Arquivo da tag: Antropologia

Crops, Towns, Government (London Review of Books)

Vol. 35 No. 22 · 21 November 2013
pages 13-15 | 3981 words

James C. Scott

The World until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies? by Jared DiamondPenguin, 498 pp, £8.99, September, ISBN 978 0 14 102448 6

 

It’s a good bet a culture is in trouble when its best-known intellectuals start ransacking the cultural inventory of its ancestors and its contemporary inferiors for tips on how to live. The malaise is all the more remarkable when the culture in question is the modern American variant of Enlightenment rationalism and progress, a creed not known for self-doubt or failures of nerve. The deeper the trouble, the more we are seen to have lost our way, the further we must go spatially and temporally to find the cultural models that will help us. In the stronger versions of this quest, there is either a place – a Shangri-la – or a time, a Golden Age, that promises to reset our compass to true north. Anthropology and history implicitly promise to provide such models. Anthropology can show us radically different and satisfying forms of human affiliation and co-operation that do not depend on the nuclear family or inherited wealth. History can show that the social and political arrangements we take for granted are the contingent result of a unique historical conjuncture.

Jared Diamond, ornithologist, evolutionary biologist and geographer, is best known as the author of Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years, one of the most influential accounts of how most of us came to live in places with huge concentrations of people, grain and domesticated animals, and how this helped create the world of massive inequalities and disparate life chances with which we now live. Diamond’s was not a simple, self-congratulatory ‘rise of the West’ story, telling how some peoples and cultures showed themselves to be essentially cleverer, braver or more rational than others. Instead, he demonstrated the importance of impersonal environmental forces: plants and herd animals amenable to domestication, pathogens, a favourable climate and geography that aided the rise of early states in the Fertile Crescent and the Mediterranean. These initial advantages were compounded by interstate competition in metallurgy for armaments and navigational devices. His argument was much praised for its bold and original synthesis, and much criticised by historians and anthropologists for reducing the arc of human history to a handful of environmental conditions. There was no denying, however, that Diamond’s simple quasi-Darwinian view of human selection was ‘good to think with’.

The subtitle of his new foray into deep history, ‘What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?’, suggests, without a trace of irony, that it might be more at home in the self-help section of the bookstore. By ‘traditional societies’, he by and large means hunting and gathering and small horticultural societies that have survived into the modern world in the marginal and stingy environments into which states have pushed them. They span the globe, but Diamond draws his principal examples from New Guinea and Australia, where his bird-watching interests lie, and from the findings of studies of hunter-gatherer societies (the Hadza and !Kung of Africa, the Piraha, Siriono and Yanomamo of Latin America) that fit best with his argument.

What could these historical relics possibly teach the wired, hyper-modernist residents of Diamond’s home village of Los Angeles? The question is not so preposterous. As he explains, Homo sapiens has been around for roughly 200,000 years and left Africa not much earlier than 50,000 years ago. The first fragmentary evidence for domesticated crops occurs roughly 11,000 years ago and the first grain statelets around 5000 years ago, though they were initially insignificant in a global population of perhaps eight million. More than 97 per cent of human experience, in other words, lies outside the grain-based nation-states in which virtually all of us now live. ‘Until yesterday’, our diet had not been narrowed to the three major grains that today constitute 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s caloric intake: rice, wheat and maize. The circumstances we take for granted are, in fact, of even more recent vintage than Diamond supposes. Before, say, 1500, most populations had a sporting chance of remaining out of the clutches of states and empires, which were still relatively weak and, given low rates of urbanisation and forest clearance, still had access to foraged foods. On this account, our world of grains and states is a mere blink of the eye (0.25 per cent), in the historical adventure of our species.

Why, Diamond asks, should we not plumb this vast historical record of human experience for what it might teach our WEIRD – ‘Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic’ – societies? Though they are the most thoroughly studied of societies, they are totally unrepresentative. If we wish to generalise about human nature, not to mention the history of human experience, we must, he argues, cast our net more widely.

Traditional societies in effect represent thousands of natural experiments in how to construct a human society. They have come up with thousands of solutions to human problems, solutions different from those adopted by our own WEIRD modern societies. We shall see that some of these solutions – for instance, some of the ways in which traditional societies raise their children, treat their elderly, remain healthy, talk, spend their leisure time and settle disputes – may strike you, as they do me, as superior to normal practices in the First World.

The lens through which Diamond, an unrelenting environmental biologist, sees the world affords striking insights but there are still massive blind spots. His discussion of languages, for example, is both passionate and convincing, as one might expect from a scholar whose New Guinea field site is home to roughly a thousand of Earth’s seven thousand languages. Aside from the ‘nine giants’ (Mandarin, Spanish, English, Arabic, Hindi, Bengali, Portuguese, Russian and Japanese), each with more than a hundred million speakers, the rest have on average only a few thousand speakers and a great many have far fewer. The ‘giants’ create vast heartland zones of monolingual citizens within which minor languages are exterminated. Inasmuch as language ‘speciation’ depends largely on dispersal and isolation, the contemporary processes of concentration and cultural homogenisation militate against the development of new languages and the survival of those already endangered. Half of the roughly 250 Australian languages are extinct, one third of the hundreds of Native American languages spoken in 1492 have disappeared and another third are unlikely to survive another generation. Each heartland of a ‘giant’ language is the graveyard of the languages it has overwhelmed.

The commonest contemporary cause of death is cultural and economic engulfment: the majority language so dominates the public sphere, media, schools and government that mastering it is the sole route to employment, social status and cultural citizenship. Diamond pauses to consider the argument that the consolidation of languages might be a fine thing. After all, eliminating language barriers makes for better mutual understanding. Why would one prefer a world in which hill peoples navigate through a linguistic thicket in which they must operate in five or more languages, as his informants do in the New Guinea Highlands?

Here, Diamond, as evolutionary biologist, has two choices. He could claim that the extinction of languages is the process of natural selection at work, just as the scientific racists of the late 19th century claimed that the extermination of backward tribal peoples like the Herero was a tragic but inevitable result of the expansion of superior races. But instead, he takes up a position not unlike that held by E.O. Wilson on the disappearance of species. He argues that just as natural diversity is a treasury of variation and resilience, so linguistic diversity represents a cultural treasury of expression, thought-ways and cosmology that, once lost, is gone for ever.

Literature, culture and much knowledge are encoded in languages: lose the language and you lose much of the literature, culture and knowledge … Traditional peoples have local-language names for hundreds of animal and plant species around them; those encyclopedias of ethnobiological information vanish when their languages vanish … Tribal peoples also have their own oral literatures, and losses of those literatures also represent losses to humanity.

It is undeniable that we are in danger of irrecoverably losing a large part of mankind’s cultural, linguistic and aesthetic heritage from the effects of ‘steamroller’ languages and states. But what a disappointment it is, after nearly five hundred pages of anecdotes, assertions, snippets of scientific studies, observations, detours into the evolution of religion, reports of near-death experiences – Diamond can be a gripping storyteller – to hear the lessons he has distilled for us. We should learn more languages; we should practise more intimate and permissive child-rearing; we should spend more time socialising and talking face to face; we should utilise the wisdom and knowledge of our elders; we should learn to assess the dangers in our environment more realistically. And, when it comes to daily health tips, you have to imagine Diamond putting on his white coat and stethoscope as he recommends ‘not smoking; exercising regularly; limiting our intake of total calories, alcohol, salt and salty foods, sugar and sugared soft drinks, saturated and trans fats, processed foods, butter, cream and red meat; and increasing our intake of fibre, fruits and vegetables, calcium and complex carbohydrates. Another simple change is to eat more slowly.’ Perhaps wary of resistance to a fully fledged hunter-gatherer diet, he recommends the Mediterranean diet. Those who have trekked all this way with him, through the history of the species and the New Guinea Highlands, must have expected something more substantial awaiting them at the end of the trail.

*

What were our ancestors like before the domestication of plants and animals, before sedentary village life, before the earliest towns and states? That is the question Diamond sets himself to answer. In doing so, he faces nearly insurmountable obstacles. Until quite recently, archaeology recorded our history as a species in relation to the concentration of debris (middens, building rubble, traces of irrigation canals, walls, fossilised faeces etc) we left behind. Hunter-gatherers were typically mobile and spread their largely biodegradable debris widely; we don’t often find their temporary habitats, which were often in caves or beside rivers or the sea, and the vast majority of such sites have been lost to history. When we do find them, they can tell us something about their inhabitants’ diet, cooking methods, bodily adornment, trade goods, weapons, diseases, local climate and occasionally even causes of death, but not much else. How to infer from this scant evidence our ancestors’ family structure and social organisation, their patterns of co-operation and conflict, let alone their ethics and cosmology?

It is here that Diamond makes his fundamental mistake. He imagines he can triangulate his way to the deep past by assuming that contemporary hunter-gatherer societies are ‘our living ancestors’, that they show what we were like before we discovered crops, towns and government. This assumption rests on the indefensible premise that contemporary hunter-gatherer societies are survivals, museum exhibits of the way life was lived for the entirety of human history ‘until yesterday’ – preserved in amber for our examination.

In the unique case of Highland New Guinea, which was apparently isolated from coastal trade and the outside world until World War Two, Diamond might be forgiven for making this inference, though the people of New Guinea have had exactly the same amount of time to adapt and evolve as homo americanus and they managed somehow to get hold of the sweet potato, which originated in South America. The inference of pristine isolation, however, is completely unwarranted for virtually all of the other 35 societies he canvasses. Those societies have, for the last five thousand years, been deeply involved in a world of trade, states and empires and are often now found in undesirable marginal areas to which they have been pushed by more powerful societies. The anthropologist Pierre Clastres argued that the Yanomamo and Siriono, two of Diamond’s prime examples, were originally sedentary cultivators who turned to foraging in order to escape the forced labour and disease associated with Spanish settlements. Like almost all the groups Diamond considers, they have been trading with outside kingdoms and states (and raiding them) for much of the past three thousand years; their beliefs and practices have been shaped by contact, trade goods, travel and intermarriage. So thoroughly have they come to live in a world of powerful kingdoms and states that one might call these societies themselves a ‘state effect’. That is, their location in the landscape is designed to help them evade or trade with larger societies. They forage forest and marine products desired by urban societies; many groups are ‘twinned’ with neighbouring societies, through which they manage their trade and relationship to the larger world.

Contemporary foraging societies, far from being untouched examples of our deep past, are up to their necks in the ‘civilised world’. Those available for Diamond’s inspection are, one might argue, precisely the most successful examples, showing how some hunter-gatherer societies have avoided extinction and assimilation by creatively adapting to the changing world. Taken together, they might make for an interesting study of adaptation, but they are useless as a metric to tell us what our remote ancestors were like. Even their designations – Yanomamo, !Kung, Ainu – convey a false sense of genealogical and genetic continuity, vastly understating the fluidity of these groups’ ethnic boundaries.

Diamond is convinced that violent revenge is the besetting plague of hunter-gatherer societies and, by extension, of our pre-state ancestors. Having chosen some rather bellicose societies (the Dani, the Yanomamo) as illustrations, and larded his account with anecdotal evidence from informants, he reaches the same conclusion as Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature: we know, on the basis of certain contemporary hunter-gatherers, that our ancestors were violent and homicidal and that they have only recently (very recently in Pinker’s account) been pacified and civilised by the state. Life without the state is nasty, brutish and short. Though Hobbes is not directly invoked, his gloomy view of savage life without a sovereign infuses Diamond’s narrative. ‘First and foremost, a fundamental problem of virtually all small-scale societies is that, because they lack a central political authority exerting a monopoly of retaliatory force, they are unable to prevent recalcitrant members from injuring other members, and also unable to prevent aggrieved members from taking matters into their own hands and seeking to achieve their goals by violence. But violence invites counter-violence.’

*

In a passage that recapitulates the fable of the social contract, Diamond implies that it was explicitly to end this violence that subjects agreed to found a sovereign power that would guarantee peace and order by restraining their habits of violence and revenge.

Maintenance of peace within a society is one of the most important services that a state can provide. That service goes a long way towards explaining the apparent paradox that, since the rise of the first state governments in the Fertile Crescent about 5400 years ago, people have more or less willingly (not just under duress) surrendered some of their individual freedoms, accepted the authority of state governments, paid taxes and supported a comfortable individual lifestyle for the state’s leaders and officials.

Two fatal objections come immediately to mind. First, it does not follow that the state, by curtailing ‘private’ violence, reduces the total amount of violence. As Norbert Elias pointed out more than half a century ago in The Civilising Process, what the state does is to centralise and monopolise violence in its own hands, a fact that Diamond, coming as he does from a nation that has initiated several wars in recent decades and a state (California) that has a prison population of roughly 120,000 – most of them non-violent offenders – should appreciate.

Second, Hobbes’s fable at least has nominally equal contractants agreeing to establish a sovereign for their mutual safety. That is hard to reconcile with the fact that all ancient states without exception were slave states. The proportion of slaves seldom dropped below 30 per cent of the population in early states, reaching 50 per cent in early South-East Asia (and in Athens and Sparta as much as 70 and 86 per cent). War captives, conquered peoples, slaves purchased from slave raiders and traders, debt bondsmen, criminals and captive artisans – all these people were held under duress, as the frequency of state collapse, revolt and flight attests. As either a theory or a historical account of state-formation, Diamond’s story makes no sense.

The straw man in his argument is that contemporary hunter-gatherer societies are oases of peace, co-operation and order. Of course they are not. The question, rather, is how violent they are compared to state-societies and what are the causes of the violence that does exist. There is, contra Diamond, a strong case that might be made for the relative non-violence and physical well-being of contemporary hunters and gatherers when compared with the early agrarian states. Non-state peoples have many techniques for avoiding bloodshed and revenge killings: the payment of compensation or Weregild, arranged truces (‘burying the hatchet’), marriage alliances, flight to the open frontier, outcasting or handing over a culprit who started the trouble. Diamond does not seem to appreciate the strong social forces mobilised by kinsmen to restrain anyone contemplating a hasty and violent act that will expose all of them to danger. These practices are examined by many of the ethnographers who have carried out intensive fieldwork in the New Guinea Highlands (for example by Edward L. Schieffelin in The Sorrow of the Lonely and the Burning of the Dancers, Marilyn Strathern inWomen in Between, and Andrew Strathern and Pamela Stewart’s work on compensation), but they make no dent in Diamond’s one-dimensional view of the desire for revenge.

On the other side of the ledger, when it comes to violence in early agrarian states, one must weigh rebellion, war and systematic violence against slaves and women (as a rule of thumb, agrarian states everywhere created patriarchal property regimes which reduced the status and freedom of women) against ‘tribal conflicts’. We also know, and Diamond notes, that hunter-gatherers even today have healthier diets and far fewer communicable diseases. Believing, against the evidence, that hunters and gatherers live in daily fear of starvation, he fails to note that they also work far less hard and thus have far more leisure. Marshall Sahlins called hunter-gatherers, even when relegated to the most undesirable environments, ‘the original affluent society’. It’s hard to imagine Diamond’s primitives giving up their physical freedom, their varied diet, their egalitarian social structure, their relative freedom from famine, large-scale state wars, taxes and systematic subordination in exchange for what Diamond imagines to be ‘the king’s peace’. Reading his account one can get the impression that the choice facing hunters and gatherers was one between their world and, say, the modern Danish welfare state. In practice, their option was to trade what they had for subjecthood in the early agrarian state.

No matter how one defines violence and warfare in existing hunter-gatherer societies, the greater part of it by far can be shown to be an effect of the perils and opportunities represented by a world of states. A great deal of the warfare among the Yanomamo was, in this sense, initiated to monopolise key commodities on the trade routes to commercial outlets (see, for example, R. Brian Ferguson’s Yanomami Warfare: A Political History, a strong antidote to the pseudo-scientific account of Napoleon Chagnon on which Diamond relies heavily). Much of the conflict among Celtic and Germanic peoples on the fringes of Imperial Rome was essentially commercial war as groups jockeyed for access to Roman markets. The unprecedented riches conjured by the ivory trade in the late 19th century set off hundreds of wars among Africans for whom tusks were the currency that purchased muskets, power and trade goods. Borneo/Kalimantan was originally settled more than a millennium ago, it is now believed, by Austronesians who regarded it as an ideal foraging ground for the Chinese luxury market in feathers, camphor wood, tortoiseshell, bezoar stones, hornbill and rhinoceros ivory, and edible birds’ nests. They were there for trade, and that meant conflict over the most profitable sites for foraging and exchange. It would be impossible to understand intertribal warfare in colonial North America without considering the competition for fur trade profits that allowed the winners to buy firearms and allies, and to dominate their rivals.

In the world of states, hunter-gatherers and nomads, one commodity alone dominated all others: people, aka slaves. What agrarian states needed above all else was manpower to cultivate their fields, build their monuments, man their armies and bear and raise their children. With few exceptions, the epidemiological conditions in cities until very recently were so devastating that they could grow only by adding new populations from their hinterlands. They did this in two ways. They took captives in wars: most South-East Asian early state chronicles gauge the success of a war by the number of captives marched back to the capital and resettled there. The Athenians and Spartans might kill the men of a defeated city and burn its crops, but they virtually always brought back the women and children as slaves. And they bought slaves: a slave merchant caravan trailed every Roman war scooping up the slaves it inevitably produced.

The fact is that slaving was at the very centre of state-making. It is impossible to exaggerate the massive effects of this human commodity on stateless societies. Wars between states became a kind of booty capitalism, where the major prize was human traffic. The slave trade then completely transformed the non-state ‘tribal zone’. Some groups specialised in slave-raiding, mounting expeditions against weaker and more isolated groups and then selling them to intermediaries or directly at slave markets. The oldest members of highland groups in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and Burma can recall their parents’ and grandparents’ memories of slave raids. The fortified, hilltop villages, with thorny, twisting and hidden approaches that early colonists found in parts of South-East Asia and Africa were largely a response to the slave trade.

There is plenty of violence in the world of hunter-gatherers, though it is hardly illuminated by resorting to statistical comparisons between the mortality rates of a tiny tribal war in Kalimantan and the Battle of the Somme or the Holocaust. This violence, however, is almost entirely a state-effect. It simply cannot be understood historically from 4000 BC forward apart from the appetite of states for trade goods, slaves and precious ores, any more than the contemporary threat to remote indigenous groups can be understood apart from the appetite of capitalism and the modern state for rare minerals, hydroelectric sites, plantation crops and timber on the lands of these peoples. Papua New Guinea is today the scene of a particularly violent race for minerals, aided by states and their militias and, as Stuart Kirsch’s Mining Capitalismshows, its indigenous politics can be understood only in this context. Contemporary hunter-gatherer life can tell us a great deal about the world of states and empires but it can tell us nothing at all about our prehistory. We have virtually no credible evidence about the world until yesterday and, until we do, the only defensible intellectual position is to shut up.

Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human (somatosphere)

September 23, 2013

By Frédéric Keck

This article is part of the series: 

Editor’s note: As part of our new series, Second Opinion (not to be confused with the SMA’s similarly titled newsletter) we ask two contributors to review the same book, respond to the same question, or comment on the same set of issues.  For our first pair of Second Opinion posts, we invited two reviews of Eduardo Kohn’s new book, How Forests Think. The second review will appear within the next few weeks.

How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human

 By Eduardo Kohn

University of California Press, 2013

$29.95, £19.95; Paperback, 228 pages.

There is a long genealogy of anthropologists who have borrowed their titles from the translation of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s La mentalité primitive — How Natives Think.  Running from Marshall Sahlins’ How “Natives” Think to Maurice Bloch’s How We Think They Think, these transformations run parallel to those of the discipline itself. By entitling his book How Forests Think, Eduardo Kohn indicates that he doesn’t study the way the people he worked with in Ecuador thought about forests, but the way forests actually think. By making a claim about the relation between life and thought, this book takes part in the ontological turn (Candea 2010) that decenters anthropologists’ longstanding focus on cultural representations to ask how representations emerge within forms of life. Following Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo Kohn shows that Amazonian ethnography challenges our conceptions of life and thought in a way that raises the ontological question of what there is. As the ecological crisis leads to a proliferation of new entities that both blur the opposition between nature and culture and ask for political recognition – “pets, weeds, pests, commensals, new pathogens, ‘wild’ animals, or technoscientific ‘mutants,’” (9) this kind of ethnography cautiously scrutinizes the continuities and discontinuities between humans and nonhumans. The book is ethnographic in a classical sense, and yet its chapters follow a theoretical progression, while powerful images plunge into an “enchanted” world – a term Kohn takes up deliberately – entangling humans and nonhumans in puzzling ways.

The main thesis of the book is about semiosis, the life of signs. If we are troubled by the idea that forests think, it is because we conceive thinking as a conventional relation to the world. Following 19th century American philosopher Charles Saunders Peirce, Kohn argues that all signs are not conventional symbols, and that there are other ways to learn the meaning of signs than to relate them to each other in a cultural context. When a hunter describes the fall of a palm tree under the weight of a monkey as pu’oh, the meaning of this sign is felt with evidence, without knowledge of Quichua (the language spoken by Kohn’s informants), because it relates hunters, monkeys and trees in a complex ecosystem. Kohn asks for “decolonizing thought” and “provincializing language” by looking at relations between signs that are not symbolic. Hence the program of an “anthropology beyond the human” that places human symbols in the forms of life from which they emerge. Without romanticizing tropical nature, Kohn argues that most of our problems are ill-shaped, or filled with anxiety – as in a wonderful description of the bus trip that led him to Avila – if we don’t place them in a larger semiotic field.

Following Terrence Deacon’s interpretation of Peirce (2012), Kohn is less interested in the classifications of signs into indices, icons and symbols than in the process through which they emerge one from the other. A sign refers to something absent that exists in futuro, just as the crashing of the palm tree under the weight of a monkey refers to a coming danger for the monkey, and a possible catch for the hunter. Habits fix the meaning of signs by producing similarity, and are considered as “interpretants” of signs. Using the example of the walking-stick insect, Kohn argues that what appears to look similar is actually the product of a selection from beings that looked different. Signs thus refer to the past as a memory of beings who have disappeared. Since this relation to the past and future is what, for Peirce, constitutes selves, all living beings, and not only humans, can be considered as selves.

The strangeness of Kohn’s text come from the way it interlaces these theoretical analyses of signs with an account of the life of the Runa people, considered not as a cultural context but as “amplifying” certain ontological properties of life itself. “Living beings are loci of selfhood,” Kohn writes. “I make this claim empirically. It grows out of my attention to Runa relations with nonhuman beings as these reveal themselves ethnographically. These relations amplify certain properties of the world, and this amplification can infect and affect our thinking about the world,” (94). This is an original intervention in the ontological reappraisal of animism. Kohn neither contrasts animism to naturalism as two inverse ontologies in the mode of Descola, nor does he engage in the paradoxes of perspectivism like Viveiros.  Instead, he considers living beings as selves in relation to past and future relations, and social life as an amplification of this process of self-formation.

