Arquivo da tag: ciência

Bill Maher: “… praying away hurricanes is (not) meteorology” (TheHuffington Post)

Bill Maher: Liberty University Is Not A Real School

By  Posted: 05/19/2012 11:10 pm Updated: 05/20/2012 11:18 am

Bill Maher Liberty University

At the end of “Real Time” Friday night, Bill Maher lambasted Liberty University, the Virginia religious university that has become a mandatory stop for Republican presidential candidates. (Watch above.)

“You can’t expect me to believe anything Mitt Romney said last week at Liberty University, because a) he’s a liar and b) Liberty University isn’t really a university,” Maher began. “It’s not like an actual statesman visited a real college. It’s more like the Tupac hologram visited Disneyland and said what he would do as president during the Main Street Electrical Parade.”

Romney delivered Liberty’s commencement speech on May 12.

Maher noted that Liberty teaches “creation science,” and the idea that earth was created 5,000 years ago. “This is a school you flunk out of when you get the answers right,” he joked.

Much as conservatives believe gay marriage cheapens their own vows, “I think a diploma from Liberty cheapens my diploma from a real school,” he continued. “I worked really hard for four years and sold a lot of drugs to get that thing.”

Liberty’s diploma may look real, Maher said, but “when you confuse a church with a school, Maher went on, “it mixes up the things you believe — religion — with the things we know — education. Then you start thinking that creationism is science, and gay aversion is psychology, and praying away hurricanes is meteorology.”

Carta aberta à presidenta Dilma Rousseff – Mudanças climáticas: hora de se recobrar o bom senso

Carta aberta à presidenta Dilma Rousseff
Mudanças climáticas: hora de se recobrar o bom senso
São Paulo, 14 de maio de 2012

CartaAbertaPresidDilmaAR

A Negação das Mudanças Climáticas e a Direita Organizada – Parte 3 – E o Professor Molion?

by Alexandre Araújo Costa on Sunday, May 20, 2012 at 10:45pm.
Postado no Facebook

Ricardo Felício fez aparição meteórica no programa do Jô Soares e, naturalmente, não se sabe que alcance isso pode ter em termos de sua carreira de militante negador. Como mostramos em dois textos anteriores (http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=384583481583550 e http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=385757404799491), academicamente trata-se de alguém com atuação evidentemente limitada, trajetória que não demonstra produtividade acadêmica. Desnudamos, porém, sua vinculação com a direita organizada, seja através da MSIa (vide as outras notas), seja via colaboração direta com o site “midia a mais” (idem), que, por sinal, é citado no Lattes de Ricardo Felício como um dos locais em que ele, deixando é claro a conotação acadêmica do termo, “publica”.

Mas evidentemente Ricardo Felicio não é o único negador brasileiro. Atuante há bem mais tempo, com bem mais trânsito na comunidade acadêmica, ainda envolvido de certo modo com a meteorologia, através do Departamento ao qual é vinculado, na UFAL, o principal negador brasileiro continua a ser o velho Luis Baldicero Molion. Aliás, algumas pessoas me indagaram exatamente da maneira como consta no título (“e o Prof. Molion”?) e este texto visa responder a tal pergunta.

Molion é bastante conhecido na comunidade brasileira de meteorologia. Sempre foi afeito a posições excêntricas e teses que cientificamente poderiam ser chamadas, no mínimo, de marginais (como a influência de vulcões submarinos sobre o El Niño-Oscilação Sul). Sempre foi tido como controvertido e polemista na comunidade, mas quero deixar claro que, conhecendo Molion há certamente mais de uma década e meia, isso parecia ser até um traço simpático. Quero, portanto, deixar claro que este texto aqui, longe de pretender atacar a sua figura ponto de vista pessoal, Ele tem como objetivo expor as movimentações de Molion para além do mundo acadêmico, mas que evidentemente levarão à conclusão de que qualquer ilusão de isenção em torno de suas opiniões seria condescendência para com ele.

Sabe-se que o professor da UFAL tem ministrado um sem-número de palestras nos últimos anos, sempre dedicadas ao mesmo tema, isto é, combater o consenso científico em torno do papel antrópico sobre as mudanças observadas no sistema climático. Não é meu objetivo neste breve texto abordar as questões de mérito, o que fiz com um relativo aprofundamento em http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=384584698250095 e em diversos posts em minha página, mas devo frisar que, longe de representar um negador mais sofisticado, Molion também é grosseiro e desrespeitoso em seus ataques ao restante da comunidade e não preza pela coerência científica, fazendo uso da amálgama variada e inconsistente de pseudo-argumentos negacionistas. Num momento, negando todos os dados observados, diz que não há aquecimento, mas resfriamento; noutro, afirma que há aquecimento, mas que este não é antrópico e que – contrariando novamente tudo que foi medido nas últimas décadas – é um efeito do sol; ou ainda, que estamos diante de algo benéfico.

Especificamente essa combinação de isentar os fatores antrópicos e de afirmar que o aumento da concentração de CO2 é benéfica tem caído como uma luva para que Molion transite confortavelmente junto a um público específico: o do agronegócio e do ruralismo. Afinal, se a pecuária não contribui com emissões de metano e se as emissões de dióxido de carbono (e também de metano) associadas ao desmatamento não são um problema, o discurso de Molion representa um tipo de armadura e escudo pseudo-científicos que o agronegócio precisa. Afinal, se ninguém consegue defender os ruralistas dos crimes perpetrados contra trabalhadores rurais e ambientalistas; se a concentração de terra e renda no campo continua sendo uma mácula revoltante desde os tempos das capitanias em um Brasil que nunca fez uma Reforma Agrária de verdade; se o uso massivo de agrotóxicos e o envenenamento cotidiano de nossas mesas também desperta antipatia do grande público… pelo menos com os argumentos “moliônicos”, o agronegócio e os reis do gado e soja ficam livres de acusações quanto à questão do clima…

E de fato, Molion tem falado muito para esse público. Em 24/06/2008, palestrou no “Seminário Cooplantio” (divulgado pela Rádio Rural em http://wp.clicrbs.com.br/radioruralam/2008/06/24/diario-de-gramado-ii-seminario-cooplantio/). Outra entrevista foi divulgada junto ao SINCAL (Assoc. Nacional dos Sindicatos Rurais das Regiões Produtoras de Café e Leite), vide http://sincal.org.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=940:prof-molion-desfaz-falsas-acusacoes-contra-a-pecuaria&catid=1:noticias-ultimas&Itemid=19. Em 30/03/2009, outra palestra, ministrada na Fenicafé 2009, com o “tema” “Aquecimento global: mitos e verdades. Quais os efeitos para a agricultura?” No evento afirmou que “o aquecimento global é totalmente questionável e amparado em “imbecilidades” (http://www.redepeabirus.com.br/redes/form/post?pub_id=49547). Em 01/02/2010, concede entrevista divulgada como “Prof. Molion desfaz falsas acusações contra a pecuária” em MFRural, site que se auto-apresenta como “O MF Rural é um site desenvolvido com a finalidade de facilitar as negociações e promover o encontro entre produtores rurais”. Na home, a chamada é “MF Rural – O Agronegócio passa por aqui!”
http://noticias.mfrural.com.br/noticia-agricola/prof.-molion-desfaz-falsas-acusacoes-contra-a-pecuaria-16151.aspx. Em 26/03/2010, ministrou palestra patrocinada pela Câmara especializada de agronomia do CREA-RJ. Na chamada, no site abaixo, diz-se que “o alarmismo ambientalista, assim como o multiculturalismo, o antitabagismo e a “anti-homofobia”, é hoje uma das principais armas utilizadas na construção do poder mundial”
(http://libertadmatters.blogspot.com.br/2010/03/convite-palestra-aquecimento-global.html). Em 11/02/2011, foi a vez do Conselho Federal de Medicina Veterinária (http://www.cfmv.org.br/portal/destaque.php?cod=443). Nele, Molion diz exatamente o que o público quer ouvir, ao afirmar que “a Pecuária, uma das principais atividades econômicas do Brasil, na qual a Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia atuam diretamente, sofre uma penalização excessiva como agente causador de poluição”. O site complementa, afirmando que “De acordo com dados de Molion, a relação não pode ser justificada, já que os rebanhos estão em crescimento, com aumento de 17 milhões de ruminantes ao ano e, no mesmo período, as taxas de metano seguem estáveis”.

Mas imbatível mesmo é o que está por vir em poucos dias. Em 26/05/2012, conforme divulgado em http://fakeclimate.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/palestra_adesg-sp1.png, Molion palestrará na XV Assembléia do “Foro do Brasil”, organização de direita cujos ataques à Comissão da Verdade, à constitucionalidade das cotas, à “ofensiva indigenista” e cuja defesa do agronegócio e do novo Código Florestal não deixam dúvidas de se tratar do mais duro e radical neo-fascismo tupiniquim. O site anuncia, altissonante, que “você terá oportunidade de saber como os conceitos de aquecimento global e poluição pelo CO2 são uma grande farsa que movimenta bilhões de Euros, beneficiando empresas, e ongs” e que “conhecerá muitas das verdades e a história desse crime que está sendo cometido”.

Quem é esse tal Foro do Brasil? Em 31 de Março (atentem para a data), tinha a idéia de fundar o POP – “Partido Ordem e Progresso” (http://forodobrasil.info/fb/?p=2361#comment-122). Refere-se à “Começão da Inverdade”, para defender torturadores e assassinos. Os links do “Foro do Brasil”, claro, não poderiam deixar de incluir a Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra, o Blog do conhecido direitista, ator Carlos Vereza, o “Cavaleiro do Templo”, o “Levante-se Brasil”, os delirantes do “Verde:A Nova Cor Do Comunismo”, o site da Monarquia e, é claro, o indefectível “Midia sem Máscara” (aquele pessoal maluco que diz que a Globo e toda a mídia são “de esquerda”, que a universidade é toda “comunista”, etc.) e outros desse naipe…

E novamente fica claro. Há sempre algo por trás do discurso negador das mudanças climáticas, da postura de ignorar todas as evidências concretas, de passar por cima de tudo que se conhece até de leis da Física, dos ataques grosseiros e virulentos à comunidade científica e da tentativa de gerar descrédito junto à opinião pública em relação à Ciência e aos Cientistas. Quem trabalha realmente em busca da verdade científica disputa seu ponto de vista fazendo valer o método. Coleta dados, faz experimentos, desenvolve e usa modelos. Escreve artigos que, se estiverem corretos metodologicamente, serão apreciados e podem servir de evidência. Se aquilo que Molion traz ao que ele chama de “debate” realmente fossem hipóteses científicas, ele teria bastante espaço. A comunidade ainda tem por ele, até de forma condescendente, apreço e respeito (pela pessoa, eu tenho, mas pela conduta, não). Molion foi chamado para, 4 dias após acusar a todos nós de farsantes e desonestos num evento da extrema-direita, discutir sobre “Extremos Climáticos, Zona Costeira e Semi-Árido”, num evento em Natal, do qual também participarei, sobre Mudanças Climáticas e Vulnerabilidade (http://www.ccet.ufrn.br/cciv2012/). Molion seria ouvido na comunidade, se sua postura fosse de fidelidade ao método científico. Mas, assim como no caso de Ricardo Felício, a ciência anda longe. Há muito foi abandonada, em nome da agenda política. O agronegócio e os neo-fascistas, claro, aplaudem.

Is there a technological solution to global warming? (The New Yorker)

ANNALS OF SCIENCE

THE CLIMATE FIXERS

by , MAY 14, 2012

Geoengineering holds out the promise of artificially reversing recent climate trends, but it entails enormous risks.

Geoengineering holds out the promise of artificially reversing recent climate trends, but it entails enormous risks.

Late in the afternoon on April 2, 1991, Mt. Pinatubo, a volcano on the Philippine island of Luzon, began to rumble with a series of the powerful steam explosions that typically precede an eruption. Pinatubo had been dormant for more than four centuries, and in the volcanological world the mountain had become little more than a footnote. The tremors continued in a steady crescendo for the next two months, until June 15th, when the mountain exploded with enough force to expel molten lava at the speed of six hundred miles an hour. The lava flooded a two-hundred-and-fifty-square-mile area, requiring the evacuation of two hundred thousand people.

Within hours, the plume of gas and ash had penetrated the stratosphere, eventually reaching an altitude of twenty-one miles. Three weeks later, an aerosol cloud had encircled the earth, and it remained for nearly two years. Twenty million metric tons of sulfur dioxide mixed with droplets of water, creating a kind of gaseous mirror, which reflected solar rays back into the sky. Throughout 1992 and 1993, the amount of sunlight that reached the surface of the earth was reduced by more than ten per cent.

The heavy industrial activity of the previous hundred years had caused the earth’s climate to warm by roughly three-quarters of a degree Celsius, helping to make the twentieth century the hottest in at least a thousand years. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, however, reduced global temperatures by nearly that much in a single year. It also disrupted patterns of precipitation throughout the planet. It is believed to have influenced events as varied as floods along the Mississippi River in 1993 and, later that year, the drought that devastated the African Sahel. Most people considered the eruption a calamity.

For geophysical scientists, though, Mt. Pinatubo provided the best model in at least a century to help us understand what might happen if humans attempted to ameliorate global warming by deliberately altering the climate of the earth.

For years, even to entertain the possibility of human intervention on such a scale—geoengineering, as the practice is known—has been denounced as hubris. Predicting long-term climatic behavior by using computer models has proved difficult, and the notion of fiddling with the planet’s climate based on the results generated by those models worries even scientists who are fully engaged in the research. “There will be no easy victories, but at some point we are going to have to take the facts seriously,’’ David Keith, a professor of engineering and public policy at Harvard and one of geoengineering’s most thoughtful supporters, told me. “Nonetheless,’’ he added, “it is hyperbolic to say this, but no less true: when you start to reflect light away from the planet, you can easily imagine a chain of events that would extinguish life on earth.”

There is only one reason to consider deploying a scheme with even a tiny chance of causing such a catastrophe: if the risks of not deploying it were clearly higher. No one is yet prepared to make such a calculation, but researchers are moving in that direction. To offer guidance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (I.P.C.C.) has developed a series of scenarios on global warming. The cheeriest assessment predicts that by the end of the century the earth’s average temperature will rise between 1.1 and 2.9 degrees Celsius. A more pessimistic projection envisages a rise of between 2.4 and 6.4 degrees—far higher than at any time in recorded history. (There are nearly two degrees Fahrenheit in one degree Celsius. A rise of 2.4 to 6.4 degrees Celsius would equal 4.3 to 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit.) Until recently, climate scientists believed that a six-degree rise, the effects of which would be an undeniable disaster, was unlikely. But new data have changed the minds of many. Late last year, Fatih Birol, the chief economist for the International Energy Agency, said that current levels of consumption “put the world perfectly on track for a six-degree Celsius rise in temperature. . . . Everybody, even schoolchildren, knows this will have catastrophic implications for all of us.”

Tens of thousands of wildfires have already been attributed to warming, as have melting glaciers and rising seas. (The warming of the oceans is particularly worrisome; as Arctic ice melts, water that was below the surface becomes exposed to the sun and absorbs more solar energy, which leads to warmer oceans—a loop that could rapidly spin out of control.) Even a two-degree climb in average global temperatures could cause crop failures in parts of the world that can least afford to lose the nourishment. The size of deserts would increase, along with the frequency and intensity of wildfires. Deliberately modifying the earth’s atmosphere would be a desperate gamble with significant risks. Yet the more likely climate change is to cause devastation, the more attractive even the most perilous attempts to mitigate those changes will become.

“We don’t know how bad this is going to be, and we don’t know when it is going to get bad,’’ Ken Caldeira, a climate scientist with the Carnegie Institution, told me. In 2007, Caldeira was a principal contributor to an I.P.C.C. team that won a Nobel Peace Prize. “There are wide variations within the models,’’ he said. “But we had better get ready, because we are running rapidly toward a minefield. We just don’t know where the minefield starts, or how long it will be before we find ourselves in the middle of it.”

The Maldives, a string of islands off the coast of India whose highest point above sea level is eight feet, may be the first nation to drown. In Alaska, entire towns have begun to shift in the loosening permafrost. The Florida economy is highly dependent upon coastal weather patterns; the tide station at Miami Beach has registered an increase of seven inches since 1935, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. One Australian study, published this year in the journal Nature Climate Change, found that a two-degree Celsius rise in the earth’s temperature would be accompanied by a significant spike in the number of lives lost just in Brisbane. Many climate scientists say their biggest fear is that warming could melt the Arctic permafrost—which stretches for thousands of miles across Alaska, Canada, and Siberia. There is twice as much CO2 locked beneath the tundra as there is in the earth’s atmosphere. Melting would release enormous stores of methane, a greenhouse gas nearly thirty times more potent than carbon dioxide. If that happens, as the hydrologist Jane C. S. Long told me when we met recently in her office at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “it’s game over.”

The Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering project, or SPICE, is a British academic consortium that seeks to mimic the actions of volcanoes like Pinatubo by pumping particles of sulfur dioxide, or similar reflective chemicals, into the stratosphere through a twelve-mile-long pipe held aloft by a balloon at one end and tethered, at the other, to a boat anchored at sea.

The consortium consists of three groups. At Bristol University, researchers led by Matt Watson, a professor of geophysics, are trying to determine which particles would have the maximum desired impact with the smallest likelihood of unwanted side effects. Sulfur dioxide produces sulfuric acid, which destroys the ozone layer of the atmosphere; there are similar compounds that might work while proving less environmentally toxic—including synthetic particles that could be created specifically for this purpose. At Cambridge, Hugh Hunt and his team are trying to determine the best way to get those particles into the stratosphere. A third group, at Oxford, has been focussing on the effect such an intervention would likely have on the earth’s climate.

Hunt and I spoke in Cambridge, at Trinity College, where he is a professor of engineering and the Keeper of the Trinity College clock, a renowned timepiece that gains or loses less than a second a month. In his office, dozens of boomerangs dangle from the wall. When I asked about them, he grabbed one and hurled it at my head. “I teach three-dimensional dynamics,’’ he said, flicking his hand in the air to grab it as it returned. Hunt has devoted his intellectual life to the study of mechanical vibration. His Web page is filled with instructive videos about gyroscopes, rings wobbling down rods, and boomerangs.

