decision, when the judges heard evidence about the biomechanical causes of psychopathy from the defense, the proportion of judges who also listed mitigating factors rose from about 30 percent to 66 percent.

Psychopathy was seen as an aggravating factor no matter which side presented the evidence, but it was viewed by the judges as less aggravating when presented by the defense than when presented by the prosecution.

A Disconnect between Sentencing and Criminal Responsibility

One surprising and paradoxical finding of the study was that even though the judges tended to reduce the sentence when given a biological explanation for the defendant’s psychopathy, the judges — when asked explicitly — did not rate the defendant as having less free will or as being less legally or morally responsible for the crime.

“The thought is that responsibility and punishment go hand in hand, so if we see reduced punishment, we would expect to see the judges feel the defendants are less responsible,” Tabery says. “So it is surprising that we got the former, not the latter.”

The researchers also counted explicit mentions by the judges of balancing or weighing factors that increase or reduce sentencing. When evidence of a biological cause of the defendant’s psychopathy was presented by the defense, the judges were about 2.5 times more likely to mention weighing aggravating and mitigating factors than when it was presented by the prosecution or when no biological evidence was presented.

The data show that “the introduction of expert testimony concerning a biological mechanism for psychopathy significantly increased the number of judges invoking mitigating factors in their reasoning and balancing them with aggravating factors,” the researchers conclude. “These findings suggest that the biomechanism did invoke such concepts as reduced culpability due to lack of impulse control, even if these concepts did not affect the ratings of free will and responsibility.”

Brown adds: “In the coming years, we are likely to find out about all kinds of biological causes of criminal behavior, so the question is, why does the law care if most behavior is biologically caused? That’s what is so striking about finding these results in psychopaths, because we’re likely to see an even sharper reduction in sentencing of defendants with a more sympathetic diagnosis, such as mental retardation.”

State Variations in Sentencing

While the overall results showed a reduction in sentencing when judges read biological evidence about the cause of psychopathy, the reduction was greater in some of the 19 states surveyed and nonexistent in others. That is not surprising due to variations in sentencing guidelines, rules of evidence and the extent of judges’ discretion.

There were too few responses from eight states to analyze them individually. In three states — Colorado, New York and Tennessee — biological evidence of psychopathy actually increased the sentence, although the findings weren’t statistically significant.

In eight other states — Alabama, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Washington state — biological evidence of psychopathy reduced the sentence or had no effect, and the reduction was statistically significant in two of those states: Utah and Maryland. When just those eight states were examined, the defendant received an average sentence of 10.7 years if evidence was introduced that psychopathy has a biological cause, versus 13.9 years without such evidence.

“We saw sentencing go up in a few states and down in most, and that’s just evidence that it [the double-edge sword] could cut either way,” Brown says.

Aspinwall adds: “When you look at the reasons the judges provide, what is striking to us is the vast majority found the psychopathy diagnosis to be aggravating and, with the presentation of the biological mechanism, also mitigating. So both things are happening.”

In the Name of the Future, Rio Is Destroying Its Past (N.Y.Times)

OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS

By THERESA WILLIAMSON and MAURÍCIO HORA

Published: August 12, 2012

THE London Olympics concluded Sunday, but the battle over the next games has just begun in Rio, where protests against illegal evictions of some of the city’s poorest residents are spreading. Indeed, the Rio Olympics are poised to increase inequality in a city already famous for it.

Last month, Unesco awarded World Heritage Site status to a substantial portion of the city, an area that includes some of its hillside favelas, where more than 1.4 million of the city’s 6 million residents live. No favela can claim greater historical importance than Rio’s first — Morro da Providência — yet Olympic construction projects are threatening its future.

Providência was formed in 1897 when veterans of the bloody Canudos war in Brazil’s northeast were promised land in Rio de Janeiro, which was then the federal capital. Upon arriving, they found no such land available. After squatting in front of the Ministry of War, the soldiers were moved to a nearby hill belonging to a colonel, though they were given no title to the land. Originally named “Morro da Favela” after the spiny favela plant typical of the Canudos hills where soldiers had spent many nights, Providência grew during the early 20th century as freed slaves joined the soldiers. New European migrants came as well, as it was the only affordable way to live near work in the city’s center and port.

Overlooking the site where hundreds of thousands of African slaves first entered Brazil, Providência is part of one of the most important cultural sites in Afro-Brazilian history, where the first commercial sambas were composed, traditions like capoeira and candomblé flourished and Rio’s Quilombo Pedra do Sal was founded. Today 60 percent of its residents are Afro-Brazilian.

Over a century after its creation, Providência still bears the cultural and physical imprint of its initial residents. But now it is threatened with destruction in the name of Olympic improvements: almost a third of the community is to be razed, a move that will inevitably destabilize what’s left of it.

By mid-2013 Providência will have received 131 million reais ($65 million) in investments under a private-sector-led plan to redevelop Rio’s port area, including a cable car, funicular tram and wider roads. Previous municipal interventions to upgrade the community recognized its historical importance, but today’s projects have no such intent.

Although the city claims that investments will benefit residents, 30 percent of the community’s population has already been marked for removal and the only “public meetings” held were to warn residents of their fate. Homes are spray-painted during the day with the initials for the municipal housing secretary and an identifying number. Residents return from work to learn that their homes will be demolished, with no warning of what’s to come, or when.

A quick walk through the community reveals the appalling state of uncertainty residents are living in: at the very top of the hill, some 70 percent of homes are marked for eviction — an area supposedly set to benefit from the transportation investments being made. But the luxury cable car will transport 1,000 to 3,000 people per hour during the Olympics. It’s not residents who will benefit, but investors.

Residents of Providência are fearful. Only 36 percent of them hold documentation of their land rights, compared with 70 percent to 95 percent in other favelas. More than in other poor neighborhoods, residents are particularly unaware of their rights and terrified of losing their homes. Combine this with the city’s “divide and conquer” approach — in which residents are confronted individually to sign up for relocation, and no communitywide negotiations are permitted — and resistance is effectively squelched.

Pressure from human rights groups and the international news media has helped. But brutal evictions continue as well as new, subtler forms of removal. As part of the city’s port revitalization plan, authorities declared the “relocations” to be in the interest of residents because they live in “risky areas” where landslides might occur and because “de-densification” is required to improve quality of life.

But there is little evidence of landslide risk or dangerous overcrowding; 98 percent of Providência’s homes are made of sturdy brick and concrete and 90 percent have more than three rooms. Moreover, an important report by local engineers showed that the risk factors announced by the city were inadequately studied and inaccurate.

If Rio succeeds in disfiguring and dismantling its most historic favela, the path will be open to further destruction throughout the city’s hundreds of others. The economic, social and psychological impacts of evictions are dire: families moved into isolated units where they lose access to the enormous economic and social benefits of community cooperation, proximity to work and existing social networks — not to mention generations’ worth of investments made in their homes.

Rio is becoming a playground for the rich, and inequality breeds instability. It would be much more cost-effective to invest in urban improvements that communities help shape through a participatory democratic process. This would ultimately strengthen Rio’s economy and improve its infrastructure while also reducing inequality and empowering the city’s still marginalized Afro-Brazilian population.

Theresa Williamson, the publisher of RioOnWatch.org, founded Catalytic Communities, an advocacy group for favelas. Maurício Hora, a photographer, runs the Favelarte program in the Providência favela.

*   *   *

APRIL 2, 2012

Are the Olympics More Trouble Than They’re Worth?

ProtestingToby Melville/Reuters

Winning a bid to host the Olympics is just the beginning. As London prepares for the 2012 Games this summer, residents have plenty of doubts: Will it be too expensive? Will it disrupt life too much? In the end, will they be better off because of the Games, or just saddled with public debt and a velodrome no one knows what to do with?

What about Rio de Janeiro: Will it come out ahead, after having hosted the Pan American Games in 2007, the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016?

READ THE DISCUSSION »

DEBATERS

Neil Jameson

The Games Help Londoners

NEIL JAMESON, LEAD ORGANIZER, LONDON CITIZENS

This is the world’s first “Living Wage Olympics,” and East London residents will reap the rewards.

Julian Cheyne

The Games Hurt Londoners

JULIAN CHEYNE, EVICTED RESIDENT, EAST LONDON

The Olympics are an expensive distraction that sets dangerous precedents, coddling the elite and trampling the poor.

Theresa Williamson

A Missed Opportunity in Rio

THERESA WILLIAMSON, FOUNDER, CATALYTIC COMMUNITIES

In preparing for the World Cup and the Olympics, Rio could make long-term investments and integrate the favelas. Instead it is aggravating its problems.

Bruno Reis

Brazil Can Come Out Ahead

BRUNO REIS, RISK ANALYST IN BRAZIL

These Games represent a golden opportunity, but will Rio de Janeiro repeat the success of Barcelona or the failure of Athens?

Andrew Zimbalist

Venues as an Asset or an Albatross

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, ECONOMIST, SMITH COLLEGE

Olympics planning takes place in a frenzied atmosphere — not optimal conditions for contemplating the future shape of an urban landscape.

Mitchell L. Moss

New York Is Lucky Not to Have the Games

MITCHELL L. MOSS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

London will be a morass this summer. Meanwhile, there has never been a better time to visit New York City.

Anunciado no Facebook, tênis da Adidas é considerado “racista” (Revista Cult)

Com correntes de borracha, calçado teve a venda suspensa

Junho 2012

No mês de junho, a fabricante de materiais esportivos Adidas anunciou em sua página do Facebook o lançamento de um novo tênis na linha outono-inverno 2012, segundo informou o jornal “Le Monde”. Desenhado pelo estilista Jeremy Scott Roundhouse, o calçado traz pulseiras de borracha simulando correntes, que muitos internautas viram como uma referência à escravidão.

Segundo a CNN, a empresa rapidamente removeu a postagem na página do Facebook, mas o assunto já havia rodado o globo gerando revolta entre internautas.

“Aparentemente não havia pessoas de cor no departamento de marketing que o aprovou”, brinca Rodwell em comentário no site “Nice Kicks”, portal destinado aos lançamentos de tênis.

A empresa, inicialmente, defendeu o designer, descrevendo seu estilo como “original” e alegre, mas o fabricante alemão emitiu um comunicado onde pede desculpas aos ofendidos com o caso e afirma que o modelo não será comercializado.

Para antropóloga, governo joga entre a inclusão e o trator (Folha de S.Paulo)

12/08/2012 – 08h00

ELEONORA DE LUCENA
DE SÃO PAULO

“Um governo em que a mão direita e a mão esquerda não parecem pertencer a um mesmo corpo”. Assim a antropóloga Manuela Carneiro da Cunha define o governo Dilma Rousseff: a gestão tem uma “face boa”, que promove inclusão social, e outra “desenvolvimentista”, que “não se importa em atropelar direitos fundamentais e convenções internacionais”.

Pioneira na discussão contemporânea da questão indígena e liderança no debate ambiental, Manuela, 69, acha o novo Código Florestal “um tiro no pé”: “A proteção ambiental é crucial para a sustentabilidade do agronegócio”.

Retrato da antropologa e professora na Univesidade de Chicago Manuela Carneiro da CunhaRetrato da antropologa e professora na Univesidade de Chicago Manuela Carneiro da Cunha. Leticia Moreira – 20.out.09/Folhapress

 

A professora emérita da Universidade de Chicago está relançando seu clássico de 1985, “Negros, Estrangeiros: Os Escravos Libertos e Sua Volta à África” [Companhia das Letras, 272 págs., R$ 49], sobre escravidão e liberdade no Atlântico Sul.

Nesta entrevista, concedida por e-mail, ela constata vestígios de realidade escravocrata no Brasil de hoje: “Olhe com atenção cenas de rua. São muitas as que parecem saídas de fotografias dos anos 1870 ou até de aquarelas de Debret, da década de 1820”.

Folha – Como a sra. avalia o desempenho do governo Dilma?

Manuela C. da Cunha – Há pelo menos duas faces no governo Dilma que não são simplesmente resultado de composições políticas. Há a face boa, que promove uma política de inclusão social e de diminuição das desigualdades. E há uma face desenvolvimentista, um trator que não se importa em atropelar direitos fundamentais e convenções internacionais.

Exemplos disso são a portaria nº 303, de 16/7, da Advocacia Geral da União, sobre terras indígenas, que tenta tornar fato consumado matéria que ainda está em discussão no Supremo Tribunal Federal, além de outras iniciativas recentes do Executivo, como a redução de áreas de unidades de conservação para viabilizar hidrelétricas.

Somam-se a essas duas faces do Executivo as concessões absurdas, destinadas a garantir a sua base parlamentar.

O resultado é um governo em que a mão direita e a mão esquerda não parecem pertencer a um mesmo corpo. Corre, por exemplo, o boato de que a senadora Kátia Abreu (PSD-TO), que chefia a bancada ruralista, poderia ser promovida a ministra da Agricultura!

Quem está vencendo o embate entre o agronegócio e os que defendem a preservação ambiental?

Ninguém venceu: com o novo Código Florestal, todos perdem, inclusive os que se entendem como vencedores. O Brasil perdeu.

Agrônomos, biólogos e climatólogos de grande reputação foram solicitados pela SBPC e pela Academia Brasileira de Ciências a se pronunciarem sobre o novo Código. Esse grupo, do qual tive a honra de ser uma escrevinhadora, publicou análises e documentos ao longo dos dois anos que durou o processo de discussão no Legislativo. As recomendações fundamentais do mais importante colegiado de cientistas reunidos para examinar as implicações do Código Florestal não foram acatadas.

Como declarou Ricardo Ribeiro Rodrigues, professor titular da Esalq (Escola Superior de Agricultura Luiz de Queiroz), o Brasil perdeu a oportunidade de mostrar ao mundo que é possível conciliar crescimento da produção de alimentos com sustentabilidade ambiental. Para aumentar a produção, não é preciso mais espaço, e sim maior produtividade.