Thus, puma designates both predators like jaguars and shamans who can see the way that jaguars see. Runa people need to learn how jaguars see in order not to be eaten by them. The soul, as what exceeds the limits of the body, is “an effect of intersubjective semiotic interpretance,” (107). What Kohn calls “soul blindness” is an inattention to the effects of the souls of other living beings. The problem is how to live with runa puma: jaguars who act like humans, and kill to revenge other killings, who are dreaded but also considered to be mature selves.

Dreams, analyzed in Chapter 4, are common ways of communication with souls and remediating “soul blindness.” Runa people give hallucinatory drugs to dogs so that they will dream, and their barks during dreaming are interpreted literally—in the same way as their daytime barks–while human dreams of hunting are interpreted metaphorically. Rather than doing a symbolic analysis of dreams, Kohn places them in the semiotic life they express, between humans, dogs and jaguars. Dreams are ways of communicating between species without abolishing them, constituting a “trans-species pidgin.”

In Chapter 5, Kohn makes an important distinction between form and sign. “Whereas semiosis is in and of the living world beyond the human, form emerges from and is part and parcel of the nonliving one as well,” (174). The question he asks is that of the efficacy of form, the constraint it exerts on living beings. Taking the example of the distribution of rubber trees in the Amazonian forest, which depends on the ecology of parasites as well as on the network of rivers, he argues that shamanistic hunting and the colonial extraction of rubber were both constrained by the same form. Forms have a causality that is not moral but that can be called hierarchical: signs emerge from forms, and symbols from signs, in a hierarchy between levels of emergence that cannot be inversed. This is a powerful interpretation of the insertion of colonial extraction in forms that historically precede it: if power brings with it moral categories, this insertion cannot be thought of as an imposition from above, but rather as a fall-out or an incidental movement.

Kohn links this morphodynamic analysis of colonialism to Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of “la pensée sauvage” – a form of thought emerging from relations between signs rather than being imposed upon them. Through forms and signs, Runa people have “frozen” history in such a way that they can interpret events through their dreams. The dream of Oswaldo, who saw a policeman with hair on his shirt, is ambivalent: does it mean he will be caught by the white man, or that he will be successful in hunting peccaries? The final chapter of the book analyses the reversals in relation between the Runa and White missionaries or policemen, as well as the pronouns by which Runa people refer to themselves as subjects, such as amu. “Amu is a particular colonially inflected way of being a self in an ecology of selves filled with a growing array of future-making habits, many of which are not human. In the process, amu renders visible how a living future gives life some of its special properties and how this involves a dynamic that implicates (but is not reducible to) the past. In doing so, amu, and the spirit realm upon which it draws its power, amplifies something general about life—namely, life’s quality of being in futuro,” (208). The question for Runa people is how they can access the realm of the White masters, that is also the heaven of saints: what is generally called the “super-natural.”  To live is to survive, Kohn argues, that is to live beyond life, in the many absences that constitute life as a semiotic process.

The strength of this book is to propose a rigorous demonstration while never leaving empirical analysis. Starting on the level of signs in their triadic mode of existence, Kohn finds form on one side and history on the other, and describes their constraints and ambivalent relationships. This is not a dualism between nature and culture that would be solved through the concept of life – and Kohn tries to avoid an all-encompassing anthropology of life – but a logical tension that is amplified by humans, almost in the way that genetic material is amplified inside and outside the laboratory (Rabinow 1996). Kohn’s anthropology “beyond the human” – but not of the “post-human” – grounds itself in the life of signs where humans emerge to amplify them. The ambition of this ontological claim, its clarity and its theoretical productivity will not doubt be amplified by other ethnographic inquiries on life.

Frédéric Keck is a researcher at the Laboratoire d’anthropologie sociale (CNRS) in Paris. He has published works on the history of philosophy and social anthropology in France (Comte, Lévy-Bruhl, Lévi-Strauss) and translated Paul Rabinow’s French DNA into French. He now works on the management of animal diseases transmitted to humans, or zoonoses (Un monde grippé, Flammarion, 2010, Des hommes malades des animaux, L’Herne, 2012)

References:

Candea, Matei
 (2010) Debate: Ontology Is Just Another Word for Culture.Critique of Anthropology 30 (2): 172-179

Deacon, Terrence (2012) Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. New York: Norton.

Descola, Philippe (2005) Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: Gallimard.

Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo (1998) Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, n.s., 4, 469-488.

Rabinow, Paul (1996) Making PCR, A Story of Biotechnology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

An interview with Alan Greenspan (FT)

October 25, 2013 10:41 am

By Gillian Tett

Six years on from the start of the credit crisis, the former US Federal Reserve chairman is prepared to admit that he got it wrong – at least in part

Alan Greenspan©Stefan Ruiz

Acouple of years ago I bumped into Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in the lofty surroundings of the Aspen Institute Ideas Festival. As we chatted, the sprightly octogenarian declared that he was becoming interested in social anthropology – and wanted to know what books to read.

“Anthropology?” I retorted, in utter amazement. It appeared to overturn everything I knew (and criticised) about the man. Greenspan, after all, was somebody who had trained as an ultraorthodox, free-market economist and was close to Ayn Rand, the radical libertarian novelist. He was (in) famous for his belief that the best way to run an economy was to rely on rational actors competing in open markets. As Fed chair, he seemed to worship mathematical models and disdain “soft” issues such as human culture.

But Greenspan was serious; he wanted to venture into new intellectual territory, he explained. And that reflected a far bigger personal quest. Between 1987 and 2006, when he led the Fed, Greenspan was highly respected. Such was his apparent mastery over markets – and success in delivering stable growth and low inflation – that Bob Woodward, the Washington pundit, famously described him as a “maestro”. Then the credit crisis erupted in 2007 and his reputation crumbled, with critics blaming him for the bubble. Greenspan denied any culpability. But in late 2008, he admitted to Congress that the crisis had exposed a “flaw” in his world view. He had always assumed that bankers would act in ways that would protect shareholders – in accordance with free-market capitalist theory – but this presumption turned out to be wrong.

In the months that followed, Greenspan started to question and explore many things – including the unfamiliar world of anthropology and psychology. Hence our encounter in Aspen.

Was this just a brief intellectual wobble, I wondered? A bid for sympathy from a man who had gone from hero to zero in investors’ eyes? Or was it possible that a former “maestro” of free markets could change his mind about how the world worked? And if so, what does that imply for the discipline of economics, let alone Greenspan’s successors in the policy making world – such as Janet Yellen, nominated as the new head of the Fed?

Earlier this month I finally got a chance to seek some answers when I stepped into a set of bland, wood-panelled offices in the heart of Washington. Ever since Greenspan left the imposing, marble-pillared Fed, this suite has been his nerve centre. He works out of a room dubbed the “Oval Office” due to its shape. It is surprisingly soulless: piles of paper sit on the windowsill next to a bust of Abraham Lincoln. One flash of colour comes from a lurid tropical beach scene that he has – somewhat surprisingly – installed as a screen saver.

“If you are not going to have numbers on your screen, you might as well have something nice to look at,” he laughs, spreading his large hands expansively in the air. Then, just in case I might think that he is tempted to slack off at the age of 87, he stresses that “I do play tennis twice a week – but my golf game is in the soup. I haven’t had time to get out.” Or, it seems, daydream on a beach. “I get so engaged when I have a problem you cannot solve, that I just cannot break away from what I am doing – I keep thinking and thinking and cannot stop.”

The task that has kept him so busy is his new book, The Map and the Territory,published this month and a successor to an earlier memoir, The Age of Turbulence.To the untrained eye, this title might seem baffling. But to Greenspan, the phrase is highly significant. For what his new manuscript essentially does is explain his intellectual journey since 2007. Most notably it shows why he now thinks that the “map” that he (and many others) once used to analyse finance is incomplete – and what this means for anyone wanting to navigate today’s economic “territory”.

Greenspan in the 'Oval Office' of his Washington workplace©Stefan RuizGreenspan in the ‘Oval Office’ of his Washington workplace

This is not quite the mea culpa that some people who are angry about the credit bubble would like to see. Greenspan is a man who built his career by convincing people that he was correct. Born in New York to a family of east European Jewish ancestry, he trained as an economist and, before he was appointed by Ronald Reagan to run the Fed, was an economic consultant on Wall Street (interspersed with a brief spell working for the Nixon administration). This background once made him lauded; today it seems more of a liability, at least in the eyes of the political left. “Before [2007] I was embarrassed by the adulation – they made me a rock star,” he says. “But I knew then that I was being praised for something I didn’t really do. So after, when I got hammered, it kind of balanced out, since I don’t think I deserved the criticism either … I am a human so I feel it but not as much as some.”

Yet in one respect, at least, Greenspan has had a change of heart: he no longer thinks that classic orthodox economics and mathematical models can explain everything. During the first six decades of his career, he thought – or hoped – that Homo economicus was a rational being and that algorithms could forecast behaviour. When he worked on Wall Street he loved creating models and when he subsequently joined the Fed he believed the US central bank was brilliantly good at this. “The Fed model was as advanced as you could possibly get it,” he recalls. “All the new concepts with every theoretical advance was embodied in that model – rational expectations, monetarism, all sorts of sophisticated means of thinking about how the economy worked. The Fed has 250 [economic] PhDs in that division and they are all very smart.”

And yet in September 2008, this pride was shattered when those venerated models suddenly stopped working. “The whole period upset my view of how the world worked – the models failed at a time when we needed them most … and the failure was uniform,” he recalls, shaking his head. “JPMorgan had the American economy accelerating three days before [the collapse of Lehman Brothers] – their model failed. The Fed model failed. The IMF model failed. I am sure the Goldman model also missed it too.

“So that left me asking myself what has happened? Are we living in an unreal world which has a model which is supposed to replicate the economy but gets caught out by one of the most extraordinary events in history?”

Shocked, Greenspan spent the subsequent months trying to answer his own question. He crunched and re-crunched his beloved algorithms, scoured the data and tested his ideas. It was not the first time he had engaged in intellectual soul-searching: in his youth he had once ascribed to intellectual positivism, until Rand, the libertarian, persuaded him those ideas were wrong. However, this was more radical. Greenspan was losing faith in “the presumption of neoclassical economics that people act in rational self-interest”. “To me it suddenly seemed that the whole idea of taking the maths as the basis of pricing that system failed. The whole structure of risk evaluation – what they call the ‘Harry Markowitz approach’ – failed,” he observes, referring to the influential US economist who is the father of modern portfolio management. “The rating agency failed completely and financial services regulation failed too.”

But if classic models were no longer infallible, were there alternative ways to forecast an economy? Greenspan delved into behavioural economics, anthropology and psychology, and the work of academics such as Daniel Kahneman. But those fields did not offer a magic wand. “Behavioural economics by itself gets you nowhere and the reason is that you cannot create a macro model based on just [that]. To their credit, behavioural economists don’t [even] claim they can,” he points out.

Alan Greenspan with Ayn Rand©GettyIn 1974 with friend and inspiration, the writer Ayn Rand

But as the months turned into years, Greenspan slowly developed a new intellectual framework. This essentially has two parts. The first half asserts that economic models still work in terms of predicting behaviour in the “real” economy: his reading of past data leaves him convinced that algorithms can capture trends in tangible items like inventories. “In the non-financial part of the system [rational economic theory] works very well,” he says. But money is another matter: “Finance is wholly different from the rest the economy.” More specifically, while markets sometimes behave in ways that models might predict, they can also become “irrational”, driven by animal spirits that defy maths.

Greenspan partly blames that on the human propensity to panic. “Fear is a far more dominant force in human behaviour than euphoria – I would never have expected that or given it a moment’s thought before but it shows up in the data in so many ways,” he says. “Once you get that skewing in [statistics from panic] it creates the fat tail.” The other crucial issue is what economists call “leverage” (more commonly dubbed “debt”). When debt in an economy is low, then finance is “neutral” in economic terms and can be explained by models, Greenspan believes. But when debt explodes, this creates fragility – and that panic. “The very nature of finance is that it cannot be profitable unless it is significantly leveraged … and as long as there is debt there can be failure and contagion.”

A cynic might complain that it is a pity Greenspan did not spot that “flaw” when he was running the Fed and leverage was exploding. He admits that he first saw how irrational finance could become as long ago as the 1950s and 1960s when he briefly tried, as a young New York economist, to trade commodity markets. Back then he thought he could predict cotton values “from the outside, looking at supply-demand forces”. But when he actually “bought a seat in the market and did a lot of trading” he discovered that rational logic did not always rule. “There were a couple of guys in that exchange who couldn’t tell a hide from copper sheeting but they made a lot of money. Why? They weren’t trading a commodity but human nature … and there is something about human nature which is not rational.”

Half-a-century later, when Greenspan was running the Fed, he had seemingly come to assume that markets would always “self-correct”, in a logical manner. Thus he did not see any reason to prick bubbles or control excessive exuberance by government fiat. “If bubbles are not leveraged, they can be highly disruptive to the wealth of people who own assets but there are not really any secondary consequences,” he explains, pointing out that the stock market bubble of the late 1980s and tech bubble of the late 1990s both deflated – without real economic damage. “It is only when you have leverage that a collapse in values becomes so contagious.”

Of course, the tragedy of the noughties credit bubble was that this bout of exuberance – unlike 1987 or 2001 – did involve leverage on a massive scale. Greenspan, for his part, denies any direct culpability for this. Though critics have carped that he cut rates in 2001, and thus created easy money, he points out that from 2003 onwards the Fed, and other central banks, were diligently raising interest rates. But even “when we raised [official] rates, long-term rates went down – bond prices were very high”, he argues, blaming this “conundrum” on the fact that countries such as China were experiencing “a huge increase in savings, all of which spilled into the developed world and the global bond market at that time”. But whatever the source of this leverage, one thing is clear: Greenspan, like his critics, now agrees that this tidal wave of debt meant that classic economic theory became impotent to forecast how finance would behave. “We have a system of finance which is far too leveraged – [the models] cannot work in this context.”

So what does that mean for institutions such as the Fed? When I arrived to interview Greenspan, the television screens were filled with the face of Yellen. What advice would he give her? Should she rip up all the Fed’s sophisticated models? Hire psychologists or anthropologists instead?

Alan Greenspan with former US President George W. Bush©Chuck KennedyMay 2004. Greenspan is nominated as Fed chairman for an unprecedented fifth term by President George W. Bush

For the first time during our two-hour conversation, Greenspan looks nonplussed. “It never entered my mind – it’s almost too presumptuous of me to say. I haven’t thought about it.” Really? I press him. He shakes his head vigorously. And then he slides into diplomatic niceties. One unspoken, albeit binding, rule of central banking is that the current and former incumbents of the top jobs never criticise each other in public. “Yellen is a great economist, a wonderful person,” he insists.

But tact cannot entirely mask Greenspan’s deep concern that six years after the leverage-fuelled crisis, there is even more debt in the global financial system and even easier money due to quantitative easing. And later he admits that the Fed faces a “brutal” challenge in finding a smooth exit path. “I have preferences for rates which are significantly above where they are,” he observes, admitting that he would “hardly” be tempted to buy long-term bonds at their current rates. “I run my own portfolio and I am not long [ie holding] 30-year bonds.”

But even if Greenspan is wary of criticising quantitative easing, he is more articulate about banking. Most notably, he is increasingly alarmed about the monstrous size of the debt-fuelled western money machine. “There is a very tricky problem we don’t know how to solve or even talk about, which is an inexorable rise in the ratio of finance and financial insurance as a ratio of gross domestic income,” he says. “In the 1940s it was 2 per cent of GDP – now it is up to 8 per cent. But it is a phenomenon not indigenous to the US – it is everywhere.

“You would expect that with the 2008 crisis, the share of finance in the economy would go down – and it did go down for a while. But then it bounced back despite the fact that finance was held in such terrible repute! So you have to ask: why are the non-financial parts of the economy buying these services? Honestly, I don’t know the answer.”

What also worries Greenspan is that this swelling size has gone hand in hand with rising complexity – and opacity. He now admits that even (or especially) when he was Fed chairman, he struggled to track the development of complex instruments during the credit bubble. “I am not a neophyte – I have been trading derivatives and things and I am a fairly good mathematician,” he observes. “But when I was sitting there at the Fed, I would say, ‘Does anyone know what is going on?’ And the answer was, ‘Only in part’. I would ask someone about synthetic derivatives, say, and I would get detailed analysis. But I couldn’t tell what was really happening.”

This last admission will undoubtedly infuriate critics. Back in 2005 and 2006, Greenspan never acknowledged this uncertainty. On the contrary, he kept insisting that financial innovation was beneficial and fought efforts by other regulators to rein in the more creative credit products emerging from Wall Street. Even today he remains wary of government control; he does not want to impose excessive controls on derivatives, for example.

But what has changed is that he now believes banks should be forced to hold much thicker capital cushions. More surprising, he has come to the conclusion that banks need to be smaller. “I am not in favour of breaking up the banks but if we now have such trouble liquidating them I would very reluctantly say we would be better off breaking up the banks.” He also thinks that finance as a whole needs to be cut down in size. “Is it essential that the division of labour [in our economy] requires an ever increasing amount of financial insight? We need to make sure that the services that non-financial services buy are not just ersatz or waste,” he observes with a wry chuckle.

Alan Greenspan with wife Andrea Mitchell©GettyIn 2004 with wife Andrea Mitchell

There is a profound irony here. In some senses, Greenspan remains an orthodox pillar of ultraconservative American thought: The Map and the Territory rails against fiscal irresponsibility, the swelling social security budget and the entitlement culture. And yet he, like his leftwing critics, now seems utterly disenchanted with Wall Street and the extremities of free-market finance – never mind that he championed them for so many years.

Perhaps this just reflects an 87-year-old man who is trying to make sense of the extreme swings in his reputation. I prefer to think, though, that it reflects a mind that – to his credit – remains profoundly curious, even after suffering this rollercoaster ride. When I say to him that I greatly admire his spirit of inquiry – even though I disagree with some conclusions – he immediately peppers me with questions. “Tell me what you disagree with – please. I really want to hear,” he insists, with a smile that creases his craggy face. As someone who never had children, his books now appear to be his real babies; the only other subject which inspires as much passion is when I mention his adored second wife, Andrea Mitchell, the television journalist.

But later, after I have left, it occurs to me that the real key to explaining the ironies and contradictions that hang over Greenspan is that he has – once again – unwittingly become a potent symbol of an age. Back in the days of the “Great Moderation” – the period of reduced economic volatility starting in the 1980s – most policy makers shared his sunny confidence in 20th-century progress. There was a widespread assumption that a mixture of free market capitalism, innovation and globalisation had made the world a better place. Indeed, it was this very confidence that laid the seeds of disaster. Today, however, that certainty has crumbled; the modern political and economic ecosystem is marked by a culture of doubt and cynicism. Nobody would dare call Yellen “maestro” today; not when the Fed (and others) are tipping into such uncharted territory. This delivers some benefits: Greenspan himself now admits this pre-2007 confidence was an Achilles heel. “Beware of success in policy,” he observes, laughing. “A stable, moderately growing, non-inflationary environment will create a bubble 100 per cent of the time.”

But a world marked by profound uncertainty is also a deeply disconcerting and humbling place. Today there are no easy answers or straightforward heroes or villains, be that among economists, anthropologists or anyone else. Perhaps the biggest moral of The Map and the Territory is that in a shifting landscape, we all need to keep challenging our assumptions and prejudices. And not just at the age of 87.

gillian.tett@ft.com; ‘The Map and the Territory: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of Forecasting‘ by Alan Greenspan is published by Penguin.

 

Building Cyberinfrastructure Capacity for the Social Sciences (American Anthropological Association)

Posted on October 9, 2013 by Joslyn O.

Today’s guest blog post is by Dr. Emilio Moran. Dr. Moran is Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Indiana University and Visiting Hannah Distinguished Professor, Michigan State University.

emilio-moran_profileThe United States and the world are changing rapidly.  These new conditions challenge the ability of the social, behavioral and economic sciences to understand what is happening at a national scale and in people’s daily local lives.   Forces such as globalization, the shifting composition of the economy, and the revolution in information brought about by the internet and social media are just a few of the forces that are changing Americans’ lives.  Not only has the world changed since data collection methods currently used were developed, but the ways now available to link information and new data sources have radically changed. Expert panels have called for increasing the cyber-infrastructure capability of the social, behavioral, and economic (SBE) sciences so that our tools and research infrastructure keep pace with these changing social and informational landscapes.  A series of workshops for the past three years has met to address these challenges and they now invite you to provide them with feedback on the proposal below and you are invited to attend a Special Event at this year’s AAA meeting in Chicago, Saturday, November 23, 2013 from 1215 to 1:30 pm at the Chicago Hilton Boulevard C room.

Needed is a new national framework, or platform, for social, behavioral and economic research that is both scalable and flexible; that permits new questions to be addressed; that allows for rapid response and adaptation to local shocks (such as extreme weather events or natural resource windfalls); and that facilitates understanding local manifestations of national phenomena such as economic downturns.  To advance a national data collection and analysis infrastructure, the approach we propose —  building a network of social observatories — is a way to have a sensitive instrument to measure how local communities respond to a range of natural and social conditions over time.  This new scientific infrastructure will enable the SBE sciences to contribute to societal needs at multiple levels and will facilitate collaboration with other sciences in addressing questions of critical importance.

Our vision is that of a network of observatories designed from the ground up, each observatory representing an area of the United States.  From a small number of pilot projects the network would develop (through a national sampling frame and protocol) into a representative sample of the places where people live and the people who live there. Each observatory would be an entity, whether physical or virtual, that is charged with collecting, curating, and disseminating data from people, places, and institutions in the United States.  These observatories must provide a basis for inference from what happens in local places to a national context and ensure a robust theoretical foundation for social analysis.  This is the rationale for recommending that this network of observatories be built on a population-based sample capable of addressing the needs of the nation’s diverse people but located in the specific places and communities where they live and work.  Unlike most other existing research platforms, this population and place-based capability will ensure that we understand not only the high-density urban and suburban places where the majority of the population lives, but also the medium- and low-density exurban and rural places that represent a vast majority of the land area in the nation.

To accomplish these objectives, we propose to embed in these regionally-based observatories a nationally representative population-based sample that would enable the observatory data to be aggregated in such a way as to produce a national picture of the United States on an ongoing basis.  The tentative plan would be to select approximately 400 census tracts to represent the U.S. population while also fully capturing the diversity that characterizes local places. The individuals, institutions and communities in which these census tracts are embedded will be systematically studied over time and space by observatories spread across the country. During the formative stages the number of census tracts and the number of observatories that might be needed, given the scope of the charge that is currently envisioned, will be determined.

These observatories will study the social, behavioral and economic experiences of the population in their physical and environmental context at fine detail. The observatories are intended to stimulate the development of new directions and modes of inquiry.  They will do so through the use of diverse complementary methods and data sources including ethnography, experiments, administrative data, social media, biomarkers, and financial and public health record. These observatories will work closely with local and state governments to gain access to administrative records that provide extensive data on the population in those tracts (i.e. 2 million people) thereby providing a depth of understanding and integration of knowledge that is less invasive and less subject to declining response rates than survey-derived data.