“I like to demonstrate the way things spin,’’ he said, as he put the boomerang down and picked up an inflated pink balloon attached to a string. “The principle is pretty simple.” Holding the string, Hunt began to bobble the balloon as if it were being tossed by foul weather. “Everything is fine if it is sitting still,’’ he continued, holding the balloon steady. Then he began to wave his arm erratically. “One of the problems is that nothing is going to be still up there. It is going to be moving around. And the question we’ve got is . . . this pipe”—the industrial hose that will convey the particles into the sky—“is going to be under huge stressors.’’ He snapped the string connected to the balloon. “How do you know it’s not going to break? We are really pushing things to the limit in terms of their strength, so it is essential that we get the dynamics of motion right.’’

Most scientists, even those with no interest in personal publicity, are vigorous advocates for their own work. Not this group. “I don’t know how many times I have said this, but the last thing I would ever want is for the project I have been working on to be implemented,’’ Hunt said. “If we have to use these tools, it means something on this planet has gone seriously wrong.’’

Last fall, the SPICE team decided to conduct a brief and uncontroversial pilot study. At least they thought it would be uncontroversial. To demonstrate how they would disperse the sulfur dioxide, they had planned to float a balloon over Norfolk, at an altitude of a kilometre, and send a hundred and fifty litres of water into the air through a hose. After the date and time of the test was announced, in the middle of September, more than fifty organizations signed a petition objecting to the experiment, in part because they fear that even to consider engineering the climate would provide politicians with an excuse for avoiding tough decisions on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Opponents of the water test pointed out the many uncertainties in the research (which is precisely why the team wanted to do the experiment). The British government decided to put it off for at least six months.

“When people say we shouldn’t even explore this issue, it scares me,’’ Hunt said. He pointed out that carbon emissions are heavy, and finding a place to deposit them will not be easy. “Roughly speaking, the CO2 we generate weighs three or four times as much as the fuel it comes from.” That means that a short round-trip journey—say, eight hundred miles—by car, using two tanks of gas, produces three hundred kilograms of CO2. “This is ten heavy suitcases from one short trip,’’ Hunt said. “And you have to store it where it can’t evaporate.

“So I have three questions, Where are you going to put it? Who are you going to ask to dispose of this for you? And how much are you reasonably willing to pay them to do it?” he continued. “There is nobody on this planet who can answer any of those questions. There is no established place or technique, and nobody has any idea what it would cost. And we need the answers now.”

Hunt stood up, walked slowly to the window, and gazed at the manicured Trinity College green. “I know this is all unpleasant,’’ he said. “Nobody wants it, but nobody wants to put high doses of poisonous chemicals into their body, either. That is what chemotherapy is, though, and for people suffering from cancer those poisons are often their only hope. Every day, tens of thousands of people take them willingly—because they are very sick or dying. This is how I prefer to look at the possibility of engineering the climate. It isn’t a cure for anything. But it could very well turn out to be the least bad option we are going to have.’’

The notion of modifying the weather dates back at least to the eighteen-thirties, when the American meteorologist James Pollard Espy became known as the Storm King, for his (prescient but widely ridiculed) proposals to stimulate rain by selectively burning forests. More recently, the U.S. government project Stormfury attempted for decades to lessen the force of hurricanes by seeding them with silver iodide. And in 2008 Chinese soldiers fired more than a thousand rockets filled with chemicals at clouds over Beijing to prevent them from raining on the Olympics. The relationship between carbon emissions and the earth’s temperature has been clear for more than a century: in 1908, the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius suggested that burning fossil fuels might help prevent the coming ice age. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson received a report from his Science Advisory Committee, titled “Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,” that noted for the first time the potential need to balance increased greenhouse-gas emissions by “raising the albedo, or the reflectivity, of the earth.” The report suggested that such a change could be achieved by spreading small reflective particles over large parts of the ocean.

While such tactics could clearly fail, perhaps the greater concern is what might happen if they succeeded in ways nobody had envisioned. Injecting sulfur dioxide, or particles that perform a similar function, would rapidly lower the temperature of the earth, at relatively little expense—most estimates put the cost at less than ten billion dollars a year. But it would do nothing to halt ocean acidification, which threatens to destroy coral reefs and wipe out an enormous number of aquatic species. The risks of reducing the amount of sunlight that reaches the atmosphere on that scale would be as obvious—and immediate—as the benefits. If such a program were suddenly to fall apart, the earth would be subjected to extremely rapid warming, with nothing to stop it. And while such an effort would cool the globe, it might do so in ways that disrupt the behavior of the Asian and African monsoons, which provide the water that billions of people need to drink and to grow their food.

“Geoengineering” actually refers to two distinct ideas about how to cool the planet. The first, solar-radiation management, focusses on reducing the impact of the sun. Whether by seeding clouds, spreading giant mirrors in the desert, or injecting sulfates into the stratosphere, most such plans seek to replicate the effects of eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo’s. The other approach is less risky, and involves removing carbon directly from the atmosphere and burying it in vast ocean storage beds or deep inside the earth. But without a significant technological advance such projects will be expensive and may take many years to have any significant effect.

There are dozens of versions of each scheme, and they range from plausible to absurd. There have been proposals to send mirrors, sunshades, and parasols into space. Recently, the scientific entrepreneur Nathan Myhrvold, whose company Intellectual Ventures has invested in several geoengineering ideas, said that we could cool the earth by stirring the seas. He has proposed deploying a million plastic tubes, each about a hundred metres long, to roil the water, which would help it trap more CO2. “The ocean is this giant heat sink,’’ he told me. “But it is very cold. The bottom is nearly freezing. If you just stirred the ocean more, you could absorb the excess CO2 and keep the planet cold.” (This is not as crazy as it sounds. In the center of the ocean, wind-driven currents bring fresh water to the surface, so stirring the ocean could transform it into a well-organized storage depot. The new water would absorb more carbon while the old water carried the carbon it has already captured into the deep.)

The Harvard physicist Russell Seitz wants to create what amounts to a giant oceanic bubble bath: bubbles trap air, which brightens them enough to reflect sunlight away from the surface of the earth. Another tactic would require maintaining a fine spray of seawater—the world’s biggest fountain—which would mix with salt to help clouds block sunlight.

The best solution, nearly all scientists agree, would be the simplest: stop burning fossil fuels, which would reduce the amount of carbon we dump into the atmosphere. That fact has been emphasized in virtually every study that addresses the potential effect of climate change on the earth—and there have been many—but none have had a discernible impact on human behavior or government policy. Some climate scientists believe we can accommodate an atmosphere with concentrations of carbon dioxide that are twice the levels of the preindustrial era—about five hundred and fifty parts per million. Others have long claimed that global warming would become dangerous when atmospheric concentrations of carbon rose above three hundred and fifty parts per million. We passed that number years ago. After a decline in 2009, which coincided with the harsh global recession, carbon emissions soared by six per cent in 2010—the largest increase ever recorded. On average, in the past decade, fossil-fuel emissions grew at about three times the rate of growth in the nineteen-nineties.

Although the I.P.C.C., along with scores of other scientific bodies, has declared that the warming of the earth is unequivocal, few countries have demonstrated the political will required to act—perhaps least of all the United States, which consumes more energy than any nation other than China, and, last year, more than it ever had before. The Obama Administration has failed to pass any meaningful climate legislation. Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican nominee, has yet to settle on a clear position. Last year, he said he believed the world was getting warmer—and humans were a cause. By October, he had retreated. “My view is that we don’t know what is causing climate change on this planet,” he said, adding that spending huge sums to try to reduce CO2 emissions “is not the right course for us.” China, which became the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases several years ago, constructs a new coal-burning power plant nearly every week. With each passing year, goals become exponentially harder to reach, and global reductions along the lines suggested by the I.P.C.C. seem more like a “pious wish,” to use the words of the Dutch chemist Paul Crutzen, who in 1995 received a Nobel Prize for his work on ozone depletion.

“Most nations now recognize the need to shift to a low-carbon economy, and nothing should divert us from the main priority of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions,’’ Lord Rees of Ludlow wrote in his 2009 forward to a highly influential report on geoengineering released by the Royal Society, Britain’s national academy of sciences. “But if such reductions achieve too little, too late, there will surely be pressure to consider a ‘plan B’—to seek ways to counteract climatic effects of green-house gas emissions.’’

While that pressure is building rapidly, some climate activists oppose even holding discussions about a possible Plan B, arguing, as the Norfolk protesters did in September, that it would be perceived as indirect permission to abandon serious efforts to cut emissions. Many people see geoengineering as a false solution to an existential crisis—akin to encouraging a heart-attack patient to avoid exercise and continue to gobble fatty food while simply doubling his dose of Lipitor. “The scientist’s focus on tinkering with our entire planetary system is not a dynamic new technological and scientific frontier, but an expression of political despair,” Doug Parr, the chief scientist at Greenpeace UK, has written.

During the 1974 Mideast oil crisis, the American engineer Hewitt Crane, then working at S.R.I. International, realized that standard measurements for sources of energy—barrels of oil, tons of coal, gallons of gas, British thermal units—were nearly impossible to compare. At a time when these commodities were being rationed, Crane wondered how people could conserve resources if they couldn’t even measure them. The world was burning through twenty-three thousand gallons of oil every second. It was an astonishing figure, but one that Crane had trouble placing into any useful context.

Crane devised a new measure of energy consumption: a three-dimensional unit he called a cubic mile of oil. One cubic mile of oil would fill a pool that was a mile long, a mile wide, and a mile deep. Today, it takes three cubic miles’ worth of fossil fuels to power the world for a year. That’s a trillion gallons of gas. To replace just one of those cubic miles with a source of energy that will not add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere—nuclear power, for instance—would require the construction of a new atomic plant every week for fifty years; to switch to wind power would mean erecting thousands of windmills each month. It is hard to conceive of a way to replace that much energy with less dramatic alternatives. It is also impossible to talk seriously about climate change without talking about economic development. Climate experts have argued that we ought to stop emitting greenhouse gases within fifty years, but by then the demand for energy could easily be three times what it is today: nine cubic miles of oil.

The planet is getting richer as well as more crowded, and the pressure to produce more energy will become acute long before the end of the century. Predilections of the rich world—constant travel, industrial activity, increasing reliance on meat for protein—require enormous physical resources. Yet many people still hope to solve the problem of climate change just by eliminating greenhouse-gas emissions. “When people talk about bringing emissions to zero, they are talking about something that will never happen,’’ Ken Caldeira told me. “Because that would require a complete alteration in the way humans are built.”

Caldeira began researching geoengineering almost by accident. For much of his career, he has focussed on the implications of ocean acidification. During the nineteen-nineties, he spent a year in the Soviet Union, at the Leningrad lab of Mikhail Budyko, who is considered the founder of physical climatology. It was Budyko, in the nineteen-sixties, who first suggested cooling the earth by putting sulfur particles in the sky.

“In the nineteen-nineties, when I was working at Livermore, we had a meeting in Aspen to discuss the scale of the energy-system transformation needed in order to address the climate problem,’’ Caldeira said. “Among the people who attended was Lowell Wood, a protégé of Edward Teller. Wood is a brilliant but sometimes erratic man . . . lots of ideas, some better than others.” At Aspen, Wood delivered a talk on geoengineering. In the presentation, he explained, as he has many times since, that shielding the earth properly could deflect one or two per cent of the sunlight that reaches the atmosphere. That, he said, would be all it would take to counter the worst effects of warming.

David Keith was in the audience with Caldeira that day in Aspen. Keith now splits his time between Harvard and Calgary, where he runs Carbon Engineering, a company that is developing new technology to capture CO2 from the atmosphere—at a cost that he believes would make it sensible to do so. At the time, though, both men considered Wood’s idea ridiculous. “We said this will never happen,’’ Caldeira recalled. “We were so certain Wood was nuts, because we assumed you can change the global mean temperature, but you will still get seasonal and regional patterns you can’t correct. We were in the back of the room, and neither of us could believe it.”

Caldeira decided to prove his point by running a computer simulation of Wood’s approach. Scenarios for future climate change are almost always developed using powerful three-dimensional models of the earth and its atmosphere. They tend to be most accurate when estimating large numbers, like average global temperatures. Local and regional weather patterns are more difficult to predict, as anyone who has relied on a five-day weather forecast can understand. Still, in 1998 Caldeira tested the idea, and, “much to my surprise, it seemed to work and work well,” he told me. It turned out that reducing sunlight offset the effect of CO2 both regionally and seasonally. Since then, his results have been confirmed by several other groups.

Recently, Caldeira and colleagues at Carnegie and Stanford set out to examine whether the techniques of solar-radiation management would disrupt the sensitive agricultural balance on which the earth depends. Using two models, they simulated climates with carbon-dioxide levels similar to those which exist today. They then doubled those concentrations to reflect levels that would be likely in several decades if current trends continue unabated. Finally, in a third set of simulations, they doubled the CO2 in the atmosphere, but added a layer of sulfate aerosols to the stratosphere, which would deflect about two per cent of incoming sunlight from the earth. The data were then applied to crop models that are commonly used to project future yields. Again, the results were unexpected.

Farm productivity, on average, went up. The models suggested that precipitation would increase in the northern and middle latitudes, and crop yields would grow. In the tropics, though, the results were significantly different. There heat stress would increase, and yields would decline. “Climate change is not so much a reduction in productivity as a redistribution,’’ Caldeira said. “And it is one in which the poorest people on earth get hit the hardest and the rich world benefits”—a phenomenon, he added, that is not new.

“I have two perspectives on what this might mean,’’ he said. “One says: humans are like rats or cockroaches. We are already living from the equator to the Arctic Circle. The weather has already become .7 degrees warmer, and barely anyone has noticed or cares. And, yes, the coral reefs might become extinct, and people from the Seychelles might go hungry. But they have gone hungry in the past, and nobody cared. So basically we will live in our gated communities, and we will have our TV shows and Chicken McNuggets, and we will be O.K. The people who would suffer are the people who always suffer.

“There is another way to look at this, though,’’ he said. “And that is to compare it to the subprime-mortgage crisis, where you saw that a few million bad mortgages led to a five-per-cent drop in gross domestic product throughout the world. Something that was a relatively small knock to the financial system led to a global crisis. And that could certainly be the case with climate change. But five per cent is an interesting figure, because in the Stern Report’’—an often cited review led by the British economist Nicholas Stern, which signalled the alarm about greenhouse-gas emissions by focussing on economics—“they estimated climate change would cost the world five per cent of its G.D.P. Most economists say that solving this problem is one or two per cent of G.D.P. The Clean Water and Clean Air Acts each cost about one per cent of G.D.P.,” Caldeira continued. “We just had a much worse shock to our banking system. And it didn’t even get us to reform the economy in any significant way. So why is the threat of a five-per-cent hit from climate change going to get us to transform the energy system?”

Solar-radiation management, which most reports have agreed is technologically feasible, would provide, at best, a temporary solution to rapid warming—a treatment but not a cure. There are only two ways to genuinely solve the problem: by drastically reducing emissions or by removing the CO2 from the atmosphere. Trees do that every day. They “capture” carbon dioxide in their leaves, metabolize it in the branch system, and store it in their roots. But to do so on a global scale would require turning trillions of tons of greenhouse-gas emissions into a substance that could be stored cheaply and easily underground or in ocean beds.

Until recently, the costs of removing carbon from the atmosphere on that scale have been regarded by economists as prohibitive. CO2 needs to be heated in order to be separated out; using current technology, the expense would rival that of creating an entirely new energy system. Typically, power plants release CO2 into the atmosphere through exhaust systems referred to as flues. The most efficient way we have now to capture CO2 is to remove it from flue gas as the emissions escape. Over the past five years, several research groups—one of which includes David Keith’s company, Carbon Engineering, in Calgary—have developed new techniques to extract carbon from the atmosphere, at costs that may make it economically feasible on a larger scale.

Early this winter, I visited a demonstration project on the campus of S.R.I. International, the Menlo Park institution that is a combination think tank and technological incubator. The project, built by Global Thermostat, looked like a very high-tech elevator or an awfully expensive math problem. “When I called chemical engineers and said I want to do this on a planetary scale, they laughed,’’ Peter Eisenberger, Global Thermostat’s president, told me. In 1996, Eisenberger was appointed the founding director of the Earth Institute, at Columbia University, where he remains a professor of earth and environmental sciences. Before that, he spent a decade running the materials research institute at Princeton University, and nearly as much time at Exxon, in charge of research and development. He believes he has developed a system to capture CO2 from the atmosphere at low heat and potentially at low cost.

The trial project is essentially a five-story brick edifice specially constructed to function like a honeycomb. Global Thermostat coats the bricks with chemicals called amines to draw CO2 from the air and bind with it. The carbon dioxide is then separated with a proprietary method that uses low-temperature heat—something readily available for free, since it is a waste product of many power plants. “Using low-temperature heat changes the equation,’’ Eisenberger said. He is an excitable man with the enthusiasm of a graduate student and the manic gestures of an orchestra conductor. He went on to explain that the amine coating on the bricks binds the CO2 at the molecular level, and the amount it can capture depends on the surface area; honeycombs provide the most surface space possible per square metre.

There are two groups of honey-combs that sit on top of each other. As Eisenberger pointed out, “You can only absorb so much CO2 at once, so when the honeycomb is full it drops into a lower section.” Steam heats and releases the CO2—and the honeycomb rises again. (Currently, carbon dioxide is used commercially in carbonated beverages, brewing, and pneumatic drying systems for packaged food. It is also used in welding. Eisenberger argues that, ideally, carbon waste would be recycled to create an industrial form of photosynthesis, which would help reduce our dependence on fossil fuels.)

Unlike some other scientists engaged in geoengineering, Eisenberger is not bothered by the notion of tinkering with nature. “We have devised a system that introduces no additional threats into the environment,’’ he told me. “And the idea of interfering with benign nature is ridiculous. The Bambi view of nature is totally false. Nature is violent, amoral, and nihilistic. If you look at the history of this planet, you will see cycles of creation and destruction that would offend our morality as human beings. But somehow, because it’s ‘nature,’ it’s supposed to be fine.’’ Eisenberger founded and runs Global Thermostat with Graciela Chichilnisky, an Argentine economist who wrote the plan, adopted in 2005, for the international carbon market that emerged from the Kyoto Climate talks. Edgar Bronfman, Jr., an heir to the Seagram fortune, is Global Thermostat’s biggest investor. (The company is one of the finalists for Richard Branson’s Virgin Earth Challenge prize. In 2007, Branson offered a cash prize of twenty-five million dollars to anyone who could devise a process that would drain large quantities of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.)

