ScienceDaily (July 18, 2012) — What makes soldiers abuse prisoners? How could Nazi officials condemn thousands of Jews to gas chamber deaths? What’s going on when underlings help cover up a financial swindle? For years, researchers have tried to identify the factors that drive people to commit cruel and brutal acts and perhaps no one has contributed more to this knowledge than psychological scientist Stanley Milgram.
Just over 50 years ago, Milgram embarked on what were to become some of the most famous studies in psychology. In these studies, which ostensibly examined the effects of punishment on learning, participants were assigned the role of “teacher” and were required to administer shocks to a “learner” that increased in intensity each time the learner gave an incorrect answer. As Milgram famously found, participants were willing to deliver supposedly lethal shocks to a stranger, just because they were asked to do so.
Researchers have offered many possible explanations for the participants’ behavior and the take-home conclusion that seems to have emerged is that people cannot help but obey the orders of those in authority, even when those orders go to the extremes.
This obedience explanation, however, fails to account for a very important aspect of the studies: why, and under what conditions, people did not obey the experimenter.
In a new article published in Perspectives on Psychological Science, a journal of the Association for Psychological Science, researchers Stephen Reicher of the University of St. Andrews and Alexander Haslam and Joanne Smith of the University of Exeter propose a new way of looking at Milgram’s findings.
The researchers hypothesized that, rather than obedience to authority, the participants’ behavior might be better explained by their patterns of social identification. They surmised that conditions that encouraged identification with the experimenter (and, by extension, the scientific community) led participants to follow the experimenters’ orders, while conditions that encouraged identification with the learner (and the general community) led participants to defy the experimenters’ orders.
As the researchers explain, this suggests that participants’ willingness to engage in destructive behavior is “a reflection not of simple obedience, but of active identification with the experimenter and his mission.”
Reicher, Haslam, and Smith wanted to examine whether participants’ willingness to administer shocks across variants of the Milgram paradigm could be predicted by the extent to which the variant emphasized identification with the experimenter and identification with the learner.
For their study, the researchers recruited two different groups of participants. The expert group included 32 academic social psychologists from two British universities and on Australian university. The nonexpert group included 96 first-year psychology students who had not yet learned about the Milgram studies.
All participants were read a short description of Milgram’s baseline study and they were then given details about 15 variants of the study. For each variant, they were asked to indicate the extent to which that variant would lead participants to identify with the experimenter and the scientific community and the extent to which it would lead them to identify with the learner and the general community.
The results of the study confirmed the researchers’ hypotheses. Identification with the experimenter was a very strong positive predictor of the level of obedience displayed in each variant. On the other hand, identification with the learner was a strong negative predictor of the level of obedience. The relative identification score (identification with experimenter minus identification with learner) was also a very strong predictor of the level of obedience.
According to the authors, these new findings suggest that we need to rethink obedience as the standard explanation for why people engage in cruel and brutal behavior. This new research “moves us away from a dominant viewpoint that has prevailed within and beyond the academic world for nearly half a century — a viewpoint suggesting that people engage in barbaric acts because they have little insight into what they are doing and conform slavishly to the will of authority,” they write.
These new findings suggest that social identification provides participants with a moral compass and motivates them to act as followers. This followership, as the authors point out, is not thoughtless — “it is the endeavor of committed subjects.”
Looking at the findings this way has several advantages, Reicher, Haslam, and Smith argue. First, it mirrors recent historical assessments suggesting that functionaries in brutalizing regimes — like the Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann — do much more than merely follow orders. And it simultaneously accounts for why participants are more likely to follow orders under certain conditions than others.
The researchers acknowledge that the methodology used in this research is somewhat unorthodox — the most direct way to examine the question of social identification would involve recreating the Milgram paradigm and varying different aspects of the paradigm to manipulate social identification with both experimenter and learner. But this kind of research involves considerable ethical challenges. The purpose of the article, the authors say, is to provide a strong theoretical case for such research, “so that work to address the critical question of why (and not just whether) people still prove willing to participate in brutalizing acts can move forward.”
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Most People Will Administer Shocks When Prodded By ‘Authority Figure’
ScienceDaily (Dec. 22, 2008) — Nearly 50 years after one of the most controversial behavioral experiments in history, a social psychologist has found that people are still just as willing to administer what they believe are painful electric shocks to others when urged on by an authority figure.
Jerry M. Burger, PhD, replicated one of the famous obedience experiments of the late Stanley Milgram, PhD, and found that compliance rates in the replication were only slightly lower than those found by Milgram. And, like Milgram, he found no difference in the rates of obedience between men and women.
Burger’s findings are reported in the January issue of American Psychologist. The issue includes a special section reflecting on Milgram’s work 24 years after his death on Dec. 20, 1984, and analyzing Burger’s study.