Foi com ganhos de produtividade que a agricultura cresceu nas últimas décadas. Diminuir a proteção ambiental, como faz o novo Código Florestal, é miopia, é dar um tiro no pé e privar as gerações futuras do que as gerações passadas nos legaram. Pois a proteção ambiental é crucial para a sustentabilidade do agronegócio.

É constrangedor ainda que, para favorecer a miopia dos setores mais atrasados do agronegócio, se tenha usado uma retórica de proteção à agricultura familiar. O que se isentou de reposição de reserva legal no novo Código não foi exclusivamente a agricultura familiar e sim um universo muito maior, a saber quaisquer proprietários de até quatro módulos fiscais.

A agricultura familiar está sendo na realidade diretamente prejudicada pela brutal redução que vinha sendo feita das matas ciliares. No Nordeste e no Norte de Minas, vários rios secaram. Com o antigo Código, ainda se tinha amparo da lei para protestar. Hoje, o fato consumado tornou-se legal. Isso se chama desregulamentação.

Por que o movimento de intelectuais não conseguiu êxito?

O movimento “A Floresta Faz a Diferença” não pode ser caracterizado como um movimento de intelectuais. Não só 200 entidades da sociedade civil se uniram no protesto, mas a população em geral se manifestou maciçamente.

Lembro que duas cartas de protesto, no final de 2011, somaram mais de 2 milhões de assinaturas. Já na pesquisa de opinião do Datafolha, realizada entre 3 e 7 de junho de 2011, em ambiente urbano e rural, 85% se manifestaram contra a desregulamentação que é o novo Código Florestal. E prometeram se lembrar nas urnas do desempenho dos parlamentares.

E o pior foi que congressistas de partidos que se dizem de esquerda, dos quais se esperava outro comportamento, tiveram atuação particularmente lamentável. Faltou uma sintonia entre o Congresso e o povo: cada vez mais os políticos não prestam contas a seus eleitores e à opinião pública.

Há quem aponte interesses externos no discurso da preservação de áreas ambientais e de reservas. Qual sua visão?

A acusação de que ambientalistas e defensores de direitos humanos servem interesses externos é primária, além de velhíssima: teve largo uso desde a ditadura e na Constituinte. Sai do armário quando não há bons argumentos.

Como a questão indígena está sendo tratada? Como devia ser tratada?

Hoje a questão indígena está sob fogo cerrado. Muitos parlamentares estão tentando solapar os direitos indígenas consagrados na Constituição de 1988. Querem, por exemplo, permitir mineração em áreas indígenas e decidir sobre demarcações. E a recente investida da Advocacia Geral da União de que já falei levanta dúvidas sobre as disposições do Poder Executivo.

Em “Negros, Estrangeiros” a sra. afirma: “Tentou-se controlar a passagem da escravidão à liberdade com o projeto de ver formada uma classe de libertos dependentes. Formas de sujeição ideológica, em que o paternalismo desempenhou um papel essencial, e formas de coerção política foram postas em uso”. Essa realidade persiste?

Comento no livro que um dos mecanismos do projeto de criar uma classe de libertos dependentes foi a separação mantida até 1872 entre o direito costumeiro e o direito positivo. Alforriarem-se escravos que oferecessem seu valor em dinheiro era um costume, mas não era um direito, contrariamente ao que se apregoou.

A alforria, mesmo paga, era sempre considerada como uma concessão do senhor, e implicava um dever de gratidão para o liberto: tanto assim que, desta vez por lei, podia ser revogada se o liberto se mostrasse ingrato. Hoje a lei avançou e o conhecimento das leis também. A dependência não é mais a mesma. Mas o clientelismo, do qual o paternalismo é uma forma até mais simpática, não desapareceu. As ligações e lealdades pessoais, a proteção, as conivências são flagrantes na esfera política.

Mas você me pergunta de vestígios da realidade escravocrata no Brasil. Olhe com atenção cenas de rua. São muitas as que parecem saídas de fotografias dos anos 1870 ou até de aquarelas de [Jean-Baptiste] Debret, da década de 1820. As babás escravas cujos retratos aparecem no livro são muito parecidas com as que, mais malvestidas e todas de branco, levam as crianças aos parques no Rio de Janeiro. Os carregadores de ontem e de hoje pouco diferem…

Como a sra. explica a escravidão moderna? Por que ela persiste?

A escravidão moderna, nisso semelhante à escravidão legal que desapareceu, é uma das múltiplas formas de uma questão sempre atual, a do fornecimento e do controle de mão de obra.

Trabalhadores em regime análogo à escravidão em fazendas; em São Paulo, imigrantes bolivianos e paraguaios enfrentam condições desumanas em confecções. Qual relação há entre essa realidade e a história brasileira de escravidão?

As formas contemporâneas de opressão de trabalhadores, sobretudo urbanos, não são específicas ao Brasil: por toda parte, elas afligem populações de migrantes sem documentos, que, mantidos na ilegalidade e sempre sujeitos a serem expulsos, não conseguem se defender das condições degradantes. A propalada globalização permitiu livre trânsito a mercadorias e capitais, mas não se estendeu (a não ser no âmbito da União Europeia) às pessoas.

No campo, os regimes análogos à escravidão usam a força para restringir a liberdade, e não a chantagem, já que em geral se trata de brasileiros recrutados em outros Estados que, teoricamente, poderiam recorrer às autoridades. Mas o isolamento físico e a distância dos seus lugares de origem permitem que impunemente se use a força contra eles.

Punishing Youth (counterpunch.org)

AUGUST 09, 2012

Saturated Violence in the Era of Casino Capitalism

by HENRY GIROUX

There is by now an overwhelming catalogue of evidence revealing the depth and breadth of the state sponsored assault being waged against young people across the globe, and especially in the United States. What is no longer a hidden order of politics is that American  society is at war with its children, and that the use of such violence against young people is a disturbing index of a society in the midst of a deep moral and political crisis.  Beyond exposing the moral depravity of a nation that fails to protect its youth, the violence used against American youth speaks to nothing less than a perverse death-wish, especially in light of the fact that As Alain Badiou argues, we live in an era in which there is zero tolerance for poor minority youth and youthful protesters and “infinite tolerance for the crimes of bankers and government embezzlers which affect the lives of millions.”  While the systemic nature of the assault on young people and its testimony to the rise of the neoliberal punishing state has been largely ignored by the mainstream media, youth in Canada and the United States are resisting the violence of what might be called neoliberalism or casino capitalism.  For instance, the Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Quebec Protest Movement are demonstrating against such assaults while simultaneously attempting to educate a larger public about the degree to which American and Canadian public spheres, institutions, and values have been hijacked by a culture of spectacular and unrelenting violence—largely directed against youthful protesters and those marginalized by class and race, who increasingly have become the targets of ruthless forms of state-sanctioned punishment.

Put into historical context, we can see that collective insurance policies and social protections in the United States, in particular, have over time given way to the forces of economic privatization, commodification, deregulation, and hyper individualism now driving the ongoing assault on democratic public spheres, public goods, and any viable notion of equality and social justice. At least since the 1980s, the American public has witnessed the transformation of the welfare state by punitive workfare programs, the privatization of public goods and spaces, and a hollow appeal to individual responsibility and self-interest as a substitute for civic responsibility and democratic engagement. Embracing the notion that market-driven values and relations should shape every domain of human life, a business-centered model of governance has eviscerated any viable notion of the public values and interests, while insidiously criminalizing social problems and cutting back on basic social services, especially for young people, the poor, minorities, immigrants, and the elderly. As young people and others organize to protest economic injustice and massive inequality, along with drastic cuts to education, workers benefits and pensions, and public services, the state has responded with the use of  injurious violence, while the mainstream media has issued insults rather than informed dialogue, critical engagement, and suggestions for meaningful reform. Indeed, it appears the United States has entered a new historical era when policy decisions not only translate into an intentional, systemic disinvestment in public institutions and the breakdown of those public spheres that traditionally provided the minimal conditions for social justice and democratic expression, but are also merging with state-sanctioned violence and the use of mass force against the state’s own citizenry. I am not referring to the violence now sweeping the United States in the form of the lone, crazed gunman shooting innocent victims in colleges, malls, and movie theaters. As horrifying as this violence is, it does not fully equate with the systemic violence now waged by the state on both the domestic and foreign fronts.

On the domestic front, state violence in response to the Occupy movement in its first six months has been decisive and swift: “There have been at least 6705 arrests in over 112 different cities as of March 6, 2012.”  Similarly, in Montreal, Canada thousands of peaceful protests have been arrested while protesting tuition increases, increasing debt burdens, and other assaults on young people and the social state. What does it mean as young people make diverse claims on the promise of a radical democracy and articulate their vision of a fair and just world that they are increasingly met with forms of physical, ideological, and structural violence? Abandoned by the existing political system, young people are placing their bodies on the line, occupying shrinking public spaces in a symbolic gesture that also deploys concrete measures demanding their presence be recognized when their voices are no longer being heard. They have, for the most part, protested peacefully while trying to produce a new language, political culture, public institutions, and a “community that manifests the values of equality and mutual respect that they see missing in a world that is structured by neoliberal principles.”  Young people are organizing in opposition to the structural violence of the state while also attempting to reclaim the discourse of the common good, social justice, and economic equality. Rejecting the notion that democracy and markets are the same or that capitalism is the only ideological and economic system that can speak in the name of democracy, youth movements are calling for an end to poverty, the suppression of dissent, the permanent warfare state, and the corporate control of the commanding institutions of politics and culture.

Many of us have been inspired by the hope for a better future that these young people represent for the nation as a whole. Yet, of utmost concern is the backlash the protesters have faced for exercising their democratic rights. Surely, what must be addressed by anyone with a stake in safeguarding what little remains of U.S. democracy is the immediate threat that an emerging police state poses not just to the young protesters occupying a number of North American cities but to the promise of a real democracy. This threat to the possibility of a democratic social order only increases with the ascendancy of a war-like mentality and neoliberal modes of discipline and education which make it that much more difficult to imagine, let alone enact, communal obligation, social responsibility, and civic engagement.  Unless the actions of young protesters, however diverse they may be, are understood as a robust form of civic courage commensurate with a vital democracy, it will be difficult for the American public to resist an increase in state violence and the framing of protests, dissent, and civic responsibility as un-American or, even worse, a species of criminal behavior.

Stuart Hall suggests that the current historical moment, or what he calls the “long march of the Neoliberal Revolution,” has to be understood in terms of the varied forms of violence that it deploys and reinforces. Such anti-democratic pressures and their provocation of the protests of young people in the United States and abroad have deepened an escalating crisis symptomatic of what Alex Honneth has termed the “failed sociality” characteristic of neoliberal states. In turn, state and corporate media-fueled perceptions of such a crisis have been used to stimulate fear and justify the creeping expansion of a militarized and armed state as the enforcer of neoliberal policies amid growing public dissent. Police violence against young people must therefore be situated within a broader set of categories that enables a critical understanding of the underlying social, economic, and political forces at work in such assaults. That is, in order to adequately address state-sponsored violence against young people, one should consider the larger context of the devolution of the social state and the corresponding rise of the warfare state. The notion of historical conjuncture—or a parallel set of forces coalescing at one moment in time—is important here because it provides both an opening into the factors shaping a particular historical moment and it allows for a merging of theory and strategy in our understanding of the conditions with which we are now faced. In this case, it helps us to address theoretically how youth protests are largely related to a historically specific neoliberal project that promotes vast inequalities in income and wealth, creates the student loan debt bomb, eliminates much needed social programs, eviscerates the social wage, and privileges profits and commodities over people.

Within the United States and Canada, the often violent response to non-violent forms of youth protest must also be analyzed within the framework of a mammoth military-industrial state and its commitment to extending violence and war through the entire society. As the late philosopher Tony Judt put it, “The United States is becoming not just a militarized state but a military society:  a country where armed power is the measure of national greatness, and war, or planning for war, is the exemplary (and only) common project.”  The blending of the military-industrial complex with state interests and unbridled corporate power points to the need for strategies that address what is specific about the current neoliberal project and  how different modes of power, social relations, public pedagogies, and economic configurations come together to shape its politics. Such considerations provide theoretical openings for making the practices of the warfare state and the neoliberal revolution visible in order “to give the resistance to its onward march, content, and focus, a cutting edge.” It also points to the conceptual value of making clear that history remains an open horizon that cannot be dismissed through appeals to the end of history or end of ideology.  It is precisely through the indeterminate nature of history that resistance becomes possible.

While there is always hope because a democratic political project refuses any guarantees, most Americans today are driven by shared fears, stoked to a great extent by media-induced hysteria. Corporations stand ready to supply a culture of fear with security and surveillance technologies that, far from providing greater public safety, do little more than ensure the ongoing militarization of the entire society, including the popular media and the cultural apparatuses that shape everyday life. Images abound in the mainstream media of such abuses. There is the now famous image of an 84-year-old woman looking straight into a camera after attending a protest rally, her face drenched in a liquid spray used by the police. There is the image of the 19-year-old pregnant woman being carried to safety after being pepper-sprayed by the police. There are the now all-too-familiar images of young people being dragged by their hair across a street to a waiting police van. In some cases, protesters have been seriously hurt. Scott Olsen, an Iraq war veteran, was critically injured in a protest in Oakland in October 2011. On March 17, 2012, young protesters attempting to re-establish an Occupy camp at Zuccotti Park in New York were confronted by excessive police violence. The Guardian reported that over 73 people were arrested in one day and that “A woman suffered a seizure while handcuffed on a sidewalk, another protester was thrown into a glass door by police officers before being handcuffed, and a young woman said she was choked and dragged by her hair….Witnesses claimed police punched one protester several times in the head while he was subdued by at least four officers.”  Another protester claimed the police broke his thumb and injured his jaw. Such stories have become commonplace in recent years, and so many are startling reminders of the violence used against civil rights demonstrators by the forces of Jim Crow in the fifties and sixties.