“What is fascinating for me is the way the innovation process has changed,’’ Eisenberger said. “In the past, somebody would make a discovery in a laboratory and say, ‘What can I do with this?’ And now we ask, ‘What do we want to design?,’ because we believe there is powerful enough knowledge to do it. That is what my partner and I did.” The pilot, which began running last year, works on a very small scale, capturing about seven hundred tons of CO2 a year. (By comparison, an automobile puts out about six tons a year.) Eisenberger says that it is important to remember that it took more than a century to assemble the current energy system: coal and gas plants, factories, and the worldwide transportation network that has been responsible for depositing trillions of tons of CO2 into the atmosphere. “We are not going to get it all out of the atmosphere in twenty years,’’ he said. “It will take at least thirty years to do this, but if we start now that is plenty of time. You would just need a source of low-temperature heat—factories anywhere in the world are ideal.” He envisions a network of twenty thousand such devices scattered across the planet. Each would cost about a hundred million dollars—a two-trillion-dollar investment spread out over three decades.

“There is a strong history of the system refusing to accept something new,” Eisenberger said. “People say I am nuts. But it would be surprising if people didn’t call me crazy. Look at the history of innovation! If people don’t call you nuts, then you are doing something wrong.”

After leaving Eisenberger’s demonstration project, I spoke with Curtis Carlson, who, for more than a decade, has been the chairman and chief executive officer of S.R.I. and a leading voice on the future of American innovation. “These geoengineering methods will not be implemented for decades—or ever,” he said. Nonetheless, scientists worry that if methane emissions from the Arctic increase as rapidly as some of the data now suggest, climate intervention isn’t going to be an option. It’s going to be a requirement. “When and where do we have the serious discussion about how to intervene?” Carlson asked. “There are no agreed-upon rules or criteria. There isn’t even a body that could create the rules.”

Over the past three years, a series of increasingly urgent reports—from the Royal Society, in the U.K., the Washington-based Bipartisan Policy Center, and the Government Accountability Office, among other places—have practically begged decision-makers to begin planning for a world in which geoengineering might be their only recourse. As one recent study from the Wilson International Center for Scholars concluded, “At the very least, we need to learn what approaches to avoid even if desperate.”

The most environmentally sound approach to geoengineering is the least palatable politically. “If it becomes necessary to ring the planet with sulfates, why would you do that all at once?’’ Ken Caldeira asked. “If the total amount of climate change that occurs could be neutralized by one Mt. Pinatubo, then doesn’t it make sense to add one per cent this year, two per cent next year, and three per cent the year after that?’’ he said. “Ramp it up slowly, throughout the century, and that way we can monitor what is happening. If we see something at one per cent that seems dangerous, we can easily dial it back. But who is going to do that when we don’t have a visible crisis? Which politician in which country?’’

Unfortunately, the least risky approach politically is also the most dangerous: do nothing until the world is faced with a cataclysm and then slip into a frenzied crisis mode. The political implications of any such action would be impossible to overstate. What would happen, for example, if one country decided to embark on such a program without the agreement of other countries? Or if industrialized nations agreed to inject sulfur particles into the stratosphere and accidentally set off a climate emergency that caused drought in China, India, or Africa?

“Let’s say the Chinese government decides their monsoon strength, upon which hundreds of millions of people rely for sustenance, is weakening,” Caldeira said. “They have reason to believe that making clouds right near the ocean might help, and they started to do that, and the Indians found out and believed—justifiably or not—that it would make their monsoon worse. What happens then? Where do we go to discuss that? We have no mechanism to settle that dispute.”

Most estimates suggest that it could cost a few billion dollars a year to scatter enough sulfur particles in the atmosphere to change the weather patterns of the planet. At that price, any country, most groups, and even some individuals could afford to do it. The technology is open and available—and that makes it more like the Internet than like a national weapons program. The basic principles are widely published; the intellectual property behind nearly every technique lies in the public domain. If the Maldives wanted to send airplanes into the stratosphere to scatter sulfates, who could stop them?

“The odd thing here is that this is a democratizing technology,’’ Nathan Myhrvold told me. “Rich, powerful countries might have invented much of it, but it will be there for anyone to use. People get themselves all balled up into knots over whether this can be done unilaterally or by one group or one nation. Well, guess what. We decide to do much worse than this every day, and we decide unilaterally. We are polluting the earth unilaterally. Whether it’s life-taking decisions, like wars, or something like a trade embargo, the world is about people taking action, not agreeing to take action. And, frankly, the Maldives could say, ‘Fuck you all—we want to stay alive.’ Would you blame them? Wouldn’t any reasonable country do the same?” ♦

ILLUSTRATION: NISHANT CHOKSI

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/14/120514fa_fact_specter#ixzz1vFsQQbfl

A Student’s Conversation With Michael Mann on Climate Science and Climate Wars (Dot Earth, N.Y.Times)

May 3, 2012, 4:00 PM

By ANDREW C. REVKIN

Casey Doyle, a student at Warren Wilson College who writes for the Swannanoa Journal, the publication of the school’s Environmental Leadership Center, had the opportunity to speak with the climate scientist Michael Mann when he visited the campus to speak about his book, “The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars.”

Here’s their exchange, which counts as a Dot Earth “Book Report” (you are welcome to contribute one as well, when you find some book, new or old, particularly relevant to the discussions on this blog):

Q.

In your book, you talk about the importance of the general public being able to understand climate change, and how the hockey stick graph allows for this. When writing your book how did you keep this accessibility in mind and who were your target readers?

A.

I was hoping that the book would be accessible to a pretty broad range of readers because I really wanted to use my personal story as sort of this reluctant and accidental public figure in the debate over climate change, to talk about the bigger issues, the reality of the problem, the threat that it represents, the need to have a good faith discussion about what to do about it. There are aspects of my story that are intrinsically a little technical, and I have to get a little into the science and technical issues, and so I do that briefly in certain places in the book. My hope was that readers who didn’t want to struggle through those sections could more or less skip them, and the rest of the story still remains intact. My hope is that it will be accessible to a lay audience, a non-technical audience.

Q.

What did you expect to find when you began your research on climate change?

A.

Well, the work that ultimately led to the so-called Hockey Stick— this reconstruction that demonstrates recent warming to be unprecedented in a long time frame— arose from an effort that really had nothing to do with climate change per se. My colleagues and I were using what we call proxy records, like corals and tree rings, and ice cores to try and extend the climate record back in time so that we could learn more about natural climate variability. As we began to untangle what these data were telling us, it did lead us inescapably to a conclusion that did have implications for climate change, but it really wasn’t what we had set out to try to understand. We were interested in natural climate variations and accidentally found ourselves once again in the center of the climate change debate because of the implications of our findings.

Q.

What were some of the biggest surprises you found during your research?

A.

When we tried to reconstruct past climate patterns we learned that there was this interesting relationship between past very large volcanic eruptions and the timing of some of the large El Nino events in past centuries. It actually ended up reinforcing a controversial hypothesis that had been put forward more than two decades ago by a scientist who had argued there was a relationship between tropical volcanic eruptions and El Nino events. But the instrumental record was so short that he was never able to convince people that this was a real relationship… so, by extending the record back in time, one surprise was that we ended up confirming his hypothesis, that there really does appear to be this relationship. And it’s just not academic because it has implications for one of the big uncertainties about climate change. One thing that the various climate models don’t yet agree upon is how climate change will influence the behavior of the El Nino phenomenon. And it turns out that’s really critical if you want to know how regional weather patterns will be influenced and what will happen with Atlantic hurricanes, which is something that at least the coastal regions of North Carolina worry about. Then you actually need to be able to say something about how climate change will influence El Nino, and by studying the past relationship between El Nino and natural factors like volcanic eruptions we could potentially better inform our understanding of how the El Nino phenomenon will respond to climate change. That was probably one surprise, and it turned out having some relevance for certain issues relating to climate change as well.

Q.

In your book, you explain your research began with natural climate variability and you said you believed this was a more important aspect to climate change than many scientists thought. How did you start with these ideas and end up where you are today?

A.

My Ph.D. thesis was about natural climate variability. It was specifically about understanding the role of natural oscillations in the climate system that might explain some recent trends. Our foray into analyzing proxy data was to give us a longer data set with which we could explore the persistence of these long-term oscillations. One of my earlier papers showed that in the proxy data was evidence for a 50-70 year time scale oscillation that ended up getting named the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation. It’s the interest in these natural oscillations and what impact they may have on things like hurricanes that led us to investigate these proxy data. But as we started to try to piece together the puzzle of what those data were telling us, they also were telling us about natural variations in temperature in the past and how they compared to the warming trends of the past century. What our reconstruction of temperatures showed was that the recent warming was outside the range of the natural variations that we saw, eventually that we were able to extend back to 1,000 years– that there was no precedent in our entire 1,000 year reconstruction for the warming of the past century. It was clear at that point, once we put together this curve depicting that finding, and it became featured in the IPCC summary for policy makers. It got a name, the Hockey Stick, then it sort of took on a life of its own, and we found ourselves in the middle of the climate change debate.

Q.

What is the proxy data used in your studies and why is it being challenged?

A.

In science, there is a very important role for legitimate skepticism and scientists in this field have been debating for decades how reliable different kinds of proxy data are. In fact, just a few months ago I published a paper in the journal Nature Geoscience that demonstrated one potential flaw in using tree rings to estimate past volcanic cooling events. So real scientists are engaged in real skepticism, basically subjecting all findings to appropriate scrutiny and critical analysis, and challenging other scientists in the field to either disprove what you’ve done or validate it independently. That’s how science moves forward, that’s what keeps science progressing, is… what I would call a good faith, honest debate between scientists… To some extent, this good faith debate has been hijacked. This has been true in climate science, but as I describe in the book, it dates back decades to the debate over tobacco and the influence of tobacco products on human health. Whenever the findings of science have found themselves on a collision course with powerful vested interests, unfortunately those interests have seen the need to try to discredit the science. Then we are no longer talking about a good faith debate, we’re not talking about honest scientific skepticism, but what I would call contrarianism or denial. It’s a cynical effort to put forward disingenuous arguments, often to attack the integrity of the scientists themselves to try to discredit their findings, not because of a belief that the science is wrong but because of the threat that the science opposes to vested interests.

We saw this with the debate over tobacco products and lung cancer decades ago, where the tobacco industry did their best to try to discredit the science linking their products with adverse health effects. We saw this with acid rain and ozone depletion, where industry groups and front groups advocating for industry special interests, again did their best to try and discredit the science. Unfortunately, we‘ve seen that in the climate change debate, and it’s not just with our work on Paleoclimate, though I think our work became a touchstone because it was very simple. You didn’t need to understand the physics of how a theoretical climate model works to understand the picture that our hockey stick was telling about the unprecedented nature of climate change; it represented a potent icon and it was attacked.

There were legitimate debates between scientists working in this field about how reliable different kinds of proxy data are and what are the limits, what are the uncertainties, and then there were the dishonest attacks against the science. We experienced both; the good faith back and forth with our scientific colleagues, all of us just interested in figuring out the truth, and we were also subject to attack by those that saw our findings as a threat to particularly fossil fuel interests who don’t want to see the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.

Q.

What do you say to those who accuse you of keeping your research process secretive? Would you regard this process as your intellectual property?

A.

All of our research is out in the public domain, all of our data. Unfortunately, those looking to smear us have made false accusations of us not making the data available, which was just a lie… There are legitimate issues over whether a computer program you have written to implement an algorithm; if you’re talking about a Microsoft or Apple computer, they would defend to the end their right to keep that. You can’t get access to Microsoft’s computer code because they consider it their intellectual property. Scientists for a long time have argued that a code that you write to implement algorithms is your intellectual property, and the National Science Foundation has stood firmly behind that.

When our critics asked us to turn over our computer code, we understood what they were doing: if it was the computer code, they didn’t care, because then it would be something else. It would be our personal emails, and in fact they ended up stealing our personal emails. They weren’t interested in seeing our computer code or trying to independently implement it. They were looking for something to try to discredit us, to be able to say ‘oh look how sloppy their computer code is, they’re not good computer programmers, you shouldn’t trust anything they do.’

We were aware of that and so we didn’t want to go down that slippery slope of saying yes, we’ll turn that over and then pretty soon you’re turning over personal emails, you’re turning over your private diaries. We didn’t want to set a precedent that would allow those looking to smear scientists, to go down this endless road of subjecting scientists to vexatious demands that would basically tie us up — we wouldn’t have any time to even do research any more. Unfortunately that’s what we’ve seen ever since. We’ve seen politicians try to subject us to subpoena all of our private emails. Its part of this cynical effort to discredit scientists, confuse the public, to intimidate scientists.

…But in the end, we even put our computer program out there in the public domain, recognizing that maybe it was going down a slippery slope, because what were they going to demand next? We knew there was nothing wrong with it at all, we put it out there, and what we predicted was exactly what we saw. We didn’t see any discussion, nobody ever even downloaded, as far as I can tell, the code or try to run it, because they didn’t care about the code, they were just looking for something that they could say, ‘oh look, scientists won’t provide this’, and then once you provide it—’oh well they won’t provide this’, and then once you provide that, ‘oh well they won’t provide that.’ And pretty soon what do they want? Do they want you to provide them literally with the dirty laundry from your house? So sadly, scientists have been subjected… to smear campaigns for decades and it is no different in this field. There are all sorts of lies that you can read on the Internet about me and many of my climate science colleagues. I think I’ve been accused of just about everything under the sun, and its part of the life of being a scientist in this field, and having to deal with efforts to impugn your integrity and discredit you

Q.

How do you feel now that State Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli’s case against you in the Virginia Supreme Court has been brought to a halt?

A.

On the one hand, we’re glad that the Supreme Court rejected it without merit, in fact they rejected it with prejudice, meaning that he can’t even try to appeal that decision to the court…. So that’s a good development, but what saddens me is the fact that he spent millions of dollars of Virginia taxpayer money and forced the University of Virginia to come up with significant funds themselves, wasted on this witch hunt, wasted on this personal vendetta, this effort that he was using to try to discredit climate science, to do the bidding of the fossil fuel interests that fund his campaigns. All of that money could have been spent on helping Virginians for example, adapt to the impacts that they are already seeing with the Chesapeake Bay from sea level rise and increased coastal erosion.

There are things that can be done to try to adapt to those changes that are already in the pipeline and that we are going to have to contend with because there is nothing we can do about them. We are committed to a certain amount of future climate change even if we curtail our emissions quickly. Wouldn’t it have been great if Virginians had been able to use those millions of dollars productively to deal with the already very real impacts of climate change rather than to bury their heads in the sands because this attorney general wanted to not only discredit us, but send a message to all scientists in Virginia that… if you too decide to talk about the impacts of climate change then you too can be subject to a subpoena from the attorney general? It was a very chilling development and I think Virginians recognized that and I think it was overwhelmingly decried even by newspaper editorial boards that had supported Cuccinelli’s candidacy, that basically called him out for what was transparently an effort to intimidate scientists.

Q.

I understand that you have received threats due to your reporting on climate data. Who or what is the threat?

A.

Many climate scientists have received hundreds, and probably now even thousands of threatening emails… attacking us, or using very nasty language to criticize us… Some emails, letters, and phone messages that have been left on my office phone contain thinly veiled threats of violence, death threats. I had an envelope sent to my work address that contained a white powder, obviously it was intended to make we think I had been exposed to anthrax. The FBI had to send that off to the regional lab to test it, and it turns out it was just cornmeal, but using the mail to intimidate in that way is a felony… I’m not sure if they were ever able to track down the person who was responsible, but there are dozens of climate scientists who had been subjected to threats of violence and death threats…. Anytime that the findings of science have come into conflict with the interests of certain industries there has been a fairly nasty effort to try and intimidate the scientists through whatever means possible, and I’ve seen some of the worst aspects of that myself.

Q.

Do you in any way regret the fame of the hockey stick graph?

A.

I am often asked the question, if I could go to that point in my career, back in the early 90s where I had made the decision whether to continue on in theoretical physics or to move into this new field of climate research… would I do it differently? And the answer is that I wouldn’t. I mean even though I became this reluctant and accidental public figure in the debate over climate change, over time I’ve learned to embrace the opportunity that has given me to talk to the public about this problem and the threat that it represents, to inform the public discourse on this issue. Frankly, I can’t imagine anything more important that I could be doing with my life than trying to educate the public about the reality of this problem, to do my best to make sure that we make decisions today as far as the environment and in particular carbon emissions, that will preserve the planet for my daughter — I have a six year old daughter — our children and our grandchildren. So no, I wouldn’t do it over because I’ve found myself in a position to try to inform the discussion of what might be the greatest challenge we have ever faced as a civilization, and I consider that a blessing rather than a curse.

Recap a Live Chat on How to Teach Climate Change in the Classroom (PBS.org)

CLIMATE CHANGE EDUCATION SCIENCE — May 2, 2012 at 12:06 PM EDT

BY: NEWS DESK

http://www-tc.pbs.org/s3/pbs.videoportal-prod.cdn/media/swf/PBSPlayer.swf

Watch Teachers Endure Balancing Act Over Climate Change Curriculum on PBS. See more from PBS NewsHour.

Post updated 6 p.m. ET May 3.

For the first time, national science standards will include guidelines on how to teach climate change kindergarten through 12th grade students — but how will teachers incorporate the subject into the curriculum?

We had more on this struggle Wednesday on the NewsHour, as part of our Coping with Climate Changeseries.

On Thursday, Hari Sreenivasan chatted here with some of those featured in the broadcast piece. The participants included:

  • Cheryl Manning, who teaches honors earth science and Advanced Placement environmental science at Evergreen High School in Colorado.
  • Susan Buhr, education outreach director at theCooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), University of Colorado, Boulder, where she works on professional development and training for teachers on science topics.

Also, check out the creative ways in which some teachers are already teaching climate science.