To attain the vision proposed here we need the commitment and enthusiasm of the community to meet these challenges and the resolve to make this proposed network of observatories useful to the social sciences and society. For more details on our objectives and reports from previous meetings, visit http://socialobservatories.org/. Please contribute your ideas at the site so that the proposal can benefit from your input and come to Chicago for the Special Event on Saturday, November 23, 2013. We are particularly interesting in hearing how this platform could help you in your future research. This is an opportunity for anthropological strengths in ethnography and local research to contribute its insights in a way that will make a difference for local people and for the nation.

Emilio F. Moran, co-Chair of the SOCN
Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Indiana University and
Visiting Hannah Distinguished Professor, Michigan State University

Transgendered Males Seen as an Asset to Some Ancestral Societies (Science Daily)

Oct. 2, 2013 — Transgendered androphilic males were accepted in traditional hunter-gatherer cultures because they were an extra set of hands to support their families. Conversely, by investing in and supporting their kin, these males ensured that their familial line — and therefore also their own genetic make-up — passed on to future generations despite their not having children of their own. This is according to an ethnographic study led by Doug VanderLaan of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Canada, published in Springer’s journal Human Nature. The study reports that this “kin selection” is still at play in pro-transgender societies today.

‘Androphilia’ refers to a predominant sexual attraction towards adult males, and takes on one of two possible gender roles depending on the cultural context: sex-gender congruent male androphilia (the typical male gender role) or transgendered androphilia (a gender role markedly similar to that of females in a given culture). Typically one of these variations is dominant within a society. For example, sex-gender congruency is more common in Western cultures, whereas the transgendered form is more typical of non-Western cultures, such as that of the Polynesian island nation of Samoa. The researchers also wanted to test predictions that enhanced kin-directed altruism is prominent in societies in which transgendered male androphilia is predominant.

To answer this question, VanderLaan and his colleagues compared the sociocultural environment of contemporary transgendered societies with ancestral small-group hunter-gatherers. Ancestral group size, sociopolitical systems, religious beliefs and patterns of residency were analyzed in 146 non-transgendered societies, and 46 transgender societies.

The analysis utilized ethnographic information about well-described nonindustrial societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample.VanderLaan and his colleagues found that transgendered male androphilia is an ancestral phenomenon typically found in communities with certain ancestral sociocultural conditions, such as “bilateral descent.” This term refers to societies in which the families of both one’s father and mother are equally important for emotional, social, spiritual and political support, as well as the transfer of property or wealth.

Also, the acceptance and tolerance of same-sex behavior evolved within a suitable, accepting environment in which discrimination against transgendered males was rare. Importantly, kin selection might have played a vital part in maintaining genes for male androphilia these societies. For example, it continues to be a driving force in contemporary Samoan fa’afafine transgender communities.Unless transgendered androphilic males are accepted by their families, the opportunities for them to invest in kin are likely limited. What was true of our ancestors still holds true. A society’s specific social organization and its general acceptance of transgenderism and homosexuality is even important today. When supported by society, transgendered males invest their time and energy in their kin in turn.

Journal Reference:

  1. Doug P. VanderLaan, Zhiyuan Ren, Paul L. Vasey. Male Androphilia in the Ancestral EnvironmentHuman Nature, 2013; DOI: 10.1007/s12110-013-9182-z

Vikings May Have Been More Social Than Savage (Science Daily)

Oct. 1, 2013 — Academics at Coventry University have uncovered complex social networks within age-old Icelandic sagas, which challenge the stereotypical image of Vikings as unworldly, violent savages.

Replica of Viking ship. Academics have uncovered complex social networks within age-old Icelandic sagas, which challenge the stereotypical image of Vikings as unworldly, violent savages. (Credit: © pemabild / Fotolia)

Pádraig Mac Carron and Ralph Kenna from the University’s Applied Mathematics Research Centre have carried out a detailed analysis of the relationships described in ancient Icelandic manuscripts to shed new light on Viking society.

In a study published in the European Physical Journal, Mac Carron and Kenna have asked whether remnants of reality could lurk within the pages of the documents in which Viking sagas were preserved.

They applied methods from statistical physics to social networks — in which nodes (connection points) represent individuals and links represent interactions between them — to home in on the relationships between the characters and societies depicted therein.

The academics used the Sagas of Icelanders — a unique corpus of medieval literature from the period around the settlement of Iceland a thousand years ago — as the basis for their investigation.

Although the historicity of these tales is often questioned, some believe they may contain fictionalised distortions of real societies, and Mac Carron’s and Kenna’s research bolsters this hypothesis.

They mapped out the interactions between over 1,500 characters that appear in 18 sagas including five particularly famous epic tales. Their analyses show, for example, that although an ‘outlaw tale’ has similar properties to other European heroic epics, and the ‘family sagas’ of Icelandic literature are quite distinct, the overall network of saga society is consistent with real social networks.

Moreover, although it is acknowledged that J. R. R. Tolkien was strongly influenced by Nordic literature, the Viking sagas have a different network structure to the Lord of the Rings and other works of fiction.

Professor Ralph Kenna from Coventry University’s Applied Mathematics Research Centre said: “This quantitative investigation is very different to traditional approaches to comparative studies of ancient texts, which focus on qualitative aspects. Rather than individuals and events, the new approach looks at interactions and reveals new insights — that the Icelandic sagas have similar properties to those of real-world social networks.

Journal Reference:

  1. P. Mac Carron, R. Kenna. Network analysis of the Íslendinga sögur – the Sagas of IcelandersThe European Physical Journal B, 2013; 86 (10) DOI:10.1140/epjb/e2013-40583-3

Math Explains History: Simulation Accurately Captures the Evolution of Ancient Complex Societies (Science Daily)

Sep. 23, 2013 — The question of how human societies evolve from small groups to the huge, anonymous and complex societies of today has been answered mathematically, accurately matching the historical record on the emergence of complex states in the ancient world.

A section of over 8000 Terracotta Warriors in the mausoleum of the first Qin emperor outside Xian, China. Intense warfare is the evolutionary driver of large complex societies, according to a new mathematical model whose findings accurately match those of the historical record in the ancient world. (Credit: iStockphoto)

Intense warfare is the evolutionary driver of large complex societies, according to new research from a trans-disciplinary team at the University of Connecticut, the University of Exeter in England, and the National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis (NIMBioS). The study appears this week as an open-access article in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The study’s cultural evolutionary model predicts where and when the largest-scale complex societies arose in human history.

Simulated within a realistic landscape of the Afro-Eurasian landmass during 1,500 BCE to 1,500 CE, the mathematical model was tested against the historical record. During the time period, horse-related military innovations, such as chariots and cavalry, dominated warfare within Afro-Eurasia. Geography also mattered, as nomads living in the Eurasian Steppe influenced nearby agrarian societies, thereby spreading intense forms of offensive warfare out from the steppe belt.

The study focuses on the interaction of ecology and geography as well as the spread of military innovations and predicts that selection for ultra-social institutions that allow for cooperation in huge groups of genetically unrelated individuals and large-scale complex states, is greater where warfare is more intense.

While existing theories on why there is so much variation in the ability of different human populations to construct viable states are usually formulated verbally, by contrast, the authors’ work leads to sharply defined quantitative predictions, which can be tested empirically.

The model-predicted spread of large-scale societies was very similar to the observed one; the model was able to explain two-thirds of the variation in determining the rise of large-scale societies.

“What’s so exciting about this area of research is that instead of just telling stories or describing what occurred, we can now explain general historical patterns with quantitative accuracy. Explaining historical events helps us better understand the present, and ultimately may help us predict the future,” said the study’s co-author Sergey Gavrilets, NIMBioS director for scientific activities.

Journal Reference:

  1. Turchin P, Currie T, Turner E, Gavrilets S. War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societiesPNAS, 2013 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1308825110

Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human (Somatosphere)

September 23, 2013

By 

Editor’s note: As part of our new series, Second Opinion (not to be confused with the SMA’s similarly titled newsletter) we ask two contributors to review the same book, respond to the same question, or comment on the same set of issues.  For our first pair of Second Opinion posts, we invited two reviews of Eduardo Kohn’s new book, How Forests Think. The second review will appear within the next few weeks.

How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human

 By Eduardo Kohn

University of California Press, 2013. $29.95, £19.95; Paperback, 228 pages.

There is a long genealogy of anthropologists who have borrowed their titles from the translation of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s La mentalité primitive — How Natives Think.  Running from Marshall Sahlins’ How “Natives” Think to Maurice Bloch’s How We Think They Think, these transformations run parallel to those of the discipline itself. By entitling his book How Forests Think, Eduardo Kohn indicates that he doesn’t study the way the people he worked with in Ecuador thought about forests, but the way forests actually think. By making a claim about the relation between life and thought, this book takes part in the ontological turn (Candea 2010) that decenters anthropologists’ longstanding focus on cultural representations to ask how representations emerge within forms of life. Following Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo Kohn shows that Amazonian ethnography challenges our conceptions of life and thought in a way that raises the ontological question of what there is. As the ecological crisis leads to a proliferation of new entities that both blur the opposition between nature and culture and ask for political recognition – “pets, weeds, pests, commensals, new pathogens, ‘wild’ animals, or technoscientific ‘mutants,’” (9) this kind of ethnography cautiously scrutinizes the continuities and discontinuities between humans and nonhumans. The book is ethnographic in a classical sense, and yet its chapters follow a theoretical progression, while powerful images plunge into an “enchanted” world – a term Kohn takes up deliberately – entangling humans and nonhumans in puzzling ways.

The main thesis of the book is about semiosis, the life of signs. If we are troubled by the idea that forests think, it is because we conceive thinking as a conventional relation to the world. Following 19th century American philosopher Charles Saunders Peirce, Kohn argues that all signs are not conventional symbols, and that there are other ways to learn the meaning of signs than to relate them to each other in a cultural context. When a hunter describes the fall of a palm tree under the weight of a monkey as pu’oh, the meaning of this sign is felt with evidence, without knowledge of Quichua (the language spoken by Kohn’s informants), because it relates hunters, monkeys and trees in a complex ecosystem. Kohn asks for “decolonizing thought” and “provincializing language” by looking at relations between signs that are not symbolic. Hence the program of an “anthropology beyond the human” that places human symbols in the forms of life from which they emerge. Without romanticizing tropical nature, Kohn argues that most of our problems are ill-shaped, or filled with anxiety – as in a wonderful description of the bus trip that led him to Avila – if we don’t place them in a larger semiotic field.

Following Terrence Deacon’s interpretation of Peirce (2012), Kohn is less interested in the classifications of signs into indices, icons and symbols than in the process through which they emerge one from the other. A sign refers to something absent that exists in futuro, just as the crashing of the palm tree under the weight of a monkey refers to a coming danger for the monkey, and a possible catch for the hunter. Habits fix the meaning of signs by producing similarity, and are considered as “interpretants” of signs. Using the example of the walking-stick insect, Kohn argues that what appears to look similar is actually the product of a selection from beings that looked different. Signs thus refer to the past as a memory of beings who have disappeared. Since this relation to the past and future is what, for Peirce, constitutes selves, all living beings, and not only humans, can be considered as selves.

The strangeness of Kohn’s text come from the way it interlaces these theoretical analyses of signs with an account of the life of the Runa people, considered not as a cultural context but as “amplifying” certain ontological properties of life itself. “Living beings are loci of selfhood,” Kohn writes. “I make this claim empirically. It grows out of my attention to Runa relations with nonhuman beings as these reveal themselves ethnographically. These relations amplify certain properties of the world, and this amplification can infect and affect our thinking about the world,” (94). This is an original intervention in the ontological reappraisal of animism. Kohn neither contrasts animism to naturalism as two inverse ontologies in the mode of Descola, nor does he engage in the paradoxes of perspectivism like Viveiros.  Instead, he considers living beings as selves in relation to past and future relations, and social life as an amplification of this process of self-formation.

Thus, puma designates both predators like jaguars and shamans who can see the way that jaguars see. Runa people need to learn how jaguars see in order not to be eaten by them. The soul, as what exceeds the limits of the body, is “an effect of intersubjective semiotic interpretance,” (107). What Kohn calls “soul blindness” is an inattention to the effects of the souls of other living beings. The problem is how to live with runa puma: jaguars who act like humans, and kill to revenge other killings, who are dreaded but also considered to be mature selves.

Dreams, analyzed in Chapter 4, are common ways of communication with souls and remediating “soul blindness.” Runa people give hallucinatory drugs to dogs so that they will dream, and their barks during dreaming are interpreted literally—in the same way as their daytime barks–while human dreams of hunting are interpreted metaphorically. Rather than doing a symbolic analysis of dreams, Kohn places them in the semiotic life they express, between humans, dogs and jaguars. Dreams are ways of communicating between species without abolishing them, constituting a “trans-species pidgin.”

In Chapter 5, Kohn makes an important distinction between form and sign. “Whereas semiosis is in and of the living world beyond the human, form emerges from and is part and parcel of the nonliving one as well,” (174). The question he asks is that of the efficacy of form, the constraint it exerts on living beings. Taking the example of the distribution of rubber trees in the Amazonian forest, which depends on the ecology of parasites as well as on the network of rivers, he argues that shamanistic hunting and the colonial extraction of rubber were both constrained by the same form. Forms have a causality that is not moral but that can be called hierarchical: signs emerge from forms, and symbols from signs, in a hierarchy between levels of emergence that cannot be inversed. This is a powerful interpretation of the insertion of colonial extraction in forms that historically precede it: if power brings with it moral categories, this insertion cannot be thought of as an imposition from above, but rather as a fall-out or an incidental movement.

Kohn links this morphodynamic analysis of colonialism to Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of “la pensée sauvage” – a form of thought emerging from relations between signs rather than being imposed upon them. Through forms and signs, Runa people have “frozen” history in such a way that they can interpret events through their dreams. The dream of Oswaldo, who saw a policeman with hair on his shirt, is ambivalent: does it mean he will be caught by the white man, or that he will be successful in hunting peccaries? The final chapter of the book analyses the reversals in relation between the Runa and White missionaries or policemen, as well as the pronouns by which Runa people refer to themselves as subjects, such as amu. “Amu is a particular colonially inflected way of being a self in an ecology of selves filled with a growing array of future-making habits, many of which are not human. In the process, amu renders visible how a living future gives life some of its special properties and how this involves a dynamic that implicates (but is not reducible to) the past. In doing so, amu, and the spirit realm upon which it draws its power, amplifies something general about life—namely, life’s quality of being in futuro,” (208). The question for Runa people is how they can access the realm of the White masters, that is also the heaven of saints: what is generally called the “super-natural.”  To live is to survive, Kohn argues, that is to live beyond life, in the many absences that constitute life as a semiotic process.

The strength of this book is to propose a rigorous demonstration while never leaving empirical analysis. Starting on the level of signs in their triadic mode of existence, Kohn finds form on one side and history on the other, and describes their constraints and ambivalent relationships. This is not a dualism between nature and culture that would be solved through the concept of life – and Kohn tries to avoid an all-encompassing anthropology of life – but a logical tension that is amplified by humans, almost in the way that genetic material is amplified inside and outside the laboratory (Rabinow 1996). Kohn’s anthropology “beyond the human” – but not of the “post-human” – grounds itself in the life of signs where humans emerge to amplify them. The ambition of this ontological claim, its clarity and its theoretical productivity will not doubt be amplified by other ethnographic inquiries on life.

Frédéric Keck is a researcher at the Laboratoire d’anthropologie sociale (CNRS) in Paris. He has published works on the history of philosophy and social anthropology in France (Comte, Lévy-Bruhl, Lévi-Strauss) and translated Paul Rabinow’s French DNA into French. He now works on the management of animal diseases transmitted to humans, or zoonoses (Un monde grippé, Flammarion, 2010, Des hommes malades des animaux, L’Herne, 2012)

References:

Candea, Matei
 (2010) Debate: Ontology Is Just Another Word for Culture.Critique of Anthropology 30 (2): 172-179

Deacon, Terrence (2012) Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. New York: Norton.

Descola, Philippe (2005) Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: Gallimard.

Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo (1998) Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, n.s., 4, 469-488.

Rabinow, Paul (1996) Making PCR, A Story of Biotechnology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Anthropology and the Anthropocene (Anthropology News)

Anthropology and Environment Society

September 2013

Amelia Moore

“The Anthropocene” is a label that is gaining popularity in the natural sciences.  It refers to the pervasive influence of human activities on planetary systems and biogeochemical processes.   Devised by Earth scientists, the term is poised to formally end the Holocene Epoch as the geological categorization for Earth’s recent past, present, and indefinite future.  The term is also poised to become the informal slogan of a revitalized environmental movement that has been plagued by popular indifference in recent years.

Climate change is the most well known manifestation of anthropogenic global change, but it is only one example of an Anthropocene event.  Other examples listed by the Earth sciences include biodiversity loss, changes in planetary nutrient cycling, deforestation, the hole in the ozone layer, fisheries decline, and the spread of invasive species.  This change is said to stem from the growth of the human population and the spread of resource intensive economies since the Industrial Revolution (though the initial boundary marker is in dispute with some scientists arguing for the Post-WWII era and others for the advent of agriculture as the critical tipping point).  Whatever the boundary, the Anthropocene signifies multiple anthropological opportunities.

What stance should we, as anthropologists, take towards the Anthropocene? I argue that there are two (and likely more), equally valid approaches to the Anthropocene: anthropology in the Anthropocene and anthropology of the Anthropocene.  Anthropology in the Anthropocene already exists in the form of climate ethnography and work that documents the lived experience of global environmental change.  Arguably, ethnographies of protected areas and transnational conservation strategies exemplify this field as well.  Anthropology in the Anthropocene is characterized by an active concern for the detrimental affects of anthropogenesis on populations and communities that have been marginalized to bear the brunt of global change impacts or who have been haphazardly caught up in global change solution strategies.  This work is engaged with environmental justice and oriented towards political action.

Anthropology of the Anthropocene is much smaller and less well known than anthropology in the Anthropocene, but it will be no less crucial.  Existing work in this vein includes those who take a critical stance towards climate science and politics as social processes with social consequences.  Beyond deconstruction, these critical scholars investigate what forms scientific and political assemblages create and how they participate in remaking the world anew.  Other existing research in this mode interrogates the idea of biodiversity and the historical and cultural context for the notion of anthropogenesis itself.  In the near future, we will see more work that can enquire into both the sociocultural and socioecological implications and manifestations of Anthropocene discourse, practice and logic.

I have only created cursory sketches of anthropology in the Anthropocene and anthropology of the Anthropocene here.  However, these modes are not at all mutually exclusive, and they should inspire many possibilities for future work.  The centrality of anthropos, the idea of the human, within the logics of the Anthropocene is an invitation for anthropology to renew its engagements with the natural sciences in research collaborations and as the object of research, especially the ecological and Earth sciences.

For starters, we should consider the implications of the Anthropocene idea for our understandings of history and collectivity.  If the natural world is finally gaining recognition within the authoritative sciences as intimately interconnected with human life such that these two worlds cease to be separate arenas of thought and action or take on different salience, then both the Humanities and the natural sciences need to devise more appropriate modes of analysis that can speak to emergent socioecologies.  This has begun in anthropology with some recent works of environmental health studies, political ecology, and multispecies ethnography, but is still in its infancy.

In terms of opportunities for legal and political engagement, the Anthropocene signifies possibilities for reconceptualizing environmentalism, conservation and development.  Anthropologists should be cognizant of new design paradigms and models for organizing socioecological collectives from the urban to the small island to the riparian.  We should also be on the lookout for new political collaborations and publics creating conversations utilizing multiple avenues for communication in the academic realm and beyond.  Emergent asymmetries in local and transnational markets and the formation of new multi-sited assemblages of governance should be of special importance.

In terms of science, the Anthropocene signals new horizons for studying and participating in global change science.  The rise of interdisciplinary socioecology, the biosciences of coupled natural and human complexity, geoengineering and the biotech interest in de-extinction are just a sampling of important transformations in research practices, research objects, and the shifting boundaries between the lab and the field.  Ongoing scientific reorientation will continue to yield new arguments about emergent forms of life that will participate in the creation of future assemblages, publics, and movements.

I would also like to caution against potentially unhelpful uses of the Anthropocene idea.  The term should not become a brand signifying a specific style of anthropological research.  It should not gloss over rigid solidifications of time, space, the human, or life.  We should not celebrate creativity in the Anthropocene while ignoring instances of stark social differentiation and capital accumulation, just as we should not focus on Anthropocene assemblages as only hegemonic in the oppressive sense.   Further, we should be cautious with our utilization of the crisis rhetoric surrounding events in the Anthropocene, recognizing that crisis for some can be turned into multiple forms of opportunity for others.  Finally, we must admit the possibility that the Anthropocene may not succeed in gaining lasting traction through formal designation or popularization, and we should not overstate its significance by assuming its universal acceptance.

In the next year, the Section News Column of the Anthropology and Environment Society will explore news, events, projects, and arguments from colleagues and students experimenting with various framings of the Anthropocene in addition to its regular content.  If you would like to contribute to this column, please contact Amelia Moore at a.moore4@miami.edu.

– See more at: http://www.anthropology-news.org/index.php/2013/09/09/anthropology-and-the-anthropocene/#sthash.vBo1RtuY.dpuf

Paraíso sitiado (O Globo)

O drama dos índios Awá e a resistência de seu povo que tenta impedir a ação criminosa de madeireiros na Reserva Biológica Gurupi, onde o território indígena já perdeu 30% de sua paisagem original.

REPORTAGEM: MÍRIAM LEITÃO – FOTOS: SEBASTIÃO SALGADO

Vídeos

QUANDO A SOBREVIVÊNCIA EXIGE CORAGEM

O drama do povo Awá na luta contra o desmatamento na Reserva Biológica Gurupi

TESTEMUNHAS DA HISTÓRIA AWÁ

A repórter Míriam Leitão fala do privilégio de acompanhar o fotógrafo Sebastião Salgado pela Aldeia Juriti

A IMPUNIDADE ROMPE O SILÊNCIO DA NOITE

Míriam Leitão flagra madeireiros em ação à noite numa serraria clandestina no interior do Maranhão

Sobreviver com coragem

Considerados um dos últimos povos caçadores e coletores do planeta, os poucos mais de 400 Awá que povoam o que restou da Floresta Amazônica no Maranhão vivem o momento mais decisivo de sua sobrevivência: impedir que grileiros, posseiros e madeireiros destruam o seu mais valioso bem. É das árvores e da mata densa situadas na Reserva Biológica do Gurupi, de onde tiram o seu alimento, a sua certeza de amanhã poderem garantir a continuação de seu povo, de sua gente. Eles não querem nada mais do que a garantia do governo federal de que não terão o seu terrítório devastado pela ganância do homem branco, que avança a passos largos em busca de madeira nobre.

Apesar de sua terra já estar demarcada, homologada e registrada com 116.582 hectares pela União, eles enfrentam uma ameaça real de assistir à destruição da floresta da qual são tão dependentes e de onde tiram o sustento de seus filhos. Ainda que a Justiça já tenha determinada a retirada desses ‘intrusos’ ou não índios, como define a Funai, os Awá temem pela própria sorte, se afirmam em sua coragem e não vacilam quando veem sua resistência em xeque. “Não temos medo. Vamos resistir”, dizem em discursos emocionados.