These stories are also indicative that a pervasive use of violence and the celebration of war-like values are no longer restricted to a particular military ideology, but have become normalized through the entire society.  As Michael Geyer points out, militarization in this sense is defined as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.” The war on terror has become a war on democracy, as police departments and baton-wielding cops across the 
nation are now being supplied with the latest military equipment and technologies imported straight from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Procuring drones, machine-gun-equipped armored trucks, SWAT vehicles, “digital communications equipment and Kevlar helmets, like those used by soldiers used in foreign wars,” is justified through reference to the domestic war against “terrorists” (code for young protesters) and provides new opportunities for major defense contractors and corporations to become ever “more a part of our domestic lives.” As Glenn Greenwald confirms, the United States since 9/11 “has aggressively paramilitarized the nation’s domestic police forces by lavishing them with countless military-style weapons and other war-like technologies, training them in war-zone military tactics, and generally imposing a war mentality on them. Arming domestic police forces with paramilitary weaponry will ensure their systematic use even in the absence of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil; they will simply find other, increasingly permissive uses for those weapons.”

With the growth of a new militarized state, it should come as little surprise that “by age 23, almost a third of Americans are arrested for a crime.”  In a society that has few qualms with viewing its young people as predators, a threat to corporate governance, and a disposable population, the violent acts inflicted on youth by a punishing state will no doubt multiply with impunity. Domestic paramilitary forces will certainly undermine free speech and dissent with the threat of force, while also potentially violating core civil liberties and human rights. In other words, the prevailing move in American society toward permanent war status sets the stage for the acceptance of a set of unifying symbols rooted in a survival-of-the-fittest ethic that promotes conformity over dissent, the strong over the weak, and fear over civic responsibility. With the emergence of a militarized society, “the range of acceptable opinion inevitably shrinks,” as violence becomes the first and most important element of power and a mediating force in shaping all social relationships.

The grave reality is that violence saturates almost every aspect of North American culture. Domestically, violence weaves through the cultural and social landscape like a highly charged electric current burning everything in its path. Popular culture has become a breeding ground for a form of brutal masculine authority and the celebration of violence it incorporates has become the new norm in America. Representations of violence dominate the media and too often parade before viewers less as an object of critique than as a for-profit spectacle and heightened source of pleasure. As much as any form of governance seeks compliance among the governed, the permanent war state uses modes of public pedagogy—practices of pedagogical persuasion—to address, enlist, and construct subjects willing to abide by its values, ideology, and narratives of fear and violence. Legitimation in the United States is largely provided through a market-driven culture addicted to consumerism, militarism, and spectacles of organized violence. Circulated through various registers of popular culture, cruelty and violence imbue the worlds of high fashion and Hollywood movies, reality TV, extreme sports, video games, and around-the-clock news media. The American public is bombarded by an unprecedented “huge volume of exposure to… images of human suffering.” As Zygmunt Bauman argues, “the sheer numbers and monotony of images may have a ‘wearing off’ impact [and] to stave off the ‘viewing fatigue,’ they must be increasingly gory, shocking, and otherwise ‘inventive’ to arouse any sentiments at all or indeed draw attention. The level of ‘familiar’ violence, below which the cruelty of cruel acts escapes attention, is constantly rising.”

When an increasing volume of violence is pumped into the culture as fodder for sports, entertainment, news media, and other pleasure-seeking outlets, yesterday’s spine-chilling and nerve-wrenching violence loses its shock value. One consequence is that today’s audiences exhibit more than mere desensitization or indifference to violence. They are not merely passive consumers, but instead demand prurient images of violence in a way that fuels their increasing production. Spectacularized violence is now unmoored from moral considerations or social costs. It now resides, if not thrives, in a diverse commercially infused set of cultural apparatuses that offers up violence as a commodity with the most attractive and enjoyable pleasure quotient. Representations of torture, murder, sadism, and human suffering have become the stuff of pure entertainment, offering a debased outlet for experiencing intense pleasure and the thrill of a depoliticized and socially irresponsible voyeurism.  The consuming subject is now educated to take intense pleasure in watching—if not also participating as agents of death—in spectacles of cruelty and barbarism. After all, assuming the role of a first shooter in the age of video game barbarism has become an unquestioned badge of both pleasure and dexterity, leading potentially to an eventual employment by the Defense Department to operate Drone aircraft in the video saturated bunkers of death in some suburban west coast town.  Seemingly unconstrained by a moral compass based on a respect for human and non-human life, U.S. culture is increasingly shaped by a disturbing collective desire for intense excitement and a never-ending flood of heightened sensations.

Although challenging to ascertain precisely how and why the collective culture continues to plummet to new depths of depravity, it is far less difficult to identify the range of horrific outcomes and social costs that come with this immersion in a culture of staged violence. When previously unfamiliar forms of violence, such as extreme images of torture and death, become banally familiar, the violence that occurs daily becomes barely recognizable relegated to the realm of the unnoticed and unnoticeable. Hyper-violence and spectacular representations of cruelty disrupt and block our ability to respond politically and ethically to the violence as it is actually happening on the ground.  How else to explain the public indifference to the violence waged by the state against non-violent youthful protesters who are rebelling against a society in which they have been excluded from any claim on hope, prosperity, equality, and justice? Cruelty has saturated everyday life when young people, once the objects of compassion and social protections, are treated as either consumers and commodities, on the one hand, or suspects and criminals on the other.

Disregard for young people and a growing taste for violence can also be seen in policies that sanction the modeling of public schools after prisons. We see the criminalization of disadvantaged youth, instead of the social conditions which they are forced to endure. Behaviors that were once handled by teachers, guidance counselors, and school administrators are now dealt with by the police and the criminal justice system. The consequences have been disastrous for young people. Not only do schools take on the technologies and culture of prisons and engage in punishment creep, but young children are being arrested and put on trial for behaviors that can only be called trivial. There was the case of the 5-year-old girl in Florida who was put in handcuffs and taken to the local jail because she had a temper tantrum; or the 13-year-old girl in a Maryland school who was arrested for refusing to say the pledge of allegiance. Alexa Gonzales in New York was another student arrested by police—for doodling on her desk. There is more at work in these cases than stupidity and a flight from responsibility on the part of educators, parents, law enforcement officers, and politicians who maintain these policies. Clearly, embedded in these actions is also the sentiment that young people constitute a threat to adults, and that the only way to deal with them is to subject them to mind-crushing punishment. Students being miseducated, criminalized, and subjected to forms of penal pedagogy in prison-type schools provide a grim reminder of the degree to which the ethos of containment and punishment now creeps into spheres of everyday life that were once largely immune from this type of official violence.

Governing-through-crime policies also remind us that we live in an era that breaks young people, corrupts the notion of justice, and saturates the minute details of everyday life with the threat if not yet the reality of violence. A return to violent spectacles and other medieval types of punishment inflict pain on both the psyches and the bodies of young people. Equally disturbing is how law-and-order policies and practices in the United States appear to take their cue from a past era of slavery. Studies have shown that “Arrests and police interactions… disproportionately affect low-income schools with large African-American and Latino populations,” paving the way for these youth to move almost effortlessly through what has been called the school-to-prison pipeline.  Sadly, the next step one envisions for such a society is a reality TV franchise in which millions tune in to watch young kids being handcuffed, arrested, tried in the courts, and sent to juvenile detention centers.  This is not merely barbarism parading as reform—it is also a blatant indicator of the degree to which sadism and the infatuation with violence have become normalized in a society that seems to take delight in dehumanizing itself.

The prevalence of institutionalized violence in American society and other parts of the world suggests the need for a new conversation and politics that address what a just and fair world looks like. Young people and others marginalized by class, race, and ethnicity appear to have been abandoned as American society’s claim on democracy gives way to the forces of militarism, market fundamentalism, and state terrorism. Until educators, intellectuals, academics, young people, and other concerned citizens address how a physics and metaphysics of war and violence have taken hold on American society and the savage social costs they have exacted, the forms of social, political, and economic violence that young people are currently protesting against as well as the violence waged in response to their protests will become impossible to recognize and act on. The American public needs to make visible and critically engage the underlying ideological, political, educational, and economic forces that embrace violence as both a commodity, spectacle, and mode of governing.  Such an approach would address the necessity of understanding the emerging pathology of violence not just through a discourse of fear or isolated spectacles, but through policies that effectively implement the wider social, economic, and political reforms necessary to curb the culture of violence and the institutions that are sustained by it.  There is a cult of violence in America and it is reinforced by a type of collective ignorance spread endlessly by special interests such as the National Rifle Association, politicians wedded to the largess of the military-industrial complex, and national entertainment-corporate complex that both employs violence and uses it to refigure the meaning of news, entertainment, and the stories America tells itself about its national identity and sense of destiny.  Violence is not something to be simply criminalized by extending the reach of the criminal justice system to the regime of criminals that now run the most powerful financial services and industries. It must be also understood as part of a politics of distraction, a poisonous public pedagogy that depoliticizes as much as it entertains and corrupts.  That is, it must be addressed as a political issue that within the current historical moment is both deployed by the neoliberal state against young people, and employed as part of the reconfiguration or transformation of the social state into the punishing state. At the heart of this transformation is the emergence of new form of corporate sovereignty, a more intense form of state violence, a ruthless survival of the fittest ethic used to legitimate the concentrated power of the rich, and a concerted effort to punish young people who are out of step with neoliberal ideology, values, and modes of governance.  Of course, these anti-democratic tendencies represent more than a threat to young people, they also put in peril all of those individuals, groups, public spheres, and institutions now considered disposable because that are at odds with a world run by bankers, the financial elite, and the rich.  Only a well-organized movement of young people, educators, workers,  parents, religious groups, and other concerned citizens will be capable of changing the power relations and vast economic inequalities that have generated what has become a country in which it is almost impossible to recognize the ideals of a real democracy.

Henry A. Giroux holds the Global TV Network chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University in Canada. His most recent books include: “Take Back Higher Education” (co-authored with Susan Searls Giroux, 2006), “The University in Chains: Confronting the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex” (2007) and “Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed” (2008). His latest book is Twilight of the Social: Resurgent Publics in the Age of Disposability,” (Paradigm.)

Entre heróis e empecilhos, os atuais capachos do capital (Conselho Indigenista Missionário)

Cleber César Buzatto – Portal do Cimi, 02-08-2012.

Lula Dilma adotaram uma fórmula de governança altamente danosa aos povos indígenas, quilombolas e campesinos que dependem da terra e do território para a sobrevivência física e cultural no Brasil. Essa fórmula associa ao menos dois grandes instrumentos, o incentivo político e financeiro a um modelo econômico desenvolvimentista, altamente dependente da exportação de produtos primários, e a aposta na “desmobilização social”, com no uso indiscriminado de “inibidores sociais”, a fim de manter sob controle as potenciais tensões resultantes de sua opção.

Lula foi eleito, em 2002, com o voto dos “pequenos do campo” das mais distantes e diferentes regiões do país, sob o signo da esperança, o que provocou um tsunami de expectativas de que finalmente seriam realizadas no país as mudanças estruturantes pelas quais essas populações vinham lutando e dando a vida historicamente. Era forte o sentimento de que o novo governo adotaria medidas efetivas e eficazes no intuito de implementar uma reforma agrária e agrícola ampla e profunda, de acelerar os procedimentos administrativos de reconhecimento, demarcação e titulação de terras indígenas e quilombolas, de proteger o meio ambiente e as lideranças sócio-populares, combatendo, dessa maneira, a sanha voraz e assassina dos grandes proprietários de terras do país e mudando a injusta estrutura fundiária brasileira.

A traição à confiança e às expectativas dos setores populares do campo brasileiro não demorou vir à tona. Já nos primeiros meses de 2003, todos os indicativos apontavam, inequivocamente, que o novo governo havia optado pelo “desenvolvimentismo” como modelo econômico. Resultou, como consequência dessa opção, a escolha dos atores que iriam implementá-lo, e que por isso deveriam ser “incentivados”, bem como, daqueles setores que, por representarem riscos à sua implementação, precisariam ser “combatidos”.

O fato de Lula ter chamado os usineiros plantadores de cana de “heróis” nacionais, eles que são reconhecidos destruidores do meio-ambiente, muitos dos quais exploradores de mão-de-obra escrava em suas usinas e alguns, inclusive, responsáveis pelo assassinato de centenas de lideranças populares na disputa pelas terras ao longo da história, e se referido publicamente aos povos indígenas como “empecilhos” ao desenvolvimento do país situa-se nesse contexto.

Ao radicalizar a opção pelo desenvolvimentismo, o governo Dilma aprofunda a retração dos processos de reconhecimento, demarcação e titulação de terras indígenas e quilombolas; instala um verdadeiro “Estado de exceção” ao publicar a Portaria 303/2012 na tentativa de rever procedimentos já finalizados de demarcação e de facilitar a exploração das terras indígenas; retira completamente de pauta a temática da reforma agrária, sem nem ao menos ter sido promovida a atualização dos índices de produtividade que remontam à década de 1970. A desidratação orçamentária e a desestruturação dos órgãos públicos, Funai e Incra, também podem ser situadas neste contexto da opção feita por Lula/Dilma.

Neste ínterim, o Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) constitui-se no instrumento ideológico e financeiro, impositivo e agressivo, posto em prática a qualquer custo com a finalidade de implementar o modelo adotado. No que diz respeito ao campo, tudo tem sido feito para favorecer a apropriação e a exploração dos territórios, bem como o deslocamento das commodities agrícolas e minerais até os portos das mais diferentes regiões brasileiras. Para isso, o que efetivamente está na pauta governamental é a construção de rodovias, ferrovias, hidrovias, hidroelétricas.

Olhando por este viés, podemos afirmar que Lula Dilma são os atuais instrumentos usados pelo capital para efetivar os seus interesses. Fazem, com o PAC, o mesmo papel de “capachos” feito pelos militares e o seu “Milagre Brasileiro”, assim como, por Fernando Henrique Cardoso e o seu “Avança Brasil”.

Neste sentido, a imagem de Lula, de mãos dadas e com sorriso no rosto, celebrando a aliança com Paulo Maluf na disputa pela Prefeitura de São Paulo, e a imagem da presidente Dilma de braços dados e sendo lançada a reeleição por Kátia Abreu, no anúncio do Plano Safra 2012, devem continuar nos indignando, mas não mais deveriam nos surpreender.