Time to tackle ‘last taboo’ of contraception and climate – experts (Alert Net)

29 Feb 2012 11:13

Source: Alertnet // Lisa Anderson

A health worker explains methods of contraception during a reproductive health fair held to mark World Population Day in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, July 11, 2009. REUTERS/John Javellana

By Lisa Anderson

NEW YORK (AlertNet) – Finding a way to put the environmental impact of population and women’s reproductive health more prominently on the climate change agenda is increasingly urgent, experts said in Washington this week.

Suggesting a strong connection between family planning and the environment often risks an explosion in the highly charged political landscape of climate talks, meaning the word “population” is rarely heard, observed speakers on a panel assembled by the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP).

Kavita Ramdas, executive director of Stanford University’s social entrepreneurship program, calls making the link between population and the environment “the last taboo”.

“This connection … needs to be in a place where we can talk thoughtfully about the fact that yes, more people on this planet – and we’ve just crossed 7 billion – does actually put pressure on the planet. And no, it is not just black women or brown women or Chinese women who create that problem,” she told a session on women’s health and climate adaptation strategies.

“In fact, the issues around consumption in the more developed part of the world are profoundly significant. And when you know that every American baby born consumes 40 times as much as every Indian baby born, clearly there is a need to be able to tie those issues together,” she added.

Daniel Schensul, a technical specialist in the climate change, population and development branch of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), noted that adapting to a shifting climate amounts to building resilience in the face of change. “Women’s ability to control fertility, I think, is at the very centre of this,” he said.

Kathleen Mogelgaard, a consultant on the Wilson Center’s ECSP, described universal access to reproductive health as “a win-win opportunity for climate change adaptation”. Compared with other adaptation strategies, family planning is already in demand among women around the world, although many lack access to it, she said.

And it’s relatively inexpensive, she added, requiring only an additional $3.6 billion a year to fully meet women’s reproductive health needs.

FEAR OF LIMITING RIGHTS

Nonetheless, social and political barriers to including population in climate discussions persist, Stanford University’s Ramdas said. Climate experts avoid talking about population issues out of fear they will be labelled racists or eugenicists, and in an effort “not to muddy the waters” surrounding the already delicate subject of climate change, she said.

“At the same time women’s rights activists also have been reluctant to jump into the argument. You can’t discuss contraception without being drawn into a debate about abortion,” she added.

The ECSP’s Mogelgaard noted that population is rarely included in assessments of climate change vulnerability and adaptation. In her experience, climate specialists have a limited understanding of population dynamics and the scale of coming demographic change – such as populations tripling in countries like Malawi by 2050.

And, if they do grasp the issues, they “assume that doing something about population means limiting people’s rights,” she said. “What this says to me is that there is a real need for raising awareness of the connection between population, climate change and reproductive health.”

More academic evidence supporting the connection would help get population considered as a legitimate issue in the climate community, the experts argued. “There hasn’t been enough work that directly shows us that, when a woman’s need for reproductive health is met, how that impacts on adaptation,” Mogelgaard said.

She knows of only one study – “Linking Population, Fertility and Family Planning with Adaptation to Climate Change: Views from Ethiopia”, issued byPopulation Action International (PAI) in October 2009 – that “shows that when women have access to reproductive health they say they are better able to cope with climate change”.

Schensul said UNFPA wants to see population and reproductive health on the June agenda of Rio+20, the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development. To that end, it is working with partners to “establish a nuanced, evidence-based and human rights-based perspective on the operational links between population, reproductive health and climate change”.

If these inter-related factors remain neglected in climate discussions, “silence around this issue will continue to leave us in a space where the planet and her women will continue to have no voice,” Ramdas warned.

New issue of the journal Ephemera – Theory and Politics in Organization, on “The atmosphere business”

volume 12, number 1/2 (may 2012)
editorial
Steffen Böhm, Anna-Maria Murtola and Sverre Spoelstra The atmosphere business
notes
Mike Childs Privatising the atmosphere: A solution or dangerous con?
Oscar Reyes Carbon markets after Durban
Gökçe Günel A dark art: Field notes on cardon capture and storage policy negotiations at COP17
Patrick Bond Durban’s conference of polluters, market failure and critic failure
Tadzio Mueller The people’s climate summit in Cochabamba: A tragedy in three acts
interview
Larry Lohmann and Steffen Böhm Critiquing carbon markets: A conversation
articles
Robert Fletcher Capitalizing on chaos: Climate change and disaster capitalism
Jerome Whitington The prey of uncertainty: Climate change as opportunity
Ingmar Lippert Carbon classified? Unpacking heterogenous relations inscribed into corporate carbon emissions
Joanna Cabello and Tamra Gilbertson A colonial mechanism to enclose lands: A critical review of two REDD+-focused special issues
Rebecca Pearse Mapping REDD in the Asia-Pacific: Governance, marketisation and contention
Esteve Corbera and Charlotte Friedli Planting trees through the Clean Development Mechanism: A critical assessment
reviews
Siddhartha Dabhi The ‘third way’ for climate action
Peter Newell Carbon trading in South Africa: Plus ça change?
David L. Levy Can capitalism survive climate change?

What is the rational response? (London Review of Books)

Vol. 34 No. 10 · 24 May 2012
By Malcolm Bull

A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change by Stephen Gardiner
Oxford, 512 pp, £22.50, July 2011, ISBN 978 0 19 537944 0

For the benefit of anyone who has spent the past decade or so on a different planet, the most frequently asked questions about climate change on this one are as follows. Is it getting warmer? Yes, surface temperatures have risen by 0.8°C from pre-industrial levels. Are humans causing it? Almost certainly. The gases produced by industrialisation and agriculture are known to have an insulating effect, and their concentration in the earth’s atmosphere has increased in line with rising temperatures, while natural causes of global warming have remained constant. Will it get warmer still? Very probably, though no one can accurately predict when or by how much. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report offers a range of projections within which its best estimates are for a temperature rise of somewhere between 1.8°C and 4°C over the course of the 21st century, depending on the level of greenhouse emissions. Is there anything we can do about it? Potentially, yes. If we were to keep emissions to the low end of that spectrum, global warming might just be kept at 2°C or below, and its impacts minimised.

Climate change sceptics are an assortment of cussed old men, mostly without relevant scientific training, who disagree with one or more of these answers. Their aim is scattershot, but they do have some ammunition. The first decade of the 21st century may have been the hottest on record, but global temperatures did not get significantly hotter in the course of the decade as they had in the 1980s and 1990s. There are several possible explanations for this, one of which is the protective effect of sulphate aerosols, another result of industrialisation (Chinese in this case), which may also explain the flattening of the upward secular trend in temperatures from the 1940s to the 1970s. If that’s so, there is no reason to adjust the trend-line, for greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere a lot longer, and sulphates mask rather than modify their effect.

That said, even though Chinese industrialisation was well advanced in the 1980s, its influence on the climate was not widely anticipated, and anyone looking back at the 1990 IPCC projections on global warming can see that they overestimate temperature rises in the 2000s by some margin (though not the associated environmental impact). This is also an indication of the difficulty of modelling future changes, and given that the range of the 2007 IPCC projections is sufficiently wide for the highest value in the low-emissions scenario (2.9°C) to be 0.5°C above the lowest in the high-emissions scenario (2.4°C), it’s clear that we are some way from quantifying all the variables involved.

Although they often have to give ground on the science, the sceptics have correctly spotted that there is something odd about the discourse around climate change. Public policy debates are rarely concerned with possibilities so remote in time and uncertain in outcome, and when they are, the policies that result are correspondingly tentative. The peculiarity of climate change is that the seemingly natural relationship of policy to time and certainty is inverted: it is precisely because climate change is so uncertain that we have to consider the possibility that it will bring disaster on a global scale, and it is precisely because its impact is long deferred that we must act decisively now.

Are these demands reasonable? They might be if – as James Hansen, one of the founders of climate science, has claimed – it is ‘our last chance to save humanity’. But is it? Any change in temperature will inevitably benefit some species and harm others, so it probably is the last chance to save those adapted only to specific ecological niches dependent on the existing climate. One pro-climate change website helpfully provides parallel columns of the positive and negative impacts: top of the list on the positive side is an increase in the numbers of chinstrap and gentoo penguins; on the negative, the extinction of the European land leech.

What about the impact on human beings? Here, too, the effects of climate change appear ambiguous. In terms of temperature change itself, the World Health Organisation estimates that climate change since the 1970s is already responsible for 140,000 deaths annually. That sounds terrible, but any temperature variation is going to result in excess deaths from either heat or cold, and it is far from clear that the net effect of an increase in temperature will in itself be harmful – it might even be beneficial. As for rises in sea level, the 2007 IPCC projections range from 18 to 59 centimetres – which is not enough to submerge anywhere other than the lowest-lying areas. And with regard to fresh water, everyone agrees that higher temperatures mean higher levels of precipitation, so there should be more water to go round. The 2007 IPCC report acknowledged that climate change reduces per capita water stress, and one recent study suggests that, with a temperature rise of around 2.4°C, water stress would increase for 1.2 billion people by 2100 but decrease for three billion others.

So what is the problem? There are two: differential impacts and high-end uncertainty. Most of the negative consequences will be felt in the earth’s mid-latitudes, already the poorest parts of the world, where secondary effects such as economic disruption, disease, famine and war will be experienced most acutely. Climate change is therefore likely to have a disproportionate impact on the vulnerable and exacerbate existing inequalities. A mid-range increase in global temperatures, which might be quite pleasant in Canada, is potentially disastrous for the population of Bangladesh or Somalia. Rises in sea level will not affect most populations at all, but even a mid-range increase would make the habitats of between sixty and a hundred million additional people liable to flooding by the end of the century. There are millions of chinstrap penguins already, but the European land leech is exceedingly rare.

However, nobody can be confident that the effects of global warming will end there. The lowest value in the high-emissions scenario might be 2.4°C, but the highest is an alarming 6.4°C, and some scientists consider the IPCC unduly cautious. Positive feedback mechanisms – the earth’s reduced albedo (reflectivity), the transformation of carbon sinks into carbon sources, or the release of methane from thawing permafrost – could push temperatures towards the top of the range and so trigger irreversible non-linear changes such as the melting of the polar ice-sheets and the disruption of thermohaline circulation in the world’s oceans. Were all that to happen, much of the planet would be uninhabitable.

What is the rational response? The possibility that climate variation is not anthropogenic, or that it will not get much worse, or that some as yet unknown technological development will mitigate its effects, cannot be wholly discounted. All are unlikely, but each has a probability well above zero. How do these combined independent probabilities compare with the probability that global political initiatives in the next, say, twenty years will make a decisive positive difference to the outcome for future generations? That depends on several conditions being met: that climate change is anthropogenic (almost certain); that it is going to get worse (very probable); that decisive and timely global political action takes place (rather doubtful); that it is sufficiently sustained to be effective (unlikely, if the past twenty years are anything to go by).

Even someone who both accepted anthropogenic global warming and believed that it was possible to do something about it might look at the odds and think that fatalism was the most appropriate response. As long ago as the 1990s, Al Gore admitted that ‘the minimum that is scientifically necessary’ to combat global warming ‘far exceeds the maximum that is politically feasible’, and many now seem to agree. Aside from the spike created by the Copenhagen summit in 2009, newspaper coverage of climate change has been dropping since 2007. Perhaps we should just acknowledge the problem, try not to exacerbate it too much and hope for the best. That, after all, is what most people have decided to do about the nightmare of the previous generation, nuclear weapons, and there is no reliable means of quantifying whether nuclear war is more or less likely than severe climate change, or whether its effects would be more or less destructive.

The real question is whether such fatalism is ethically defensible. The moral argument for preventing further climate change is easily stated. It is not just a matter of protecting the vulnerable from harm, but of taking responsibility for a harm that we in the industrialised North have both caused and benefited from. However, the worst effects of climate change are likely to be experienced by beings from other times, places or species, and as Stephen Gardiner points out, this allows us to rationalise our obligations to suit our inclinations, rather in the way that, in Sense and Sensibility, John Dashwood and his wife Fanny gradually persuade themselves that the large sum of money John had promised to support his stepmother and half-sisters really ought, in the best interests of everyone involved, to be reduced to nothing at all.

Global surveys already show that people who live in countries with high per capita emissions are less inclined to believe that global warming is a serious problem than those who live in hotter, more vulnerable countries with low emissions. But in this case it is not necessarily just a matter of self-interest prevailing over honesty and virtue. Climate change creates what Gardiner calls ‘a perfect moral storm’, within which it is difficult to keep one’s bearings. The key elements of this storm, which he enumerates with admirable – if exhausting – clarity, are problems of agency, the temptation to intergenerational buck-passing, and the inapplicability of existing political theories.

It is no secret that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, designed to bring the emissions of industrialised countries below their 1990 levels, has been unable to achieve its targets (or only with unexpected help from economic recessions), or that the Copenhagen summit of 2009 failed to reach any meaningful agreement at all. Such failures, according to Gardiner, reflect a fragmentation of agency: while it might be collectively rational for nations to co-operate on climate change, it is individually rational for them not to. Even greater difficulties are presented by what Gardiner calls the ‘pure intergenerational problem’. The current generation has nothing to gain from reducing emissions and every subsequent one has more at stake than its predecessor. In game-theoretical terms, this means that the current generation has no incentive to co-operate even if every other generation were willing to do so, and that the same will be true of the next generation if the present one has failed to co-operate and passed the buck instead. If successive generations were distinct in this way, it would never be rational to do anything about global warming. In practice, of course, they are not distinct, but even if future generations overlap with ours, they can do little for us or to us as far as climate change is concerned, so our relationship with them is effectively non-reciprocal.

How does the difficulty of achieving co-operation between nations relate to that of achieving co-operation across generations? Gardiner opposes the two, arguing that taking nation-states to represent the interests of their citizens in perpetuity effectively excludes the intergenerational aspect of the climate change problem. However, there are good reasons for thinking that the reverse is true. People routinely make sacrifices for their children and grandchildren, and both individuals and governments are far more likely to invest their resources for the benefit of people who are temporally remote but genetically or culturally proximate than they are for their spatially distant coevals. In these cases, the possibility of future-recognition (transmitted forward through family tradition or cultural memory) trumps that of future-reciprocity. And it is the nation, conceived as a community bound together by cross-generational ties that stretch into the future, that functions as the primary vehicle of such recognition.

Paradoxically, therefore, the intergenerational politics of climate change brings us back to the political form seemingly least able to cope with it: the nation-state. For while the fragmentation of space appears to call for supranational institutions to monitor and enforce agreement, fragmentation in time demands national institutions capable of identifying with and aggregating the interests of future generations. Nation-states could act as the self-appointed representatives of future generations of their own citizens, and then (alongside various NGOs like the WWF) lobby some supranational body on their behalf. In this scenario, what climate change most conspicuously undermines is not the nation-state but democracy, for it requires supranational institutions at a time when there is no supranational democracy, and allows that at a national level the interests of future generations might take precedence over those of the current one. Perhaps, as James Lovelock has argued, climate change means that ‘it may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while.’

Gardiner acknowledges that it is doubtful whether democratic political institutions, with their short time horizons, have the capacity to deal with deferred climate impacts, but it does not occur to him that the ‘tyranny of the contemporary’ of which he complains might be coextensive with democracy itself. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, it was Edmund Burke who argued that society ‘is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born’, and Tom Paine who, ‘contending for the rights of the living’, responded that ‘every generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require.’ If the absolute rights of the living are a form of tyranny, then their freedom to choose their own government must be called into question as well.

That might sound bizarre, but although the dead and the unborn cannot make choices now, their interests could be registered through a form of what Burke called ‘virtual representation’, in which ‘there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them.’ The current generation may of necessity furnish the representatives, but it does not follow that it is in its entirety an appropriate virtual representative of other generations, for it is collectively liable to prefer its own interests to theirs. Other generations will be more adequately represented by that minority best equipped to act for them.

One version of this arrangement would be the Burkean one in which power resides with a natural aristocracy able to mediate between past and future by conserving what is best and passing it on. Its members are conscious of what is due to posterity precisely because they are mindful of what they have received from their ancestors, and do not think it ‘among their rights to cut off the entail or commit waste on the inheritance … hazarding to leave to those who come after them a ruin instead of a habitation’. Without this, according to Burke, ‘the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could link with the other.’

As Paine observed, this version of inter-generational politics has a strong bias towards the past, allowing people to govern from the grave and bind future generations for ever. An alternative weighting would be closer to the Leninist idea of a vanguard. Articulated in opposition to those who wanted to fight only ‘for themselves and for their children, and not for some kind of socialism for some future generation’, Lenin’s account of the party as the vanguard of the proletariat was founded on the idea that it embodied their objective class interests in a way they could not yet do themselves. In this manner, as Georg Lukács puts it, ‘the party, on the basis of its knowledge of society in its totality, represents the interests of the whole proletariat (and in doing so mediates the interests of all the oppressed – the future of mankind).’

The virtual representatives of other generations will inevitably have to press their claims against those of the living. In respect of climate change, the way in which they do so will depend largely on the weighting given to past emissions, on the one hand, and future prosperity, on the other. Should the magnitude of past emissions (for which the United States and the EU nations are mostly responsible) have a positive or negative impact on the extent of emissions in the future? And should we discount the costs and benefits that accrue to future generations on the basis that economic growth will probably make them richer than we are? A Burkean would argue that past emissions are irrelevant, and that it is reasonable to discount the future to preserve the comparability and continuity across the generations; a Leninist might say that past emissions extracted value from the lives of future generations, and that any future discounting should be at a zero or negative rate. The Burkean move is liable to have the effect of entrenching the stranglehold of the past over the future: the Leninist creates a dictatorship of the future over the present.

Gardiner himself argues that past emissions do matter, and (it would appear, though he is very cautious here) that the future should not be discounted. But he gives little thought to the far-reaching political implications of these conclusions. Insofar as we move beyond the tyranny of the contemporary, we invite other forms of dictatorship, and the hard-won battle of democracy to exclude its ideological rivals by establishing the present as the temporal locus of sovereignty is under threat. Rather than being able to take its destiny in its own hands, as Paine advocated, the current generation is in danger of becoming the squeezed middle – a victim of the careless excess of the past, yet still obliged to save all its resources for the needs of those to come.