“People learning about Milgram’s work often wonder whether results would be any different today,” said Burger, a professor at Santa Clara University. “Many point to the lessons of the Holocaust and argue that there is greater societal awareness of the dangers of blind obedience. But what I found is the same situational factors that affected obedience in Milgram’s experiments still operate today.”
Stanley Milgram was an assistant professor at Yale University in 1961 when he conducted the first in a series of experiments in which subjects – thinking they were testing the effect of punishment on learning – administered what they believed were increasingly powerful electric shocks to another person in a separate room. An authority figure conducting the experiment prodded the first person, who was assigned the role of “teacher” to continue shocking the other person, who was playing the role of “learner.” In reality, both the authority figure and the learner were in on the real intent of the experiment, and the imposing-looking shock generator machine was a fake.
Milgram found that, after hearing the learner’s first cries of pain at 150 volts, 82.5 percent of participants continued administering shocks; of those, 79 percent continued to the shock generator’s end, at 450 volts. In Burger’s replication, 70 percent of the participants had to be stopped as they continued past 150 volts – a difference that was not statistically significant.
“Nearly four out of five of Milgram’s participants who continued after 150 volts went all the way to the end of the shock generator,” Burger said. “Because of this pattern, knowing how participants react at the 150-volt juncture allows us to make a reasonable guess about what they would have done if we had continued with the complete procedure.”
Milgram’s techniques have been debated ever since his research was first published. As a result, there is now an ethics codes for psychologists and other controls have been placed on experimental research that have effectively prevented any precise replications of Milgram’s work. “No study using procedures similar to Milgram’s has been published in more than three decades,” according to Burger.
Burger implemented a number of safeguards that enabled him to win approval for the work from his university’s institutional review board. First, he determined that while Milgram allowed his subjects to administer “shocks” of up to 450 volts in 15-volt increments, 150 volts appeared to be the critical point where nearly every participant paused and indicated reluctance to continue. Thus, 150 volts was the top range in Burger’s study.
In addition, Burger screened out any potential subjects who had taken more than two psychology courses in college or who indicated familiarity with Milgram’s research. A clinical psychologist also interviewed potential subjects and eliminated anyone who might have a negative reaction to the study procedure.
In Burger’s study, participants were told at least three times that they could withdraw from the study at any time and still receive the $50 payment. Also, these participants were given a lower-voltage sample shock to show the generator was real – 15 volts, as compared to 45 volts administered by Milgram.
Several of the psychologists writing in the same issue of American Psychologist questioned whether Burger’s study is truly comparable to Milgram’s, although they acknowledge its usefulness.
“…there are simply too many differences between this study and the earlier obedience research to permit conceptually precise and useful comparisons,” wrote Arthur G. Miller, PhD, of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.
“Though direct comparisons of absolute levels of obedience cannot be made between the 150-volt maximum of Burger’s research design and Milgram’s 450-volt maximum, Burger’s ‘obedience lite’ procedures can be used to explore further some of the situational variables studied by Milgram, as well as look at additional variables,” wrote Alan C. Elms, PhD, of the University of California, Davis. Elms assisted Milgram in the summer of 1961.
Em novo paradigma da ciência para a sustentabilidade global, cientista tende a ser mais multidisciplinar e mais participativo na sociedade, segundo Lidia Brito, diretora da Divisão de Políticas Científicas da Unesco (foto:Unesco)
“A exaustão dos recursos naturais não será resolvida enquanto os padrões de subjetividade ocidentais não forem incluídos como parte fundamental do problema. […] A insatisfação crônica do cidadão ocidental, e a forma irresponsável com que se relaciona com as coisas […] são coisas tão importantes quanto a discussão sobre matrizes energéticas”.
Essa fissura não se limita à questão do “nordeste”, mas é ainda mais importante, ainda que menos saliente, na própria questão do clima. Somos levados a crer todo o tempo que o clima que importa está em algum outro lugar, e que só é acessível através da mediação de especialistas e equipamentos. Obviamente isso ocorre de fato, mas há efeitos deletérios nessa alienação entre os indivíduos e o meio ambiente: a questão passa a ser entendida como problema distante, vivido apenas de forma abstrata. Isso gera a atitude caracterizada pela ideia de que “eu não tenho nada com isso” – o que é exatamente o que o personagem do filme diz à avó quando percebe que esta espera que ele vingue a morte do pai. De certa forma, ele vivia a sua própria relação familiar de forma alienada, como algo abstrato, virtual, e as contingências da vida o obrigam a enfrentar a incontornável materialidade dos contextos locais. A crise ambiental atual nos confronta com esta materialidade incontornável. Se o personagem vivesse as suas relações familiares de forma mais integral, talvez o destino de todos ali fosse outro. Há responsabilidades que nos implicam, mas que não escolhemos – algo difícil de aceitar no contexto liberal em que vivemos. Mas a analogia acaba por aqui: felizmente não há morte alguma a ser vingada na questão climática (ou haverá?).