Cientes de que essa opção poderia resultar em instabilidades inclusive junto a setores sociais historicamente aliados, como complemento à fórmula de governança, Lula e Dilma vêm apostando fortemente num instrumento político que poderíamos denominar de “desmobilização social”. Para implementá-lo, os governos Lula/Dilma tem-se agarrado numa ampla gama de “inibidores sociais”. Tais inibidores são constituídos por diferentes estratagemas. Citamos três deles que, a nosso ver,  tem sido mais eficazes.

1) a adoção massiva de programas governamentais de cunho assistencial, que retira muitas pessoas das fileiras das lutas por mudanças mais profundas;

2) o uso da imagem e a ação empedernida de sujeitos remanescentes de movimentos e organizações sociais nas fileiras governamentais, que buscam “amaciar” a relação entre estes movimentos e o governo;

3) a criminalização/repressão às lideranças e segmentos da sociedade organizada que insistem nas lutas por mudanças estruturantes no campo e no enfrentamento às conseqüências advindas da opção governamental. A criminalização de militantes e organizações sociais em curso no caso da UHE Belo Monte é um exemplo típico deste último estratagema governamental.

Relativamente ao campo brasileiro, a “desmobilização social” somada aos “incentivos” estatais em curso tem produzido um exponencial fortalecimento de atores políticos altamente reacionários, a saber, as empresas multinacionais que controlam o sistema de produção de commodities agrícolas, os fazendeiros-latifundiários e o grupo que lhes dá sustentação no Congresso Nacional, os ruralistas. A devastação do Código Florestal e o ataque ferrenho aos direitos dos povos indígenas e quilombolas, por meio da PEC 215, são dois exemplos que se situam nessa correia, sem limites e sem escrúpulos, de violências e interesses deste setor minoritário e historicamente privilegiado em nosso país.

No campo político, não custa lembrar que, no Paraguai, o golpe contra o presidente Lugo foi planejado, financiado e executado por estes mesmos atores.

Diante desse contexto de total atrelamento governamental com as forças reacionárias do agronegócio no Brasil e a conseqüente falta de compromisso para com os povos indígenas, quilombolas e campesinos, a estes não resta outra alternativa senão empunhar as “bandeiras” e ir para o enfrentamento sem qualquer tipo de subterfúgio e amarras, sejam elas históricas, partidárias e/ou financeiras.

Nas ruas, nas ocupações, nas retomadas das terras invadidas pelo agronegócio, com os povos do campo, sempre e de cabeça erguida, “sem medo de ser feliz” e sem medo dos atuais capachos do capital em nosso país.

Brasília, DF, 2 de agosto de 2012.

Cleber César Buzatto

Secretário Executivo do Cimi

Occupy, Anthropology, and the 2011 Global Uprisings (Cultural Anthropology)

Hot spot – Occupy, Anthropology, and the 2011 Global Uprisings

Submitted by Cultural Anthropology on Fri, 2012-07-27 10:36

Introduction: Occupy, Anthropology, and the 2011 Global Uprisings

Guest Edited by Jeffrey S. Juris (Northeastern University) and Maple Razsa (Colby College)

Occupy Wall Street burst spectacularly onto the scene last fall with the take-over of New York City’s Zuccotti Park on September 17, 2011, followed by the rapid spread of occupations to cities throughout the US and the world. The movement combined mass occupations of urban public spaces with horizontal forms of organization and large-scale, directly democratic assemblies. Making effective use of the viral flows of images and information generated by the intersections of social and mass media, the occupations mobilized tens of thousands around the globe, including many new activists who had never taken part in a mass movement before, and inspired many more beyond the physical encampments themselves. Before the wave of violent police evictions in November and December of 2011 drove activists into submerged forms of organizing through the winter, the Occupy movements had already captured the public imagination. Bequeathing to us potent new memes such as the 1% (those at the top of the wealth and income scale) and the 99% (the rest of us), Occupy provided a framework for talking about issues that have been long obscured in public life such as class and socio-economic inequality and helped to shift the dominant political-economic discourse from an obsession with budget deficits and austerity to a countervailing concern for jobs, equality, and economic fairness.

In other words, prior to Occupy, much of the populist anger stemming from the 2008 financial crisis in North America and Europe had been effectively channeled by the Right into both an attack on marginalized groups—e.g. immigrants, people of color, Gays and Lesbians—and a particularly pernicious version of the already familiar critique of unbridled spending. This was especially so in the US where the Tea Party tapped into the widespread public ire over the Wall Street bailouts to bolster a far-reaching attack on “big government” through a radical program of fiscal austerity. Of course, the debt problem was a consequence rather than a cause of the crisis, the result of deregulation, predatory lending, and the spread of highly complex financial instruments facilitated by the neoliberal agenda of the very people who were now seeking to impose budgetary discipline (see Financial Crisis Hot Spot).

However, the contributions of Occupy are not exclusively, or even primarily, to be assessed in terms of their intervention in public discourse. The Occupy movements are also a response to a fundamental crisis of representative politics embodied in an embrace of more radical, directly democratic practices and forms. In their commitment to direct democracy and action the politics put into practice in the various encampments are also innovative prefigurative attempts to model alternative forms of political organization, decision making, and sociability. This turn is crucial: while neoliberalism has been endlessly critiqued it seems to live on as the only policy response—in the form of austerity—to the crisis neoliberalism itself has produced. The need for ethnographic accounts of this prefigurative politics, and its attendant challenges and contradictions, is especially urgent given that Occupy has refused official representatives and because occupiers have extended democracy beyond formal institutions into new spheres of life through a range of practices, including the collective seizure of public space, the people’s mic, horizontal organization, hand signals, and general assemblies.

It is also important to remember that Occupy was a relative latecomer—if a symbolically important one—to the social unrest the global crisis and policies of austerity have provoked. Cracks in the veneer of conformity emerged during the 2008 rebellion in Greece, where students, union members, and other social actors, galvanized by the murder of a fifteen year old student, took to the streets to challenge the worsening economic conditions (See Greece Hot Spot). Students were also among the first wave of resistance elsewhere with protests against budget cuts and increased fees in California, Croatia, the UK, and Chile. In the US signs of wider social discontent finally surfaced during the Wisconsin uprising in February 2011, which included the occupation of the Wisconsin State House in opposition to Governor Scott Walker’s attack on collective bargaining for public sector unions under the guise of budgetary discipline (cf. Collins 2012). As in Wisconsin, the widespread circulation of images from the Arab Spring continued to spark the intense feelings of solidarity, political possibility, and agency that ultimately led to the occupation of Wall Street. From the pro-democracy marches in Tunisia in response to the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi to the mass occupations of Cairo’s Tahrir Square in opposition to the Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, the Middle East uprisings, imbued protesters with the sense that dramatic political transformation was possible even as subsequent events have indicated that actual political outcomes are always ambivalent and uncertain (see Arab Spring Hot Spot).

Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and responding to the working and middle class casualties of Spain and Europe’s debt crisis, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Madrid on May 15, 2011 and occupied the Puerta del Sol square, sparking a wave of similar mobilizations and encampments around the Spain that would become known as 15M or the movement of the Indignados. Indeed, the combination of mass public occupations with large-scale participatory assemblies provided a template that would be enacted in Zuccotti Park, in part via the influence of Spanish activists residing in New York. That summer a similar movement of Israeli youths sprang up in Tel Aviv, using tent cities and popular assemblies to shine a light on the rising cost of housing and other living expenses.

Finally, in response to an August 2011 call by the Canadian magazine AdBusters to occupy Wall Street in the spirit of these 2011 Global uprisings, activists occupied Zuccotti Park after being rebuffed by the police in an attempt to take Wall Street itself. The occupation initially garnered little media attention, until its second week when images of police repression started going viral, leading to a surge in public sympathy and support, and ever growing numbers streaming to the encampments themselves each time another protester was maced or a group of seemingly innocent protesters rounded up, beaten, and/or arrested. Occupations quickly spread around the US and other parts of the world, generating, for a moment, a proliferating series of encampments physically rooted in local territories, yet linked up with other occupations through interpersonal and online trans-local networks. Following the evictions in the US last fall, local assemblies and working groups have continued to meet—hosting discussions, planning actions and campaigns, producing media, and building and modifying organizational forms—even as the Occupy movements prepared for their public reemergence in the spring through mobilizations such as the May Day protests and mass direct actions against NATO in Chicago and the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.

Additionally, each of these uprisings has diffused through the widespread use of social media, reflecting the mutually constitutive nature of embodied and online protest. The use of social media, in particular, has allowed the Occupy movements, as in other recent mobilizations, to penetrate deeply into the social fabric and mobilize many newcomers who have never been active before in social movements. At the same time, these emerging “logics of aggregation” within the Occupy movements have resulted in a more individualized mode of participation and a form of movement that is more singularizing (e.g. the way the 99% frame can obscure internal differences) and more dependent on the long-term occupation of public space than other recent movements (Juris 2012). A particular set of tensions and strategic dilemmas have thus plagued the Occupy movements, including a divide between newer and more seasoned activists, the difficulty of recognizing and negotiating internal differences, a lack of common political and organizational principles beyond the General Assembly model, and the difficulty of transitioning to new tactics, strategies, visions, and structures in a post-eviction era. In short, activists are now faced with fundamental questions about how to build a movement capable of actually transforming the deep inequalities they have attempted to address.

In assembling this Hot Spot on Occupy we have invited contributions from anthropologists, ethnographers, and activists writing on the above themes: the mass occupation of public spaces, directly democratic practices and forms, the use of social media, the emotions and emerging subjectivities of protest, as well as the underlying political critiques and contradictions that have arisen in the movement. Similarly, in light of the global history we outline above, the range of other social movement responses to the current global economic crisis, as well as the ongoing links between struggles in the US, Europe, Latin America, and North Africa, we have been careful to include contributors conducting research beyond the US in countries such as Greece, Slovenia, Spain, Israel, Argentina, Egypt, and Canada. In so doing, we insist that Occupy must be understood in a global rather than a populist US-centric framework.

Our collaboration on this Hot Spot—which emerged from conversations around our articles on Occupy in the May 2012 edition ofAmerican Ethnologist (Juris 2012Razsa and Kurnik 2012)—also reflects our scholarly and political commitments, as well as those of our contributors. First, it was our priority to invite scholars and activists who are directly involved with these movements rather than adding to the abundant armchair punditry on Occupy. These contributions also reflect recent trends in anthropology with respect to the growing practice of activist research, militant ethnography, public anthropology, and other forms of politically committed ethnographic research, which are taking increasingly institutionalized forms with Cultural Anthropology “Hot Spots”like this one, “Public Anthropology Reviews” in American Anthropologist, recent interventions in American Ethnologist on Egypt, Wisconsin, and Occupy, as well as Current Anthropology “Current Applications.”

In addition to providing an ethnographically and analytically informed view of and from various occupations and kindred mobilizations, this Hot Spot thus provides another example of how anthropologists are making themselves politically relevant and are engaging issues of broad public concern. Given these shifts, together with the progressive inclinations of many anthropologists and the ubiquity and inherent interest of Occupy, it should come as no surprise that so many anthropologists and ethnographers from related fields, including those within and outside the academy, have played key roles in the Occupy movements and their precursors in countries such as Greece and Spain. Indeed, in their post Carles Feixa and his collaboratorsrefer to anthropologists as the “organic intellectuals” of the 15 M movement. As many of the contributions to this Hot Spot attest, a similar case might be made for the role of activist anthropologists within Occupy more generally.

As the contributions below make clear, our emphasis on participatory and politically committed research does not imply a romanticization of resistance or a refusal to confront the contradictions, limits, and exclusions of social movements, especially along axes of class, race, gender, sexuality, and citizenship. Given the disproportionate, though by no means exclusively White, middle class participation in the US Occupy movements, such critical perspectives are essential. Each of the following entries thus combines thick ethnographic description on the part of anthropologists, ethnographers, and activists who have been directly involved in the Occupy movements or other instances of mobilization during the 2011 global uprisings—either through engagement with one more encampments and/or the themes addressed by Occupy—with critical analysis of one or more of the issues outlined above.

NOTES

[1] Occupy has thus addressed many of the same themes and drawn on many of the organizational practices associated with the global justice movements of a previous era, even as it has resonated more strongly with domestic national contexts of the Global north.

[2] The people’s mic is a form of voice amplification whereby everyone in listening distance repeats a speaker’s words so that others situated further away can also hear (See Garces, this Hot Spot).

[3] For example, in the U.S. local encampments created “Inter-Occupy” groups maintain ties with other occupations, while twitter feeds, listservs, websites, and other digital tools were used to communicate and coordinate more broadly. See our digital resources page for additional links.

REFERENCES

Collins, Jane. 2012. “Theorizing Wisconsin’s 2011 Protests: Community-Based Unionism Confronts Accumulation by Dispossession.” American Ethnologist 39 (1):6–20.

Juris, Jeffrey. 2012. “Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation.”American Ethnologist 39 (2):259-279.

Razsa, Maple and Andrej Kurnik. 2012. “The Occupy Movement in Žižek’s Hometown: Direct Democracy and a Politics of Becoming.” American Ethnologist 39 (2):238-258.