Should this shift in the temporality of political thinking be resisted, or is the need for it an indication that the political forms fostered by industrialisation have proved unsuited to dealing with its consequences, and are now obsolete? With its unavoidable reliance on virtual representation, and its insistence on appropriate deliberation about technical matters beyond the grasp of the uninformed, climate change politics suggests that technocratic government, the contemporary version of Burke’s natural elite, is the only appropriate solution. And yet, with its emphasis on the ‘future of mankind’ and its deployment of backcasting (working backwards from a desired future state to determine what measures are necessary to achieve it), climate change politics has, for all its apocalyptic rhetoric, a distinctively utopian form.

Is this because the emergence of concern about global warming coincided with the failure of Communism? As some climate change sceptics have noted, there was something suspicious about the way that Communism departed stage right moments before climate change entered stage left as the new nemesis of consumer capitalism. Perhaps we should think of climate change as an updated version of the chess-playing Turkish puppet that Walter Benjamin likened to historical materialism operated by the hidden hand of theology, save that historical materialism has now become the wizened hunchback that controls the puppet and has to keep out of sight.

That would be too simplistic. The recognition that actions are liable to have unintended negative consequences is a constant in human affairs, whether mediated through the discourse of theology, economics or environmental science. Such negative consequences provide the phantom opponents against whom we strive and from whom we try to learn. Counter-hegemonic movements invariably seek to harness the latent power of unintended negative consequences to challenge the status quo. But they are not alone in this. All morality is in part an effort to mobilise sentiment to pre-empt negative outcomes, and climate science is just the latest means through which our actions are amplified back to us to create a moral connection with their consequences.

One indication of the distinctively moral nature of the discourse around climate change is the concern Gardiner expresses about treating it as a purely physical problem susceptible to a technical resolution. Those sulphate aerosols, which may be responsible for the stabilisation of global temperatures in the 21st century, could in theory be pumped into the atmosphere indefinitely for the sole purpose of reducing global warming. Any state (or company or individual for that matter) with the requisite resources could do it unilaterally, thus changing the earth’s atmosphere for everyone else. Given that sulphates are themselves a pollutant, this would be a less desirable option than controlling greenhouse emissions, but in the absence of effective action on that front, it might well be a lesser evil than uncontrolled climate change.

Gardiner devotes an entire chapter to warning against any such solution. Lesser evils, he suggests, may still tarnish those who commit them and blight their lives and those of others, rather as Sophie’s life is destroyed by the sacrifice of one child in Sophie’s Choice. The analogy is absurd but revealing, for what Gardiner calls ‘marring evils’ are meta-ethical evils that arise not from the action itself, but from the resulting negative moral assessment of the agent. On this view, the moral failure threatened by sulphate injection, or other forms of geo-engineering, arises not so much from its result, as from the failure of the action as a moral response.

What this reveals is the extent to which climate change is now constructed not as a scientific problem that generates unexpected moral dilemmas, but as an ethical problem that necessarily requires moral solutions. The sceptics are understandably wary of this, and, as Björn Lomborg has argued, we are not generally as moral as climate change ethics assumes, for if we were we might not make climate change our top priority. If we were concerned about polar bears we would start by not shooting them, rather than worrying about how much ice they had left to stand on, and if we were really worried about the global poor, we could help them now rather than helping their descendants at the end of the century, who will probably be a lot better off anyway.

These are in many respects valid arguments, but they miss the point that were it not for climate change, we would be giving even less thought to polar bears, or to the global poor, and would see little connection between our actions and their fate. As Peter Unger’s Living High and Letting Die showed, our customary moral intuitions barely extend to poor foreigners, let alone to their descendants, or to Arctic fauna. It is thanks to climate change that an entire body of political thought has emerged which positions our everyday actions in direct relation to their most distant consequences.

Adam Smith once noted that we are less troubled by the prospect of a hundred million people dying as a result of an earthquake in some distant location than of losing our little finger, but would nevertheless be horrified by the idea we might allow them to die in order to save it. Climate change effectively transforms the former scenario into the latter, and so places unprecedented demands on our moral imagination. Almost every little thing we do contributes to our carbon footprint, which increases greenhouse gases, which could in turn ultimately threaten hundreds of millions of lives in some remote time and place – the uncertainty only adding to the sublime awfulness of our responsibilities.

Contrary to Gardiner’s concerns about moral corruption, climate change does not tempt us to be less moral than we might otherwise be; it invites us to be more moral than we could ever have imagined. Unlike the Dashwoods, we never knew how many relatives we had. Climate ethics is not morality applied but morality discovered, a new chapter in the moral education of mankind. It may tell us things we do not wish to know (about democracy, perhaps), but the future development of humanity may depend on what, if anything, it can teach us.

More on Extreme Weather in a Warming Climate (Dot Earth, N.Y.Times)

April 10, 2012, 5:30 PM

By ANDREW C. REVKIN

April 11, 9:47 a.m. | Updated with a reaction from Stefan Rahmstorf below |

Here’s a followup to my piece on how greenhouse-driven warming is loading the dice toward more hot weather extremes. In late March, the journal Nature: Climate Change published a “perspective” article by Dim Coumou and Stefan Rahmstorf of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research titled “A decade of weather extremes.” The piece, discussed by its authors on the RealClimate blog, was widely cited in news accounts and blogs as new scientific analysis.

The article summary is here:

The ostensibly large number of recent extreme weather events has triggered intensive discussions, both in- and outside the scientific community, on whether they are related to global warming. Here, we review the evidence and argue that for some types of extreme — notably heatwaves, but also precipitation extremes — there is now strong evidence linking specific events or an increase in their numbers to the human influence on climate. For other types of extreme, such as storms, the available evidence is less conclusive, but based on observed trends and basic physical concepts it is nevertheless plausible to expect an increase.

I sent the article around to some researchers working on these questions. Here are their reactions, along with another valuable assessment posted by Michael Tobis at Planet 3.0:

Martin Hoerling, leader of the climate-extremes attribution team at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, wrote:

A few quick comments from my (single) read through.

– Not a scientific paper, but more Op-Ed. If the science of extremes is desired, then the best current synthesis is IPCC SREX, 2012. [This is the Intergorvernmental Panel on Climate Change report, “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” which I wrote about here.]

– Exaggerated language, and many unsubstantiated assertions. For instance, in what manner did the last decade experience an “unprecedented” number of extreme weather events? Note that the increase in heat waves was largely balanced by a decrease in cold waves—-

– Overly simplistic view of the relation between damage, human suffering, and the extremes. Much more balanced arguments can be found in R. Pielke Jr.’s work that consider changes in society, communities, coastal development, etc. Also, a more useful perspective is found in the recent EOS article by Mike Wallace, titled “Weather and Climate Extreme Events: Teachable Moments.”

– Very few of the [cases of extreme weather listed in the paper] have undergone a scientific investigation of contributing factors, let alone human impacts. I believe that a read of the Lewis and Clark journals would reveal an impressive list of extreme weather also…. so what is one to make of this list for the 2001-2011 period provided in this Perspective by Coumou and Rahmstorf. The fact is that extremes happen, have happened, and will continue to happen. For some, their character, preferred phase, and intensity may be changing (aside from temperature extremes, the detection and attribution evidence to date is weak).

– I suspect that if one engaged in grand mitigation today (as useful as that would be for many other purposes), many of the extremes listed in [the paper] would happen anyway, and will likely happen again.

– The piece lacks all perspective on the human and technological elements contributing to greater observational capacity to sense extremes (radar, satellite), nor does it consider the reality of a heighten interest by the public in extremes, given recent public discourses.

– The matter of attribution, as raised in the second to last paragraph, is a much broader science that merely determining the change in probability due to greenhouse-gas forcing….which is an inherently difficult and uncertain undertaking. The piece ignores the broader context in which all manner of contributing factors is assessed to understand the magnitude of events, their temporal and regional specificity (e.g., why did the heat wave happen over Texas (rather than Washington), why did it occur in 2011 (and not 2009, or next year), and why did it break the previous records by a factor of 2. After all, the irony of extreme events is that the larger the magnitude the smaller the fractional contribution by human climate change.

– Consistent with the policy-direct tone of this piece, hyperbole is used throughout. The piece often convoluting apparent “effects” of apparent changes in extremes in the last decade with causes not to arise till the latter part of the 21st century.

John M. Wallace, a longtime climate scientist at the University of Washington (see my recent post on the loaded climate “dice” for more), wrote:

My reactions to the article are very much along the same lines as Marty Hoerling’s. By exaggerating the influence of climate change on today’s weather and climate-related extreme events, a part of our community is painting itself into a rhetorical corner.

My opinion piece, “Weather and Climate-Related Extreme Events: Teachable Moments ” to which Hoerling refers, serves as a counterpoint to Coumou and Rahmsdorf’s article. Before submitting it to Eos, as an experiment, I submitted it to Nature: Climate Change, where their article was published. I cannot say that I was surprised when the editors informed me that they would not be sending it out for review because “we are not persuaded that your article represents a sufficiently substantial contribution to the ‘climate change debate’ [my quotation marks] to justify publication in the journal”. Perhaps to ease the pain of rejection, the editor added, “more Commentaries are actively commissioned and […] we only rarely publish unsolicited contributions to the section”.

Although it may sound a bit like sour grapes, here’s the way that I’ve rationalized Nature’s editorial decision. I’ve become convinced that many of the editors of the high impact journals are inclined to cast opinion pieces as salvos in the ongoing war between climate change believers and skeptics. Articles like mine that take issue with the way in which the war is being waged are not particularly welcome. By soliciting opinion pieces and by selecting, from among the growing list of contributed articles, the very few that will be sent out for peer review, the editors promote their vision of what constitutes “groundbreaking” and “policy relevant” science. What if it is not the right vision?

By granting the editors of Nature and other high impact journals ever increasing power in deciding which of our articles should be singled out for emphasis in the news media, we risk losing control of the peer review process upon which our public image depends. The way to maintain control is to make a point of sending our most newsworthy scientific articles and opinion pieces to the journals of our own professional societies, in which the peer review process is editor-facilitated, rather than editor-directed. Dot.Earth could render our community a valuable service by ensuring that newsworthy articles published in our journals receive the public attention that they deserve.

Kerry Emanuel, longtime climate scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (focused on the impact of greenhouse-driven heating on hurricanes):

I read the piece differently from the way Mike and Martin read it. It was published as a “perspective” and I did not read it as a scientific paper or letter. It tries to draw attention to the point that weather extremes a) affect society more so than means, and b) require a different statistical approach to detect trends. This is certainly old hat to climate scientists, but there is so much literature on the the mean temperature response that I believe there is room to draw attention to the problem of extremes. Thus I think the perspective piece is useful. The one criticism I would level, echoing to some extent what Martin and Mike have said, is that it is a bit heavy on weather anecdotes (this record broken here; that record there), which draws attention away from the central issue of the statistics of extremes.

It is vital that as a community we focus more attention on detecting changes in the tails of the distributions of weather events. To the extent that this perspective piece may draw scientists from other disciplines into this endeavor, it will have proven useful.

On last point: I completely agree with Mike that you could do science a service by getting journalists to pay more attention to our own professional journals and not focus so exclusively on the high profile journals, which often tend toward the sensational at the expense of solid advances.

Michael Tobis, a scientist, programmer and climate bloggerfrom the University of Texas, posted a nice essay on the Coumou-Rahmstorf article and related issues. The piece, “Disequilibrium is Not Your Friend,” examines the consequences of disturbing a system in a state of complex equilibrium, whether it is an intricate Alexander Calder mobile sculpture or the climate. Here’s an excerpt:

It’s a general principle of complex equilibria that the more they are disturbed, the more complex the processes involved in restoring their equilibrium. The mobile sculpture is not unusual in this regard….

What makes the sculpture less predictable under forcing? Both the size and duration of the impact matter. If you moved the piece ten yards very gently, its behavior might be nothing out of the ordinary, while if you moved it an inch suddenly, a lot of complexity would emerge. (If you moved the piece ten yards suddenly, you would expect permanent alterations, with a whole new set of modes created and many of the old ones destroyed. Let’s hope we do not take the analogous experiment that far.)

While this in no way constitutes a mathematical proof for any given system, the underlying behavior is common and intuitively understandable. If a complex system acts otherwise, it would be something extraordinary that deserves explanation. As applied to the climate system, consider it a plausibility argument: the more rapidly and extensively the system is disturbed, the more we would expect that unexpected behaviors will emerge, and the further from expectations they will be. [Please read the rest.]

April 11, 9:47 a.m. | Updated Stefan Rahmstorf offers his response here:

There is a broad spectrum of views on extreme events in the community – you’ve sampled some of those. It is precisely this range of opinions which made us think it worthwhile to take a good dispassionate look at the evidence and stimulate some discussion. We noticed this range also in the reviews of our Perspective. One reviewer asked us to make stronger statements on the link between climate change and extremes, another just asked the opposite and the third one found we got it about right. I think overall we struck a good balance, and I’ve never gotten such an overwhelming positive feedback from colleagues after publishing a paper – lots of emails still coming in. Looks like we struck a chord.

Hoerling’s claim that we make “many unsubstantiated assertions” is itself one. First he claims we said that the last decade experienced an unprecedented number of extreme weather events – which we do not say anywhere in our paper. And then he claims that “the  increase in heat waves was largely balanced by a decrease in cold waves,” which is a popular climate sceptics argument but demonstrably false. Already the IPCC TAR in 2001 illustrated that this is not the case, see the famous TAR graph and compare the size of the pink/red and blue areas in panels (a) or (c). We explained this again in our 2011 PNAS paper, and we demonstrate it again in the present Perspective: In a stationary climate you’d get approximately the same amount of hot and cold records. We cite the global data analysis of Benestad (2004) in Fig. 2 which shows that record heat waves already have increased more than threefold as compared to a stationary climate. Now even if record cold waves would have declined to zero in number (which they have not), it is obvious that this could not balance a more than threefold increase in heat waves.

Interestingly, Hoerling immediately raises the climate policy issue (stating that mitigation efforts would not prevent extremes) and even denounces our Perspective as “policy-direct”, even though we do not even mention policy – it is simply not the topic of our article, we exclusively discuss scientific questions and we point out at the outset that societal impacts and possible policy strategies are discussed in the SREX.

We cite James Hansen’s 1988 statement on global warming at the end. Back then he got a lot of criticism for it, but in hindsight it turned out he was right. We hope that in hindsight we will find out that we were wrong, and global warming is not leading to more unprecedented extremes. But the evidence is pointing the other way, I’m afraid.

April 23, 5:41 a.m. | Updated 
Mike Wallace wrote an op-ed piece for the Los Angeles Times building out his argument for caution in interpreting “March madness” as human-driven.

Study Finds No Link Tying Disaster Losses to Human-Driven Warming (Dot Earth, N.Y.Times)

August 23, 2010, 11:42 AM

By ANDREW C. REVKIN

The pull of the “front-page thought” and the eagerness of climate campaigners to jog the public have sometimes created a tendency to tie mounting losses from weather-related disasters to human-driven global warming.

But finding a statistically robust link between such disasters and the building human climate influence remains a daunting task. A new analysis of nearly two dozen papers assessing trends in disaster losses in light of climate change finds no convincing link. The author concludes that, so far, the rise in disaster losses is mainly a function of more investments getting in harm’s way as communities in places vulnerable to natural hazards grow.

The paper — “Have disaster losses increased due to anthropogenic climate change?” — is in press in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society. It was written byLaurens M. Bouwer, a researcher at Vrije University in Amsterdam focused on climate and water resources (and a lead author of a chapter in the 2001 assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). You can read more about the paper at the blog of Roger Pielke, Jr., which drew my attention to this work.

Here’s the summary and a link to the full paper:

The increasing impact of natural disasters over recent decades has been well documented, especially the direct economic losses and losses that were insured. Claims are made by some that climate change has caused more losses, but others assert that increasing exposure due to population and economic growth has been a much more important driver. Ambiguity exists today, as the causal link between climate change and disaster losses has not been addressed in a systematic manner by major scientific assessments. Here I present a review and analysis of recent quantitative studies on past increases in weather disaster losses and the role of anthropogenic climate change. Analyses show that although economic losses from weather related hazards have increased, anthropogenic climate change so far did not have a significant impact on losses from natural disasters. The observed loss increase is caused primarily by increasing exposure and value of capital at risk. This finding is of direct importance for studies on impacts from extreme weather and for disaster policy. (Read the rest.)

The bottom line? Regardless of what happens due to global warming, on a crowding, urbanizing planet, increasedexposure to, and losses from, nature’s hard knocks are a sure thing if people keep settling in harm’s way.

None of this negates the importance of moving to limit emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases; the analysis just reinforces the reality that while that effort proceeds, there’s plenty of other work to do, as well, if humanity desires a relatively smooth journey in this century (as was recently stressed by Robert Verchick here).

Varied Views on Extreme Weather in a Warming Climate (Dot Earth, N.Y.Times)

May 11, 2012, 9:28 AM

By ANDREW C. REVKIN
 
drought in oklahomaShawn Yorks/The Guymon Daily Herald, via Associated PressA message from the residents of Hough, Okla., in late June, 2011. More Photos »

[May 15, 6:01 p.m. | Updated |
Here’s a fresh post examining the climate arguments of James Hansen and Martin Hoerling.]

Through decades of work, James E. Hansen of NASA has earned his plaudits as a climate scientist. But his intensifying personal push for aggressive cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases has come with a framing of climate science that is being criticized by some respected researchers for stepping beyond what peer-reviewed studies have concluded.

Here is a critique of “Game Over for Climate,” Hansen’s Op-Ed article in The Times this week, from Martin Hoerling, who runs an effort by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to assess the forces contributing to extreme weather events, followed by a must-read reaction to both from Kerry Emanuel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:

Martin Hoerling:

In his recent New York Times Op-Ed piece, Jim Hansen asserts:

“Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels.”

He doesnt define “several decades,” but a reasonable assumption is that he refers to a period from today through mid-century. I am unaware of any projection for “semi-permanent” drought in this time frame over the expansive region of the Central Great Plains. He implies the drought will be due to a lack of rain (except for the brief, and ineffective downpours). I am unaware of indications, from model projections, for a material decline in mean rainfall. Indeed, that region has seen a general increase in rainfall over the long term during most seasons (certainly no material decline). Also, for the warm season when evaporative loss is especially effective, the climate of the central Great Plains has not become materially warmer (perhaps even cooled) since 1900. In other words, climate conditions in the growing season of the Central Great Plains are today not materially different from those existing 100 years ago. This observational fact belies the expectations from climate simulations and, in truth, our science lacks a good explanation for this discrepancy.