A repórter Míriam Leitão, a convite do renomado fotógrafo Sebastião Salgado, viajou até a Aldeia Juriti e pôde comprovar como os Awá vivem essa dramática expectativa. Neste ambiente especial, que complementa a série de reportagens publicadas na edição dominical de O GLOBO, o leitor poderá saber mais do cotidiano dos chamados ‘índios invisíveis’, como vivem, e como reverenciam a sua sagrada cultura.

Sem Título-1Reserva Biológica Gurupi
Terra Indígena Awa
Terra Indígena Caru
Terra Indígena Alto Turiaçu

Áudio

A AMEAÇA DOS MADEIREIROS

Sebastião Salgado se prepara para fotografar os Awá

O DISCURSO AWÁ

Ouça trecho da fala de uma das lideranças Awá

DENÚNCIA

A repórter Míriam Leitão flagra a ação ilegal de madeireiros em uma serraria

O JOVEM GUERREIRO JUI’I

Ouça trecho de seu discurso

OS ÍNDIOS INVISÍVEIS

O antropólogo Uirá Garcia fala sobre a cultura Awá

O CANTO DA CAÇA

Ouça o canto do jovem guerreiro antes de ir à caça

“NÓS TEMOS CORAGEM TAMBÉM”

O jovem guerreiro Jui’i fala da ameaça dos madeireiros

Textos

A LUTA CONTRA A DESTRUIÇÃO DOS MADEIREIROS

Awás tentam sobreviver à ação criminosa dos desmatadores

PARA OS AWÁ, A TRAGÉDIA DO DESMATAMENTO ATINGE A TERRA E O CÉU

Fim da floresta os impedirá de virar ‘Karauaras’, seres que habitam o mundo após a morte

SILENCIOSOS, AWÁ SE CONFUNDEM COM A MATA

Audição acima dos padrões comuns permite ouvir som da devastação a quilômetros

‘ESTAMOS BRAVOS. ASSIM ELES VÃO NOS MATAR’, DIZ LIDERANÇA AWÁ

Após vencer a desconfiança dos índios, ouve-se o desabafo: ‘Quero ficar na minha casa’

FOTOGALERIA

Os Awás pelas lentes de Sebastião Salgado

MADEIREIROS IMPÕEM SUA LEI

Em emboscadas, comerciantes de madeira demostram ter mais força do que a Polícia Federal e a Força Nacional juntas

NO CAMINHO DA VOLTA, O ENCONTRO COM O CRIME

Na estradas que ligam terra Awá, grileiros, serrarias e caminhões agem na certeza da impunidade

MINISTRO: RETIRADA DE TERRA AWÁ TERÁ PF, IBAMA E EXÉRCITO

Ministro da Justiça programa operação, atrasada pela vinda do Papa, já para este semestre

REPORTAGEM: MÍRIAM LEITÃO | FOTOS: SEBASTIÃO SALGADO | EDIÇÃO: DANIEL BIASETTO | MAPA: DANIEL LIMA | ARTE E DESENVOLVIMENTO: GUSTAVO SARAIVA | DESENVOLVIMENTO: AYRTON TESHIMA

Os Awá-Guajá viram bichos-pau (Yahoo! Notícias)

Por  – ter, 20 de ago de 2013

As primeiras fotos de índios surgiram no início mesmo da invenção e popularização dos daguerreótipos e câmeras fotográficas. Pelo Oeste americano intrépidos aventureiros arriscavam suas vidas e suas imensas geringonças para obter um clique de um grupo de guerreiros a cavalo, um retrato de um chefe indígena Sioux, Apache ou Comanche engalonado em suas casacas de couro de búfalo e seus exuberantes cocares de pena de águia. Posavam hirtos, de cara dura, olhando para o horizonte infinito, como se estivessem em alguma solenidade com autoridades estrangeiras, quem sabe, o próprio presidente americano, manifestando sua dignidade humana para preservar ou recuperar seus territórios e ocupar um lugar digno no novo mundo que se criava ao seu redor.

Mas o destino lhes foi cruel demais.

Das fotos solenes, ao final dos anos de resistência (1830-1880) em que o Oeste foi definitivamente incorporado aos Estados Unidos da América, passou-se à dessacralização dos índios, quando até um líder de grande respeito, como Touro Sentado, chefe dos Sioux que destroçou o 6º Regimento de William Custer, na famosa batalha de Little Big Horn, se submeteu a ser uma das estrelas do famoso circo do fanfarrão Buffalo Bill, montando cavalos, dando gritos de guerra e empunhando um rifle winchester com balas de festim. O Wild West Circus fez história se apresentando nas cidades e bribocas que se formavam por todo o imenso centro-oeste americano. Mutatis mutandi, não pensem que no Brasil seja diferente!

As primeiras fotos de índios brasileiros, passado o tempo de viajantes estrangeiros fazendo desenhos e aquarelas, foram tiradas em cidades como Manaus e Cuiabá. Marc Ferrez, famoso por suas fotos do Rio de Janeiro, conseguiu levar um grupo de 11 índios Bororo para um studio em Cuiabá e os fotografou com maestria, mostrando como seres humanos dignos, em toda sua nudez virtuosa, ainda em 1880.

Indios Bororo , coleção Gilberto Ferrez

Indios Bororo , coleção Gilberto Ferrez

No campo, nas matas, nos cerrados, ao vivo em seus ambientes, fotos de índios brasileiros vão surgir pelas lentes de viajantes, cientistas e, no começo do século XX, pela Comissão Rondon, que percorreu todo o oeste do Mato Grosso, Rondônia e várias partes da Amazônia. Os índios aparecem ora desnudos completamente, com algum pano, uma tanga inventada na hora, ora vestidos em camisas sem gola, manga comprida, calças simples, como os pobres brasileiros da época, pés descalços, um ou outro em uniforme militar, as mulheres de saia e os seis expostos. Exceto nas missões, quando as saias desciam até os calcanhares.

A coloração em preto, cinza e branca dessas fotos é do tipo que hoje se chama sépia, a qual faz as imagens se diferenciarem tão somente pela textura e forma dos objetos, como se o mundo fosse uma penumbra. Visualizando isso, o espectador precisava de um esforço intelectual para ver e dar significado às distintas imagens. Por esse esforço as imagens ganhavam um significado muito além do real corriqueiro. De algum modo elas se sacralizavam, como se fosse um objeto antigo ou precioso. Daí porque naqueles tempos tornara-se de praxe os amigos se presentearem com retratos, que eram solenemente expostos nas salas e nos escritórios. Daí porque as fotos eram tratadas com reverência e carinho, e eram beijadas como se representassem as pessoas vivas.

A nitidez da coloração das fotos, desde os anos 1960, mudou o modo como as vemos e elas foram aos poucos se vulgarizando, tanto pela banalidade de sua existência quanto principalmente pelo realismo que elas nos evocam. A arte da fotografia, consequentemente, passou a requerer mais sutileza de luzes para obter algum senso de sacralidade do objeto visado.

E aqui chegamos ao objetivo desse artigo – as fotos tiradas pelo fotógrafo profissional Sebastião Salgado dos índios Awá-Guajá, do Maranhão, recentemente publicadas pelo jornal O Globo, em reportagem de Miriam Leitão.

Nessas fotos, os Guajá, a última sociedade a viver quase que exclusivamente da caça, pesca e coleta de animais, frutos e tubérculos da floresta, são fotografados em coloração sépia, com pouca luz, sob um fundo “natural” de árvores, raízes e chão. Apresentam-se nus, os homens com seus prepúcios amarrados com fibras de tucum, braceletes e auréolas de penas, meninos e meninas sem nada, e as mulheres em seus saiotes tecidos de fibras de tucum, bem como as tipóias em que carregam seus bebês.

Algumas fotos, talvez as que mais calaram fundo com os propósitos do fotógrafo mineiro-europeu, trazem grupos de homens e meninos adornados a caráter, todos em pé, fisionomias sérias, porém mudos e imóveis, arcos à mão, numa clara alusão de que são parte da floresta que lhes ladeia como o cenário de fundo e de compartilhamento.

Nas fotos de Salgado não há informação etnográfica, exceto aquela em que um caçador, que o reconheço pelo nome de Mutumhû, porta um macaco guariba morto pendurado às suas costas, com um olhar de inadvertida preocupação. Não sabemos como vivem os Guajá, como se alimentam, como amam e cuidam dos filhos, como se divertem e como sofrem. Não há tempo aqui. Nem eternidade, nem instantaneidade. Tempo morto.

A jornalista Miriam Leitão, emocionada com o quê viu, produziu alguns textos nos quais procura mostrar que os Guajá estão em perigo de sobrevivência, ecoando inadvertidamente as matérias da Survival International, uma ONG inglesa que alardeia que os Guajá são o povo em maior grau de perigo de sobrevivência do mundo. No total, os Guajá somam cerca de 360 pessoas, mas eram menos de 200 na década de 1980. A terra indígena visitada por Salgado e Leitão, chamada de Awá-Guajá, está parcialmente invadida por madeireiros e posseiros, sem dúvida, mas não consta nas matérias informação sobre por que isto está acontecendo e se a presença da FUNAI é eficiente ou não para deter esse perigo e para dar assistência aos índios. Por que tudo está tão ruim no indigenismo brasileiro da atualidade?

Os Guajá, em virtude de sua característica cultural de mobilidade, se dispersaram há mais de 100 anos por uma vasta área do oeste maranhense, e hoje se encontram morando em quatro terras indígenas, com pouco contato entre si. A terra indígena Awá-Guajá, com 116.000 hectares, conecta as terras indígenas Caru (172.000 ha) e Alto Turiaçu (530.000 ha), que juntas somam 718.000 hectares, compartilhadas com os povos Guajajara e Kaapor. Em vários trechos delas os últimos madeireiros do Maranhão se esbaldam, traçando picadas pelo meio da mata por onde passam seus tratores e caminhões carregados de toras de madeira de lei, sob as vistas grossas de alguns índios não Guajá, cooptados por migalhas, com rara presença do órgão indigenista, ultimamente em completa inatividade e decadência.

Aqueles Guajá que residem na Terra Indígena Awá-Guajá são, por ironia, os que estão mais bem protegidos por funcionários dedicados do órgão indigenista, funcionários que passam às vezes mais de 60 dias sem saírem do posto indígena perto do qual se fixou, há mais de 20 anos, o grupo Guajá visitado. Na verdade, o posto indígena não existe mais, foi extinto por um decreto presidencial, e só por teimosia é que os resolutos funcionários nele permanecem. É provável que tenham que se retirar de vez ainda este mês. Se ao menos essa informação e um pouco do histórico da luta desigual que esses funcionários travam para manter a dignidade dos índios, à indiferença das atitudes do poder federal, fossem divulgados aos leitores, algo mais verdadeiro e esperançoso teria surgido dessa expedição e das fotos obtidas.

Ilustrar com fotos artísticas e etnograficamente relevantes para informar o espectador e sensibilizá-lo para a causa indígena tem sido o mais nobre dos propósitos de fotógrafos e jornalistas. Neste caso, a informação jornalística sem dúvida pode pressionar o governo a tomar as medidas necessárias para seguir as ordens judiciais, exaradas há algum tempo pela Justiça Federal do Maranhão, para retirar de uma vez por todas todos os invasores que teimam em permanecer nessa terra, e coibir definitivamente as atividades destrutivas dos madeireiros. Nada disso é fácil, nas circunstâncias do anti-indigenismo oficial que estamos vivenciando. Este é o sentido que se esperava desta reportagem publicada em O Globo pelos dois competentes profissionais da informação.

Porém, para além desse propósito, as fotos de Sebastião Salgado têm um objetivo considerado transcendente. Salgado está engajado num projeto patrocinado por financiadores particulares e chancelado pela ONU com o intuito visionário, e, dir-se-ia, poético, no sentido de criativo, de captar do mundo atual, tão diversificado na natureza e nas culturas, mas tão dilapidado e com tendência à homogeneização, aquilo que representaria a gênese mesmo da Terra, da vida e do homem. Uma espécie de arqueologia ao vivo.

Assim, Salgado vem fotografando geleiras intocáveis, vulcões flamejantes, montanhas inalcançáveis e povos remotos e “imutáveis” na África, Ásia e Américas. Há sete anos passou um mês morando em duas aldeias dos índios do Alto Xingu capturando sua vida autêntica ao máximo. Durante a cerimônia do Kwarup, quando os índios celebram o fim de um período de luto pela morte de um parente respeitado, Salgado fez questão absoluta de fotografar a efeméride sem a presença de qualquer objeto exógeno à cultura xinguana, seja um cigarro de palha ou uma tira de pano, muito menos alguém não indígena, apesar da aldeia ter isso tudo e mais. As fotos são ahistóricas, pois todos os seus signos foram escoimados pelas lentes prístinas do fotógrafo. Entretanto, os índios xinguanos não vivem e não pensam assim: sabem que estão no meio do redemoinho histórico, sendo e vindo a ser, procurando seu lugar no mundo da atualidade, não flutuando em um éter deshistorizado.

Os Guajá sabem muito menos do nosso mundo, tão recente e tão sofrido tem sido sua aproximação conosco. Nós sabemos muito menos sobre eles. Sua cultura tradicional é viva, apesar dos objetos exógenos. Assim, retratá-los como figurantes da natureza, e mostrá-los como seres quase ctônicos, não deve ter sido difícil para Sebastião Salgado. Mas, ao invés do resultado se tornar uma imagem de auto-conhecimento para os Guajá para avançar em sua compreensibilidade do mundo que os massacra, e de ser um modo de nós os conhecer melhor para amá-los e os ajudar a sobreviver e encontrar um lugar seguro nesse mundo convoluto, essas fotografias se tornam um desserviço para todos nós, os Guajá em especial.

Por essas fotos, os Guajá se tornaram seres da natureza, animais ou vegetais, folhagem, até talvez bichos-pau mimetizados na sépia florestal. A estética da ecologização do mundo virou uma estética da desumanização do homem pelas lentes de um brasileiro que perdeu o senso de brasilidade e anda pelo mundo apegado às cadeias do espetáculo do faz-de-conta.

The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography (Cultural Anthropology)

Abstract

June 14, 2010

A Special Issue of Cultural Anthropology

Edited by Eben Kirksey and Stefan Helmreich

In the November 2010 issue of Cultural Anthropology, Eben Kirksey and Stefan Helmreich explore how creatures previously appearing on the margins of anthropology — as part of the landscape, as food for humans, as symbols — have been pressed into the foreground in recent ethnographies.  Multispecies ethnographers are studying the host of organisms whose lives and deaths are linked to human social worlds. A project allied with Eduardo Kohn’s “anthropology of life”—“an anthropology that is not just confined to the human but is concerned with the effects of our entanglements with other kinds of living selves” (2007:4)—multispecies ethnography centers on how a multitude of organisms’ livelihoods shape and are shaped by political, economic, and cultural forces.

“Becomings”—new kinds of relations emerging from nonhierarchical alliances, symbiotic attachments, and the mingling of creative agents (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987:241–242)—abound in this chronicle of the emergence of multispecies ethnography, and in the essays in this collection.“The idea of becoming transforms types into events, objects into actions,” writes contributor Celia Lowe.

The work of Donna Haraway also provides one key starting point for the “species turn” in anthropology: “If we appreciate the foolishness of human exceptionalism,” she writes in When Species Meet, “then we know that becoming is always becoming with—in a contact zone where the outcome, where who is in the world, is at stake” (2008:244).

Anna Tsing’s scholarship also provides a charter for multispecies ethnographers.  In an forthcoming essay, “Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species”, she suggests that “human nature is an interspecies relationship” (Tsing n.d.; see Haraway 2008:19).  Displacing studies of animal behavior used by social conservatives and sociobiologists to naturalize autocratic and militaristic ideologies, Tsing began studying mushrooms to imagine a human nature that shifted historically along with varied webs of interspecies dependence. Searching familiar places in the parklands of northern California for mushrooms—looking for the orange folds of chanterelles or the warm muffins of king boletes—she discovered a world of mutually flourishing companions. Aspiring to mimic the “mycorrhizal sociality” of mushrooms, Tsing formed the Matsutake Worlds Research Group—an ethnographic research team centered on matsutake, an aromatic gourmet mushroom in the genus Tricholoma, a “species cluster.” Following the matsutake mushroom through commodity chains in Europe, North America, and East Asia, this group has experimented with new modes of collaborative ethnographic research while studying scale-making and multispecies relations.

Multispecies ethnography has emerged with the activity of a swarm, a network with no center to dictate order, populated by “a multitude of different creative agents” (Hardt and Negri 2005:92). The Multispecies Salon — a series of panels, round tables, and events in art galleries held at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association (in 2006 and 2008) — was one place, among many others, where this swarm alighted. In November the Multispecies Salon will travel to New Orleans.  Here, at the 2010 AAA meetings, a lively group of interlocutors—wild artists and para-ethnographers—will come together to discuss the multispecies zeitgeist that is sweeping the social sciences and the humanities.

 

Inline_img_0243
Eben Kirksey, “Untitled.” April 6, 2010.

 

The “Twins,” a chimerical pair of grubs with wings, graces the cover of the November 2010 issue of Cultural Anthropology. This ceramic piece was created by Marnia Johnston, who joined Eben Kirksey in curating the Multispecies Salon.  Only adult insects have wings. Their juvenile forms, larvae, do not. “Humans are acquiring adult characteristics, such as breasts, at an early age,” Johnston told us. “Endocrine disrupting chemicals, like Bovine Growth Hormone,” she continued, “are working on the bodies of humans and multiple other species. I want people to think about how our chemical dependencies change us and the world we live in.”

Questions for Classroom Discussion

1. What were the Science Wars?  What distinguishes emerging conversations about nature and culture in anthropology from this earlier historical moment?

2. What does anthropos mean?  As the facts of life are being remade by the biosciences, what is anthropos becoming?

3. In the Anthropocene, a new epoch in Earth’s history, are there elements of nature that exist outside of culture?

About the Authors

Eben Kirksey is a cultural anthropologist at the CUNY Graduate Center who studies the political dimensions of imagination as well as the interplay of natural and cultural history.  As a graduate student at the University of Oxford, and UC Santa Cruz, he published four articles in peer-reviewed journals and two chapters in edited books on these themes.  His doctoral dissertation and first book, “Freedom in Entangled Worlds”, is about an indigenous political movement in West Papua, the half of New Guinea under Indonesian control (forthcoming 2011).  As a National Science Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow (2008-2010), he conducted an ethnography of place at multiple biological research stations in Latin America.  Following the movement of people and organisms—across national borders and through a fragmented landscape—he studied oblique powers at play in global assemblages.

Stefan Helmreich has worked as a Postdoctoral Associate in Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University, an External Faculty Fellow at the Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture at Rutgers University, and as Assistant Professor of Science and Society at New York University. The National Science Foundation and the Wenner-Gren Foundation have funded his research. Helmreich’s research examines the works and lives of contemporary biologists puzzling through the conceptual boundaries of “life” as a category of analysis. He has written extensively on Artificial Life, most notably in Silicon Second Nature: Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World (University of California Press, 1998), which in 2001 won the Diana Forsythe Book Prize from the American Anthropological Association. His latest book, Alien Ocean: Anthropological Voyages in Microbial Seas (University of California Press, 2009), is a study of marine biologists working in realms usually out of sight and reach: the microscopic world, the deep sea, and oceans outside national sovereignty.

The Multispecies Salon 3: SWARM

An Innovent panel at the AAA Meeting in New Orleans

Get Involved: CFP

Call for Papers: from Deborah Bird Rose and Thom van Dooren

Editors’ Footnotes

Cultural Anthropology has published a number of essay that map new directions in anthropology, including George Marcus’s “The End(s) of Ethnography: Social/Cultural Anthropology’s Signature Form of Producing Knowledge in Transition” (2008); Michael M. J. Fischer’s “Four Genealogies for a Recombinant Anthropology of Science and Technology” (2007); Daniel Segal’s “Editor’s Note: On Anthropology and/in/of Science”(2001); and Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams’s “Cyborg Anthropology” (1995).

Cultural Anthropology has also published essays on art and/as cultural analysis. See Kenneth George’s “Ethics, Iconoclasm, and Qur’anic Art in Indonesia” (2009), and Liam Buckley’s “Objects of Love and Decay: Colonial Photographs in a Postcolonial Archive” (2005).

Vendettas, not war? Unpicking why our ancestors killed (New Scientist)

20:03 18 July 2013 by Bob Holmes

Is war in our blood? Perhaps not, if you believe a controversial new study that suggests violence in primitive cultures is overwhelmingly the result of personal squabbles, rather than organised violence between two different groups. The finding contradicts the popular view that humans have evolved to be innately warlike.

In recent years, many anthropologists and evolutionary biologists have come to believe that warfare arose deep in humans’ evolutionary past. In part that is because even chimpanzees exhibit this kind of intergroup violence, which suggests the trait shares a common origin. Proponents of this view also point to the occurrence of war in traditional hunter-gatherer societies today, such as some notoriously quarrelsome groups in the Amazon, and hence to its likely prevalence in early human societies.

Yet the archaeological record of warfare in early humans is sketchy, and not all contemporary hunter-gatherers make war.

In a bid to resolve the issue, Douglas Fry and Patrik Soderberg of Åbo Akademi University in Vasa, Finland, turned to the Ethnographic Atlas, a widely used database that was created in the 1960s to provide an unbiased cross-cultural sample of primitive societies.

From this, Fry and Soderberg selected the 21 societies that were exclusively nomadic hunter-gatherers – groups that upped sticks to wherever conditions were best – without livestock or social class divisions. They reasoned that these groups would most closely resemble early human societies.

Hello, sailor

The researchers then sifted through the early ethnographic accounts of each of these societies – the earliest of which was from the 17th century, while most were from the 19th and 20th centuries – and noted every reference to violent deaths, classifying them by how many people were involved and who they were. The records include accounts of events such as a man killing a rival for a woman, revenge killings for earlier deaths, and killing of outsiders such as shipwrecked sailors.

The pair found that in almost every society, deaths due to violence were rare – and the vast majority of those were one-on-one killings better classified as homicides than as warfare. Indeed, for 20 of the 21 societies, only 15 per cent of killings happened between two different groups. The exception was the Tiwi people of northern Australia, where intergroup feuds and retaliatory killings were common.

Fry and Soderberg say this suggests that warfare is rare in such primitive societies and may instead have become common only after the rise of more complex societies just a few thousand years ago. If so, then warfare would have likely played only a minor role in human evolution.

Anecdotal evidence

Not everyone agrees. For one thing, the data set Fry and Soderberg used is essentially a collection of anecdotes rather than a systematic survey of causes of death, says Kim Hill, an anthropologist at Arizona State University in Tempe. They are relying on the people who originally noted down these events to have included all the important details.

Moreover, they focus only on nomadic foragers and exclude any sedentary foraging societies – groups that would have foraged from a permanent base. Yet these sedentary foragers would probably have occupied the richest habitats and so would have been most likely to be involved in wars over territory, says Richard Wrangham, an anthropologist at Harvard University.