Desta forma, na imaginação artística o sertão funcionou, ao longo dos últimos dois séculos, como o “outro mundo” onde há liberdade em contraposição aos controles que marcam as sociedades urbanas, e onde há mais autenticidade, o que pode ser encarado por um viés romântico (como vemos em José de Alencar, por exemplo) ou onde coisas impensáveis podem ocorrer, numa espécie de mirada conradiana [referente a elementos da obra do escritor britânico Joseph Conrad (1857-1924), autor de Coração das trevas]. Mesmo com o Cinema Novo, onde há uma sociologização mais intensa do sertão, esse não deixa de ser espaço de liberdade e experimentação, como vemos em Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol, de Glauber Rocha. Mas é preciso que se diga que isso tudo marca uma perspectiva de quem olha de fora. O sertão não é uma coisa, são muitas.
Além disso, nossa percepção do ambiente é visceralmente marcada por nossas perspectivas contextuais. Uma pesquisa que coordenei a respeito das respostas sociais e culturais às secas do ano de 2005 – um ano em que houve secas na Amazônia, no Nordeste e no sul do Brasil – mostrou que as populações locais não pensam o meio ambiente como algo desconectado das demais dimensões da vida; como tais dimensões são variáveis, a percepção do ambiente o é também. Os resultados da pesquisa foram publicados no livroDepois que a chuva não veio, disponível em texto integral na Internet. O problema é que os governos centrais, como o federal, no Brasil, têm a tendência a homogeneizar tudo com o qual se relacionam, ignorando os contextos locais; e a ciência climática tende a pregar que o contexto local e o clima não têm relação causal direta (especialmente quando estão contestando a capacidade do conhecimento tradicional de produzir previsões climáticas válidas). No que diz respeito às relações entre sociedade e clima, vivemos uma situação verdadeiramente neurótica. O meio ambiente pode inclusive ser uma forma de eufemizar uma discussão demasiadamente sensível em termos políticos e sociais. Um manual de infoativismo editado na Inglaterra, por exemplo, sugere que personagens em forma de animais sejam usados em campanhas públicas em que questões politicas sensíveis dificultem a comunicação através de exemplos humanos.
As diferenças culturais não devem ser entendidas como obstáculo às ações relacionadas à crise ambiental. Pelo contrário, são recursos importantes. É interessante observar como a biodiversidade é hipervalorizada, ao ponto de ser fetichizada, e ao mesmo tempo a diversidade de formas humanas de ser e estar no mundo é desvalorizada – por exemplo, quando se acredita, com as melhores intenções, que é preciso “educar” as pessoas que praticam queimadas para plantio, por exemplo, para que “entendam” os efeitos deletérios de algumas de suas práticas cotidianas. Projetamos o problema sobre os outros, sem perceber que esse nosso foco em informação e no pensamento, ou seja, ao diagnosticar tudo como “falta de informação” ou diferentes “formas de pensar”, é parte fundamental do problema. Tudo ficou cibernético demais, de forma que as questões morais e éticas nos escapam muito facilmente.
No meu entender, o que sobressai nesta questão da participação social e da multiplicidade cultural é o fato de que é preciso que os ocidentais, e nós, ocidentalóides, entendamos que há dimensões do problema que transcendem a materialidade e o utilitarismo. A exaustão dos recursos naturais, por exemplo, não será resolvida enquanto os padrões de subjetividade ocidentais não forem incluídos como parte fundamental do problema. Não adianta criar esquemas institucionais para evitar a “tragédia dos comuns”, por exemplo, sem lidar com os temas da satisfação e da responsabilidade. A insatisfação crônica do cidadão ocidental, e a forma irresponsável com que se relaciona com as coisas (ao pagar os governos municipais para “sumir” com o nosso lixo, sem que nenhuma pergunta seja feita, de modo que não precisemos pensar mais nele, por exemplo), são coisas tão importantes quanto a discussão sobre matrizes energéticas.
– sustentabilidade: o que exatamente se está tentando sustentar? Precisamos pensar a “mutabilidade” tanto quanto sustentabilidade. É muito difícil mudar o (insustentável) sistema econômico em que nos encontramos, e é preciso atentar para o fato de que, sob a fachada de “sustentabilidade”, há um esforço imenso de mudar apenas o que é necessário para que nada mude no final. O mercado de carbono é o exemplo paradigmático disso. Ou seja, em geral os debates sobre sustentabilidade (e sobre adaptação, resiliência etc.) são conservadores e insuficientes.
Uma (in)certa antropologia 
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