The Hansen piece is policy more than it is science, to be sure, and one can read it for the former. But facts should, and do, matter to some. The vision of a Midwest Dustbowl is a scary one, and the author appears intent to instill fear rather than reason.

The article makes these additional assertions:

“The global warming signal is now louder than the noise of random weather…”

This is patently false. Take temperature over the U.S. as an example. The variability of daily temperature over the U.S. is much larger than the anthropogenic warming signal at the time scales of local weather. Depending on season and location, the disparity is at least a factor of 5 to 10.

I think that a more scientifically justifiable statement, at least for the U.S. and extratropical land areas is that daily weather noise continues to drum out the siren call of climate change on local, weather scales.

Hansen goes on to assert that:

“Extremely hot summers have increased noticeably. We can say with high confidence that the recent heat waves in Texas and Russia, and the one in Europe in 2003, which killed tens of thousands, were not natural events — they were caused by human-induced climate change.”

Published scientific studies on the Russian heat wave indicate this claim to be false. Our own study on the Texas heat wave and drought, submitted this week to the Journal of Climate, likewise shows that that event was not caused by human-induced climate change. These are not de novo events, but upon scientific scrutiny, one finds both the Russian and Texas extreme events to be part of the physics of what has driven variability in those regions over the past century. This is not to say that climate change didn’t contribute to those cases, but their intensity owes to natural, not human, causes.

The closing comment by Hansen is then all the more ironic, though not surprising knowing he often writes from passion and not reason:

“The science of the situation is clear — it’s time for the politics to follow. ”

Let me borrow from a recent excellent piece in New Scientist by tornado expert Dr. Harold Brooks regarding the global warming and tornado debate, and state:

“Those who continue to talk in certain terms of how local weather extremes are the result of human climate change are failing to heed all the available evidence.”

Kerry Emanuel:

I see overstatements on all sides. Extreme weather begets extreme views. On the Russian heat wave, Marty is citing a single paper that claims it had nothing to do with climate change, but there are other papers that purport to demonstrate that events of that magnitude are now three times more likely than before the industrial era.

This is a collision between the fledgling application of the science of extremes and the inexperience we all have in conveying what we do know about this to the public. A complicating factor is the human psychological need to ascribe every unusual event to a cause. Our Puritan forebears ascribed them to sin, while in the 80’s is was fashionable to blame unusual weather on El Niño. Global warming is the latest whipping boy. But even conveying our level of ignorance is hard: Marty’s quotation of Harold Brooks makes it sound as though he is saying that the recent uptick in severe weather had nothing to do with climate change. The truth is that we do not know whether it did or did not; absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Regular readers of my work will not be surprised that I align with Emanuel.

More on Extreme Weather and the Greenhouse Effect (Dot Earth, N.Y.Times)

May 15, 2012, 9:05 AM

By ANDREW C. REVKIN

Martin P. Hoerling, a federal research meteorologist specializing in climate dynamics, faced a lot of pushback after he criticized some assertions made in an Op-Ed article on climate change by James E. Hansen of NASA. One critic is Dan Miller, an engineer and venture capitalist focused on non-polluting energy technologies who blogs on climate atClimatePlace.org and helped Hansen craft his Times piece.

At roughly the same time, Hoerling sent an amplification on his arguments and Miller sent a critique of Hoerling’s initial post. You can read both below. Keep in mind that neither writer has seen the other’s piece. (I asked Hansen for his thoughts on the complaints of Hoerling and Kerry Emanuel, another climate scientist who weighed in on Dot Earth. His response is at the end of this post.)

Here’s Hoerling’s expanded critique of Hansen [if you’re having trouble reading it, click here for a downloadable version]:

Here’s Miller’s critique of Hoerling [click here for a downloadable version]:

Here’s Hansen’s comment:

I have several papers well along in the publication process that make clear your characterizations are far off the mark. The editors prefer, indeed are insistent, that I not discuss these in blogs. Some scientists may be able to spend their time blogging and e-mailing without a significant impact on their scientific productivity — I’m not one of them — but I do make an effort to make my papers understandable to a wide audience.

You can track Hansen’s output on his Columbia University Web site.

Walter Neves: o pai de Luzia (Fapesp)

Arqueólogo e antropólogo da USP conta como formulou uma teoria sobre a chegada do homem às Américas

MARCOS PIVETTA e RICARDO ZORZETTO | Edição 195 – Maio de 2012

© LEO RAMOS

Ele é o pai de Luzia, um crânio humano de 11 mil anos, o mais antigo até agora encontrado nas Américas, que pertenceu a um extinto povo de caçadores-coletores da região de Lagoa Santa, nos arredores de Belo Horizonte. O arqueólogo e antropólogo Walter Neves, coordenador do Laboratório de Estudos Evolutivos Humanos do Instituto de Biociências da Universidade de São Paulo (USP), não foi o responsável por ter resgatado esse antigo esqueleto de um sítio pré-histórico, mas foi graças a seus estudos que Luzia, assim batizada por ele, tornou-se o símbolo de sua polêmica teo-ria de povoamento das Américas: o modelo dos dois componentes biológicos.Formulada há mais de duas décadas, a teoria advoga que nosso continente foi colonizado por duas levas de Homo sapiensvindas da Ásia. A primeira onda migratória teria ocorrido há uns 14 mil anos e fora composta por indivíduos parecidos com Luzia, com morfologia não mongoloide, semelhante à dos atuais australianos e africanos, mas que não deixaram descendentes. A segunda leva teria entrado aqui há uns 12 mil anos e seus membros apresentavam o tipo físico característico dos asiáticos, dos quais os índios modernos derivam.

Nesta entrevista, Neves, um cientista tão aguerrido como popular, que gosta de uma boa briga acadêmica, fala de Luzia e de sua carreira.

Como surgiu seu interesse por ciência?
Venho de uma família pobre, de Três Pontas, Minas Gerais. Por alguma razão, aos 8 anos, eu já sabia que queria ser cientista. As 12 anos, que queria trabalhar com evolução humana. Não tenho explicação para isso.

Quando você veio para São Paulo?
Foi em 1970, depois da Copa. Migramos para São Bernardo, onde morei grande parte da minha vida.

Como era sua vida?
Todo mundo em casa tinha que trabalhar. A família era pequena. Era meu pai, minha mãe, eu e meu irmão, três anos mais velho. Quando chegamos a São Paulo, meu pai era pedreiro e minha mãe vendia Yakult na rua. Eu tinha de 12 para 13 anos. Um ano depois de chegar aqui, comecei a trabalhar. Vendia massas uma vez por semana numa barraca de feirantes do meu bairro. Meu primeiro emprego fixo foi de ajudante-geral na Malas Primicia, para fazer fechadura de mala. E eu odiava. Era chato, não exigia qualificação. Durou pouco. Um mês depois fui contratado na fábrica de turbinas de avião da Rolls-Royce, em São Bernardo. Eu me beneficiei muito desse ambiente, que era refinado, cheio de regras e de valorização da hierarquia. Acho que desenvolvi minha excelente capacidade administrativa nos anos que passei na Rolls-Royce. Tive uma formação burocrática de primeira. Todos os dias, quando a gente chegava à fábrica, tinha um quadro da rainha da Inglaterra e a gente tinha que fazer mesura. Eu achava o máximo. Para quem vivia no mato, era um upgrade de glamour na vida. Tinha de 13 para 14 anos.

O que fazia?
Comecei como office-boy e quando saí era assistente da diretoria técnica. A Rolls-Royce no Brasil recebia as turbinas para fazer reparos e revisão geral. Meu chefe era diretor dessa parte e eu o ajudava em tudo. Trabalhava oito horas por dia e estudava à noite. Estudei em escola pública e entrei na USP, em biologia, em 1976. Tínhamos um ensino médio público de excelente nível.

Por que escolheu biologia?
Sempre achei que o caminho para estudar evolução humana era estudar história. Numa visita à USP no colegial, conheci o Instituto de Pré-história, que não existe mais. O instituto fora fundado por Paulo Duarte e funcionava no prédio da Zoo-logia, onde hoje fica a Ecologia. Nessa visita, fui ao prédio da História atrás de informação sobre o curso e me disseram que, se eu fizesse história, não aprenderia nada sobre evolução humana. Descendo a rua do Matão, vi numa plaquinha escrito Instituto de Pré-história, onde conheci a arqueó-loga Dorath Uchôa. Lá vi as réplicas de hominídeos fósseis e esqueletos pré-históricos escavados nos sambaquis da costa brasileira. Então disse para Dorath: “Quero fazer arqueologia e estudar esqueleto”. E ela disse: “Não faça história. Ou você faz biologia ou medicina”. Medicina não dava porque era em tempo integral. Optei por biologia. Foi um bom negócio. Em 1978 fui contratado, ainda na graduação, pelo Instituto de Pré-história como técnico.

Você estava em que ano da faculdade?
Do segundo para o terceiro, acho. Quando concluí a licenciatura em 1980, fui contratado como pesquisador e professor. Não tinha concurso. Era indicação.

Era um instituto independente?
Sim. Depois foi anexado ao Museu de Arqueologia e Etnologia, o MAE. Na época se fazia arqueologia em três lugares na USP: no Instituto de Pré-história, o mais antigo, no MAE e no setor de arqueologia do Museu Paulista, no Ipiranga. No final dos anos 1980, os três foram unidos em um só. Trabalhei no Instituto de Pré-história como pesquisador de 1980 a 1985. Em 1982 fui fazer doutorado sanduíche na Universidade Stanford. Eu era autodidata, porque não havia no Brasil especialista nessa área. No Instituto de Pré-história, o material estava lá, a biblioteca estava lá, mas não havia quem me orientasse.

Eles não trabalhavam com evolução humana?
O instituto era muito pequeno, tinha dois pesquisadores, que se achavam donos daquilo. Quando fui contratado, outra arqueóloga, a Solange Caldarelli, também foi contratada. Formamos um par muito produtivo. Trabalhamos no interior de São Paulo com grupos de caçadores-coletores, na faixa cronológica dos 3 mil aos 5 mil anos. Foi com ela que me tornei um arqueólogo. Minha transformação de biólogo para antropólogo físico foi autodidata. O crescimento do nosso grupo de pesquisa começou a expor a mediocridade do trabalho feito no Instituto de Pré-história e no Brasil. Isso levou a uma guerra entre nós e o establishment. Em 1985 fomos expulsos da universidade.

Como assim?
Expulsos. Demitidos sumariamente.

O que alegavam?
Nada. Não tínhamos estabilidade. A maior parte dos docentes era contratada a título precário e fomos chutados do Instituto de Pré-história pelo pessoal mais velho.

Qual a diferença do antropólogo físico e do arqueólogo? Você se considera o que hoje?
Me considero antropólogo e arqueólogo. Na verdade me considero uma categoria que tem nos Estados Unidos e se chama evolutionary anthopologyst, antropólogo evolutivo. Mesmo entre os antropólogos evolutivos são raros os que têm uma trajetória em antropologia física, arqueologia e antropologia sociocultural. Nesse sentido tenho uma carreira única, que os meus colegas no exterior não entendiam. Eu fazia antropologia física e antropologia biológica e tinha projetos de arqueologia. Quando fui para a Amazônia, trabalhei com antropologia ecológica. Sou uma das únicas pessoas no mundo que passou por todas as antropologias possíveis. Se por um lado não sou bom em nenhuma delas, por outro eu tenho uma compreensão do humano muito mais multifacetada do que meus colegas.

O arqueólogo faz o trabalho de campo e o antropólogo físico espera o material?
O antropólogo físico pode ir a campo, mas não vai. Espera os arqueólogos entregarem o material para ele estudar. Me rebelei contra isso no Brasil. Falei: quero ser arqueólogo também. Nos Estados Unidos, no final dos anos 1980, se definiu uma área chamada bioarqueologia, composta por antropólogos físicos que não aguentavam mais ficar na dependência dos arqueólogos. Aqui de maneira independente me rebelei contra essa situação. E a demissão do instituto em 1985 foi traumática porque tínhamos sete anos de pesquisa de campo e perdemos tudo. De uma hora para outra minha carreira foi zerada. A sorte é que àquela altura eu tinha defendido meu doutorado.

Aqui?
Aqui na Biologia, mas sobre paleogenética. Fui para Stanford por meio de uma bolsa sanduíche de seis meses do CNPq. Para me manter em Stanford e em Berkeley, eu contava com meu salário daqui, na época dava US$ 250, e o [Luigi Luca] Cavalli-Sforza, com quem trabalhei, me pagava no laboratório mais US$ 250.

Ele é um grande pesquisador, mas da genética de populações.
Me perguntam por que não fui trabalhar com um antropólogo físico, se eu era autodidata na parte osteológica. Não fui porque o que o Cavalli-Sforza faz é fascinante. Ele une várias áreas do conhecimento. Na época eu estava matriculado no mestrado na Biologia, quem me orientava aqui era o [Oswaldo] Frota-Pessoa.

Que também é da genética.
Da genética, mas com uma visão muito abrangente do ser humano. Se o Frota não existisse, eu não teria conseguido fazer o mestrado. Ele percebeu minha situação e foi muito generoso. Quando eu estava terminando o trabalho em Stanford, o Cavalli-Sforza descobriu que eu estava fazendo mestrado, e não doutorado. Ele olhava para mim e dizia: “Como você pode estar fazendo mestrado se já tem diversas publicações, coordena dois projetos de arqueologia e tem sete estudantes? Não tem sentido. Vou mandar uma correspondência para o Frota-Pessoa sugerindo que você faça direto o doutorado”. Hoje isso é comum. Foi o que me salvou. Defendi o doutorado em dezembro de 1984 e, meses depois, fui demitido. A Solange Caldarelli saiu tão enojada com a academia que nunca mais quis saber de carreira universitária. Eu queria voltar para a academia. Aí surgiram três possibilidades. Uma era fazer um pós-doc em Harvard; outra um pós-doc na Universidade Estadual da Pensilvânia e uma terceira coisa, inesperada. Quando eu fui demitido disse para o Frota que ia para o exterior. Sabia que a minha condição ia ser sempre conflituosa com a arqueologia brasileira. Nessa época existia o programa integrado de genética, do CNPq, importante para o desenvolvimento da genética no Brasil, e o Frota coordenava alguns cursos itinerantes. Aí o Frota disse: “Agora que a gente ia ter um especialista em evolução humana você vai embora. Eu entendo, mas eu vou te convidar para, antes de ir para o exterior, você dar um curso itinerante pelo Brasil sobre evolução humana”. Dei o curso na Universidade Federal da Bahia, na Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, no Museu Goeldi e na Universidade de Brasília. Fiquei muito bem impressionado com o Goeldi. No último dia de curso no Goeldi, o diretor quis me conhecer. Falei da minha trajetória e que estava indo para os Estados Unidos. Ele me perguntou: “Não tem nada que possa demover você dessa ideia?” Eu disse: “Olha, Guilherme”, o nome dele é Guilherme de La Penha, “a única coisa que me faria ficar no Brasil seria ter a oportunidade de criar meu próprio centro de estudos, que pudesse ser interdisciplinar e não estivesse ligado nem à antropologia, nem à arqueologia”. E ele me convidou para criar lá o que na época se chamou de núcleo de biologia e ecologia humana. Aconteceu também uma coisa no nível pessoal que me levou a optar por Belém.

Isso em 1985?
Ainda em 1985. Um pouco antes de eu dar esse curso pelo Brasil, eu me apaixonei profundamente pela primeira vez. Me apaixonei pelo Wagner, a melhor coisa que aconteceu na minha vida. Se fosse para os Estados Unidos, dificilmente conseguiria levá-lo. Em Belém, seria mais fácil arrumar um emprego para ele e continuar o relacionamento. Por isso aceitei a ida para o Goeldi. Só que tive de me afastar dos esqueletos. Na Amazônia a última coisa do mundo que se pode fazer é trabalhar com esqueletos, porque eles não se preservam.

O que você fazia?
Comecei a me dedicar à antropologia ecológica.

E o que é antropologia ecológica?
Ela estuda as adaptações de sociedades tradicionais ao ambiente. Até então, era uma linha que os americanos trabalhavam muito na Amazônia. Como a nossa antropologia aqui é eminentemente estruturalista, e tem urticária de alguma coisa que seja biológica, essa linha nunca progrediu no Brasil. Aí pensei: “Bárbaro, vou comprar outra briga. Vou formar uma primeira geração em antropologia ecológica”. Grande parte das pesquisas sobre antropologia ecológica na Amazônia era feita com indígenas. Então decidi estudar as populações caboclas tradicionais.

Vocês publicaram um livro, não?
Publicamos a primeira grande síntese sobre a adaptação cabocla na Amazônia, que saiu aqui e no exterior. Coloquei alunos que trabalharam comigo na Amazônia para fazer doutorado no exterior.

Quais conclusões você destaca dessa síntese?
Estudando essas populações amazônicas tradicionais, ficou claro que todo mundo que chega lá, as ONGs principalmente, acha que eles têm problema de nutrição. De fato, eles têm um déficit de crescimento em relação aos padrões internacionais. Mas nosso trabalho mostrou que na verdade eles não têm deficiência de ingestão de carboidratos e de proteínas. O problema é parasitose.

Como você retornou para a USP?
Em 1988, pouco depois de mudar para a Amazônia, o Wagner foi diagnosticado  com Aids, e fizemos um trato. Quando ele chegasse na fase terminal, voltaríamos para São Paulo. Vim fazer um pós-doc na antropologia. Quando o Wagner morreu, em 1992, eu não queria mais voltar para a Amazônia e prestei dois concursos.

Você fazia pós-doc em antropologia na USP?
Sim, na Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas. Aí prestei dois concursos. Um na Federal de Santa Catarina, na área de antropologia ecológica, mas eu queria ficar em São Paulo. Como eu já tinha feito em 1989 a primeira descoberta do que se tornou o meu modelo de ocupação das Américas, pensei: “Tenho que ir para um lugar em que possa me dedicar a isso e voltar a me concentrar em esqueletos humanos”. Aí surgiu uma vaga aqui no departamento, na área de evolução. Passei em ambos os lugares, mas optei por aqui. Sabia que poderia criar um centro de estudos evolutivos humanos que tivesse arqueologia, antropologia física, antropologia ecológica.