Fry and Soderberg are probably correct that most violent deaths are the result of homicide, not warfare – that was even true for the US during the Vietnam War, says Sam Bowles at the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico. He has put forward the idea that altruism evolved out of the need for our ancestors to cooperate during times of war. But even if warfare is relatively uncommon, it can still exert an important evolutionary force, he says.

Journal reference: Science, DOI:10.1126/science.1235675

Outros valores, além do frenesi de consumo (Outras Palavras)

POR 

– ON 20/09/2012

Eduardo Viveiros de Castro dispara: iludido por noção ultrapasada de progresso, Brasil pode desperdiçar oportunidade única de propor novo modelo civilizatório

Entrevista a Júlia Magalhães

É preciso insistir no fato de que é possível ser feliz sem o frenesi de consumo que a mídia nos impõe”, reafirma o antropólogo Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, à jornalista Júlia Magalhães. Para ele, assim como para Fernando Meirelles e Ricardo Abramovay – primeiros entrevistados da sério Outra Política – a felicidade pode ter outros caminhos. O novo diálogo é parte da série que o Instituto Ideafix produziu por encomenda do IDS(Instuto Democracia e Sustentabilidade), e que o site publica na seção especial “Outra Política“.

Pesquisador e professor de antropologia do Museu Nacional (UFRJ) e sócio fundador do Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), Viveiros insiste em que só pela educação avançaremos rumo a uma sociedade mais democrática. “A falta de educação é o nó cego responsável por esse conservadorismo reacionário de boa parte da população”, diz ele. Vai além: arrisca dizer que haveria uma conspiração para impedir os brasileiros de ter acesso a educação ou conexão de à internet de qualidade – conquistas que permitiriam ampliar o acesso a produtos e bens culturais.

Ainda como Meirelles e Abramovay, Viveiros insiste em políticas que reduzam adesigualdade e favoreçam novos padrões de consumo. “É um absurdo afirmar que produzir mais carros é sinal de pujança, utilizar esse dado como indicador de melhoria econômica.”

Para o antropólogo, a mobilização pelas causas ambientais é importante, mas ainda está longe de corresponder à gravidade do problema. É preciso ampliar o universo dos que se preocupam, lembrar “que saneamento básico, dengue e lixo são problemas ambientais”. Viveiros está alarmado: “as pessoas fingem não saber o que está acontecendo, mas o fato é que temos que nos preparar para o pior”. O raciocínio é semelhante ao de Fernando Meirelles, diretor de Ensaio sobre a Cegueira: “Apenas cegos, cínicos ou oportunistas recusam-se a enxergar”.

Diferentemente de Abramovay – que vê germinar um trabalho sério nas empresas e acredita que a sociedade terá força e atitude para impor limites à iniciativa privada –, Viveiros de Castro considera que as corporações não são capazes de ir além do “capitalismo verde”, fingindo responsabilidade social e ambiental. Os dois se alinham, contudo, na esperança depositada nas redes sociais como canais de expressão, opinião, colaboração e mobilização.

Não existe um rumo Brasil”, alerta Viveiros de Castro, ao falar sobre a fratura que marca a sociedade brasileira contrapondo as forças vivas do autoritarismo e do racismo aos setores que buscam a inovação. “O Brasil é um país escravocrata, racista, que não fez reforma agrária, e precisa fazê-la”, diz.

Não por coincidência, dissse o mesmo, há pouco, Mano Brown, em vídeo gravado na Ocupação Mauá, centro de São Paulo. “O Brasil está em transição, não sabe se é um país moderno ou se está ainda em 1964. Tem uma geração de direita ainda viva – Kassab é de direita, Alckmin é de direita – que tem um modus operandi dos caras da antiga, de usar a força, o poder.” A seguir, a entrevista (Inês Castilho).

Qual é sua percepção sobre a participação política do brasileiro?

Preferiria começar por uma desgeneralização: vejo a sociedade brasileira como profundamente dividida no que concerne à sua visão do país e do futuro. A ideia de que existe um Brasil, no sentido não-trivial das ideias de unidade e de brasilidade, parece-me uma ilusão politicamente conveniente (sobretudo para os dominantes) mas antropologicamente equivocada. Existem no mínimo dois, e, a meu ver, bem mais Brasis. O conceito geopolítico de Estado-nação unificado não é descritivo, mas prescritivo. Há fraturas profunda na sociedade brasileira. Há setores da população com uma vocação conservadora imensa; eles não integram necessariamente uma classe específica, embora as chamadas “classes médias”, ascendentes ou descendentes, estejam bem representadas ali. Grande parte da chamada sociedade brasileira — a maioria, infelizmente, temo — se sentiria muito satisfeita sob um regime autoritário, sobretudo se conduzido mediaticamente pela autoridade paternal de uma personalidade forte. Mas isso é uma daquelas coisas que a minoria libertária que existe no país, ou mesmo uma certa medioria “progressista”, prefere manter envolta em um silêncio embaraçado. Repete-se a todo e a qualquer propósito que o povo brasileiro é democrático, “cordial”, amante da liberdade, da igualdade e da fraternidade – o que me parece uma ilusão muito perigosa. É assim que vejo a “participação política do povo brasileiro”: fraturada, dividida, polarizada, uma polarização que não está necessariamente em harmonia com as divisões politicas oficiais (partidos etc.). O Brasil permanece uma sociedade visceralmente escravocrata, renitentemente racista, e moralmente covarde. Enquanto não acertarmos contas com esse inconsciente, não iremos “para a frente”. Em outros momentos, é claro, soluços insurreicionais esporádicos, e uma certa indiferença pragmática em relação aos poderes constituídos, que se testemunha sobretudo entre os mais pobres, ou os mais alheios ao teatro montado pelo andar de cima, inspiram modestas utopias e moderados otimismos por parte daqueles que a historia colocou na confortável posição de “pensar o Brasil”. Nós, em suma.

O que é preciso para mudar isso?

Falar, resistir, insistir, olhar por cima do imediato – e, evidentemente, educar. Mas não “educar o povo”, como se a elite fosse muito educada e devêssemos (e pudéssemos) trazer o povo para um nível superior; mas sim criar as condições para que o povo se eduque e acabe educando a elite, quem sabe até livrando-se dela. A paisagem educacional do Brasil de hoje é a de uma terra devastada, um deserto. E não vejo nenhuma iniciativa consistente para tentar cultivar esse deserto. Pelo contrário: chego a ter pesadelos conspiratórios de que não interessa ao projeto de poder em curso modificar realmente a paisagem educacional do Brasil: domesticar a força de trabalho, se é que é isso mesmo que se está sinceramente tentando (ou planejando), não é de forma alguma a mesma coisa que educar.

Isto é só um pesadelo, decerto: não é assim, não pode ser assim, espero que não seja assim. Mas fato é que não se vê uma iniciativa de modificar a situação. Vê-se é a inauguração bombástica de dezenas de universidades sem a mínima infra-estrutura física (para não falar de boas bibliotecas, luxo quase impensável no Brasil), enquanto o ensino fundamental e médio permanecem grotescamente inadequados, com seus professores recebendo uma miséria, com as greves de docentes universitários reprimidas como se eles fossem bandidos. A “falta” de instrução — que é uma forma muito particular e perversa de instrução imposta de cima para baixo — é talvez o principal fator responsável pelo conservadorismo reacionário de boa parte da sociedade brasileira. Em suma, é urgente uma reforma radical na educação brasileira.

“A floresta e a escola”, sonhava Oswald de Andrade. Infelizmente, parece que deixaremos de ter uma e ainda não teremos a outra. Pois sem escola, aí é que não sobrará floresta mesmo.

Por onde começaria a reforma na educação?

Começaria por baixo, é lógico, no ensino fundamental – que continua entregue às moscas. O ensino público teria de ter uma política unificada, voltada para uma – com perdão da expressão – “revolução cultural”. Não adianta redistribuir renda (ou melhor, aumentar a quantidade de migalhas que caem da mesa cada vez mais farta dos ricos) apenas para comprar televisão e ficar vendo o BBB e porcarias do mesmo quilate, se não redistribuímos cultura, educação, ciência e sabedoria; se não damos ao povo condições de criar cultura em lugar de apenas consumir aquela produzida “para” ele. Está havendo uma melhora do nível de vida dos mais pobres, e talvez também da velha classe média – melhora que vai durar o tempo que a China continuar comprando do Brasil e não tiver acabado de comprar a África. Apesar dessa melhora no chamado nível de vida, não vejo melhora na qualidade efetiva de vida, da vida cultural ou espiritual, se me permitem a palavra arcaica. Ao contrário. Mas será que é preciso mesmo destruir as forças vivas, naturais e culturais, do povo, ou melhor, dos povos brasileiros para construir uma sociedade economicamente mais justa? Duvido.

Nesse cenário, quais os temas capazes de mobilizar a sociedade brasileira, hoje?

Vejo a “sociedade brasileira” imantada, pelo menos no plano de sua auto-representação normativa por via da midia, por um ufanismo oco, um orgulho besta, como se o mundo (desta vez, enfim) se curvasse ao Brasil. Copa, Olimpíadas… Não vejo mobilização sobre temas urgentíssimos, como esses da educação e da redefinição de nossa relação com a terra, isto é, com aquilo que está por baixo do território. Natureza e Cultura, em suma, que hoje não apenas se acham mediadas, mediatizadas pelo Mercado, mas mediocrizadas por ele. O Estado se aliou ao Mercado, contra a Natureza e contra a Cultura.

Esses temas ainda não mobilizam?

Existe alguma preocupação da opinião pública com a questão ambiental, um pouco maior do que com a educacional – o que não deixa de ser para se lamentar, pois as duas vão juntas. Mas tudo me parece “too little, too late”: muito pouco, e muito tarde. Está demorando tempo demais para se espalhar a consciência ambiental, o sentido de urgência absoluta que a situação do planeta impõe a todos nós. Essa inércia se traduz em pouca pressão sobre os governos, as corporações, as empresas – estas investindo cada vez mais na historia da carochinha do “capitalismo verde”. E pouca pressão sobre a grande imprensa, suspeitamente lacônica, distraída e incompetente quando se trata da questão das mudanças climáticas.

Não se vê a sociedade realmente mobilizada, por exemplo, por Belo Monte, uma monstruosidade provada e comprovada, mas que tem o apoio desinformado (é o que se infere) de porções significativas da população do Sul e Sudeste, para onde irá boa parte da energia que não for vendida a preço de banana paras as multinacionais do alumínio fazerem latinha de sakê, no baixo Amazonas, para o mercado asiático. Faz falta um discurso politico mais agressivo em relação à questão ambiental. É preciso sobretudo falar aos povos, chamar a atenção de que saneamento básico é um problema ambiental, dengue é problema ambiental, lixão é problema ambiental. Não é possível separar desmatamento de dengue e de saneamento básico. É preciso convencer a população mais pobre de que melhorar as condições ambientais é garantir as condições de existência das pessoas. Mas a esquerda tradicional, como se está comprovando, mostra-se completamente despreparada para articular um discurso sobre a questão ambiental. Quando suas cabeças mais pensantes falam, tem-se a sensação de que estão apenas “correndo atrás”, tentando desajeitadamente capturar e reduzir ao já-conhecido um tema novo, um problema muito real que não estava em seu DNA ideológico e filosófico. Isso quando ela, a esquerda, não se alinha com o insustentável projeto ecocida do capitalismo, revelando assim sua comum origem com este último, lá nas brumas e trevas da metafísica antropocêntrica do Cristianismo.

Enquanto acharmos que melhorar a vida das pessoas é dar-lhes mais dinheiro para comprarem uma televisão, em vez de melhorar o saneamento, o abastecimento de água, a saúde e a educação fundamental, não vai dar. Você ouve o governo falando que a solução é consumir mais, mas não vê qualquer ênfase nesses aspectos literalmente fundamentais da vida humana nas condições dominantes no presente século.

Não se diga, por suposto, que os mais favorecidos pensem melhor e vejam mais longe que os mais pobres. Nada mais idiota do que esses Land Rovers que a gente vê a torto e a direito em São Paulo ou no Rio, rodando com plásticos do Greenpeace e slogans “ecológicos” colados nos pára-brisas. Gente refestelada nessas banheiras 4×4 que atravancam as ruas e bebem o venenoso óleo diesel, gente que acha que “contato com a natureza” é fazer rally no Pantanal…

É uma situação difícil: falta instrução básica, falta compromisso da midia, falta agressividade política no tratar da questão do ambiente — isso quando se acha que há uma questão ambiental, o que está longe de ser o caso de nossos atuais Responsáveis. Estes mostram, ao contrário e por exemplo, preocupação em formar jovens que dirijam com segurança, e assim ao mesmo tempo mantêm sua aposta firme no futuro do transporte por carro individual numa cidade como São Paulo, em que não cabe nem mais uma agulha. Um governo que não se cansa de arrotar grandeza sobre a quantidade de veiculos produzidos por ano. É um absurdo utilizar os números da produção de veiculos como indicador de prosperidade econômica. Isso é uma proposta podre, uma visão tacanha, um projeto burro de país.

Você está dizendo que muitos apelos ao consumo vêm do próprio governo. Mas também há um apelo muito grande que vem do mercado. Como você avalia isso?

O Brasil é um país capitalista periférico. O capitalismo industrial-financeiro é considerado por quase todo mundo hoje como uma evidência necessária, o modo incontornável de um sistema social sobreviver no mundo de hoje. Entendo, ao contrário de alguns companheiros de viagem, que o capitalismo sustentável é uma contradição em termos, e que se nossa presente forma de vida econômica é realmente necessária, então logo nossa forma de vida biológica, isto é, a espécie humana, vai-se mostrar desnecessária. A Terra vai favorecer outras alternativas.

A ideia de crescimento negativo, ou de objeção ao crescimento, a ética da suficiência são contraditórias com a lógica do capital. O capitalismo depende do crescimento contínuo. A ideia manutenção de um determinado patamar de equilíbrio na relação de troca energética com a natureza não cabe na matriz econômica do capitalismo.

Esse impasse, queiramos ou não, vai ser “solucionado” pelas condições termodinâmicas do planeta em um período muito mais curto do que imaginávamos. As pessoas fingem não saber o que está acontecendo, preferem não pensar no assunto, mas o fato é que temos que nos preparar para o pior. E o Brasil, ao contrário, está sempre se preparando para o melhor. O otimismo nacional diante de uma situação planetária para lá de inquietante é extremamente perigoso, e a aposta de que vamos nos dar bem dentro do capitalismo é algo ingênua, se é que não é, quem sabe, desesperada.. O Brasil continua sendo um país periférico, uma plantation relativamentehigh tech que abastece de produtos primários o capitalismo central. Vivemos de exportar nossa terra e nossa água em forma de soja, açúcar, carne, para os países industrializados – e são eles que dão as cartas, controlam o mercado. Estamos bem nesse momento, mas de forma alguma em posição de controlar a economia mundial. Se mudar um pouco para um lado ou para o outro, o Brasil pode simplesmente perder esse lugar à janela onde está sentado hoje. Sem falar, é claro, no fato de que estamos vivendo uma crise econômica mundial que se tornou explosiva em 2008 e está longe de acabar; ninguém sabe onde ela vai parar. O Brasil, nesse momento da crise, está em uma espécie de contrafluxo do tsunami, mas quando a onda quebrar vai molhar muita gente. Essas coisas têm de ser ditas.

E como você avalia a relação dessa realidade macropolítica, macroeconômica, com as realidades do Brasil rural, dos ribeirinhos, dos indígenas?

O projeto de Brasil que tem a presente coalizão governamental sob o comando do PT é um no qual ribeirinhos, índios, camponeses, quilombolas são vistos como gente atrasada, retardados socioculturais que devem ser conduzidos para um outro estágio. Isso é uma concepção tragicamente equivocada. O PT é visceralmente paulista, seu projeto é uma “paulistanização” do Brasil. Transformar o interior do país numa fantasiacountry: muita festa do peão boiadeiro, muito carro de tração nas quatro, muita música sertaneja, bota, chapéu, rodeio, boi, eucalipto, gaúcho. E do outro lado cidades gigantescas e impossíveis como São Paulo. O PT vê a Amazônia brasileira como um lugar a se civilizar, a se domesticar, a se rentabilizar, a se capitalizar. Esse é o velho bandeirantismo que tomou conta de vez do projeto nacional, em uma continuidade lamentável entre as geopolítica da ditadura e a do governo atual. Mudaram as condições políticas formais, mas a imagem do que é uma civilização brasileira, do que é uma vida que valha a pena ser vivida, do que é uma sociedade que esteja em sintonia consigo mesma, é muito, muito parecida. Estamos vendo hoje, numa ironia bem dialética, o governo comandado por uma pessoa perseguida e torturada pela ditadura realizando um projeto de sociedade encampado e implementado por essa mesma ditadura: destruição da Amazônia, mecanização, transgenização e agrotoxificação da “lavoura”, migração induzida para as cidades. Por trás de tudo, uma certa ideia de Brasil que o vê, no início do século XXI, como se ele devesse ser o que os Estados Unidos foram no século XX. A imagem que o Brasil tem de si mesmo é, sob vários aspectos, aquela projetada pelos Estados Unidos nos filmes de Hollywood dos anos 50 – muito carro, muita autoestrada, muita geladeira, muita televisão, todo mundo feliz. Quem pagava por tudo isso éramos, entre outros, nós. (Quem nos pagará, agora? A África, mais uma vez? O Haiti? A Bolivia?). Isso sem falarmos na massa de infelicidade bruta gerada por esse modo de vida para seus beneficiários mesmo.

É isso que vejo, uma tristeza: cinco séculos de abominação continuam aí. Sarney é um capitão hereditário, como os que vieram de Portugal para saquear e devastar a terra dos índios. O nosso governo dito de esquerda governa com a permissão da oligarquia e dos jagunços destas para governar, ou seja, pode fazer várias coisas desde que a parte do leão continue com ela. Toda vez que o governo ensaia alguma medida que ameace isso,o congresso, eleito sabe-se como, breca, a imprensa derruba, o PMDB sabota.

Há uma série de impasses para os quais não vejo saída, não vejo como sair por dentro do jogo político tradicional, com as presentes regras – vejo mais como sendo possível pelo lado do movimento social. Este está desmobilizado; se não está, o que mais se ouve é que ele está. Mas se não for por via do movimento social, vamos continuar vivendo nesse paraíso subjuntivo, aquele em que um dia tudo vai ficar ótimo. O Brasil é um país dominado politicamente por grandes proprietários e grandes empreiteiros, que não só nunca fez sua reforma agrária, como onde se diz que já não é mais preciso fazê-la.

Você acha que as coisas vão começar a mudar quando chegarem a um limite?

A crise econômica mundial vai provavelmente pegar o Brasil no contrapé em algum momento próximo. Mas o que vai acontecer com certeza é que o mundo todo vai passar por uma transição ecológica, climática e demográfica muito intensa nos próximos 50 anos, com epidemias, fomes, secas, desastres, guerras, invasões. Estamos vendo as condições climáticas mudarem muito mais aceleradamente do que imaginávamos, e é grande a possibilidade de catástrofes, de quebras de safras, de crises de alimentos. Por ora, hoje, isso está até beneficiando o Brasil. Mas um dia a conta vai chegar. Os climatologistas, os geofísicos, os biólogos e os ecólogos estão profundamente pessimistas quanto ao ritmo, as causas e as consequências da transformação das condições ambientais em que se desenvolve hoje a vida da espécie. Porque haveria eu de estar otimista?

Penso que é preciso insistir que é possível ser feliz sem se deixar hipnotizar por esse frenesi de consumo que a mídia nos impõe. Não sou contra o crescimento econômico no Brasil, não sou idiota a ponto de achar que tudo se resolveria distribuindo a grana do Eike Batista entre os camponeses do semi-árido nordestino ou cortando os subsídios aos clãs político-mafiosos que governam o país. Não que isso não fosse uma boa ideia. Mas sou contra, isso sim, o crescimento da “economia” mundial, e sou a favor de uma redistribuição das taxas de crescimento. Sou também obviamente a favor de que todos possam comprar uma geladeira, e, por que não, uma televisão — mas sou a favor de que isso envolva a máxima implementação das tecnologias solar e eólica. E teria imenso prazer em parar de andar de carro se pudéssemos trocar esse meio absurdo de transporte por soluções mais inteligentes.

E como você vê o jovem nesse contexto?

É muito difícil falar de uma geração à qual não se pertence. Na década de 60 tínhamos ideias confusas mas ideais claros, achávamos que podíamos mudar o mundo, e sabíamos que tipo de mundo queríamos. Acho que, no geral, os horizontes utópicos se retraíram enormemente.

Algum movimento recente no Brasil ou no mundo chamou sua atenção?

No Brasil, a aceleração da difusão do que podemos chamar de cultura agro-sulista, tanto à direita como à esquerda, pelo interior do país. Vejo isso como a consumação do projeto de branqueamento da nacionalidade, esse modo muito peculiar da elite dominante acertar suas contas com o próprio passado (passado?) escravista.

Outra mudança importante foi a consolidação de uma cultura popular ligada ao movimento evangélico. O evangelismo das igrejas universais do reino de Deus e congêneres está evidentemente associado à religião do consumo, aliás.

E como você vê o surgimento das redes sociais, nesse contexto?

Isso é uma das poucas coisas com que estou bastante otimista: o relativo e progressivo enfraquecimento do controle total das mídias por cinco ou seis grandes grupos. Esse enfraquecimento está acontecendo com a proliferação das redes sociais, que são a grande novidade na sociedade brasileira e que estão contribuindo para fazer circular um tipo de informação que não tinha trânsito na imprensa oficial, e permitindo formas de mobilização antes impossíveis. Há movimentos inteiramente produzidos dentro das redes sociais, como a marcha contra a homofobia, o churrasco da “gente diferenciada” em Higienópolis, os vários movimentos contra Belo Monte, a mobilização pelas florestas. As redes são nossa saída de emergência para a aliança mortal entre governo e mídia. São um fator de desestabilização, no melhor sentido da palavra, do arranjo de poder dominante. Se alguma grande mudança no cenário político brasileiro vier a acontecer, creio que vai passar por essa mobilização das redes.

Por isso se intensificam as tentativas de controlar essas redes por parte dos poderes constituídos – isso no mundo inteiro. Pelo controle ao acesso ou por instrumentos vergonhosos, como o “projeto” brasileiro de banda larga, que começa pelo reconhecimento de que o serviço será de baixa qualidade. Uma decisão tecnolotica e política antidemocrática e antipopular, equivalente ao que se faz com a educação: impedir que a população tenha acesso pleno à circulação cultural. Parece mesmo, às vezes, que há uma conspiração para impedir que os brasileiros tenham uma educação boa e acesso de qualidade à internet. Essas coisas vão juntas e têm o mesmo efeito, que é o aumento da inteligência social, algo que, pelo jeito, é preciso controlar com muito cuidado.

Você imagina um novo modelo político?