***ESSAYS***

Prefigurative Politics

Marianne Maeckelbergh, Horizontal Decision-Making across Time and Place

Chris Garces, People’s Mic and ‘Leaderful’ Charisma

Philip Cartelli, Trying to Occupy Harvard

Public Space

Zoltán Glück, Between Wall Street and Zuccotti: Occupy and the Scale of Politics

Carles Feixa, et al., The #spanishrevolution and Beyond

Dimitris Dalakoglou,  The Movement and the “Movement” of Syntagma Square

Experience and Subjectivity

Jeffrey S. Juris, The 99% and the Production of Insurgent Subjectivity

Diane Nelson, et al., Her earliest leaf’s a flower…

Maple Razsa, The Subjective Turn: The Radicalization of Personal Experience within Occupy Slovenia

Marina Sitrin, Occupy Trust: The Role of Emotion in the New Movements

Strategy and Tactics

David Graeber, Occupy Wall Street rediscovers the radical imagination

Kate Griffiths-Dingani, May Day, Precarity, Affective Labor, and the General Strike

Angelique Haugerud, Humor and Occupy Wall Street

Karen Ho, Occupy Finance and the Paradox/Possibilities of Productivity

Social Media

Alice Mattoni, Beyond Celebration: Toward a More Nuanced Assessment of Facebook’s Role in Occupy Wall Street

John Postill, Participatory Media Research and Spain’s 15M Movement

Critical Perspectives

Yvonne Yen Liu, Decolonizing the Occupy Movement

Manissa McCleave Maharawal, Fieldnotes on Union Square, Anti-Oppression, and Occupy

Uri Gordon, Israel’s “Tent Protests:” A Domesticated Mobilization

Alex Khasnabish, Occupy Nova Scotia: The Symbolism and Politics of Space

Mapping the Future of Climate Change in Africa (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 2, 2012) — Our planet’s changing climate is devastating communities in Africa through droughts, floods and myriad other disasters.

Children in the foothills of Drakensberg mountains in South Africa who still live in traditional rondavels on family homesteads. (Credit: Todd G. Smith, CCAPS Program)

Using detailed regional climate models and geographic information systems, researchers with the Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) program developed an online mapping tool that analyzes how climate and other forces interact to threaten the security of African communities.

The program was piloted by the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin in 2009 after receiving a $7.6 million five-year grant from the Minerva Initiative with the Department of Defense, according to Francis J. Gavin, professor of international affairs and director of the Strauss Center.

“The first goal was to look at whether we could more effectively identify what were the causes and locations of vulnerability in Africa, not just climate, but other kinds of vulnerability,” Gavin said.

CCAPS comprises nine research teams focusing on various aspects of climate change, their relationship to different types of conflict, the government structures that exist to mitigate them, and the effectiveness of international aid in intervening. Although most CCAPS researchers are based at The University of Texas at Austin, the Strauss Center also works closely with Trinity College Dublin, the College of William and Mary, and the University of North Texas.

“In the beginning these all began as related, but not intimately connected, topics” Gavin said, “and one of the really impressive things about the project is how all these different streams have come together.”

Africa is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to its reliance on rain-fed agriculture and the inability of many of its governments to help communities in times of need.

The region is of increasing importance for U.S. national security, according to Gavin, because of the growth of its population, economic strength and resource importance, and also due to concerns about non-state actors, weakening governments and humanitarian disasters.

Although these issues are too complex to yield a direct causal link between climate change and security concerns, he said, understanding the levels of vulnerability that exist is crucial in comprehending the full effect of this changing paradigm.

The vulnerability mapping program within CCAPS is led by Joshua Busby, assistant professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

To determine the vulnerability of a given location based on changing climate conditions, Busby and his team looked at four different sources: 1) the degree of physical exposure to climate hazards, 2) population size, 3) household or community resilience, and 4) the quality of governance or presence of political violence.

The first source records the different types of climate hazards which could occur in the area, including droughts, floods, wildfires, storms and coastal inundation. However, their presence alone is not enough to qualify a region as vulnerable.

The second source — population size — determines the number of people who will be impacted by these climate hazards. More people create more demand for resources, potentially making the entire population more vulnerable.

The third source looks at how resilient a community is to adverse effects, analyzing the quality of their education and health, as well as whether they have easy access to food, water and health care.

“If exposure is really bad, it may exceed the capacity of local communities to protect themselves,” Busby said, “and then it comes down to whether or not the governments are going to be willing or able to help them.”

The final source accounts for the effectiveness of a given government, the amount of accountability present, how integrated it is with the international community, how politically stable it is, and whether there is any political violence present.

Busby and his team combined the four sources of vulnerability and gave them each equal weight, adding them together to form a composite map. Their scores were then divided into a ranking of five equal parts, or quintiles, going from the 20 percent of regions with the lowest vulnerability to the 20 percent with the highest.

The researchers gathered information for the tool from a variety of sources, including historic models of physical exposure from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), population estimates from LandScan, as well as household surveys and governance assessments from the World Bank’s World Development and Worldwide Governance Indicators.

This data reflects past and present vulnerability, but to understand which places in Africa would be most vulnerable to future climate change, Busby and his team relied on the regional climate model simulations designed by Edward Vizy and Kerry Cook, both members of the CCAPS team from the Jackson School of Geosciences.

Vizy and Cook ran three, 20-year nested simulations of the African continent’s climate at the regional scales of 90 and 30 kilometers, using a derivation of the Weather Research and Forecasting Model of the National Center for Atmospheric Research. One was a control simulation representative of the years 1989-2008, and the others represented the climate as it may exist in 2041-2060 and 2081-2100.

“We’re adjusting the control simulation’s CO2 concentration, model boundary conditions, and sea surface temperatures to increased greenhouse gas forcing scenario conditions derived from atmosphere-ocean global climate models. We re-run the simulation to understand how the climate will operate under a different, warmer state at spatial resolutions needed for regional impact analyses,” Vizy said.

Each simulation took two months to complete on the Rangersupercomputer at the Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC).

“We couldn’t run these simulations without the high-performance computing resources at TACC, it would just take too long. If it takes two months running with 200 processors, I can’t fathom doing it with one processor,” Vizy said.

Researchers input data from these vulnerability maps into an online mapping tool developed by the CCAPS program to integrate its various lines of climate, conflict and aid research. CCAPS’s current mapping tool is based on a prototype developed by the team to assess conflict patterns in Africa with the help of researchers at the TACC/ACES Visualization Laboratory (Vislab), according to Ashley Moran, program manager of CCAPS.

“The mapping tool is a key part of our effort to produce new research that could support policy making and the work of practitioners and governments in Africa,” Moran said. “We want to communicate this research in ways that are of maximum use to policymakers and researchers.”

The initial prototype of the mapping tool used the ArcGIS platform to project data onto maps. Working with its partner Development Gateway, CCAPS expanded the system to incorporate conflict, vulnerability, governance and aid research data.

After completing the first version of their model, Busby and his team carried out the process of ground truthing their maps by visiting local officials and experts in several African countries, such as Kenya and South Africa.

“The experience of talking with local experts was tremendously gratifying,” Busby said. “They gave us confidence that the things we’re doing in a computer lab setting in Austin do pick up on some of the ground-level expert opinions.”

Busby and his team complemented their maps with local perspectives on the kind of impact climate was already having, leading to new insights that could help perfect the model. For example, local experts felt the model did not address areas with chronic water scarcity, an issue the researchers then corrected upon returning home.

According to Busby, the vulnerability maps serve as focal points which can give way to further analysis about the issues they illustrate.

Some of the countries most vulnerable to climate change include Somalia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Sudan and parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Knowing this allows local policymakers to develop security strategies for the future, including early warning systems against floods, investments in drought-resistant agriculture, and alternative livelihoods that might facilitate resource sharing and help prevent future conflicts. The next iteration of the online mapping tool to be released later this year will also incorporate the future projections of climate exposure from the models developed by Vizy and Cook.

The CCAPS team publishes their research in journals likeClimate Dynamics and The International Studies Review, carries out regular consultations with the U.S. government and governments in Africa, and participates in conferences sponsored by concerned organizations, such as the United Nations and the United States Africa Command.

“What this project has showed us is that many of the real challenges of the 21st century aren’t always in traditional state-to-state interactions, but are transnational in nature and require new ways of dealing with,” Gavin said.

A burocracia e as violências invisíveis (Canal Ibase)

Renzo Taddei – Colunista do Canal Ibase

2 de agosto de 2012

matéria de capa da revista Time da semana passada chama a atenção para dados impressionantes sobre o suicídio entre militares norte-americanos. Desde 2004, o número de militares americanos que se suicidaram é maior do que os que foram mortos em combate no Afeganistão. Em média, um soldado americano na ativa se suicida por dia. Dentre os veteranos, um suicídio ocorre a cada 80 minutos. Entre 2004 e 2008, a taxa de suicídio entre militares cresceu 80%; só em 2012, esse crescimento já é de 18%. O suicídio ultrapassou os acidentes automobilísticos como primeira causa de morte de militares fora de situação de combate.

Foto: Matthew C. Moeller (Flickr)

O exército americano naturalmente busca, preocupado, identificar as causas do problema – até o momento sem sucesso. O problema está longe de ser óbvio, no entanto. Um terço dos suicidas nunca foi ao Afeganistão ou ao Iraque. 43% só foram convocados uma vez. Apenas 8,5% dos suicidas foram convocados três vezes ou mais. E, em sua maioria, são casados. Ou seja, nem todos os suicídios estão relacionados com traumas de campos de batalha.

Como é de se esperar, a burocracia militar busca um diagnóstico burocrático, para que a solução seja burocrática – de modo que não seja necessário cavar muito fundo na questão. O exército americano não tem psiquiatras e profissionais de serviço social suficientes. Muitos soldados se suicidam na longa espera por uma consulta psiquiátrica; outros, após terem sido receitados soníferos e oficialmente diagnosticados como “não sendo um perigo para si ou para os demais”. A cultura militar estigmatiza demonstrações de fraqueza, de modo que muitos evitam procurar ajuda a tempo. Viúvas acusam o exército de negligência; oficiais militares dizem que os soldados se suicidam devido a problemas conjugais.

Enquanto eu refletia sobre o assunto, chegou até mim a indicação de um livro chamadoDays of Destruction, Days of Revolt, do jornalista americano Chris Edges. O livro descreve a situação de algumas das cidades mais pobres dos Estados Unidos e chega à conclusão de que a pobreza de tais cidades não tem ligação com a ideia de subdesenvolvimento, mas sim ao que se poderia chamar de contra-desenvolvimento: são cidades que foram destruídas pela exploração capitalista.

Uma dessas cidades, Camden, no estado de Nova Jersey, é velha conhecida: durante meu doutorado nos Estados Unidos, trabalhei como fotógrafo para complementar minha renda, e estive em Camden várias vezes. Sempre me impressionaram os sinais explícitos de decadência do lugar: gente vivendo em prédios em ruínas; equipamentos públicos em decomposição; tráfico de droga à luz do dia. Agora descubro que se trata nada menos da cidade com menor renda per capita do país.

Chris Edges chama tais cidades de zonas de sacrifício do capitalismo. Ou seja, para que a exploração capitalista possa ocorrer sem impedimentos, o capital se move de um lugar para outro assim que os recursos ou as oportunidades se esgotam, deixando para trás cidades fantasmas, desemprego e depressão. A lógica desse padrão de exploração é bem conhecida desde Marx, pelo menos. O que Chris Edges faz é, com a ajuda do artista gráfico e também jornalista Joe Sacco, dar nova visibilidade a um problema que a burocracia oficial e a mídia fazem questão de não enxergar.

Que relação há entre os suicídios militares e a pobreza urbana dos Estados Unidos? Na verdade, me dei conta que há uma analogia fundamental entre os dois casos: em ambos há a conjugação do fato de que para que o sistema funcione – e estamos falando de sistemas diferentes para cada caso – alguém tem que ser sacrificado; e esse sacrifício e suas vítimas sacrificiais devem permanecer invisíveis para a maioria da população. O esforço dos Estados Unidos para manter sua hegemonia militar produz de forma sistemática a morte de uma imensa quantidade de gente, dentre americanos e seus supostos inimigos. E, para que a lucratividade se mantenha alta, florestas, cidades e empregos são destruídos, também de forma sistemática. Uma das expressões usadas nas ciências sociais para descrever esse estado de coisas é violência estrutural.

A invisibilidade dessas coisas é imprescindível – só assim pessoas bem intencionadas e de boa fé podem participar do sistema perverso, sem enxergar sua perversidade. Por isso, por exemplo, o governo Bush (pai) articulou com a imprensa americana um pacto para que não fossem publicadas fotos de caixões de soldados mortos em combate na primeira Guerra do Golfo. O pacto esteve em vigor por quase vinte anos, até que foidesfeito por Obama em 2009.

Mas a forma mais comum, e eficaz, de produzir as formas de violência estrutural que reproduzem desigualdades de forma invisível é a burocracia. E isso se dá, como nos lembra David Graeber, em razão do fato de que é função da burocracia ignorar as minúcias da vida cotidiana e reduzir tudo a fórmulas mecânicas e estatísticas. Isso nos permite focar nossas energias em um número menor de variáveis, e assim realizar coisas grandiosas e incríveis – para o bem e para o mal. O papel que a burocracia tem na produção da invisibilidade que mantém violências estruturais em funcionamento pode ser exemplificado através do uso de estatísticas em políticas públicas, por exemplo. Um dos programas oficiais de apoio à população rural do Nordeste mais importantes da atualidade, o Garantia Safra – em que pequenos agricultores adquirem um seguro e são indenizados em caso de perda de safra -, sistematicamente exclui agricultores em função de miopia burocrática. Para que os agricultores de um município recebam a indenização, as regras do programa exigem que haja 50% de perda da safra de todo o município. No entanto, basta ver a dimensão e os contornos dos municípios brasileiros para rapidamente concluir que não há relação necessária entre os limites municipais e os fenômenos meteorológicos. Há municípios que, de tão extensos, apresentam variações climáticas dramáticas dentro de suas fronteiras. Nesses casos, é comum que muitos agricultores com grandes perdas não recebam qualquer indenização, se outras regiões do município tiverem perdas menores. Por que é que o município tem que ser tomado como unidade de referência nesse caso? Porque há um aparato burocrático municipal para gerir o programa, e não há níveis burocráticos oficiais em escala menor. Ou seja, o sistema é burro mesmo que ninguém o seja, e quem sofre as consequências são os agricultores.