Como teve a ideia de criar  um modelo alternativo de colonização das Américas?
Um dia, o Guilherme de La Penha, diretor do Goeldi, me chamou e disse: “Olha, Walter, daqui a uma semana tenho de ir a um congresso em Estocolmo sobre arqueologia de salvamento. Preciso que você me substitua”. Eu disse: “Mas assim, em cima da bucha?” Então lembrei que Copenhague fica na rota de Estocolmo. Negociei com ele a permissão para passar uns cinco dias em Copenhague e conhecer a coleção Lund. Fiz a viagem e não só conheci como medi os crânios de Lagoa Santa da coleção Lund. Quando voltei, falei com um pesquisador da Argentina que passava um tempo no Goeldi, o Hector Pucciarelli, meu maior parceiro de pesquisa e o mais importante bioantropólogo da América do Sul. Propus que fizéssemos um trabalhinho com esse material. Na época estavam surgindo os trabalhos de Niède Guidon com conclusões que me pareciam loucura, como dizer que o homem estava nas Américas havia 30 mil anos. Minha ideia no trabalho sobre os crânios de Lund era mostrar que os primeiros americanos não eram diferentes dos índios atuais. Bom, imagina nossa cara quando vimos que os crânios de Lagoa Santa eram mais parecidos com os australianos e os africanos do que com os asiáticos. Entramos em pânico. Vimos que precisávamos de um modelo para explicar isso.

O que vocês fizeram então?
Alguns autores clássicos, dos anos 1940 e 1950, como o antropólogo francês Paul Rivet, já haviam reconhecido uma similaridade entre o material de Lagoa Santa e o da Austrália. Só que o Rivet propôs uma migração direta da Austrália para a América do Sul para explicar a semelhança. Mais tarde, com o avanço dos estudos de genética indígena, principalmente com o trabalho do (Francisco) Salzano, ficou claro que todos os marcadores genéticos daqui apontavam para a Ásia. Não havia similaridade com os australianos. Pensamos então em criar um modelo que explorasse essa dualidade morfológica. Não queríamos cair em desgraça como o Rivet e começamos a estudar a ocupação da Ásia. Descobrimos que lá, no final do Pleistoceno, também havia uma dualidade morfológica. Havia os pré-mongoloides e os mongoloides. Nossas populações de Lagoa Santa eram parecidas com os pré-mongoloides. Os índios atuais são parecidos com os mongoloides. Foi daí que surgiu a ideia de que a América foi ocupada por duas levas distintas: uma com morfologia generalizada, parecida com os africanos e os australianos; e outra parecida com os asiáticos. Nosso primeiro trabalho foi publicado na revista Ciência e Cultura, em 1989. A partir de 1991 começamos a publicar no exterior.

Você então formulou esse modelo antes de examinar o crânio da Luzia.
Dez anos antes. No Brasil vários museus tinham acervos da região de Lagoa Santa. Mas, como eu era o enfant gâté da arqueologia brasileira, não me davam acesso às coleções. Por isso fui estudar a coleção Lund. Só passei a ter acesso às coleções no Brasil a partir de 1995, quando algumas das pessoas que colocavam barreiras morreram. Um dos crânios que eu tinha mais curiosidade de estudar era o da Luzia.

Já tinha esse nome?
Não. Eu é que dei. A gente conhecia como esqueleto da Lapa Vermelha IV, nome do sítio em que foi encontrado. O sítio foi escavado pela missão franco-brasileira, coordenada pela madame Annette Emperaire. O esqueleto da Luzia foi achado nas etapas de 1974 e 1975. Mas a madame Emperaire morreu inesperadamente. Com exceção de um artigo que ela publicou, não tinha mais nada escrito sobre a Lapa Vermelha.

No artigo ela falava que o crânio era antigo?
Madame Emperaire achava que havia dois esqueletos na Lapa Vermelha: um mais recente e outro mais antigo, datado de mais de 12 mil anos, antes da cultura Clovis, ao qual pertenceria o crânio da Luzia. Só que o André Prous (arqueólogo francês que participou da missão e hoje é professor da UFMG) revisou as anotações dela e percebeu que o crânio era do esqueleto mais recente, que estava cerca de um metro acima. Luzia não foi sepultada, foi depositada no chão do abrigo, numa fenda. Prous demonstrou que o crânio tinha rolado e caído num buraco de uma raiz de gameleira que tinha apodrecido. Portanto, o crânio pertencia a esses restos que estavam na faixa dos 11 mil anos de idade. Madame Emperaire morreu acreditando que tinha encontrado uma evidência pré-Clovis na América do Sul, o crânio que apelidei de Luzia.

Onde estava o crânio da Luzia quando você o examinou?
Sempre esteve no Museu Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, mas as informações não. O museu era a instituição parceira da missão francesa.

O povo de Luzia era restrito a Lagoa Santa?
Lagoa Santa é uma situação excepcional. No artigo síntese do meu trabalho, que publiquei em 2005 na revista PNAS, usamos 81 crânios da região. Para se ter uma ideia de como são raros os esqueletos com mais de 7 mil anos no nosso continente, os Estados Unidos e o Canadá, juntos, têm cinco. Temos o que chamamos de fossil powerno que se refere à questão da origem do homem americano. Estudei também algum material de outras partes do Brasil, do Chile, do México e da Flórida e demonstrei que a morfologia pré-mongoloide não era uma peculiaridade de Lagoa Santa. Acredito que os não mongoloides devem ter entrado lá em cima por volta de uns 14 mil anos e os mongoloides por volta de 10 ou 12 mil anos. Na verdade, a morfologia mongoloide na Ásia é muito recente. Imagino que, entre uma e outra, não deve ter mais do que 2 ou 3 mil anos de diferença. Mas é puro chute.

Dois ou 3 mil anos são o suficiente para mudar o fenótipo?
Foram o suficiente para mudar na Ásia. Hoje está mais ou menos claro que a morfologia mongoloide é resultado da exposição das populações que saíram da África, com uma morfologia tipicamente africana, e se submeteram ao frio extremo da Sibéria. Meu modelo não é totalmente aceito por alguns colegas, inclusive argentinos. Eles acham que o processo de mongolização ocorreu na Ásia e na América de forma paralela e independente. Não vamos resolver o assunto por falta de amostras. Mas, em evolução, a gente sempre opta pela lei da parcimônia. Você escolhe o modelo que envolve o menor número de passos evolutivos para explicar o que encontrou. Pela regra da parcimônia, meu modelo é melhor do que outros, que dependem de ter havido dois eventos evolutivos paralelos e independentes. Mas há oposição ao meu modelo.

De quem?
Dos geneticistas. Mas acho que não dá para enterrar o meu modelo com esse tipo de dado. Não há razão para o DNA mitocondrial, por exemplo, se comportar evolutivamente do mesmo jeito que a morfologia craniana. Onde geneticistas veem certa homogeneidade do ponto de vista do DNA, posso encontrar fenótipos diferentes.

Também tem o argumento de que teria havido uma só leva migratória para as Américas, já composta por uma população com tipos mongoloides e não mongoloides como Luzia.
Existe essa terceira possibilidade. Mas teria que ter havido uma taxa de deriva genética assombrosa para explicar a colonização dessa forma. Por que teria desaparecido um fenótipo e ficado apenas o outro? Das opções ao meu modelo, acho essa a mais fraca.

Mas como você explica o desaparecimento da morfologia de Luzia?
Na verdade, descobrimos nos últimos anos que ela não desapareceu. Quando propusemos o modelo, achávamos que uma população tinha substituído a outra. Mas em 2003 ou 2004 um colega argentino mostrou que uma tribo mexicana que viveu isolada do resto dos índios, num território hoje pertencente à Califórnia, manteve a morfologia não mongoloide até o século XVI, quando os europeus chegaram pelo mar. Estamos descobrindo também que os índios botocudos, do Brasil Central, mantiveram essa morfologia até o século XIX. Quando se estuda a etnografia dos botocudos, vê-se que eles se mantiveram como caçadores-coletores até o fim do século XIX. Estavam cercados por outros grupos indígenas, com os quais tinham relação belicosa. O cenário foi esse. Sobrou um pouquinho da morfologia não mongoloide até recentemente.

O que você acha do trabalho da arqueóloga Niède Guidon no Parque Nacional Serra da Capivara? Para ela, o homem chegou ao Piauí há 50 mil, talvez 100 mil anos.
Mas cadê as publicações? Ela publicou uma nota na Nature nos anos 1990 e estamos esperando as publicações. Eu e a Niède fomos inimigos mortais por 20 anos. Uns anos atrás, a gente fumou o cachimbo da paz. Já estive no Piauí algumas vezes e até publicamos trabalhos sobre esqueletos de lá. No parque havia as duas morfologias de crânio. É muito interessante. Tive uma boa formação em análise de indústria da pedra lascada. A Niède abriu toda a coleção lítica para mim e o Astolfo Araujo (hoje no MAE). Saí 99,9% convencido do fato de que houve ali uma ocupação humana com mais de 30 mil anos. Mas tenho esse 0,1% de dúvida, que é muito significativo.

O que seria preciso para acabar com a dúvida?
A Niède deveria convidar os melhores especialistas internacionais em tecnologia lítica para ver o material e publicar os resultados das análises. Se ela estiver certa, teremos de jogar tudo que sabemos fora. Meu trabalho não terá servido para nada. Mas, graças a Deus, não só o meu, o de todo mundo.

Da garoa à tempestade (Fapesp)

Temporais se tornam mais frequentes e chuva aumenta 30% em São Paulo em 80 anos

MARCOS PIVETTA | Edição 195 – Maio de 2012

  © LEO RAMOS

Entre 1933 e 2010, o total anual de chuvas aumentou 425 mm na região metropolitana, segundo dados da USP

A terra da garoa virou a megalópole da tempestade. Em cerca de 80 anos, a quantidade de chuva anual que cai na Região Metropolitana de São Paulo, onde um em cada 10 brasileiros vive numa área equivalente a quase 1% do território nacional, aumentou 425 milímetros (mm), metade do que chove em boa parte do semiárido brasileiro. Saltou de uma média anual de quase 1.200 mm na década de 1930 para algo em torno dos 1.600 nos anos 2000. Fazendo uma soma linear, é como se todo ano tivesse chovido 5,5 mm a mais do que nos 12 meses anteriores. A pluviosidade não apenas se intensificou como alterou seu padrão de ocorrência. Não está simplesmente chovendo um pouco mais a cada dia, um efeito que seria pouco perceptível na prática e incapaz de ocasionar alagamentos constantes na região. A quantidade de dias com chuva forte ou moderada cresceu, provocando inclusive tempestades no inverno, época normalmente seca. Em contrapartida, o número de dias com chuva fraca, menor do que 5 mm, diminuiu.

Um regime de extremos, pendular, passou a dominar o ciclo das águas na região metropolitana: quando chove, em geral é muito; mas, entre os dias de grande umidade, pode haver longos períodos de seca. A Grande São Paulo parece caminhar para o pior dos dois mundos, alternando períodos intensos de excesso e de falta de chuva ao longo do ano. “A urbanização e o chamado efeito ilha de calor, além da poluição atmosférica, parecem ter um papel importante na alteração do padrão de pluviosidade em São Paulo, em especial nas estações já normalmente mais úmidas, como primavera e verão”, afirma Maria Assunção da Silva Dias, do Instituto de Astronomia, Geofísica e Ciências Atmosféricas da Universidade de São Paulo (IAG-USP), autora de um estudo ainda inédito sobre o tema. “Nos meses mais secos, a influência das mudanças globais do clima é responsável por 85% da dinâmica envolvida no aumento de chuvas extremas.” Embora com menos nitidez, a mesma tendência de elevação no número de dias com chuva intensa foi detectada na Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro.

O novo padrão pluviométrico em São Paulo não é como uma frente fria passageira. Veio para ficar, segundo modelagens feitas pelo Centro de Ciência do Sistema Terrestre do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (CCST-Inpe). As projeções sugerem que a situação atual é uma espécie de prólogo do enredo futuro. Elas sinalizam que deverá ocorrer até o final deste século um aumento no número de dias com chuvas superiores a 10, 20, 30 e 50 mm, ou seja, praticamente em todas as faixas significativas de pluviosidade. Haverá apenas uma diminuição na quantidade de dias com chuvas muito fracas e possivelmente um aumento no número de dias secos. “A sazonalidade das chuvas também deverá mudar”, afirma José Marengo, chefe do CCST, coordenador de um trabalho ainda não publicado sobre as projeções de chuva na região metropolitana. “A quantidade de tempestades fora da época normalmente mais úmida deverá crescer, um tipo de situação que pega a população de surpresa.” As simulações levam em conta apenas os possíveis efeitos sobre o regime pluviométrico da região metropolitana causados pelas chamadas mudanças climáticas globais, sobretudo o aumento nas concentrações dos gases de efeito estufa, que esquentam a temperatura do ar. O peso que a urbanização e a poluição atmosférica podem ter sobre as chuvas da Grande São Paulo não é considerado nas projeções.

Verde escasso na metrópole de concreto e asfalto: se 25% do território da Grande São Paulo fosse coberto por árvores, a temperatura média cairia até 2,5ºC

Uma das grandes dificuldades de fazer grandes estudos, capazes de revelar flutuações climáticas do passado e servir de baliza para projeções futuras, é a ausência de séries históricas longas e confiáveis, com informações diárias sobre a incidência de chuvas. Sem elas, não é possível fazer uma análise estatística robusta e ter uma visão clara sobre quanto chovia e como se distribuía a pluviosidade ao longo dos anos e das estações climáticas (primavera, verão, outono e inverno). Os especialistas são unânimes em apontar essa deficiência no Brasil. A série com dados de melhor qualidade sobre chuvas num ponto do território nacional é a fornecida pela estação meteorológica do IAG, que fica no Parque do Estado, no bairro da Água Funda, zona Sul da cidade de São Paulo. Os registros se iniciaram em 1933, quando a unidade foi inaugurada, e prosseguem até hoje.

Outro fator reveste os dados fornecidos pela estação meteorológica do IAG de um caráter único. Os registros foram obtidos dentro de uma grande área verde da cidade de São Paulo que não mudou radicalmente seu perfil ao longo de quase oito décadas – uma raridade numa megalópole que não possui muitos parques e jardins. Em outras palavras, embora a cidade tenha sofrido um forte processo de urbanização e de impermeabilização do solo no século passado, as condições naturais nos arredores da estação do Parque do Estado não se alteraram radicalmente.  Dessa forma, faz sentido comparar os dados do presente com os do passado, visto que o ambiente local é mais ou menos o mesmo. “Na zona Norte de São Paulo, no Mirante de Santana, existe uma estação meteorológica com medições desde os anos 1950”, afirma Pedro Leite da Silva Dias, pesquisador do IAG-USP e diretor do Laboratório Nacional de Computação Científica (LNCC), no Rio de Janeiro, também autor do estudo sobre a evolução das chuvas na região metropolitana. “Mas lá só havia matas algumas décadas atrás e hoje tem prédio do lado da estação.”

Devido à riqueza de dados fornecidos pela estação do IAG no Parque do Estado, Assunção e seus colaboradores puderam enxergar detalhes e tendências mais sutis no regime das chuvas ao longo das últimas oito décadas. Entre 1935 e 1944 choveu, em média, mais do que 40 mm em cerca de 30 dias, com grande concentração de pluviosidade nos meses de verão e, em menor escala, na primavera e no outono. Durante o período não houve registros de episódios de pluviosidade dessa intensidade nos meses de inverno. A situação começou a mudar a partir de meados dos anos 1940. Desde então, em todas as décadas ocorreu, em média, ao menos uma chuva desse porte no inverno. Entre 2000 e 2009, o número total de jornadas com tempestades acima de 40 mm esteve na casa de 70 eventos. Uma tendência similar se repete quando se analisa década a década a ocorrência de chuvas diárias acima de 60 e de 80 mm.

De forma geral, dois fatores principais podem estar relacionados com a alteração no regime de chuvas na região metropolitana: as mudanças climáticas globais, um fenômeno de grande escala, e o efeito ilha de calor, de caráter localizado e típico das megacidades. Os dois atuam em conjunto. Um potencializa os efeitos do outro e, em geral, é difícil traçar uma linha divisória entre ambos. Segundo Marengo, a maioria dos modelos climáticos indica que haverá um aumento na quantidade de chuva desde a bacia do Prata até o Sudeste do Brasil nas próximas décadas. Dentro dessa moldura mais ampla, surge a questão específica do clima nas grandes cidades, em especial do efeito ilha de calor, que, ao tornar mais quentes as áreas extremamente urbanizadas, também funciona como um ímã de chuvas.

Brisa marinha mais úmida
A temperatura superficial do oceano Atlântico no litoral paulista aumentou cerca de um grau entre os anos de 1950 e 2010. Passou de 21,5°C para 22,5°C. Pode parecer pouco, mas uma das consequências desse aquecimento é aumentar a taxa de evaporação da água do oceano, combustível que torna a brisa marinha ainda mais carregada de umidade. Esse processo tem repercussões sobre o clima acima da serra do Mar, no planalto onde fica a região metropolitana.

Por que boa parte das chuvas na Grande São Paulo ocorre entre o meio e o final da tarde, depois das 15 ou 16 horas? Essa é a hora em que a brisa marinha, quente e úmida, vinda da Baixada Santista, termina de subir a serra e atinge a megalópole. “A zona Sudeste é geralmente o primeiro lugar da capital que sente os efeitos da brisa”, comenta Maria Assunção. A estrutura interna das cidades, com muitos prédios altos, altera a direção dos ventos e pode até provocar a ascensão da brisa marinha em certoss pontos da região metropolitana e favorecer localmente a formação de nuvens de chuvas. A poluição urbana, sobretudo os aerossóis, pode tanto favorecer como inibir a ocorrência de tempestades sobre as cidades, dependendo de sua quantidade.

Estudos feitos nos Estados Unidos na década de 1990 sugerem que parte do aumento de pluviosidade em algumas regiões metropolitanas, como na de Saint Louis, se deve à sua crescente urbanização. Nessa área do estado de Missouri, onde vivem cerca de 2,9 milhões de pessoas, as chuvas aumentaram entre 5% e 25% nas últimas décadas. Um estudo do ano passado, conduzido em grandes cidades da Índia, conclui que as alterações no regime pluviométrico dessas concentrações urbanas derivam mais das  flutuações naturais do clima do que de fenômenos locais.