Um amigo que trabalhava no ministério do Meio Ambiente na época de Marina Silva me criticava dizendo que essa minha conversa de ficar longe do Estado era romântica e absurda, que tínhamos que tomar o poder, sim. Eu respondia que, se tínhamos de tomar o poder, era preciso saber manter o poder depois, e era aí que a coisa pegava. Não tenho um desenho político para o Brasil, não tenho a pretensão de saber o que é melhor para o povo brasileiro em geral e como um todo. Só posso externar minhas preocupações e indignações, e palpitar, de verdade, apenas ali onde me sinto seguro.

Penso, de qualquer forma, que se deve insistir na ideia de que o Brasil tem – ou, a essa altura, teria – as condições ecológicas, geográficas, culturais de desenvolver um novo estilo de civilização, um que não seja uma cópia empobrecida do modelo americano e norte-europeu. Poderíamos começar a experimentar, timidamente que fosse, algum tipo de alternativa aos paradigmas tecno-econômicos desenvolvidos na Europa moderna. Mas imagino que, se algum país vai acabar fazendo isso no mundo, será a China. Verdade que os chineses têm 5000 anos de historia cultural praticamente continua, e o que nós temos a oferecer são apenas 500 anos de dominação europeia e uma triste historia de etnocídio, deliberado ou não. Mesmo assim, é indesculpável a falta de inventividade da sociedade brasileira, pelo menos das suas elite políticas e intelectuais, que perderam várias ocasiões de se inspirarem nas soluções socioculturais que os povos brasileiros historicamente ofereceram, e de assim articular as condições de uma civilização brasileira minimamente diferente dos comerciais de TV. Temos de mudar completamente, para começar, a relação secularmente predatória da sociedade nacional com a natureza, com a base físico-biológica da própria nacionalidade. E está na hora de iniciarmos uma relação nova com o consumo, menos ansiosa e mais realista diante da situação de crise atual. A felicidade tem muitos caminhos.

Cientistas sociais procuram modelo para onda de protestos no Brasil (Folha de S.Paulo)

23/06/2013 – 11h09

CASSIANO ELEK MACHADO
GRACILIANO ROCHA

Olhem para paris, diz Teresa Caldeira. Mas não a de Maio de 68: para a antropóloga brasileira radicada nos EUA, professora da Universidade da Califórnia em Berkeley, a análise das manifestações que tomaram o país na semana passada deve se pautar pelos distúrbios que eclodiram nas periferias francesas em 2005, quando cidades suburbanas na região metropolitana de Paris (“banlieues”) explodiram em uma onda de protestos sociais.

Especialista em antropologia urbana, Caldeira, 58, pesquisa a cultura da periferia, em especial a de São Paulo, e diz que se vários cientistas sociais se declararam surpresos, para ela não há novidade.

“Todos comparam com Istambul ou com a Primavera Árabe, mas deveriam olhar para o que houve em Paris há oito anos”, diz Caldeira. “Dá muito bem para entender o que está acontecendo e isso vem sendo articulado há muito tempo”, acredita a antropóloga, autora do livro “Cidade de Muro: Crime, Segregação e Cidadania” (Editora 34).

Ela lembra que o Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) existe há muitos anos e afirma que ele “articula todo o imaginário da produção cultural da periferia”.

“A Folha fez uma foto em 2010 de um grafite feito pelo MPL no Minhocão, em São Paulo, que dizia ‘A cidade só existe para quem pode se movimentar por ela’.”

Caldeira reproduziu a imagem em um artigo dela na revista “Public Culture” (Duke University Press, 2012) e a frase do grafite como uma ideia fundamental do movimento cultural da periferia. “Rap, literatura marginal, pixação, saraus, todos se fazem na base e rede e de circulação. E circular por São Paulo é um caos para quem não tem dinheiro.”

Opinião diferente tem o sociólogo francês Sebastian Roché. Em seu livro “Le Frisson de l’Émeute”, (Seuil, sem tradução no Brasil), ele afirma que as revoltas que inflamaram a França -cujo estopim foi a morte de dois adolescentes eletrocutados em uma perseguição policial- foram protagonizadas por jovens que se consideram vítimas da xenofobia por não terem a pele branca e, na maioria, filhos de imigrantes e muçulmanos.

“Os jovens muçulmanos, muito numerosos nas ‘banlieues’, não se sentem aceitos nem respeitados em suas crenças. Além disso, essa juventude foi abandonada à própria sorte. Nas ‘banlieues’, a taxa de desemprego oscila entre 25% e 40% entre jovens com menos de 25 anos”, frisa Roché.

Professor da celebrada Sciences Po (Instituto de Estudos Políticos), da Universidade de Grenoble e pesquisador do CNRS (Centro Nacional de Pesquisa Social), Roché diz ter acompanhado com atenção a onda de protestos no Brasil, e não vê “muitos pontos de comparação” entre o que aconteceu aqui e lá. Na França, diz ele, “não foram pobres destruindo o meio de vida de outros pobres”.

“A burguesia ou o governo não foram os alvos. Nenhum espaço do poder foi sitiado ou tomado. Ninguém se aproximou, por exemplo, do parlamento nem da sede do governo [como ocorreu no Brasil]. Aqui, os grupos operavam durante a noite, escondiam o rosto em capuzes e muitas vezes buscavam o confronto com a polícia. Não houve qualquer manifestação de massa, nenhum líder ou palavra de ordem emergiu.”

Teresa Caldeira, que no ano passado ganhou a prestigiosa bolsa Guggenheim de pesquisa, nos EUA, aponta outra foto dos movimentos recentes, que ela diz ter visto nas redes sociais, como icônica do que está acontecendo. Dois rapazes seguravam cartazes: um dizendo “O Brasil acordou” e outro “A periferia nunca dormiu”.

Também chamaram a atenção dela as faixas que faziam referências ao trabalho da polícia. “A PM está fazendo na Paulista o que faz todo dia na periferia”, dizia uma delas. “Há uma tensão de classes latente. E não me surpreende que os protestos tenham chegado agora na periferia”, diz ela, citando como exemplo as manifestações dos últimos dias em regiões como a estrada do M’Boi Mirim (na zona sul de São Paulo).

Ela aposta que, “tal como em Paris, em 2005, veremos agora a explosão da periferia”. Ainda que, segundo ela, a presença de classes A e B tenha tido importante papel na eclosão dos movimentos, os protestos veiculam uma insatisfação que vem sendo cozinhada nas periferias. “Uma coisa é de onde vem o caldo e a outra é a forma que a manifestação adquire. Na forma, parece um pouco com a Primavera Árabe: a maneira como circularam as informações e a insatisfação com as instituições políticas tradicionais”, diz.

“No conteúdo, é muito significativo que tenha estourado pelos R$ 0,20. Ninguém aguenta mais os ônibus da cidade. Conheço muita gente da periferia, devido às pesquisas, que todos os dias posta algo em mídias sociais contra o transporte público.”

Para o francês Roché, “a melhoria das condições de vida faz com que aqueles que se sentem excluídos se mobilizem coletivamente para reivindicar, como é o caso do Brasil”. “Na França, a questão é de exclusão social em um período de estagnação econômica, e a revolta de 2005 não gerou um modelo coletivo de massas e organizado. Não houve protesto contestador, mas sim apropriações individuais, como roubos e saques, ou então confrontos e destruição para exprimir a raiva. Nas ‘banlieues’, não houve reivindicação explícita.”

Ele afirma que, embora “revoltas possam ensinar muito aos governantes”, isso depende de eles “serem capazes de olhá-las de frente”. “Na França, nós não aprendemos muito. Em novembro de 2005, a França estava a um ano e meio das eleições presidenciais. O então ministro do Interior [Nicolas Sarkozy, presidente entre 2007-2012] viu naquilo uma oportunidade de reafirmar sua autoridade e estigmatizar as ‘banlieues’ e seus habitantes com vistas à eleição de 2007” -que ele terminaria vencendo. “Nenhuma análise política foi feita pelo Parlamento e menos ainda pelo ministério do Interior, proibido de refletir sobre sua atuação pelo próprio ministro.”

Para o sociólogo, as revoltas urbanas podem, ainda, exprimir um desejo de participação direta nas decisões públicas, no caso de países como Brasil e Turquia. “Nesses dois países, muitos jovens com acesso à educação apresentam reivindicações sobre o direito à diferença e que sejam levadas em conta suas demandas sociais pelo poder central desses países.”
O estudioso considera que “há progressos econômicos tanto no Brasil quanto na Turquia, e esses movimentos de contestação se dão em um contexto bem diferente do que ocorreu na França, cujo crescimento econômico tem sido mínimo ou nulo nos últimos anos”.

Para o sociólogo “o que está acontecendo no Brasil se parece mais com o Maio de 68”. “Naquela época a França vivia em pleno Les Trente Glorieuses [como ficaram conhecidas as três décadas de crescimento e prosperidade no pós-Guerra], e a juventude, com trabalho ou diplomas, mergulhou numa luta para que seu modo de vida e aspirações fossem reconhecidos pelo governo”, recorda.

Roberto DaMatta: Como não perder no futebol? (OESP)

12 de junho de 2013 | 2h 10

ROBERTO DAMATTA – O Estado de S.Paulo

-Qual é o maior problema do “nosso” futebol?

– Todos! Não ganhamos nada!

– Mas exportamos o futebol do Brasil para todo o mundo. Todos jogam como nós.

– Tudo bem… Mas por que não conseguimos ganhar?

– Precisamente por causa disso. Todo sucesso vira fracasso. Quem ganha perde…

Ouvi isso na barca indo para o Rio, eu que continuo insistindo em morar em Niterói. Ora, morar em Niterói é como não saber que o futebol sofre de um pecado original: o nosso time não pode perder. E, no entanto, se um time fosse eternamente ganhador os estádios ficariam vazios.

Num espaço de tempo que hoje engloba uns 100 anos, contabilizamos muitos jogos e, em consequência, muitas perdas e ganhos. As derrotas, contudo, são mais lembradas porque nossa memória retém – como dizia Freud – mais a ferida e o sofrimento (o trauma) do que o gozo, o encantamento e a beleza de céu estrelado das experiências transitórias (aliás, Freud tem um belíssimo ensaio sobre esse assunto). O belo passa e o feio fica? De modo algum. Mas o bom é amarrado com teias de aranha, ao passo que o ruim deixa cicatrizes. Pensamos a vida como uma escada quando, de fato, ela é uma bola que gira sem parar e corre mais do que nós.

Notei num ensaio presunçoso que, em inglês, existe uma diferença entre jogar e jogar. Entre “to gamble” e “to play”; entre ir a um cassino para apostar ou jogar tênis e tocar um piano. Num caso é necessário algum tipo de habilidade sem a qual não há música ou disputa, mas nos jogos de azar basta ter sorte. Mas além de “gamble” e “play” existe a palavra “match” para designar o encontro equilibrado entre dois adversários.

Veja o leitor. Na roleta não há um “match”, porque as chances são da banca. É um jogo com aficionados, mas sem “atletas”. Ninguém compete com uma roleta, mas contra ela. No mundo do esporte, porém, a disputa se transforma em competição. A igualdade inicial é um ponto central da dualidade constitutiva do esporte. Ora, a dualidade é o eixo sobre o qual gira a reciprocidade contida das fórmulas da caridade, das boas maneiras, da vingança e do dar-para-receber como viu Marcel Mauss. A palavra “partida” designa isso e antigamente era usada para se falar do futebol que retorna com a força das paixões recalcadas.

Para nós, brasileiros, o verbo jogar engloba tanto o jogo de azar (como o famoso e até hoje milagrosamente ilegal “jogo do bicho” e as loterias bancadas pelo governo) quanto o encontro esportivo regrado e igualitário, essa disputa agônica constitutivamente ligada à probabilidade de vencer ou perder.

Mas se uma mesma palavra – jogo – junta o jogo de azar e a disputa esportiva – nem por isso lembramos que o futebol é imprevisível. Nossa leitura canônica do futebol é sempre a de uma luta na qual o time do nosso coração vai ganhar, daí as desilusões das derrotas. Podemos perder, sem dúvida, mas resistimos freudianamente a pensar nessa possibilidade. Temos perdido muito, sem dúvida, mas recusamos perpetrar a única coisa acertada diante da derrota: aceitá-la.

Surge, então, o problema cósmico do futebol no Brasil. Como admitir que perder e ganhar fazem parte da própria estrutura desse jogo, se nós – em princípio – não lemos na palavra jogo a possibilidade de derrota? A agonia e o prazer do futebol estão ligados precisamente a essa possibilidade, mas isso é afastado do nosso consciente. Quando vamos ao jogo, vamos à vitória e há motivos para isso. Um deles eu mencionei na semana passada: o futebol foi o primeiro elemento extraordinariamente positivo de uma autovisão que era permanentemente negativa. Como imaginar que um povo convencido de sua inferioridade natural como atrasado, porque era mestiço, pudesse disputar (e vencer) os brancos “adiantados” e “puros”, que inventaram a civilização e o futebol?

Quando começamos a dominar o futebol dele, fazendo um fato social total: algo com elementos econômicos, religiosos, culturais, morais, políticos, filosóficos e cósmicos – uma grande tela que projetava tudo -, descobrimos que o que vinha de fora podia ser canibalizado e tornar-se nosso. Era possível inverter a lógica colonial. A digestão do outro pela sua incorporação ou englobamento sociopolítico no nosso meio é o pano de fundo do roubo do fogo dos deuses pelos homens.

No entanto, é preciso uma nota cautelar. Roubamos o futebol, mas não a vitória perpétua. Confundir a atividade futebolista com o sucesso permanente é infantil. Na política, isso surge com o vencer a qualquer custo ou, como diz um professor de poder no poder, o Sr. Gilberto Carvalho, “o bicho vai pegar…”. Ou seja: temos que vencer com ou sem jogo o que, lamentavelmente, mas graças a Deus, é bem diferente do futebol. Escrevi essas péssimas linhas antes da vitória de 3 a 0 contra a França! Somos, de agora em diante, somente vencedores? Um lado meu espera que sim…

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O futebol como filosofia

05 de junho de 2013

ROBERTO DAMATTA – O Estado de S.Paulo

O jogo é um modelo da vida. Ele exige temporadas, palcos, equipamentos (mesas, baralhos, dados, roletas, bolas, uniformes, redes, tacos) e regras de modo a garantir uma atenção apaixonada. E como tem início, meio e fim o jogo reduz a indiferença da vida. Com isso, faz com que meros passantes possam posar de campeões. O domingo pode não ter mesa farta, mas tem o jogo do Brasil com sua pompa e seus resplendores de esperança. Os jogos são uma das passagens secretas que permitem escapar de nós mesmos.

Dentre os esportes modernos, o futebol praticado no Brasil é certamente o mais denso. Simoni Lahud Guedes, uma estudiosa pioneira do futebol sugere que ele seria uma tela sobre a qual projetamos nossas indagações. Nascido na Inglaterra industrial dos 1860, o futebol ganhou regras fixas e, desde então, tem sido o sujeito predileto de intensas projeções simbólicas em todo o planeta.

No Brasil, ele acordou reações. Embora tivesse a chancela colonial de tudo o que vinha de fora e da poderosa Inglaterra, era uma atividade desconhecida. Um “esporte” (uma disputa governada por normas e pela necessidade imperiosa de saber vencer e perder), algo inusitado num Brasil que conhecia duelos e brigas que sempre acabavam mal.

Ademais, exercícios físicos e banhos frios não faziam parte da prática nacional. Entre nós, a barriguinha sempre foi prova de riqueza e da imobilidade física – expressiva do ideal de imobilidade social. Como receber essa inovação marcada pela disputa física veloz e igualitária, na qual perder e ganhar são – como na democracia – parte de sua estrutura? Onde encontrar um lugar para um jogo livre das restrições aristocráticas do nome de família, da cor da pele, e da “aparência”. Esse marco com o qual convivemos até hoje no Brasil?

O futebol sofreu muitos ataques em nome de um nacionalismo que se pensava frágil como porcelana. E, no entanto, como estamos vendo nessas vésperas de Copas, canibalizamos e digerimos o “foot-ball”, roubando-o dos ingleses. Hoje, há um estilo brasileiro de jogar e produzir esse esporte. De quinta coluna capaz de desvirtuar, ao lado da música e do cinema americanos, o estilo de vida e a língua pátria, o futebol acabou servindo como um instrumento básico de reflexão sobre o Brasil, conforme eu mesmo assinalei no livro Universo do Futebol, no qual, em 1982, agrupei um conjunto de ensaios socioantropológicos de colegas sobre esse esporte. Em 2006, no livro A Bola Corre Mais Que os Homens, reuni trabalhos nos quais apresentava uma saída para o dilema do esporte como alienação ou consciência do mundo insistindo como, no Brasil, o sucesso futebolístico foi o nosso primeiro instrumento de autoestima diante dos países “adiantados” e inatingíveis. O futebol foi o alento de um Brasil que se concebia como doente pela mistura de raças e que, até hoje, tem problemas em conviver consigo mesmo. Ele é a garantia do recomeço honrado na derrota e do gozo sem arrogância e corrupção na vitória.

Como prova do imprevisível destino das coisa sociais, o futebol não veio confirmar a dominação colonial. Pelo contrário, ele nos fez colonizadores e, mais que isso, filósofos por meio de toda uma literatura que a partir de Nelson Rodrigues, Jacinto de Thormes (Maneco Muller), José Lins do Rego e Armando Nogueira, entre outros, nos permitiu articular uma leitura positiva do mundo.

Literatura? Não seria um exagero? Digo que não e vou mais longe para acrescentar: o futebol criou entre nós uma filosofia, uma antropologia e uma teologia. O seu maior papel foi, como eu disse algumas vezes, o de ensinar democracia. Foi o de revelar com todas as letras que não se ganha sempre e que o mundo é instável como uma bola. Perder e vencer, ensina o futebol, fazem parte de uma mesma moeda.

Nelson Rodrigues fala de jogos bíblicos, do mesmo modo que nos abre a uma metafísica quando associa jogos e craques a destinos fechados ou ao afirmar que já no começo do mundo aquele gol seria perdido. Sua condenação da “objetividade burra” é uma crítica aguda de um senso comum hierarquizado e aristocrático que tenta tornar a própria vida algo oficial, possuída pelo Estado. Por outro lado, sua antropologia inaugura uma neoaristocracia nativa insonhável de negros e mestiços que deixam de ser híbridos enfermiços e passam – tal como ocorreu no jazz de uns Estados Unidos segregados – a príncipes, duques, condes e reis, apesar de nossos desejos inconfessáveis de fracasso. A sub-raça envenenada dos que queriam curar o Brasil se tornou a metarraça que, driblando os nossos subsociólogos – esses cartolas acadêmicos -, nos brindou com cinco Copas do Mundo. “A pátria em chuteiras” abria um novo espaço para esse futebol não branco, permitindo a países como o Brasil, uma redefinição inclusive muito mais abrangente e sem preconceitos de suas identidades nacionais.

Chimpanzees Have Five Universal Personality Dimensions (Science Daily)

June 3, 2013 — While psychologists have long debated the core personality dimensions that define humanity, primate researchers have been working to uncover the defining personality traits for humankind’s closest living relative, the chimpanzee. New research, published in the June 3 issue ofAmerican Journal of Primatology provides strong support for the universal existence of five personality dimensions in chimpanzees: reactivity/undependability, dominance, openness, extraversion and agreeableness with a possible sixth factor, methodical, needing further investigation.

Chimpanzee. New research provides strong support for the universal existence of five personality dimensions in chimpanzees: reactivity/undependability, dominance, openness, extraversion and agreeableness with a possible sixth factor, methodical, needing further investigation. (Credit: © anekoho / Fotolia)

“Understanding chimpanzee personality has important theoretical and practical implications,” explained lead author Hani Freeman, postdoctoral fellow with the Lester E. Fisher Center for the Study and Conservation of Apes at Lincoln Park Zoo. “From an academic standpoint, the findings can inform investigations into the evolution of personality. From a practical standpoint, caretakers of chimpanzees living in zoos or elsewhere can now tailor individualized care based on each animal’s personality thereby improving animal welfare.”

The study of chimpanzee personality is not novel; however, according to the authors, previous instruments designed to measure personality left a number of vital questions unanswered.

“Some personality scales used for chimpanzees were originally designed for another species. These ‘top-down’ approaches are susceptible to including traits that are not relevant for chimps, or fail to include all the relevant aspects of chimpanzee personality,” explained Freeman. “Another tactic, called a ‘bottom-up’ approach, derives traits specifically for chimpanzees without taking into account information from previous scales. This approach also has limitations as it impedes comparisons with findings in other studies and other species, which is essential if you want to use research on chimpanzees to better understand the evolution of human personality traits.”

To address the limitations of each approach and gain a better understanding of chimpanzee personality, the authors developed a new personality rating scale that incorporated the strengths of both types of scales. This new scale consisted of 41 behavioral descriptors including boldness, jealousy, friendliness and stinginess amongst others. Seventeen raters who work closely and directly with chimpanzees used the scale to assess 99 chimpanzees in their care at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research, UT MD Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop, Texas.

The chimpanzees rated were aged 8 to 48, a majority had been captive born and mother-raised, and all had lived at the facility for at least two years.

To validate their findings, the researchers used two years worth of behavioral data collected on the chimpanzees. As the authors expected, the findings showed the personality ratings were associated with differences in how the chimpanzees behaved. The researchers also showed the raters tended to agree in their independent judgments of chimpanzees’ personalities, suggesting the raters were not merely projecting traits onto the chimpanzees.

Researchers suggest that one benefit to having the chimpanzees rated on the five core personality dimensions is that this information can now be used to make predictions that will help in their management, such as how individual chimpanzees will behave in various social situations. This type of information will help zoos better anticipate certain behaviors from various individuals, and will assist them in providing individualized care.

Journal Reference:

  1. Hani D. Freeman, Sarah F. Brosnan, Lydia M. Hopper, Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro, Samuel D. Gosling.Developing a Comprehensive and Comparative Questionnaire for Measuring Personality in Chimpanzees Using a Simultaneous Top-Down/Bottom-Up DesignAmerican Journal of Primatology, 2013; DOI: 10.1002/ajp.22168

Fight Clubs: On Napoleon Chagnon (The Nation)

One anthropologist’s place in his field’s ongoing battle over questions of power, means and ends.

Peter C. Baker

May 15, 2013   |    This article appeared in the June 3, 2013 edition of The Nation.

In December 1919, Franz Boas, the German-born academic widely recognized as the father of American anthropology, published a letter in this magazine accusing four of his American colleagues—whom he did not identify—of having used their research positions as cover for engaging in espionage in Central America during the recently concluded war. Ten days later, the governing council of the American Anthropological Association voted 20 to 10 to censure Boas, claiming that his highly public letter was unjustified and in no way represented the AAA’s position. Boas was a founding member and former president of the association, so the censure was doubly humiliating; it essentially forced him to resign from both the AAA’s governing body and the National Research Council.

Noble Savages
My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes—The Yanomamö and the Anthropologists.
By Napoleon A. Chagnon.