De forma correlata, índices nacionais ou estaduais de desemprego, crescimento do PIB e do PIB per capita, são unidades de referência centrais das políticas públicas atuais, ainda que sejam médias que não levem em consideração as situações extremas onde efetivamente existe vulnerabilidade socioeconômica. É como se o ditado que diz que “a corda sempre se parte no lado mais fraco” fosse sistematicamente ignorado. A vulnerabilidade de qualquer sistema – uma máquina, por exemplo – é definida pelo seu componente mais frágil. Qualquer engenheiro sabe disso; na verdade, a ideia é tão óbvia que qualquer um sabe disso. É ai que entra a burocracia: . Nesse contexto, não importa muito o que as pessoas sabem ou não: elas não serão capazes de identificar como a burocracia produz inconsistências e violência estrutural, a menos que sejam diretamente afetadas. Dessa forma, cidades como Camden ficam sistematicamente fora do radar, camufladas por estatísticas de âmbito estadual ou nacional.

Isso tudo está relacionado a outra notícia veiculada nos jornais na semana passada: a posição do Brasil nos debates na ONU sobre a regulação do comércio mundial de armas. Apesar das evidências de que as armas fabricadas no Brasil foram e continuam sendo vendidas a governos com histórico de violação dos direitos humanos, o Brasil se colocou frontalmente contra a regulação e criação de mecanismos que deem transparência a esse mercado. A justificativa, como não poderia deixar de ser, é burocrática: a disseminação de informações sobre capacidade bélica “poderia expor os recursos e a capacidade dos países […] de sustentar um conflito prolongado”. Colocar isso como argumento que tem precedência sobre a necessidade de proteger os direitos humanos é um escândalo. Por trás dessa desculpa esfarrapada, está a intenção de proteger a lucrativa indústria bélica brasileira. O que faz a história toda mais indigesta é o fato da Dilma ter sido vítima de tortura, durante o período em que o Brasil era dirigido pela burocracia militar. Como pode a mesma presidente que criou aComissão da Verdade ser conivente com uma indústria e um mercado manchados de sangue?

Esse episódio mostra que, em termos éticos, há menos diferença entre Estados Unidos e Brasil do que os brasileiros gostam de acreditar. Para proteger o capitalismo – já não mais num campo de luta ideológica, como à época da guerra fria, mas na forma de interesses privados reais e específicos de empresas norte-americanas -, os Estados Unidos passam a ser um perigo não apenas para nações vulneráveis não-alinhadas, mas a si mesmo, como revela a epidemia de suicídios entre militares. Da mesma forma, e pelas mesmas razões – ou seja, na caminhada rumo à sua consolidação como poder imperialista – o Brasil se preocupa com seus mortos políticos, e estrategicamente finge não ver que, para a engorda do seu PIB e para a prosperidade de sua indústria bélica, uma imensa quantidade de vidas – na África, no Oriente Média, no sul do Pará e nos morros cariocas –  é sacrificada.

Renzo Taddei é professor da Escola de Comunicação da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. É doutor em antropologia pela Universidade de Columbia, em Nova York. Dedica-se aos estudos sociais da ciência e tecnologia.

Projeto proíbe uso de animais em pesquisas se houver sofrimento (Agência Câmara)

JC e-mail 4551, de 31 de Julho de 2012.

Está em análise na Câmara o Projeto de Lei 2905/11, do deputado Roberto De Lucena (PV-SP), que proíbe o uso de animais em pesquisas quando eles forem submetidos a algum tipo de sofrimento físico ou psicológico.

A proibição vale para estudos relacionados à produção de cosméticos, perfumes, produtos para higiene pessoal, limpeza doméstica, lavagem de roupas, de suprimentos de escritório, de protetores solares, além de vitaminas e suplementos.

Atualmente a Lei dos Crimes Ambientais (9.605/98), que define punições para quem praticar atividade lesiva ao meio ambiente, criminaliza apenas a realização de experiência dolorosa ou cruel em animal vivo, ainda que para fins didáticos ou científicos, quando existirem recursos alternativos.

Pelo projeto, quem não cumprir a determinação ficará sujeito às penalidades previstas na lei de crimes ambientais. No caso de provocar o sofrimento de animais durante pesquisa, a pessoa poderá pegar de três meses a um ano de prisão, além de ser multada.

Declaração Universal – O autor do projeto lembra que a Declaração Universal dos Direitos dos Animais, estabelecida pela Organização das Nações Unidas para a Educação, Ciência e a Cultura (Unesco) em 1978, prevê que experimentos que causem sofrimento físico ou psicológico violam os direitos dos animais e que métodos alternativos devem ser desenvolvidos e sistematicamente implementados.

“O ideal seria dispormos de técnicas alternativas ao uso de animais em toda atividade de ensino e pesquisa. A cura para muitas doenças depende de pesquisas médicas que utilizam animais e não podem ainda ser realizadas por métodos alternativos. Mas o que dizer, entretanto, de pesquisas relacionadas, por exemplo, à produção de cosméticos? Cosméticos não são produtos essenciais para a vida e a saúde humana. Não há, neste caso, nenhuma justificativa para tolerarmos o sofrimento de milhares de animais”, disse o parlamentar.

Tramitação – A proposição tramita em conjunto com o PL 4548/98 e outras oito propostas, que estão prontas para serem votadas em Plenário.

Psychological Abuse and Youth Anxiety and Depression (Science Daily)

Psychological Abuse Puts Children at Risk

ScienceDaily (July 30, 2012) — Child abuse experts say psychological abuse can be as damaging to a young child’s physical, mental and emotional health as a slap, punch or kick.

While difficult to pinpoint, it may be the most challenging and prevalent form of child abuse and neglect, experts say in an American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) position statement on psychological maltreatment in the August issue of the journal Pediatrics.

Psychological abuse includes acts such as belittling, denigrating, terrorizing, exploiting, emotional unresponsiveness, or corrupting a child to the point a child’s well-being is at risk, said Dr. Harriet MacMillan, a professor in the departments of psychiatry and behavioural neurosciences and pediatrics of McMaster University’s Michael G. DeGroote School of Medicine and the Offord Centre for Child Studies. One of three authors of the position statement, she holds the David R. (Dan) Offord Chair in Child Studies at McMaster.

“We are talking about extremes and the likelihood of harm, or risk of harm, resulting from the kinds of behavior that make a child feel worthless, unloved or unwanted,” she said, giving the example of a mother leaving her infant alone in a crib all day or a father involving his teenager in his drug habit.

A parent raising their voice to a strident pitch after asking a child for the eighth time to put on their running shoes is not psychological abuse, MacMillan said. “But, yelling at a child every day and giving the message that the child is a terrible person, and that the parent regrets bringing the child into this world, is an example of a potentially very harmful form of interaction.”

Psychological abuse was described in the scientific literature more than 25 years ago, but it has been under-recognized and under-reported, MacMillan said, adding that its effects “can be as harmful as other types of maltreatment.”

The report says that because psychological maltreatment interferes with a child’s development path, the abuse has been linked with disorders of attachment, developmental and educational problems, socialization problems and disruptive behaviour. “The effects of psychological maltreatment during the first three years of life can be particularly profound.”

This form of mistreatment can occur in many types of families, but is more common in homes with multiple stresses, including family conflict, mental health issues, physical violence, depression or substance abuse.

Although there are few studies reporting the prevalence of psychological abuse, the position statement says large population-based, self-report studies in Britain and the United States found approximately eight-to-nine per cent of women and four per cent of men reported exposure to severe psychological abuse during childhood.

The statement says pediatricians need to be alert to the possibility of psychological abuse even though there is little evidence on potential strategies that might help. It suggests collaboration among pediatric, psychiatric and child protective service professionals is essential for helping the child at risk.

Funders for the paper’s development included the Family Violence Prevention Unit of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

Along with MacMillan, the statement was prepared by Indiana pediatrician Dr. Roberta Hibbard, an expert on child abuse and neglect; Jane Barlow, professor of Public Health in the Early Years at the University of Warwick; as well as the Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Child Maltreatment and Violence Committee.

*   *   *

Emotion Detectives Uncover New Ways to Fight-Off Youth Anxiety and Depression

ScienceDaily (July 30, 2012) — Emotional problems in childhood are common. Approximately 8 to 22 percent of children suffer from anxiety, often combined with other conditions such as depression. However, most existing therapies are not designed to treat coexisting psychological problems and are therefore not very successful in helping children with complex emotional issues.

To develop a more effective treatment for co-occurring youth anxiety and depression, University of Miami psychologist Jill Ehrenreich-May and her collaborator Emily L. Bilek analyzed the efficacy and feasibility of a novel intervention created by the researchers, called Emotion Detectives Treatment Protocol (EDTP). Preliminary findings show a significant reduction in the severity of anxiety and depression after treatment, as reported by the children and their parents.

“We are very excited about the potential of EDTP,” says Ehrenreich-May, assistant professor of psychology in the College of Arts and Sciences at UM and principal investigator of the study. “Not only could the protocol better address the needs of youth with commonly co-occurring disorders and symptoms, it may also provide additional benefits to mental health professionals,” she says. “EDTP offers a more unified approach to treatment that, we hope, will allow for an efficient and cost-effective treatment option for clinicians and clients alike.”

Emotion Detectives Treatment Program is an adaptation of two treatment protocols developed for adults and adolescents, the Unified Protocols. The program implements age-appropriate techniques that deliver education about emotions and how to manage them, strategies for evaluating situations, problem-solving skills, behavior activation (a technique to reduce depression), and parent training.

In the study, 22 children ages 7 to 12 with a principal diagnosis of anxiety disorder and secondary issues of depression participated in a 15-session weekly group therapy of EDTP. Among participants who completed the protocol (18 out of 22), 14 no longer met criteria for anxiety disorder at post-treatment. Additionally, among participants who were assigned a depressive disorder before treatment (5 out of 22), only one participant continued to meet such criteria at post-treatment.

Unlike results from previous studies, the presence of depressive symptoms did not predict poorer treatment response. The results also show a high percentage of attendance. The findings imply that EDTP may offer a better treatment option for children experiencing anxiety and depression.

“Previous research has shown that depressive symptoms tend to weaken treatment response for anxiety disorders. We were hopeful that a broader, more generalized approach would better address this common co-occurrence,” says Bilek, doctoral candidate in clinical psychology at UM and co-author of the study. “We were not surprised to find that the EDTP had equivalent outcomes for individuals with and without elevated depressive symptoms, but we were certainly pleased to find that this protocol may address this important issue.”

The study, titled “The Development of a Transdiagnostic, Cognitive Behavioral Group Intervention for Childhood Anxiety Disorders and Co-Occurring Depression Symptoms,” is published online ahead of print in the journal Cognitive and Behavioral Practice. The next step is for the team to conduct a randomized controlled trial comparing the EDTP to another group treatment protocol for anxiety disorder.

Bryan Fischer Blames ‘Liberals’ Way’ For Aurora Mass Shooting (The Huffington Post)

The Huffington Post  |  By Meredith Bennett-Smith Posted: 07/24/2012 2:51 pm Updated: 07/24/2012 9:12 pm

Video

Pundits across the political spectrum have been quick to use the weekend’s tragic mass shooting at an Aurora, Colo., movie theater as a means of pushing various threads of partisan rhetoric.

Bryan Fischer, the oft-quoted mouthpiece of the American Family Association, was quick to jump on the bandwagon, tying the mass shooting first to a general breakdown in Judeo-Christian values, and most recently to the public school system’s teaching of evolution.

The Raw Story published comments made Monday by Fischer, the director of issues analysis for the fundamentalist Christian organization, during his daily radio show, “Focal Point.” In an impressive feat of extrapolation, Fischer linked the massacre to “the liberals’ way” of teaching the theory of evolution and preventing prayer in schools.

Fischer wondered aloud if bestselling author and California magachurch evangelical Reverend Rick Warren was referring to the alleged shooter, James Holmes, when hetweeted, “When students are taught they are no different from animals, they act like it.”

“If this tweet was connected to the shooting, to this James Holmes, to the one that killed the 12 and wounded the 58 in this theater, it would be appropriate,” Fischer said.

Fischer went on to blame Holmes’ murderous tendencies on Charles’ Darwin’s principle of survival of the fittest.

“[Holmes] sees himself as evolutionarily advanced just like he was taught in school about Darwin, that this is how natural selection works,” Fischer said.

Fischer then moved on to also blame the killings on the end of organized prayer in schools. The Supreme Court prohibited state-sponsored prayer in schools in two landmark cases in the early 1960s: Engel v. Vitale in 1962 and Abington School District v. Schempp one year later.

“We have spent 60 years telling God to get lost,” Fischer said. “What if every single day in [James Holmes’] educational process, there had been readings from the word of God … Who knows if things could have been different. But we’ve tried it the other way. The point of my column, we’ve tried it the liberals’ way for 60 years now. What do we got? We have massacres in Aurora.”

Fischer did not mention the fact that James Holmes’ family belonged to the Penasquitos Lutheran Church for about ten years, as originally reported by the Associated Press. Holmes’ mother still attends services there regularly.

The American Family Association is no stranger to controversy. In comments made during a segment of the AFA Journal program on Friday and reported by Right Wing Watch, AFA news director Fred Jackson, co-host Teddy James and guest Jerry Newcombe of the Truth in Action Ministries suggested that violent incidents in America, including in Aurora, were evidence of God’s judgement.

“The AFA Journal has been dealing with denominations that no longer believe in the God of the Bible,” Jackson said. “They no longer believe that Jesus is the only way of salvation, they teach that God is OK with homosexuality, this is just increasing more and more. It is mankind shaking its fist at the authority of God.”

“And God will not be silent when he’s mocked, and we need to remember that,”James said, to which Jackson replied, “We are seeing his judgment. You know, some people talk about ‘God’s judgment must be just around the corner,’ we are seeing it.”

Concerns Over Accuracy of Tools to Predict Risk of Repeat Offending (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (July 24, 2012) — Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and antisocial behavior in 73 samples involving 24,827 people: systematic review and meta-analysis

Tools designed to predict an individual’s risk of repeat offending are not sufficient on their own to inform sentencing and release or discharge decisions, concludes a study published on the British Medical Journal website.

Although they appear to identify low risk individuals with high levels of accuracy, the authors say “their use as sole determinants of detention, sentencing, and release is not supported by the current evidence.”