The Boas incident was the prelude to a century in which anthropology has been haunted by questions of means and ends. What sorts of alliances with power are worth it? What responsibilities (if any) do anthropologists have to the populations they study? Above all, to what extent has Western anthropology been fatally compromised by its associations—direct and indirect, public and covert—with a violent and imperial foreign policy? In several books, the anthropologist David Price has cataloged the substantial sums of money funneled from the military and intelligence community to academic anthropology over the years, as well as the contribution of American anthropologists to every significant war effort in modern US history. Most recently, ethnographers have joined the Army’s Human Terrain System program, designed to aid military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by decoding the nuances of local culture. Price notes that although the revelation of these collaborations has often sparked heated short-term controversy, the disputes have passed without prompting broad, discipline-wide reform—or even conversation. After all, what anthropologist wants to spend time discrediting anthropology, a discipline that relies on trust, most importantly the trust of foreign governments and the subject populations that are the source of the discipline’s prized product of local knowledge? At what point are the ethical costs of doing anthropology too high, for ethnographers as well as the people they study?

That last question applies equally to anthropologists who may not work directly for the military or do fieldwork in areas explicitly labeled war zones. There is no better example than the career of Napoleon Chagnon, author of the bestselling anthropological text of the twentieth century, a slim volume called Yanomamö. Published in 1968, when Chagnon was 30, the book describes his fieldwork among the eponymous group of about 20,000 people who lived (and still live) in rainforest villages on both sides of the Venezuela-Brazil border. (Chagnon called them the Yanomamö, but most people who study the group call them the Yanomami.) Chagnon claimed—and now claims again in his recently published memoir, Noble Savages—that he arrived at his first Yanomami village in 1964 expecting to meet egalitarian natives living in harmony with nature and each other. This, he says, was what his University of Michigan anthropology professors had prepared him for. Instead, he found a way of life more reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes’s notion of the “state of nature”: an aggressive people mired in a cycle of inter-village combat, revenge begetting revenge and deception begetting deception. Death by murder was strikingly common, as was brutality toward women.

For Chagnon, the shock was immediate. No sooner had he and his guide arrived than they found themselves surrounded by “a dozen burly, naked, filthy, hideous men staring at us down the shafts of their drawn arrows! Immense wads of green tobacco were stuck between their lower teeth and lips making them look even more hideous, and strands of dark-green slime dripped or hung from their noses.” Whatever else might be said about this type of writing, with its blend of the lurid and the exotic, it appealed to American undergrads—or at least their professors assumed it did, and they kept assigning Yanomamö in Anthro 101. Before long, the book was in its second edition, then its third; a sixth came out last year. Chagnon has claimed, not unreasonably, that it has been read by as many as 4 million people, and it has certainly sold over 1 million copies. Unlike most other academic anthropologists, especially those writing in the 1960s, Chagnon brought lucidity and flair to his descriptions of fieldwork’s trials: the impossibility of staying clean and avoiding insects, the Sisyphean ordeal of trying to make a cup of oatmeal, the deep frustration of miscommunication, the loneliness. But it is obvious from reading Yanomamö that he also found the fieldwork to be a thrilling adventure. Trekking through the rainforest, a shotgun in one hand and a machete in the other; shooting tapir to roast over an open fire; building dugout canoes; forging friendships; tagging along for raids—Chagnon made cultural anthropology look more exciting than any textbook or tweedy professor’s lecture on kinship rituals. The book’s popularity has also benefited from the stylish films about the Yanomami that Chagnon made with the renowned visual ethnographer Timothy Asch.

In both the book and the films, there is a lot of fighting: chest-pounding matches, club fights, ax fights, raids, counter-raids, ambushes. Chagnon decided that Yanomami warfare was in large part about women, and specifically the question of who got to have sex with them. Women were regularly abducted from other villages during raids, and success in combat boosted a man’s social status, increasing his odds of securing wives for himself and his relatives. In order to reach this conclusion, Chagnon first constructed elaborate genealogies, tracing family trees across generations and far-flung villages to observe the relationship between blood ties and war patterns. This required not just learning the Yanomami language, but also overcoming his hosts’ frequent reluctance to supply the information he wanted. The most significant obstacle was a system of name taboos, including a prohibition against speaking a person’s name in that person’s presence and another against uttering the names of the dead.

The book was controversial from the start. Chagnon presented the Yanomami as a people living in the “state of nature,” untouched by the influence of modern civilization and nation-states, and so providing something of an undiluted example of humankind’s evolutionary ancestry. The possibility that these “primitive,” “Stone Age” people were killing each other not in competition over strategic resources, but specifically to improve their “reproductive fitness”—their odds of passing on their genes, either by reproducing themselves or by boosting the reproductive prospects of their relatives—was irresistible to proponents of the emerging field of sociobiology, which looks to natural selection to explain human social behaviors like altruism, the emergence of nation-states and war. The discipline’s recognition skyrocketed after the publication of E.O. Wilson’s influentialSociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975; in subsequent editions of Yanomamö, Chagnon placed more emphasis on the role of biology in explanations of human behavior. For sociobiologists and their descendants, especially so-called evolutionary psychologists, such thinking was nothing short of a scientific revolution; for their detractors, among them cultural anthropologists, it was reductionist mumbo-jumbo at best, and politically dangerous at worst—the squeezing of the Yanomami and similar groups into categories crafted from Western assumptions to serve Western interests. The battles were heated and inseparable from competition over funding. The Yanomami became something of a prize token: for Chagnon’s defenders and critics, the fighting that occurred among this small group of people in the Amazon simply could not be what the other camp claimed it was, nor mean what the other side said it meant. Allegations of bad faith, often tinged with personal hostility, were as thick in the air as insects in the Amazon rainforest.

* * *

Even if the Yanomami are, or were, our “contemporary ancestors,” they live on land that is claimed by modern nation-states and happens to be rich in precious minerals. When the miners arrive, the Yanomami die, mostly from disease or poisonous chemical runoff, but sometimes also from shotgun blasts. During the 1980s and ’90s, anthropologists and indigenous rights groups became concerned about the possible effect that Chagnon’s theories might have outside the academy. This concern escalated after 1988, when Chagnon published an article in Science claiming that, among the Yanomami, men who killed other men also had the most wives and children. In 1989, the Brazilian Anthropological Association wrote to the AAA’s newsletter, arguing that Chagnon’s characterization of the Yanomami as a fundamentally “fierce people” (the subtitle of his book’s first three editions) was exaggerated to the point of falsehood, and less than helpful at a time when the Yanomami were under attack by miners and their allies in the Brazilian government, who were citing this supposedly endemic Yanomami violence as one of the reasons they should be segregated on twenty-one separate micro-reservations. As similar accusations circulated, it became increasingly difficult for Chagnon to obtain the permits required to do his work. In 1999, citing this obstacle, he announced his early retirement from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and returned to his home state of Michigan.

Around a year later, controversy about Chagnon’s Yanomami work reached a new level of scrutiny and public visibility, prompted by the publication of Patrick Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazon. Where previous Yanomami debates had rarely strayed beyond specialized academic venues, Tierney’s attack on Chagnon was published by W.W. Norton, a respected trade house, and garnered the attention of reviewers around the world. Tierney was at the time a journalist and indigenous rights activist; in Darkness in El Dorado, he took all the old complaints against Chagnon and wove them into a dramatic narrative of white men and the ruin they’d brought to the rainforest. His rogues’ gallery includes the French anthropologist Jacques Lizot, who for years used his store of foreign goods to pay Yanomami men and boys for sex. There was also the public television documentary crew that paid the Yanomami to dress and act differently (more “primitively”) than they otherwise would have—and then sat by, cameras rolling, while a young woman and her child died, despite having a motorboat that could have taken them to a hospital. There are miners and soldiers and corrupt politicians—and there’s Chagnon himself, whom Tierney portrays as the monomaniacal, violence-obsessed Colonel Kurtz of sociobiology, so entranced by the possibility of making a vital contribution to a beautiful, voguish theory that he lost all sight of Yanomami reality, research ethics and human decency.

In addition to rehashing—and, more than once, overcooking—the old accusations about Chagnon’s flawed assumptions, suspect methodology, dubious interpretations and their effects on the Yanomami, Tierney raised a new charge, one that seemed to dwarf the others in terms of its horror. The allegation related to a central aspect of Chagnon’s research program, one that had hardly been mentioned in his writings to date. The funding for Chagnon’s first few trips to South America came from the National Institute of Mental Health; but by 1967, Chagnon was collaborating with James Neel, a titan of modern genetics. Neel worked for the Atomic Energy Commission, the post–World War II agency created to study nuclear technology and its effects (including the infamous experiments in which Americans were exposed to large doses of radiation without their consent). As a geneticist, Neel saw the Yanomami as the closest link to our “evolutionary ancestors” he would ever get a chance to sample, an isolated population unaffected by industrialization or global conflict. Neel and Chagnon were both then based at the University of Michigan, and it was on Neel’s recommendation that Chagnon went to live with the Yanomami in the first place. Chagnon got AEC money; in return, whenever one of Neel’s teams wanted to collect blood and tissue samples, he served as their guide and translator.

* * *

Though Neel had little concern for the specifics of Yanomami life and (according to Chagnon) a disdain for anthropology in general, he sometimes went on the sample-gathering trips. On one, in 1968, a measles outbreak was erupting just as his team arrived. In the account presented in Darkness in El Dorado, Neel and his team—despite delivering a thousand vaccines—made the epidemic worse, causing many more Yanomami to fall ill and die than would have otherwise. This was not, Tierney insinuated in the pre-publication proofs of the book sent to reviewers, a matter of neglect; instead, Neel had knowingly made the epidemic worse because it gave him the perfect chance to observe the immune systems of a virgin-soil population in action. In this account, a founding figure of modern genetics comes across as little different from a Nazi scientist, with America’s bestselling anthropologist as his willing handmaiden.

After Norton sent out the proofs of Tierney’s book, his tale of killer anthropologists started circulating at great speed on academic listservs. It was a “nightmarish story,” wrote two of Chagnon’s longtime critics in August 2000, “a real anthropological heart of darkness beyond the imagining of even a Josef [sic] Conrad (though not, perhaps a Josef Mengele).” Chagnon’s partisans set in motion efforts to discredit Tierney’s book page by page, hoping to stem the inevitable tide of bad press. Allies like Richard Dawkins, Edward Wilson, Steven Pinker, Daniel Dennett and Marc Hauser e-mailed people covering the book, urging them to denounce it. In late 2000, an excerpt appeared in The New Yorker, and the book—though still not released—was nominated for a National Book Award. Meanwhile, Tierney and Norton continued editing it, softening some of its more incendiary claims about the measles epidemic; when released, it still claimed that Neel had made the epidemic worse, but allowed that it had not been intentional.

Sensing the possibility of a public relations disaster for the entire discipline, the AAA’s leadership convened a task force to evaluate Tierney’s charges. This was highly unusual: unlike a state medical or legal board, for example, the AAA is not a licensing body; you need not be a member of the association to practice anthropology. (Chagnon canceled his membership in the late 1980s.) It has little in the way of meaningful investigative authority, and its ethics guidelines are notoriously muddled and difficult to apply. The task force’s preliminary report, released in 2001 soon after the book’s publication, concluded that Tierney’s argument was shot through with flaws: the accusation that Neel had worsened the measles epidemic, as one example, was found to be baseless and not even possible. But many of Tierney’s less sensational, more complex charges against Chagnon were substantiated, and the task force declared that the book was of definite value to the field. This satisfied no one, not least because of an obvious procedural failing: two of the task force’s members admitted to not having read the whole report.

The final report, released a few months later, was considerably more critical of Chagnon. But for his detractors, it was at best an imperfect attempt to grapple with fundamental questions, and at worst a PR move designed to hurry the discipline past an ugly episode. For Chagnon’s supporters, it was a disgraceful hatchet job, one more sign of cultural anthropology’s resentment over the encroachment of “hard” science onto its turf. Three years later, a referendum was put forth to rescind the report, on the grounds that the original task force had been illegitimate, biased and sloppy. Roughly 10 percent of the AAA’s members voted: 846 for, 338 against. The report was removed from the organization’s website, and the question of which, if any, of its conclusions had been true was left for die-hards to debate in academic journals and on their personal websites. There is little agreement even about what the controversy is exactly, and most often the people involved—tenured professors—do little more than talk past each other, bemoan the quality of debate, and then continue talking past each other. Davi Kopenawa, a prominent Yanomami activist, put it well: “I want to know how much they are making each month. How much does an anthropologist earn?… This is a lot of money. They may be fighting but they are happy. They fight and this makes them happy. They make money and fight.”

There were two other referendums on the ballot when the AAA voted to rescind the El Dorado report. One expressed a strong preference for holding the annual meetings at facilities staffed by unions; it passed by a vote of 695 to 624. The other was a repudiation of the 1919 censure of Franz Boas, whose accusations about anthropologist-spies had since been confirmed by researchers—including the fact that some of the men who voted to censure him were the spies he had declined to name out of respect for their safety. The language of the 2005 repudiation implied that the original censure had been a regrettable error from another era, the sort of mistake anthropology didn’t make anymore and hadn’t made for a long time. It passed by an overwhelming margin: 1,245 to 73.

* * *

Chagnon’s retirement was not what he’d hoped for. In 2000, overcome by the stress of working to clear his name, but nonetheless seeing his alleged complicity with genocide become headline news around the world, he collapsed and was hospitalized. In subsequent years, he found it impossible to put the affair behind him:

I did not travel much, did not fish much, did not hunt grouse and pheasants over my German short-haired pointers, did not go to many concerts, did not read much fiction for pleasure, and did not spend more time with members of my family.

Instead, he set to work on a memoir. But he repeatedly scrapped what he’d written “because of the anger that kept creeping into my writing, giving it a very depressive tone.”

In Secrets of the Tribe, a recent documentary about anthropologists and the Yanomami, Chagnon responds to his critics mostly by repeating simplified versions of their charges in a sanctimonious tone. Despite his attempts to expunge the anger from his memoir, much of Noble Savages has a similar quality. As Chagnon sees it, his critics are a coalition of anthropological “ayatollahs” scrambling to protect their own authority from scientific rigor, “Marxist”-style “Thought Police” guarding the “politically correct” conventional wisdom, “postmodernists” unqualified to make claims about his conduct because they can’t even decide if the world exists, Catholic missionaries who wanted the Yanomami for themselves, and “barefoot” “activist” types less interested in studying the people of the world than in leading a witch hunt for the bad guy in the “office down the hall.” (The long history of overlap between American anthropology and the American military-intelligence sector is not mentioned.) These are the sorts of people, we are given to understand, who don’t care about what is true or not—the sort willing to smear a man to keep an ideology alive.

But Chagnon is in a bind: he’s written a memoir to refute the charges against him, but he finds the charges so baseless, and their existence so revolting, that he can barely be bothered to address them, or even to characterize them accurately. (In this sense, Noble Savages mirrors Darkness in El Dorado, which might have been more rigorous if Tierney hadn’t been so furious.) A telling example is Chagnon’s response to criticism from his fellow anthropologist Brian Ferguson. In 1995, Ferguson published Yanomami Warfare: A Political History, a book centrally concerned with countering Chagnon’s analysis of Yanomami life and violence. He disputed Chagnon’s interpretations of his own data (convincingly, I think), but also advanced a more fundamental objection: that the Yanomami had been in contact, direct and otherwise, with the “outside” world at several points long before Chagnon’s arrival, and that these moments of contact had influenced everything from where their villages were established to how they related to each other. Warfare was not the Yanomami historical norm, Ferguson said, and when war did break out, it had at least as much to do with the effects of encroaching nation-states and empires as it did with women and revenge. One crucial result of these moments of contact was the Yanomami’s acquistion of steel. Steel tools are many times more efficient than stone ones; when some villages came to possess more than others, it tilted the scales toward conflict, especially in times of hardship and deprivation, such as those caused by disease outbreaks (which even by Chagnon’s calculations were a more common cause of Yanomami death than violence).

Whatever the soundness and validity of Ferguson’s complex argument, it deserves more of a response than the single sentence that Chagnon has buried in an endnote: “Ferguson also claimed that I caused animosity, jealousy, and conflicts by the way I gave metal tools to the Yanomamö.” You can almost hear Chagnon snorting in disbelief. Because the endnotes lack corresponding numbers in the main text, the path the reader must take to them is unmarked. No reader will learn from Chagnon what Ferguson actually thinks. It is true that, in Yanomamö, Chagnon admitted to intentionally exploiting local animosities and conflicts to gain information, especially in his efforts to work past the Yanomami’s pesky name taboos. It is also true that Ferguson discusses Chagnon and other anthropologists’ habit of handing out steels tools in exchange for information, labor and blood samples. But to make this the centerpiece of his critique is absurd. It is also a measure of Chagnon’s narcissism that he reduces an argument about hundreds of years of history, empires and culture to an argument about himself. (Tierney is guilty of a similar fixation: when he cites Ferguson’s arguments in Darkness in El Dorado, he is also seemingly obsessed with the possibility that Chagnon himself had caused Yanomami warfare.)

The irony is that in Noble Savages, a story of an allegedly Stone Age people, steel and its influence are ubiquitous. One village Chagnon visited exists where it does, a missionary tells him, because its residents wanted to be near the missionaries and the steel tools they brought with them. His hosts lie to him about other villages—how far away they are, the dangers he can expect en route—so that he won’t leave and share his steel gifts with others. When he’s not watching, they break into his supplies and make off with knives and fishhooks. “The very word madohe [trade goods] stirs people,” Chagnon says. If machetes or axes are present, he observes, club fights can escalate to machete fights, increasing the likelihood of their participants being crippled or killed. Even after pointing all this out, Chagnon takes a position worthy of the National Rifle Association: machetes don’t kill Yanomami, Yanomami do.

Elsewhere in his memoir, though, he insists that the introduction of new technology can alter—and has altered—the way people relate to each other, even by encouraging them to kill each other. Missionaries from the Salesians of Don Bosco, a Catholic charity, gave shotguns to the Yanomami, something Chagnon refused to do “as a matter of principle.” The results, he says, were disastrous. “Although the shotguns did not make the Yanomamö warlike, I believe that they probably caused an increase in mortality rates…. Shotguns may have even made the Yanomamö more willing to attack their enemies because the shotguns were more efficient killing weapons than their bows and arrows.” And: “The introduction of shotguns at Salesian missions would most likely change traditional Yanomamö warfare patterns.”

The Salesians might be the only people Chagnon dislikes more than cultural anthropologists. From his perspective, they were determined to make the rainforest into a theocracy, controlling who came and went (including anthropologists) and luring the heathen Yanomami to their settlements so as to render them dependent on the goods they supplied. It was the Salesians, Chagnon theorizes, who pulled strings to get Tierney the permits he needed to do his research in the Amazon for Darkness in El Dorado. In 2010, he even speculated that they paid Tierney to write his book. As with the postmodern barefoot ayatollahs of anthropology, the Salesians are presented to us as ruthless Machiavellians. Chagnon all but accuses them of turning a blind eye to the inevitable result of their largesse: if the guns were being used for raids, or even making the raids more common, so be it—this would make the guns more valuable, and the missionaries with the guns more powerful still. So shotguns, it seems, can influence warfare patterns, but never machetes—and anyway, Chagnon writes, the Yanomami (a supposedly untouched people) had “possessed steel tools many years prior to my first trip.

Now and then, Chagnon will recognize that, yes, war is complicated, a cumulative result of many intertwined factors. He even draws attention to the difference between motive, on the one hand, and human statements about motive, on the other. If a Yanomami was bitten by a snake and died, Chagnon recalls, his fellow villagers might decide that the snake had been sent by a rival village—therefore providing a pretext for revenge, which might involve seizing control of some strategic resources. Such behavior should sound familiar: quite recently, the leader of the most powerful nation on earth organized the invasion of another, oil-rich nation, claiming that he was acting on God’s personal instructions. The leader of the invaders also pointed out that, in addition to possessing terrible new weapons, the oil-rich country’s leader had once tried to kill his father. Oil was never mentioned: the history of war is a history of obfuscation about its motives. But whenever the Yanomami tell Chagnon that they’re fighting over women, he takes it as a direct expression of fact—one that, conveniently enough, supports the theory that for the Yanomami, as for all our ancestors, warfare was essentially about reproduction and its kissing cousin, revenge.

* * *

For all his claims to be working in opposition to the archetype of the noble savage, Chagnon is implicitly committed to the idea that the Yanomami he met were in some sense completely different from us—that they lived, to borrow a phrase from the pop science writer Jared Diamond, in a premodern sliver of the “world until yesterday” preserved in our midst. The Yanomami are, at different points in Chagnon’s book, “wild,” “primitive” and “Stone Age”—never mind all their steel, or the fact that they rely on farming, not hunting or gathering, for 70 percent of their diet. Never mind that none of their primary crops—bananas and plantains—are indigenous to the Amazon or even South America. No, the Yanomami are “pristine,” “pure,” “special,” even noble: “I have chosen to call this book Noble Savages,” Chagnon writes, “in part because the Yanomamö I lived among had a certain kind of nobility that most anthropologists rarely see in acculturated and depopulated tribes that have been defeated by and incorporated into the political states in whose jurisdiction they reside.”

When it comes to describing the definitively unpristine Yanomami—those who, even by his standard, have had extended contact with “civilization”—Chagnon vacillates between pity, disdain and (most often) disinterest. Readers of Noble Savages will learn almost nothing of contemporary Yanomami or their politics. They will certainly not learn about the assemblies at which representatives from different villages discuss the ongoing threats to their existence posed by mining interests, and the future of their relationships with Venezuela and Brazil. Yanomami have even traveled to the United States—not just to speak about the Chagnon controversy, but also to request the return of the blood samples gathered by research teams, including those led by James Neel. The Yanomami argue that they never consented to the indefinite storage of bodily materials in far-away freezers, a practice that violates their burial customs. (In 2010, several research facilities agreed to return the blood.) Chagnon says not one word about any of this; he’s too busy calling Yanomami leaders the puppets of Salesian missionaries, who are using them to advance their anti-Chagnon, anti-science agenda.

Chagnon’s fixation on those Yanomami he judged “pristine,” and his disinterest in any he’d determined to be “acculturated,” took its most explicit turn in 1990, when he was contacted by Cecilia Matos, the mistress of Venezuela’s then-president, Carlos Andrés Pérez. As Chagnon tells it, Pérez’s political career was winding down, and Matos wanted him to beef up his legacy by doing something to benefit people like the Yanomami. Though Chagnon had started a Yanomami Survival Fund in 1988, there is no evidence that he ever delivered any money to the people it was named for. The one time he was asked for advice about safeguarding the Yanomami’s living conditions, Chagnon recommended a rainforest biosphere project that would protect their land—but not all of it, just those parts whose inhabitants Chagnon deemed sufficiently untouched. About four-fifths of Yanomami lands in Venezuela would be unprotected, and so more open to mining concerns.

This aspect of the proposal goes unmentioned in Noble Savages; all Chagnon says, in his three-page account of the incident, is that before the project could be implemented, the usual network of detractors went to work spreading lies, which prompted hysterical protests, and so the project died. He doesn’t say that a similar project that included almost all Yanomami land was launched the following year. More damningly, he doesn’t tell his readers that in 1993 Pérez was impeached, removed from office and jailed after getting caught siphoning millions of dollars’ worth of public funds to private accounts he shared with his mistress. Matos was to be arrested too, but she fled the country; on her arrest order, she was accused of, among other things, misappropriating state resources to get a noble-sounding biosphere project running as a front for more profitable activities. Almost every commentator on the Chagnon saga, even among his army of vociferous allies, has agreed that his participation in this project, however tangential, was at the very least bad judgment. In a recent New York Times Magazine profile, Chagnon swatted away such accusations. In exchange for his help, Pérez had restored his research permit. “I got a year’s worth of data,” he said. “It was worth it for that reason.”

At the end of the Secrets of the Tribe documentary, Patrick Tierney says, “I don’t think that there’s any way [Chagnon’s defenders] can salvage [him] in the long run.” Time will tell, but I’d wager that Tierney is wrong: he is too enamored of the idea that scandal might lead to change, and too optimistic about facts trumping ideology (which is, of course, what Chagnon claims to hope for, too). Chagnon’s basic conclusions about the Yanomami were cited uncritically in Jared Diamond’s bestseller The World Until Yesterday, published in December [see Stephen Wertheim, “Hunter-Blatherer,” April 22]. Early reviews of Noble Savages were almost all positive. In a triumphant blurb, the anthropologist Robin Fox calls it the “final knockout punch in a fight [Chagnon] didn’t pick but has most assuredly won.” Chagnon was recently asked by the University of Michigan, his alma mater, to organize his life’s work into a digital archive for use by academics around the world. And last year, he was voted into the National Academy of Sciences.

In response, his old University of Michigan professor Marshall Sahlins resigned from the academy, citing not only Chagnon’s election but also the recruitment of NAS anthropologists by the US military. “The two are connected,” he told me recently. “Chagnon’s research and the imperial venture are both based on the same assumption, that pursuit of material self-interest is the natural human condition—the obvious, natural, best thing for the individual and the nation.”

Online, Chagnon’s fans have been selling T-shirts that caricature his critics’ positions as: Napoleon Chagnon kicked my dog! Word is the man himself thinks they’re hilarious and has ordered a bunch for friends and family. This semester, at age 74, Chagnon joined the anthropology department at the University of Missouri. “I feel like a battleship,” he told the campus newspaper, “shaking off the mothballs and taking to the high seas again.” Let’s christen it the USS Machete.

In “Library Man” (Feb. 7, 2011), Thomas Meaney reviewed Patrick Wilcken’s biography of Claude Lévi-Strauss, “a poet in the laboratory of anthropology.”

Read more: http://www.thenation.com/article/174369/fight-clubs-napoleon-chagnon#ixzz2VSi1oT30

‘Não existem índios no Brasil’, diz escritor em abertura de congresso (G1)

22/05/2013 14h24 – Atualizado em 22/05/2013 14h40

Para ele, a palavra ‘índio’ surgiu de maneira equivocada e reduz os povos.

Autor de 43 livros, Daniel Munduruku abriu o evento em Poços de Caldas. 

Jéssica BalbinoDo G1 Sul de Minas

Daniel Munduruku é autor de 43 livros e falou durante abertura de Congresso (Foto: Jéssica Balbino/ G1)Daniel Munduruku é autor de 43 livros e falou durante abertura de Congresso (Foto: Jéssica Balbino/ G1)

Autor de 43 livros, o indígena Daniel Munduruku foi o palestrante convidado para a abertura do 10º Congresso do Meio Ambiente em Poços de Caldas (MG) nesta quarta-feira (22). O índio, que é doutor em educação e cursa pós-doutorado em literatura na Universidade Federal de São Carlos (Ufscar), falou sobre a ‘Mãe Terra e a Questão Indígena’  durante um bate-papo com os congressistas.

Em uma saudação na língua do povo ao qual pertence, abriu a fala e brincando, pediu licença a quem estava no ambiente. “Bom dia a todos os amigos aqui presentes, espero que este encontro seja tão bom para vocês como vai ser para mim”, saudou, em uma referência aos ancestrais. “Nossos avós diziam que quando vamos encontrar alguém, temos que ir com o coração aberto e alegre para que o encontro seja bom, desejando que as pessoas que estão no lugar se sintam da mesma forma”, pontuou, ao lembrar que estar conectado com o meio ambiente é estar conectado com a poesia do universo.

“A luta pelo meio ambiente é a luta de todo povo brasileiro” – Daniel Munduruku, escritor e doutor

“Vou falar de outras tantas coisas que não são meio ambiente, mas também são. Quero olhar nos olhos e conversar. Para começar, vou destacar que não sou índio e que não existem índios no Brasil. O que existem são povos. Eu sou Munduruku e pertencer a um povo é ter participação dentro de uma tradição ancestral brasileira. Quando eu digo que não existem índios, quero dizer que existe uma diversidade muito grande de ancestralidade. São pelo menos 250 povos indígenas e são faladas pelo menos 180 línguas no Brasil”, disse.

Para ele, a palavra ‘índio’ surgiu de maneira equivocada e reduz os povos. “Está ligada a uma série de conceitos e pré-conceitos. Normalmente ela está vinculada a coisas negativas, embora haja muito romantismo na história, a maioria do pensamento quer dizer que o  índio é um ser fora de moda, atrasado no tempo e selvagem. Alguém que está atrapalhando o progresso e continuamos reproduzindo um estereótipo que foi sendo passado ao longo da nossa história”, criticou.”

Público vindo de várias partes do Brasil debateu durante palestra (Foto: Jéssica Balbino/ G1)Público vindo de várias partes do Brasil debateu
durante palestra (Foto: Jéssica Balbino/ G1)

O bate-papo foi permeado por lembranças do indígena, que contou histórias sobre a própria vida, a fase de transição entre infância e adolescência e a perda do avô, que segundo ele, na tradição Munduruku, é quem transmite os ensinamentos dentro de uma família ou tribo. Com isso, ele chegou à dúvida dos presentes que era: como começou a escrever e se tornou acadêmico. “Quando meu avô morreu, me fez entender o que era ser Munduruku e eu sempre quis lembrar dele assim. Queria ser como ele, um contador de histórias. Demorei para saber como seria meu caminho, se seria na tribo ou na cidade, mas optei pela cidade e pela vida acadêmica e hoje estou aqui,  transmitindo estas histórias que são tão cheias de sabedoria de vida e de meio ambiente”, pontuou.

Em relação ao meio ambiente e aos questionamentos feitos pelo público, o indígena destacou a questão da evolução humana e no Brasil a construção de barragens. “O povo Munduruku está sofrendo com a construção das barragens, seja em Belomonte, seja em Rondônia, enfim, eles estão lutando para viver. A natureza e o ambiente que os índios vivem fazem parte da humanidade deles. Eles lutam para se manterem e lutam por um Brasil inteiro que não tem a consciência de perceber isso. A luta pelo meio ambiente é a luta de todo povo brasileiro”, finalizou.

Origins of human culture linked to rapid climate change (Cardiff University)

21-May-2013

By Ian Hall

Rapid climate change during the Middle Stone Age, between 80,000 and 40,000 years ago, during the Middle Stone Age, sparked surges in cultural innovation in early modern human populations, according to new research.

The research, published this month in Nature Communications, was conducted by a team of scientists from Cardiff University’s School of Earth and Ocean Sciences, the Natural History Museum in London and the University of Barcelona.

The scientists studied a marine sediment core off the coast of South Africa and reconstructed terrestrial climate variability over the last 100,000 years.

Dr Martin Ziegler, Cardiff University School of Earth and Ocean Sciences, said: “We found that South Africa experienced rapid climate transitions toward wetter conditions at times when the Northern Hemisphere experienced extremely cold conditions.”

These large Northern Hemisphere cooling events have previously been linked to a change in the Atlantic Ocean circulation that led to a reduced transport of warm water to the high latitudes in the North. In response to this Northern Hemisphere cooling, large parts of the sub-Saharan Africa experienced very dry conditions.

“Our new data however, contrasts with sub-Saharan Africa and demonstrates that the South African climate responded in the opposite direction, with increasing rainfall, that can be associated with a globally occurring southward shift of the tropical monsoon belt.”

Linking climate change with human evolution

Professor Ian Hall, Cardiff University School of Earth and Ocean Sciences, said: “When the timing of these rapidly occurring wet pulses was compared with the archaeological datasets, we found remarkable coincidences.

“The occurrence of several major Middle Stone Age industries fell tightly together with the onset of periods with increased rainfall.”

“Similarly, the disappearance of the industries appears to coincide with the transition to drier climatic conditions.”

Professor Chris Stringer of London’s Natural History Museum commented “The correspondence between climatic ameliorations and cultural innovations supports the view that population growth fuelled cultural changes, through increased human interactions.”

The South African archaeological record is so important because it shows some of the oldest evidence for modern behavior in early humans. This includes the use of symbols, which has been linked to the development of complex language, and personal adornments made of seashells.

“The quality of the southern African data allowed us to make these correlations between climate and behavioural change, but it will require comparable data from other areas before we can say whether this region was uniquely important in the development of modern human culture” added Professor Stringer.

The new study presents the most convincing evidence so far that abrupt climate change was instrumental in this development.

The research was supported by the UK Natural Environment Research Council and is part of the international Gateways training network, funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union.

Anthropologists should do a better job of promoting their field (Orlando Sentinel)

By Ty Matejowsky and Beatriz M. Reyes-Foster | Guest columnists

April 24, 2013

Anthropology has been in the news quite a bit lately.

The New York Times recently profiled Napoleon Chagnon on the eve of the publication of his memoir, “Noble Savages: My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes — The Yanomamo and the Anthropologists.”

Last August, Kiplinger named anthropology “the worst major for your career.”

Two months later, Forbes ranked “anthropology and archaeology,” as No. 1 on its list of “worst college majors.”

This newfound public shaming of anthropology only adds insult to injury in light of Florida Gov. Rick Scott‘s dismissive 2011 statements about anthropologists. More than once Scott, whose daughter famously earned an anthropology degree, quipped that Florida does “not need any more anthropologists.”

Overall, 2012 was anthropology’s annus horribilis, as Science magazine recently stated.

Of anthropology’s major subfields, cultural anthropology has probably fared the worst in recent public discussions. Although archaeology and physical anthropology get their fair share of positive media portrayals — think Emily Deschanel’s portrayal of sexy forensic anthropologist Temperance Brennan on CBS’s Bones — it seems that journalists only acknowledge cultural anthropology when it is gripped by controversy.

Cultural anthropology suffers a public-image problem as our “brand” is now largely defined by others. Politicians, studies by business media with profit-driven measures of success, and pseudo-anthropological authorities like Jared Diamond have done much to define cultural anthropology in the popular consciousness.

In many ways, cultural anthropology lacks archaeology’s and physical anthropology’s “cool” cachet. While their practices and methodologies easily translate to National Geographic or History Channel programs, they necessarily involve some degree of commodification.

Bones, ruins, and artifacts all become objects for public consumption. Cultural anthropology is much more difficult to “sell” because it resists similarly commodifying living people. The 2013 Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue with photos of tribal peoples alongside bikini-clad models serves as a prime example of this commodification.

Many cultural anthropologists have remained aloof amid this tumult. This remoteness is surely compounded by today’s academic environment. Public engagement counts little toward promotion and tenure and may even be viewed dismissively by fellow academics.

Many anthropologists, already burdened with increased class sizes, decreased institutional support, and ever-growing pressures to publish and secure research grants simply do not have the time, resources or motivation to publicly voice their opinions.

Cultural anthropology’s branding problem is largely superficial. Anthropologists possess unique knowledge and skill sets that have real-world value. Anthropology helps us understand the world in a way that cannot be reduced to numbers or captured in surveys.

The marketing industry is increasingly recognizing the value of anthropological methodologies. A recent Atlantic article highlights the way in which ethnography and participant-observation are used in market research. Moreover, the World Bank recently elected an anthropologist, Jim Yong Kim, as president.

Anthropologists need to take better ownership of our brand. The complexity of anthropological concepts such as “culture,” “power” and the “global” should not dissuade anthropologists from engaging in meaningful public discourse.

Evidence of such newfound public engagement is emerging within the Web and blogosphere. Jason Antrosio’s Living Anthropologically blog and the “This is Anthropology” initiative, a “jargon-free” website with the purpose of informing the public about anthropology, are well ahead of the curve in this way, providing anthropological perspectives on relevant social issues that are both accessible and engaging.

Revisiting anthropology’s history may be the best way to revitalize the cultural anthropology brand. Franz Boas, considered the father of American anthropology, argued that race is not biologically determined and that no race is genetically superior. His numerous speeches and public writings underscore his commitment to public engagement.

Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict continued Boas’ tradition by writing books read by millions. Mead’s “Coming of Age in Samoa” pushed gender and sex boundaries in the 1920s. Benedict’s book “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword” transformed many people’s’ understandings of post-war Japan.

The much-loved fictional writing of Zora Neale Hurston was greatly informed by her anthropological training. These anthropologists, perhaps imperfectly, challenged prevailing assumptions by the general public in their times.

Challenging preconceived notions and assumptions is still central to our brand. Anthropology is critically engaged, proactive, holistic and progressive. More than anything, the anthropology brand is concerned with culture, an ever-changing process that both defines our reality and is defined by our individual and societal choices.

Ty Matejowsky and Beatriz M. Reyes-Foster are professors in the department of anthropology at the University of Central Florida.

Anthropologists at the All Scientists Meeting of the Long Term Ecological Research Network (Anthropology News)

By Mark Moritz, Michael Paolisso, Courtney Carothers, Sean Downey, Kathleen Galvin, Drew Gerkey, Steven Lansing, Terrence McCabe, Amber Wutich and Rebecca Zarger

March 1st, 2013

"Participants attend a working group session on anthropological sciences, ecology and environment during the 2012 LTER All Scientists Meeting in Estes Park, Colorado. Photo courtesy LTER Network Office"

Participants attend a working group session on anthropological sciences, ecology and environment during the 2012 LTER All Scientists Meeting in Estes Park, Colorado. Photo courtesy LTER Network Office

In September 2012, we participated in the 2012 All Scientists Meeting (ASM) of the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) Network in Estes Park, Colorado to make the case for integrating more anthropologists into the study of ecosystems. During the ASM’s initial plenary, the presence of embedded anthropologists was announced to all, and we were invited to stand and identify ourselves for the audience. From then on we spent several days immersing ourselves in the activities of the LTER network and engaging with its researchers, a group previously unknown to many of us. We worked to overcome apprehensions (“Why are anthropologists studying us?”), identify areas where our expertise might be useful (“What can anthropologists contribute to ecological research?”), and left with some experiences and ideas that we would like to share with fellow anthropologists who may be interested in pursuing the challenges and opportunities provided by the LTER network.

The LTER Network

The National Science Foundation (NSF) created the LTER Network in 1980 to support long-term research of ecosystems with the understanding that many ecosystem processes can only be studied through long-term research. Sites were selected to represent major ecosystem types or natural biomes across the US (there are now also a few international LTER sites). It is one of the most highly funded NSF programs. The LTER Network is a major component of the LTER program as it allows for integrative cross-site, and network-wide research. The ASM is another critical component of the network as it brings researchers, post-docs, graduate and undergraduate students together every three years to share results, discuss progress, and develop new collaborative research projects. The ASMconsists of an intensive six-day program with workshops, keynote speakers, poster presentations (with free beer) and field trips, which all offer plenty of opportunities to strengthen and develop new connections and opportunities within the network.

Anthropologists at the ASM

Anthropologists (eg, Ted Gragson, Laura Ogden, Charles Redman) have been involved in research at a number of the LTER sites and have written about the integration of social science in the LTER network (Redman et al, Integrating Social Science into the Long-Term Ecological Research [LTER] Network, Ecosystems, 2004), but the theme of this year’s ASM meeting—the Anthropocene—offered a unique opportunity to make the case for greater involvement of anthropologists in LTER projects. And so with support of the cultural anthropology program at NSF, Steve Lansing gave a keynote lecture about his research on complex adaptive systems in Bali, while Michael Agar and Michael Paolisso organized two workshops to identify intellectual and programmatic bridges between ecological and environmental anthropology and LTER projects to strengthen research into ecological and human dimension interactions at multiple spatiotemporal scales. The workshops showcased our research, which represented a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches within ecological anthropology, but all underscored the relevance of anthropological approaches for study of complex social-ecological systems in the Anthropocene. In addition, we participated in workshops, visited the poster sessions, and made connections with LTER researchers. Most researchers at our session were already studying the human dimensions of ecosystems, which is indicative of some the challenges in integrating anthropology.

There is a growing recognition among ecologists that they need to grapple with the human impacts on ecosystems and that the old model of studying isolated and protected reserves to understand ecosystems is no longer valid. This is evidenced by the theme of this year’s ASM meeting and the increasing impact of climate change on ecosystems in the LTER sites. However, there are few ecological models that satisfactorily incorporate human complexity. Ecologists may study ecosystem processes at the micro-scale and then jump to the global macro-scale, eg, measuring the impact of global warming on these processes, thus skipping the local, regional, and national scales at which human activities more directly affect ecosystem processes in myriad ways. This offers opportunities for anthropologists who study complex social-ecological systems using a holistic approach and making linkages across these spatiotemporal scales. Moreover, anthropologists are no strangers to long-term research as many are involved in ethnographic research in one site over multiple decades. Thus, anthropologists can make significant conceptual contributions to LTER projects.

Opportunities

One attraction of research in LTER sites is that anthropologists living close to an LTER site could do research in their own backyard. There are currently 26 sites across the US so there are plenty of opportunities. In addition, it offers the possibility of funding sources other than the NSF Cultural Anthropology program. However, funding processes are complicated and opportunities may be more limited (than they should be). There are some funding restrictions within NSF that limit the integration of social and ecological research. There are no clear guidelines or processes for funding social science research within LTER projects. Senior anthropologists may have to find other sources of funding to support their research at LTER sites. However, we found that there may be many more opportunities for enterprising graduate students to join an LTER team. The advantage for graduate students is that LTER sites have extensive data and an established infrastructure, which relieves them of some of the challenges of finding a new field site and provides ample opportunity to collaborate with other graduate students, more effectively bridging interdisciplinary divides.

The research model of the LTER network—long-term projects, cross-site linkages, and consistent funding—also offers unique opportunities for anthropologists to rethink ways of doing research in unprecedented ways. Whereas long-term ethnographic research often depends on the commitment of individual researchers, research at LTER sites is institutionalized. We could ask, what comprehensive, long-term, high frequency data on social systems could be collected across multiple sites to advance our understanding of the dynamic processes in coupled human and natural systems? That is an exciting question to ponder.

Challenges

While there are social science activities at almost all LTER sites and the network has a long history of social science engagement, it is often on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis and contingent on funding availability. The greatest challenge in integrating anthropological research in LTER projects may be a general problem of interdisciplinary research. This is manifested in different ways, including the incongruence of conceptual models, theories, methods, scope, and units of analysis in ecology and anthropology. Anthropologists’ primary goal has been describing and explaining cross-cultural variation across all human societies and very long time periods, while LTER research is mainly conducted within the context of the US and over relatively short periods (even though it is long-term research). In addition, the iterative, recursive, abductive approaches of ethnographic research strategies, as described by Michael Agar, are not always understood by ecologists who use more standardized scientific protocols and can be seen as lacking value and validity. Of course, there are many ecologists and anthropologists that have successfully collaborated in interdisciplinary studies of complex social-ecological systems, for example the South Turkana Ecosystem Project, but the number of transdisciplinary studies in which research transcends the disciplines is less common.

Conclusion

Of course, being anthropologists, we could not help ourselves and studied the LTER participants at their ASM. If we want to make the case for integrating more anthropologists in the study of ecosystems, we should at least become familiar with what ecologists think of our research and us. The audience at our workshops consisted primarily of fellow anthropologists, ecology graduate students, and a few PIs of LTER sites, which indicates that among the higher organizational levels of the LTER network and the next generation of ecologists there is a growing interest in anthropological approaches to study anthromes in the Anthropocene. However, there still may be some resistance to the integration of social sciences in ecosystem research as well as stereotypes of anthropologists, and we overheard a senior ecologist describe anthropologists as being lousy scientists with physics envy and no quantitative skills who want a slice of the LTER cake. To be fair, Lansing’s keynote was well-received by the ecologists in the audience, who for the most part were excited to see how topics that interested them were interwoven with topics more familiar to anthropologists, including religion, social relations, economic development, and governance.

In the end, one keynote and two workshops are not sufficient to make the case for anthropology, but it is a necessary first step and we think that an ongoing engagement with LTER research is critical if we want to contribute to a discussion about Earth stewardship.

This essay was a collaboration of Mark Moritz (Ohio State U), Michael Paolisso(UMaryland), Courtney Carothers (U Alaska-Fairbanks), Sean Downey (U Maryland),Kathleen Galvin (Colorado State U), Drew Gerkey (National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center), J Stephen Lansing (U Arizona), Terrence McCabe (U Colorado),Amber Wutich (Arizona State U) and Rebecca Zarger (U South Florida).

Female Anthropologists Harassed (The Scientist)

[Why the photo of Maasai people? -RT]

A new survey finds a high incidence of sexual harassment and rape among women doing anthropological field work.

By Jef Akst | April 15, 2013

The Maasai tribe in Kenya. WIKIMEDIA, MATT CRYPTO

More than 20 percent of female bioanthropologists who took part in a new survey are victims of “physical sexual harassment or unwanted sexual contact” in the course of their scientific research, primarily at the hand of superior professional colleagues, even their own mentors.

After talking to a friend that had been raped by a colleague, anthropologist Kathryn Clancy of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign decided to look into the matter further.  “It was like a slap in the face to learn that this was happening to my friends,” Clancy told ScienceInsider.

She began posting anonymous stories of sexual harassment, shared with her by her female colleagues, on the Scientific American blog Context and Variation. The stories began to draw comments of other researchers’ harassment stories. “This is definitely not limited to just my discipline,” Clancy told ScienceInsider—nor is it limited to females, she found.

To get a better handle on the frequency with which such harassment occurs, Clancy and colleagues conducted a (still ongoing) online survey, asking scientists to report on their field-work experiences. Preliminary results, presented Saturday (April 13) at the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA) annual meeting in Knoxville, Tennessee, indicated that about 30 percent of both men and women reported the occurrence of verbal abuse “regularly” or “frequently” at field sites. And 21 percent of women reported having experienced physical sexual harassment or unwanted sexual contact; one out of 23 men also reported such abuse.

Notably, fewer than 20 percent of the reported cases of harassment involved the local community; rather, most of the abuse came from other researchers, primarily those further along in their careers. But why are such experiences so rarely reported?

“Quitting a field site, not completing and publishing research, and/or loss of letters of recommendation can have potent consequences for academic careers,” collaborator Katie Hinde of Harvard University told ScienceInsider. “Taken together, these factors result in a particularly vulnerable population of victims and witnesses powerless to intervene. As a discipline, we need to recognize and remedy that an appreciable non-zero number of our junior colleagues, particularly women, are having to endure harassment and a hostile work environment in order to be scientists.”