Risk assessment tools are widely used in psychiatric hospitals and criminal justice systems around the world to help predict violent behavior and inform sentencing and release decisions. Yet their predictive accuracy remains uncertain and expert opinion is divided.

So an international research team, led by Seena Fazel at the University of Oxford, set out to investigate the predictive validity of tools commonly used to assess the risk of violence, sexual, and criminal behavior.

They analyzed risk assessments conducted on 24,827 people from 13 countries including the UK and the US. Of these, 5,879 (24%) offended over an average of 50 months.

Differences in study quality were taken into account to identify and minimize bias.

Their results show that risk assessment tools produce high rates of false positives (individuals wrongly identified as being at high risk of repeat offending) and predictive accuracy at around chance levels when identifying risky persons. For example, 41% of individuals judged to be at moderate or high risk by violence risk assessment tools went on to violently offend, while 23% of those judged to be at moderate or high risk by sexual risk assessment tools went on to sexually offend.

Of those judged to be at moderate or high risk of committing any offense, just over half (52%) did. However, of those predicted not to violently offend, 91% did not, suggesting that these tools are more effective at screening out individuals at low risk of future offending.

Factors such as gender, ethnicity, age or type of tool used did not appear to be associated with differences in predictive accuracy.

Although risk assessment tools are widely used in clinical and criminal justice settings, their predictive accuracy varies depending on how they are used, say the authors.

“Our review would suggest that risk assessment tools, in their current form, can only be used to roughly classify individuals at the group level, not to safely determine criminal prognosis in an individual case,” they conclude. The extent to which these instruments improve clinical outcomes and reduce repeat offending needs further research, they add.

As armas do vazio mental (FSP)

26/07/2012 – 03h00

Janio de Freitas

Mais duas explicações estão lançadas em socorro à recusa do governo brasileiro, agora mesmo na ONU, de votar a favor da transparência no comércio internacional de armas.

Diz um dos dois argumentos que já está em prática, na indústria bélica, a inscrição indelével, a laser e em cada arma e projétil, indicando sua procedência. Assim será possível saber, quando de violações das normas internacionais e transgressão dos direitos humanos, o país que forneceu as armas em uso.

Belo e carinhoso consolo, sem dúvida, para as crianças que perderem seus pais e para os pais que perderem seus filhos estilhaçados por armamentos, agora sim, de procedência inapagável. Para usufruir do consolo, porém, resta ainda um pequeno problema que a inventividade dos engenheiros da matança, por certo, vai resolver.

Fatos atuais ajudam a expor a questão pendente. Há 24 horas noticia-se, inclusive com fotos e vídeos, o recurso do ditador sírio Bashar Assad ao bombardeio aéreo de cidades do seu país.

É um reforço mais drástico e preciso aos tiros de canhões, no entanto continuados. E às metralhas pesadas e também canhões dos tanques.

A população civil vê e ouve os aviões, e vê as bombas em direção a suas casas, suas famílias, à vizinhança. Não vê os canhões e não é certo que ouça os seus estrondos, mas ouve o silvo fino e feroz de suas balas cortando o ar. Todas essas peças assassinas com sua procedência devidamente identificada. Ainda a tinta ou talvez já a laser.

A população vê e ouve os sinais do sofrimento e da morte. Mas lerá a inscrição dos petardos em seu voo? E depois de bombas, balas e foguetes destruídos por sua própria explosão, onde estarão as inscrições para a comprometedora “identificação de quem os forneceu”? É provável que parte deles até ostentasse o nosso “made in Brazil”. Impossível afirmar ou negar: sabemos estar entre os exportadores de bombas terríveis, mas estamos proibidos de saber para quem as exportamos.

Não se sabe se o outro argumento foi criado pelo mesmo vácuo mental que invocou a “inscrição identificadora”, ou se foi um dos prodígios intelectuais que a adotam no Itamaraty, nas Forças Armadas, no jornalismo. A suposição de que os outros também padecemos de idiotia é a mesma, nos dois argumentos.

Eis o segundo: o sigilo das exportações de armas é necessário porque os compradores querem segredo do tipo e quantidade de seus armamentos.

Antes de tudo: nem sempre. Com a ideia fixa (da qual emanava certo cheiro de charuto cubano) de que os Estados Unidos usariam a Colômbia para atacar a Venezuela, Hugo Chávez tratou de alardear suas grandes compras militares. Se houve, o risco arrefeceu e foi silenciado pelo novo presidente colombiano, Juan Manuel Santos, mais lúcido do que o antecessor Uribe.

Acima de tudo, a conveniência militar alheia não é problema a ser resolvido pelo Brasil. Ainda mais se o pretendente a comprador é uma ameaça a relações normais com seus vizinhos ou à liberdade e aos direitos humanos em seu país.

Esta regra essencial no Estado de Direito é transgredida pelo Brasil, com suas exportações de bombas condenadas e outras armas para o Oriente Médio e para ditaduras africanas. E ainda em operações triangulares: a exportação para a ditadura de Robert Mugabe, do Zimbábue, no governo Fernando Henrique, foi tornar mais feroz a terrível guerra civil no Congo. Mas, nas organizações internacionais, e em casa mesmo, o governo brasileiro mostrava-se muito condoído com o genocídio congolês.

 

Gustavo Grabia, repórter do Olé, sobre violência de torcidas: “futebol argentino virou um enorme funeral” (Trivela)

17 de Julho de 2012 às 03:13, por Ubiratan Leal

Onipotentes. As barras bravas argentinas já deixaram de ser apenas torcedores que se organizaram para torcer por seu clube. E fora muito além do que se conhece no Brasil, com brigas entre simpatizantes de equipes rivais. Lá, esses grupos ganharam ramificação criminal, usando a projeção que as arquibancadas de futebol lhes dão para criar toda uma estrutura de delitos que vão do tráfico de drogas ao combate de manifestações políticas contra o partido que os contratar como mercenários.

Quem conta essa história é Gustavo Grabia, repórter do Olé, maior jornal esportivo da Argentina, e autor do livro La Doce (lançado no Brasil pela Panda Books), que revela as atividades da barra brava do Boca Juniors. Segundo ele próprio, o poder dos torcedores se tornou tão grande que parece impossível mudar o cenário.

Na Argentina, as brigas de torcedores rivais diminuíram muito. Qual é a nova cara da violência de torcidas?
Não acontece, mesmo com times do mesmo bairro, como Racing e Independiente. O maior medo do torcedor organizado é perder seu negócio. E como ele perde o negócio? Se briga e morre alguém. Porque, se morre alguém, os políticos determinam que alguém tem de cair no comando da torcida. Tudo bem que colocam outro no lugar, mas alguém acaba caindo. Par manter o negócio, não se pode brigar com outro clube. Quando acontece algo como na morte mais recente, em uma briga dentro da torcida do River, as pessoas pensam “se mataram entre eles, que se matem todos”. Vêem como um problema interno da máfia, a pressão por atitudes oficiais é bem menor.

Até porque mexeria com o orgulho do torcedor cujo barra brava foi morto, mesmo que ele não seja um barra brava, e cobraria mais por atitudes.
Certamente, e é por essas coisas que não acontece mais. Os chefes de torcida se conhecem, fazem negócios juntos. Durante a semana estão juntos em uma ONG de torcedores criada e financiadas pelo governo para agir em favor dele. Os torcedores de Racing e Independiente supostamente se odeiam, mas trabalham juntos para o mesmo político. Como vão brigar no domingo se durante a semana estão juntos nos mesmos delitos? Em Rosário, os líderes das torcidas de Newell’s e Rosario Central são sócios no tráfico de drogas, dominam regiões da cidade. Depois, cada um vai ao estádio fazer seu próprio negócio. Então, eles não brigam para não prejudicar todo o negócio.

O que essa ONG de torcedores financiada pelo governo faz?
Recebe dinheiro para trabalhar pelo partido do governo reprimindo opositores, marchas sindicais. Usaram os torcedores organizados para terceirizar a violência. Por exemplo, na Copa de 2010, o governo recrutou as torcidas organizadas para trabalharem pelo partido dele nas ruas, fazendo atos políticos. Uma situação muito louca. Em troca disso, pagou 232 passagens e hospedagens à África do Sul. Isso foi um escândalo internacional. A polícia sul-africana deportou quase 30 integrantes desse grupo.

Então a chance de as autoridades fazerem algo contra os torcedores é pequena.
Para ter uma ideia, o advogado do chefe da torcida do Boca era o advogado do chefe da polícia. E essa pessoa, depois, foi indicada como chefe de segurança do Congresso. O advogado do chefe da torcida tem como cliente a polícia e os partidos políticos! Como as autoridades vão perseguir alguém se compartilham advogados? Essas relações de poder na Argentina nunca vi em lugar algum do mundo. O chefe de segurança da Eurocopa esteve na Argentina ano passado e, quando eu explicava, ele não acreditava. Foi aos estádios para comprovar, e ficou horrorizado. Acha que não dá para consertar. Afinal, se o torcedor organizado tira uma foto com a presidente Cristina Kirchner, por que não teria impunidade?

Foto com a presidente?
Em setembro do ano passado, o San Lorenzo estava lutando para não ser rebaixado. A barra brava foi cobrar os jogadores e o chefe dela agrediu o capitão do time. Não aconteceu nada. Fui investigar e achei fotos dele em um ato político abraçado com a Cristina Kirschner! Com a presidente da República! Então, esse sujeito tem acesso à presidente. Eu sou um jornalista reconhecido e não tenho acesso a ela. Um monte de gente importante e conhecida não tem acesso a ela. Mas esse delinquente tem e tira uma foto ao lado dela. Não significa que ele seja amigo dela, mas, no mínimo, conhece pessoas influentes que conseguem colocá-lo ao lado dela em um ato político. Se esse apoio político não acaba, não há como combater o problema.

Em que nível está esse problema hoje?
Em relação a mortes, foram dez vítimas até agora em 2012. Mas isso são apenas os registros ligados ao futebol. Não estão computados os crimes cometidos por eles em questões políticas ou sindicais. Todos os últimos crimes de violência política ou sindical na Argentina têm barras bravas como responsáveis. São contratados pelos políticos para fazer o trabalho sujo. Também fazem delinquência comum, como narcotráfico. São uma máfia mesmo, com interesses em seus negócios e não mais nos clubes para os quais supostamente torcem. Um dos líderes de La Doce, a torcida do Boca, é torcedor do River Plate. Por quê? Porque essa pessoa viu que na torcida do Boca gira mais dinheiro.

E a torcida do Boca o aceita por quê?
Ele é um delinquente muito perigoso. Esteve em prisões de segurança máxima. Mas tem contatos com o mundo criminal e com políticos. É conveniente para os negócios ter um homem como ele na organização.

As leis argentinas são frouxas nessa questão ou dariam suporte a quem quisesse combater as barras bravas?
Existem as leis, o problema é que não se aplicam a quem precisa. Se você vai a um estádio, tem cinco minutos de loucura e atira algo no árbitro, será levado a uma delegacia. Provavelmente você não será preso, mas deve receber uma pena de ficar longe de estádios por um longo período. Se você fosse de uma torcida organizada, poderia fazer o que quisesse que nunca iriam até você. Antes de vir ao Brasil, o último morto do futebol argentino foi há três semanas, em um jogo do River contra o Boca Unidos, o penúltimo antes da promoção. Assassinaram uma pessoa nas arquibancadas em uma briga nos Borrachos del Tablón [barra brava do River Plate]. Quando a Justiça foi buscar as gravações das câmeras de segurança para identificar os responsáveis, as imagens da briga em si tinham sido apagadas. O médico que fazia o atendimento naquele jogo contou que os líderes da torcida levaram o corpo do rapaz dizendo “olha, aqui tem um que parece que está morrendo” e foram embora. Tudo dentro da torcida do River.

Como uma briga de máfia, em que um irmão manda matar o outro para ser herdeiro nos negócios do pai.
Isso. Os últimos dez mortos no futebol argentino foram em disputas dentro das torcidas.

Que se pode fazer para que as leis sejam aplicadas se eles têm tanto poder com as autoridades?
Não se pode fazer nada se os políticos mais importantes os utilizam. A barra brava do Boca é a maior e mais violenta do país e o governo já a utilizou para a campanha eleitoral de outubro do ano passado. Pagava para que levassem bandeirões com mensagens políticas. Francisco de Narváez, candidato mais importante à província de Buenos Aires, paga a La Doce para exibir um bandeirão escrito “Narváez governador”. Depois disso, eles podem fazer o que quiserem.

Quando fazem isso, vendem espaço publicitário. Um espaço publicitário que seria indiretamente do clube. Ainda que o clube não possa vender publicidade exibida pelos torcedores, o evento é dele e as pessoas veem o jogo pela TV por causa do clube. Eles não têm interesse em eles usarem seu poder de mídia para eles ganharem esse dinheiro, e não a torcida?
Em princípio, os clubes são sócios das torcidas, que também trabalham para os interesses dos dirigentes.

Como o Mauricio Macri [prefeito de Buenos Aires, ex-presidente do Boca]?
O crescimento da barra brava do Boca foi tremendo quando Mauricio Macri estava na presidência. Ele emprestava o estádio para os barras bravas jogarem bola! Mas não foi só ele. É que o Macri é o personagem mais conhecido que saiu do esporte e ingressou na política.

Se os barras bravas vivem desses negócios extracampo, por que ainda precisam do futebol?
Porque o futebol dá cartaz a eles. Na Argentina, os torcedores organizados são muito populares, têm tratamento de estrelas. O chefe da torcida do Boca e dá tantos autógrafos quanto Riquelme ou Palermo. O futebol retroalimenta a relação deles com os políticos. Porque, se põem uma bandeirão no jogo do Boca, têm enorme visibilidade. Um jogo do Boca tem 30% de audiência, 9 milhões de pessoas. Então a eles é conveniente falar com o chefe da torcida.

Então o futebol ainda representa uma ao parte da receita desse negócio, mesmo com as atividades extracampo?
Representa muito. Sem o futebol, todos os outros negócios ilegais não existiriam. Eles conseguem todos os outros negócios por serem os chefes de torcidas. Eles vendem ingressos, até 5 mil em uma partida. Se um ingresso médio está US$ 12, são US$ 60 mil em um jogo. Eles controlam o trabalho de guardador de carro, de flanelinha. Não sei como é aqui.

Aqui são “profissionais autônomos”.
Então, lá são controlados pelos barras bravas. Em março, houve um tiroteio muito grande por causa disso. Uma parte da torcida queria essa fatia do negócio e outra parte não queria abrir mão. Trocaram tiros, a poucas quadras de La Bombonera. Isso dá muito dinheiro. Há também as festas com os jogadores. Ao contrário do que ocorre no Brasil, onde as equipes de fora de Rio e São Paulo têm muita força, as equipes provinciais não são tão fortes na Argentina. Mesmo em Rosário, é provável que o Boca tenha mais torcida que o Central ou o Newell’s. Aí, a barra brava leva jogadores do time a filiais no interior. Digamos, levam Riquelme a Luján, a 200 km de Buenos Aires. Montam um evento para mil pessoas, cobrando ingresso para quem quiser ver, tirar foto e pegar o autógrafo com o ídolo.

Era algo que o clube poderia explorar.
Sim, mas deixa para os barras bravas fazerem. É uma coisa muito grande. Para cada evento desses, faturam US$ 20 mil.

E quanto se pode ganhar com isso?
Mauro Martín, presidente de La Doce, não tem trabalho reconhecido. Já vi suas declarações de imposto de renda e ele alega que é instrutor de boxe em um clube. Ele nunca vai lá. E basta ver o nível de vida que ele tem para perceber que tem algo errado. Ele possui uma picape Honda nova, que custa uns US$ 150 mil na Argentina, um Mini Cooper e uma casa de dois andares, com campo oficial de futebol. Imagina o tamanho do terreno. E diz que é instrutor de boxe ou que trabalha no escritório de seu advogado, que é um dos mais famosos da Argentina.

Ele teria de ser instrutor de boxe de Manny Pacquiao.
Pois é. E ele faz tudo isso e não é pego. Por quê? Bem, ele é casado com a secretária particular do governador de Buenos Aires. O chefe da barra brava do Boca Juniors é casado com a secretária da segunda pessoa mais importante da Argentina. Então, ele pode fazer qualquer coisa que ninguém vai incomodar.

Nas equipes provinciais, acontece a mesma coisa?
Tudo o/ que eu conto com La Doce ocorre igual em todas as equipes da Argentina. Pelo menos, coisas da mesma natureza. A única diferença é o peso de cada torcida pelo volume que mexe de acordo com o tamanho do clube. Eu sou torcedor do Ferro Carril, um time pequeno que está na segunda divisão. Lá acontece a mesma coisa, mas em menor quantidade porque é uma equipe pequena. O chefe da torcida do Ferro também não tem trabalho, mas, ao invés de uma picape Honda e um Mini Cooper, tem um carro normal. Ao invés de uma casa com dois andares, tem um apartamento de 150 m². Mas a forma de organização é a mesma nos clubes.

Economicamente, a diferença entre o futebol brasileiro e o argentino está aumentando. Quanto o futebol argentino perde por não explorar tudo o que pode por repartir com as barras bravas?
É muito dinheiro que perdem. Mas os dirigentes não têm interesse em mudar. Os clubes são associações civis sem fins lucrativos. Se o clube abre falência, o dirigente vai embora e não é responsabilizado. Fora que eles também ganham uma parcela. É algo conjunto.

Como assim?
Um bom exemplo foi a venda do Higuaín ao Real Madrid. Foi uma operação fraudulenta. O que apareceu no balanço do River Plate foi muito menor do que o pago pelo Real. O Real disse que pagou € 14 milhões, mas o River registrou a entrada de € 9 milhões. O balanço só foi aprovado porque os dirigentes de oposição foram ameaçados de morte pela barra brava. Eles entraram no recinto onde era a votação e ameaçaram de morte se não votassem a favor. Era algo contra o caixa do clube. Os € 5 milhões de diferença entre os valores foram repartidos entre todos, com 10% para os Borrachos del Tablón.

Há barras bravas menores nos clubes, que brigam por “mercado” com as maiores?
Não. Não há concorrência de barras de um mesmo clube. Não é que existe La Doce e “La Fiel de Boca” brigando por espaço como barras bravas do Boca. Há uma só por clube, e os confrontos são por poder e negócios dentro de cada uma.

A polícia também tem participação no esquema das organizadas?
De várias formas. Na temporada passada, naquele jogo em que o River caiu contra o Belgrano, o placar estava empatado. Se terminasse assim, o River caía. No intervalo, os dirigentes e os policiais liberaram o acesso para 12 torcedores conhecidos da organizada do River descessem das arquibancadas, andassem internamente pelos corredores do Monumental de Núñez e chegassem aos vestiários do árbitro, onde o ameaçaram de morte. Se ele não marcasse um pênalti, seria morto. Bem, o pênalti foi marcado, mas o River o desperdiçou e acabou caindo mesmo. Insólito! O incrível é que esses torcedores tiveram apoio dos dirigentes e da chefia da polícia. Tive acesso ao vídeo e se vê claramente como os policiais orientam os torcedores por onde ir para chegar aos vestiários. E não acontece nada quando isso chega à Justiça. Isso aconteceu há um ano e ainda estão discutindo se o tal vídeo é uma prova válida ou não para o caso. E, claro, nada aconteceu com os responsáveis até agora. É conveniente para a polícia que a violência siga.

Conveniente como?
Ela tira vantagem da violência. Há dois anos, houve uma investigação grande que envolveu até a cúpula da divisão de esportes da polícia. Consegui provas de como eles combinavam com os torcedores para criar violência. Porque, se há violência, eles têm argumentos para pedir mais efetivo para a segurança nas partidas, um serviço cobrado dos clubes e da AFA. Cada policial recebe US$ 40 por partida trabalhada. Então, no jogo que teria 300 agentes eles pedem mil, alegando que a partida anterior teve diversos problemas. Mas ficou comprovado que não levam mil policiais. Levam 500 e embolsam o resto. O Congresso tomou a denúncia e demitiu diretores a polícia.

Há grupos políticos ou algum setor da sociedade que se coloquem contra os barras bravas?
Há uma ONG, que se chama “Salvemos al Fútbol”, que trabalha contra a violência no futebol. Mas não tem muito poder. Até organizam mobilizações, mas não são muito populares. Eles levam à Justiça as questões que eu apresento no jornal, mas é um grupo pequeno. Eu já falei que o único jeito de mudar o cenário atual é uma greve de torcedores, ninguém mais ir ao estádio. Se a TV mostrar um Boca x River com estádio vazio, só com mil torcedores organizados de cada lado, os políticos perceberão que está acontecendo algo muito grave. Mas os torcedores dizem que se pode fazer tudo, menos deixar de ir ao estádio. Na Argentina há movimentos de indignação quando morre alguém, mas depois passa.

O presidente do Independiente entrou em conflito com a barra brava do clube. Foi o único dirigente a tentar fazer isso?
Foi. O Independiente era completamente dominado pela barra brava. Ela tinha o passe dos jogadores, o campo de treino. O chefe da torcida era o diretor da ONG de torcedores que o governo armou. Então, começaram a ganhar muito dinheiro e muito poder. E o Independiente era um desastre sob o controle da organizada. Ninguém queria ir mais lá, era muita violência. Então, o Javier Cantero fez uma campanha dizendo que tiraria a barra se votassem nele e ganhou.

Ele está tendo sucesso?
Mais ou menos. Ele assumiu em dezembro de 2011 e tentou acertar as coisas com a torcida. Em março eu descobri que ele ainda dava alguns benefícios. Até entendo que não dá para cortar tudo pela raiz, mas aí tem de explicar isso a todos. Ele dava muito menos que antes, mas ainda dava algo para mantê-los tranquilos. Quando publiquei a reportagem, ele admitiu publicamente seu erro, disse que acreditava que era uma forma de manter a barra brava controlada e que passaria a combater seriamente a partir dali. E, quando começou a fazer isso, as coisas ficaram piores.

De que forma?
São suspeitas, porque os jogadores negam. Mas, desde que o Cantero cortou todos os benefícios dos barras bravas, a equipe estranhamente começou a perder uma partida atrás da outra. Perguntam aos jogadores se estão sendo ameaçados pela torcida, exigindo que entreguem o jogo para derrubar o presidente. Eles dizem que não, mas não dá para saber se é verdade. Hoje, o time está brigando para não cair. Quando começar a próxima temporada, o Independiente estará em posição de rebaixamento direto pela média de pontos das últimas temporadas. E é o único clube, ao lado do Boca, que nunca caiu para a segunda divisão.

Se os torcedores do Ferro concordassem em fazer uma greve contra a barra brava do clube, você participaria?
Claro! Porque é o que tem de ser feito para que isso fique explicitado. Quando eu escrevi umas matérias sobre a torcida do Ferro, o líder da torcida me perguntou porque eu o atacava: “Eu faço com que não roubem dentro do nosso bairro. Mandamos roubar fora”. Bem, não tem de roubar em lugar nenhum! São padrinhos da máfia, cada um em seu setor. É uma situação cada vez pior, porque a política, ao invés de combatê-los, os incluiu. A pessoa que gerencia o futebol do Ferro é uma figura muito importante do Partido Justicialista [peronista, partido do governo].

Como foi fazer a investigação de tudo isso, para ter acesso?
Tenho uma vantagem, que é trabalhar há 16 anos com esse tema. Conheço todas as partes envolvidas. Eu colaboro muito com a Justiça ou os advogados que trabalham nesse meio. No caso dos barras bravas que invadiram o vestiário do árbitro no River x Belgrano, a polícia só conhecia dois dos 12. Me chamaram para ver as imagens e identificar os demais. Com isso, acabei tendo acesso ao vídeo e tendo os nomes dos envolvidos. Muitas vezes, acabo tendo mais informações das leis supostamente violadas em um processo que os próprios advogados dos torcedores. Quando precisam de uma informação sobre o que está acontecendo, acabam me passando muita coisa também.

Como as pessoas viram seu livro?
Há três públicos diferentes. Um público é o torcedor normal que admira a barra brava. Na Argentina, um dos problemas é que o torcedor que vai ao estádio admira a torcida organizada e só repudia quando há violência forte. Aí, diz “não, não quero mais”. Depois, passa um tempo, eles voltam a dizer que a torcida é necessária, porque organizam a festa, as bandeiras. Esse público é muito importante e há muitos boquenses que dizem que “hoje, somos os únicos com um livro sobre sua torcida organizada”.

Viram seu livro como prova da grandeza do Boca?
Isso. Cada vez que o Boca é campeão, sai uma revista. E, agora, sai um livro sobre a torcida. Eles encaram La Doce como um livro sobre a história deles próprios, e não é. É sobre o grupo mafioso.

E quais os outros dois públicos do livro?
Outro tipo é o torcedor comum que repudia a torcida organizada. E dizem que o livro comprova o que eles sempre disseram: são máfias e é preciso eliminá-las. Até porque, as relações das torcidas organizadas mostram como são as relações corruptas na Argentina como um todo. E há o grupo de barras bravas. No início, foi um pouco complicada a relação. Quando saiu o livro, reclamaram que me haviam me dito coisas, contado os crimes que cometem, sem saber que sairia um livro sobre isso. Mas, depois, ficam orgulhosos porque saíram um livro sobre eles, com fotos deles. Então, sentem como reconhecimento.

Os barras bravas chegaram a ameaçá-lo?
Sim, mas eu trabalho no Grupo Clarín, o maior da Argentina. Ele tem muito poder. Quando há um problema sério, isso ajuda. E nunca tive um problema grave com os barras bravas. Se eles reclamam, eu digo que vou processá-los pelas ameaças e passa. O problema é quando houve investigações que esbarraram na polícia, no caso da fraude nos efetivos utilizados para fazer segurança nas partidas. E eu tenho mais medo da polícia do que dos barras bravas. Aí tive ameaças sérias.

O que fizeram?
Invadiram minha conta de e-mail, me telefonaram dizendo que horas eu deixava meus filhos na escola. No segundo dia em que isso aconteceu, fui falar com o presidente do Clarín. Ele ligou para o diretor geral da polícia e contou o que acontecia comigo. Disse que, se acontecesse algo comigo no dia seguinte, essa história seria a capa do jornal, com ataques diretos à cúpula da polícia. Não aconteceu mais nada. Mas isso só aconteceu porque trabalho no Clarín. Se trabalhasse em um veículo menor, não teria esse suporte.

Os barras bravas o conhecem. Por que contam os crimes que cometem?
Porque gostam de aparecer no jornal. Gostam de se mostrar. Outro dia, houve um julgamento contra várias figuras importantes de La Doce. Quando terminou o julgamento, 500 barras bravas fecharam a rua, no centro de Buenos Aires, para comemorar. Rafael Di Zeo, chefe de La Doxe e barra brava mais popular da Argentina, se mostrava para fotos. Depois, me deu uma entrevista exclusiva porque eu cubro esse assunto sempre. Ele ainda ficou me perguntando se ia aparecer na capa do jornal! Não queria página interna.

Aqui no Brasil, muita gente acredita que a festa na arquibancada faz o torcedor comum ter alguma simpatia pelas organizadas, mas a violência é importante para atrair novos membros, sobretudo os mais jovens que querem alguma adrenalina e poder. Na Argentina, ser reconhecido como um criminoso que está acima do bem e do mal ajuda também a ter seguidores?
Sim, claro. Há muita gente que vêem nesses barras bravas exemplos de pessoas que começaram de baixo e estão ali no topo. Aí, imaginam que podem conseguir o mesmo. De qualquer modo, a festa no estádio também é importante porque transforma a questão da torcida em “folclore do futebol”, como se diz lá na Argentina. Mas eu acho que nenhum folclore pode ser admitido se uma pessoa morre por violência. E já foram 268 mortos. Não é festa nenhuma, é um funeral enorme.