Estratégias de mitigação
No caso da Região Metropolitana de São Paulo, o trabalho da USP encontrou uma forte correlação entre seu processo de urbanização e as alterações no regime das chuvas. Os episódios de chuvas extremas, acima de 40 mm, se acentuam à medida que a população de São Paulo e de suas cidades vizinhas cresce e os territórios desses municípios viram praticamente uma única mancha de ocupação contínua, com pouco verde, muito asfalto e repleta de fontes de poluição e calor. De 1940 a 2010, a população da região metropolitana aumentou 10 vezes, de 2 para 20 milhões de habitantes. A mancha urbana cresceu 12 vezes entre 1930 e 2002, de 200 para 2.400 quilômetros quadrados. A temperatura média anual de São Paulo subiu 3°C entre 1933 e 2009, de acordo com os registros da estação do IAG no Parque do Estado e o total de chuvas aumentou em um terço. “Antes estudávamos esse processo de forma teórica”, afirma Pedro Leite da Silva Dias. “Agora temos mais dados, inclusive de fontes digitais.”

Mitigar o efeito ilha de calor pode ser uma forma de reduzir os episódios de chuvas extremas nos centros urbanos. O físico Edmilson Dias de Freitas, do IAG-USP, tem testado algumas medidas em simulações computacionais para ter uma ideia de seu impacto sobre o clima da Região Metropolitana de São Paulo. Pintar de branco as superfícies das casas e prédios não seria um procedimento eficaz. “A poluição e os eventos meteorológicos escurecem o branco rapidamente em São Paulo”, diz Freitas. “Não há como manter isso.” A medida mais eficaz seria aumentar a cobertura vegetal da cidade. Segundo as simulações, se 25% da área da região metropolitana fosse tomada por árvores, a temperatura média poderia ser reduzida entre 1,5°C e 2,5°C. Um clima mais ameno reduziria o efeito ilha de calor e talvez não atraísse tanta chuva para a região. Hoje as áreas verdes não representam nem 10% da Grande São Paulo.

Por tabela, se houvesse mais parques e menos áreas impermeabilizadas na maior metrópole brasileira, o efeito mais perverso das tempestades também seria minimizado: as chuvas intensas produziriam menos enchentes e alagamentos. O solo exposto absorve mais as águas que caem sobre ele. “São Paulo fere um princípio básico de drenagem: a água da chuva tem de se infiltrar no solo onde ela cai”, diz a engenheira civil Denise Duarte, professsora da Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo da USP, que colabora com colegas do IAG. “Aqui, com boa parte da cidade impermeabilizada, a água é simplesmente escoada.” A chuva de um lugar é transferida para outro, em geral os situados em pontos baixos da mancha urbana.

Nas zonas mais úmidas, em geral pontuadas por serras e montanhas, a pluviosidade anual pode chegar a 2.400 mm, quantidade de chuva parecida com a da floresta amazônica. Esse é caso da porção da Grande São Paulo cortada pela serra do Mar, que pega o trecho sul da capital paulista e parte de cidades como São Bernardo do Campo e Rio Grande da Serra, e também de trechos de Santana do Parnaíba e Cajamar, no oeste da região metropolitana. Nas áreas menos úmidas, como uma grande parte de Mogi das Cruzes, o índice de chuvas pode ficar na casa dos  1.300 mm por ano. Entre esses dois extremos há vários níveis intermediários de pluviosidade.O valor atual de aproximadamente 1.600 mm anuais de chuva registrado na estação do IAG funciona como uma referência genérica ao regime pluviométrico vigente na região metropolitana. Numa área que hoje se estende por 8 mil quilômetros quadrados e engloba os territórios de 39 municípios, a quantidade de chuva realmente medida ano a ano em cada estação meteorológica pode variar bastante. Um trabalho do CCST traça uma espécie de distribuição geográfica da pluviosidade na Grande São Paulo a partir de séries históricas, com o total diário de chuva, fornecidas por 94 estações meteorológicas do Departamento de Águas e Energia (DAEE) do Estado de São Paulo e da Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA). Dados de um período de 25 anos, entre 1973 e 1997, foram utilizados no trabalho.

“Essa diferença de níveis de chuvas se mantém ao longo do ano e em todas as estações climáticas”, diz Guillermo Obregón, do CCST, principal autor do estudo sobre a distribuição geográfica da chuva na região metropolitana. “Nos locais mais úmidos predominam as chuvas orográficas ou de relevo.” Esse mecanismo faz as massas de ar quente e úmido subirem ao se chocar com elevações topográficas, condensarem-se e gerarem precipitações frequentes. Seja por seus prédios e asfalto, seja por suas áreas montanhosas, a Grande São Paulo parece estar no caminho das chuvas.

Artigos científicos
1 SILVA DIAS, M.A.F.  et al. Changes in extreme daily rainfall for São Paulo, Brazil. Climatic Change. no prelo. 2012.
2 MARENGO, J. A. et al. The climate in future: projections of changes in rainfall extremes for the Metropolitan Area of São Paulo (Masp). Climate Research. no prelo. 2012

© LEO RAMOS

Mais águas na Guanabara

As chuvas na Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro, a segunda maior do país com 12,5 milhões de habitantes, parecem exibir tendências semelhantes às de São Paulo. Embora a capital fluminense não disponha de uma série histórica sobre pluviosidade tão longa e confiável como a do IAG-USP, duas estações do Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia (Inmet) instaladas no Rio de Janeiro fornecem dados de qualidade razoável sobre ao menos quatro décadas de chuva.

De acordo com os registros obtidos entre 1967 e 2007 pela estação mantida no Alto da Boa Vista, a quantidade de água despejada sobre esse bairro da zona Norte da capital fluminense nos dias de forte tempestade elevou-se, em média, 11,7 mm ao ano. A estação fica no Parque Nacional da Tijuca, uma das maiores florestas urbanas do planeta. “Houve uma tendência de aumento da pluviosidade total na região metropolitana e as áreas de floresta, como o Alto da Boa Vista, se tornaram mais úmidas”, afirma a meteorologista Claudine Dereczynski, da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), principal autora do estudo, ainda não publicado.

A outra estação do Inmet se situa em Santa Cruz, bairro com menos áreas verdes da zona Oeste. Nessa região, os sinais de intensificação das chuvas foram discretos, segundo as informações coletadas entre 1964 e 2009, e não foram considerados estatisticamente significativos. “No Rio, os dados climáticos das últimas décadas sinalizam mais claramente um aumento na temperatura local e de forma mais fraca uma elevação da quantidade de chuvas”, diz Claudine. Simulações feitas por pesquisadores do Inpe e da UFRJ projetam para as próximas décadas um aumento na intensidade e na frequência tanto dos dias de chuva intensa como dos de seca. A pluviosidade apresenta tendência a se tornar mais mal distribuída ao longo do ano e a se concentrar fortemente em alguns dias.

Os Projetos
1Narrowing the Uncertainties on Aerosol and Climate Changes in São Paulo State – Nuance-SPS – n° 08/58104-8
2Assessment of impacts and vulnerability to climate change in Brazil and strategies for adaptation option – n° 08/58161-1
Modalidade
1e2Programa FAPESP de Pesquisa sobre Mudanças Climáticas Globais – Projeto Temático
Coordenadores
1Maria de Fátima Andrade – IAG-USP
2José Marengo – Inpe
Investimento
1R$ 570.084,46
US$ 2.654.199,16
2R$ 1.264.027,66

Game Over for the Climate (N.Y.Times)

May 9, 2012 – By JAMES HANSEN

GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.”

If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate.

Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk.

That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels.

If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground.

The global warming signal is now louder than the noise of random weather, as I predicted would happen by now in the journal Science in 1981. Extremely hot summers have increased noticeably. We can say with high confidence that the recent heat waves in Texas and Russia, and the one in Europe in 2003, which killed tens of thousands, were not natural events — they were caused by human-induced climate change.

We have known since the 1800s that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere. The right amount keeps the climate conducive to human life. But add too much, as we are doing now, and temperatures will inevitably rise too high. This is not the result of natural variability, as some argue. The earth is currently in the part of its long-term orbit cycle where temperatures would normally be cooling. But they are rising — and it’s because we are forcing them higher with fossil fuel emissions.

The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million to 393 p.p.m. over the last 150 years. The tar sands contain enough carbon — 240 gigatons — to add 120 p.p.m. Tar shale, a close cousin of tar sands found mainly in the United States, contains at least an additional 300 gigatons of carbon. If we turn to these dirtiest of fuels, instead of finding ways to phase out our addiction to fossil fuels, there is no hope of keeping carbon concentrations below 500 p.p.m. — a level that would, as earth’s history shows, leave our children a climate system that is out of their control.

We need to start reducing emissions significantly, not create new ways to increase them. We should impose a gradually rising carbon fee, collected from fossil fuel companies, then distribute 100 percent of the collections to all Americans on a per-capita basis every month. The government would not get a penny. This market-based approach would stimulate innovation, jobs and economic growth, avoid enlarging government or having it pick winners or losers. Most Americans, except the heaviest energy users, would get more back than they paid in increased prices. Not only that, the reduction in oil use resulting from the carbon price would be nearly six times as great as the oil supply from the proposed pipeline from Canada, rendering the pipeline superfluous, according to economic models driven by a slowly rising carbon price.

But instead of placing a rising fee on carbon emissions to make fossil fuels pay their true costs, leveling the energy playing field, the world’s governments are forcing the public to subsidize fossil fuels with hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This encourages a frantic stampede to extract every fossil fuel through mountaintop removal, longwall mining, hydraulic fracturing, tar sands and tar shale extraction, and deep ocean and Arctic drilling.

President Obama speaks of a “planet in peril,” but he does not provide the leadership needed to change the world’s course. Our leaders must speak candidly to the public — which yearns for open, honest discussion — explaining that our continued technological leadership and economic well-being demand a reasoned change of our energy course. History has shown that the American public can rise to the challenge, but leadership is essential.

The science of the situation is clear — it’s time for the politics to follow. This is a plan that can unify conservatives and liberals, environmentalists and business. Every major national science academy in the world has reported that global warming is real, caused mostly by humans, and requires urgent action. The cost of acting goes far higher the longer we wait — we can’t wait any longer to avoid the worst and be judged immoral by coming generations.

James Hansen directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and is the author of “Storms of My Grandchildren.”

‘Climategate’ Undermined Belief in Global Warming Among Many TV Meteorologists, Study Shows (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Feb. 22, 2011) — A new paper by George Mason University researchers shows that ‘Climategate’ — the unauthorized release in late 2009 of stolen e-mails between climate scientists in the U.S. and United Kingdom — undermined belief in global warming and possibly also trust in climate scientists among TV meteorologists in the United States, at least temporarily.

In the largest and most representative survey of television weathercasters to date, George Mason University’s Center for Climate Change Communication and Center for Social Science Research asked these meteorologists early in 2010, when news stories about the climate e-mails were breaking, several questions about their awareness of the issue, attention to the story and impact of the story on their beliefs about climate change. A large majority (82 percent) of the respondents indicated they had heard of Climategate, and nearly all followed the story at least “a little.”

Among the respondents who indicated that they had followed the story, 42 percent indicated the story made them somewhat or much more skeptical that global warming is occurring.These results stand in stark contrast to the findings of several independent investigations of the emails, conducted later, that concluded no scientific misconduct had occurred and nothing in the emails should cause doubts about the fact which show that global warming is occurring.

The results, which were published in the journal Bulletin of the American Meteorology Society, also showed that the doubts were most pronounced among politically conservative weathercasters and those who either do not believe in global warming or do not yet know. The study showed that age was not a factor nor was professional credentials, but men — independent of political ideology and belief in global warming — were more likely than their female counterparts to say that Climategate made them doubt that global warming was happening.

“Our study shows that TV weathercasters — like most people — are motivated consumers of information in that their beliefs influence what information they choose to see, how they evaluate information, and the conclusions they draw from it,” says Ed Maibach, one of the researchers. “Although subsequent investigations showed that the climate scientists had done nothing wrong, the allegation of wrongdoing undermined many weathercasters’ confidence in the conclusions of climate science, at least temporarily.”

The poll of weathercasters was conducted as part of a larger study funded by the National Science Foundation on American television meteorologists. Maibach and others are now working with a team of TV meteorologists to test what audience members learn when weathercasters make efforts to educate their viewers about the relationship between the changing global climate and local weather conditions.

Ultimately, the team hopes to answer key research questions about how to help television meteorologists nationwide become an effective source of informal science education about climate change.

“Most members of the public consider television weather reporters to be a trusted source of information about global warming — only scientists are viewed as more trustworthy,” says Maibach. “Our research here is based on the premise that weathercasters, if given the opportunity and resources, can become an important source of climate change education for a broad cross section of Americans.”

Weathercasters Take On Role of Science Educators; Feel Some Uncertainty On Issue of Climate Change (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Mar. 29, 2010) — In a time when only a handful of TV news stations employ a dedicated science reporter, TV weathercasters may seem like the logical people to fill that role, and in many cases they do.

In the largest and most representative survey of television weathercasters to date, George Mason University’s Center for Climate Change Communication shows that two-thirds of weathercasters are interested in reporting on climate change, and many say they are already filling a role as an informal science educator.

“Our surveys of the public have shown that many Americans are looking to their local TV weathercaster for information about global warming,” says Edward Maibach, director of the Center for Climate Change Communication. “The findings of this latest survey show that TV weathercasters play — or can play — an important role as informal climate change educators.”

According to the survey, climate change is already one of the most common science topics TV weathercasters discuss — most commonly at speaking events, but also at the beginning or end of their on-air segments, on blogs and web sites, on the radio and in newspaper columns.

Weathercasters also indicated that they are interested in personalizing the story for their local viewers — reporting on local stories such as potential flooding/drought, extreme heat events, air quality and crops. About one-quarter of respondents said they have already seen evidence of climate change in their local weather patterns.

“Only about 10 percent of TV stations have a dedicated specialist to cover these topics,” says University of Texas journalism professor Kristopher Wilson, a collaborator on the survey. “By default, and in many cases by choice, science stories become the domain of the only scientifically trained person in the newsroom — weathercasters.”

Many of the weathercasters said that having access to resources such as climate scientists to interview and high-quality graphics and animations to use on-air would increase their ability to educate the public about climate change.

However, despite their interest in reporting more on this issue, the majority of weathercasters (61 percent) feel there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about the issue of global warming. Though 54 percent indicated that global warming is happening, 25 percent indicated it isn’t, and 21 percent say they don’t know yet.

“A recent survey showed that more than 96 percent of leading climate scientists are convinced that global warming is real and that human activity is a significant cause of the warming,” says Maibach. “Climate scientists may need to make their case directly to America’s weathercasters, because these two groups appear to have a very different understanding about the scientific consensus on climate change.”

This survey is one part of a National Science Foundation-funded research project on meteorologists. Using this data, Maibach and his research team will next conduct a field test of 30-second, broadcast-quality educational segments that TV weathercasters can use in their daily broadcasts to educate viewers about the link between predicted (or current) extreme weather events in that media market and the changing global climate.

Ultimately, the team hopes to answer key research questions supporting efforts to activate TV meteorologists nationwide as an important source of informal science education about climate change.

Jô Soares entrevista Ricardo Augusto Felício sobre mudanças climáticas + comentário de Alexandre Costa

Programa Jô Soares, dia 02 de maio de 2012

* * *

Comentário de Alexandre A. Costa, um dos mais respeitados meteorologistas do Brasil, sobre a entrevista:

A Negação da Mudança Climática e a Direita Organizada (10 de maio de 2012 – postado no Facebook)

Vocês devem ter assistido ou ouvido falar da entrevista recentemente veiculada no programa do Jô, com o Sr. Ricardo Felício que, mesmo sendo professor da Geografia da USP, atacou a comunidade de cientistas do clima, esboçou uma série de teorias conspiratórias e cometeu absurdos que não fazem sentido científico algum como as afirmações de que “não há elevação do nível do mar”, “o efeito estufa não existe”, “a camada de ozônio não existe”, “a Floresta Amazônica se reconstituiria em 20 anos após ser desmatada” e chegou ao auge ao apresentar uma explicação desprovida de sentido para a alta
temperatura de Vênus, apresentando uma interpretação totalmente absurda da lei dos gases.

Enfim, o que levaria uma pessoa que, a princípio é ligada à comunidade acadêmica, a postura tão absurda? Primeiro, achei tratar-se de alpinismo midiático. Como o currículo da figura não mostra nenhuma produção minimamente relevante, achei apenas que bater no “mainstream” fosse uma maneira de chamar atenção, atrair publicidade, ganhar fama, etc. Ingenuidade minha.

Após uma breve pesquisa, encontrei este trecho de entrevista de Ricardo Felicio disponível em http://www.fakeclimate.com/arquivos/EntrevistasImprensaFake/EntrevistaAqGloFINAL.pdf:

Entrevistador: “Você conhece alguma instituição que apóie o seu pensamento? Como ela funciona? E o que ela faz?” Ridardo Felício: “Recomendo que procurem, aqui no Brasil, a MSIa – Movimento de Solidariedade Ibero-Americana.”

Mas quem é essa MSIa? Um grupo de extrema-direita especialista em teorias conspiratórias e em ataques ao Greenpeace (“um instrumento político das oligarquias internacionais”), ao Movimento de Trabalhadores Sem Terra — MST (“um instrumento de guerra contra o Estado Brasileiro), o Foro de São Paulo (“reúne grupos revolucionários que objetivam desestabilizar as Forças Armadas”), a Pastoral da Terra, etc. Eu mesmo fui no site dessa organização e a última desse pessoal é uma campanha contra a Comissão da Verdade, a favor dos militares (“A quem interessa uma crise militar”)! Para quem quiser conhecer os posicionamentos desse pessoal, basta checar em http://www.msia.org.br/

Eis que um pouco mais de busca e achei o Ricardo Felicio sendo citado (‘”A ONU achou um jeito de implementar seu governo global, e o mundo será gerido por painéis pseudocientíficos””) onde? No site http://www.midiasemmascara.org/ do ultra-direitista Olavo de Carvalho…

Parece ser sintomático que às vésperas do final do prazo para veto do Código ruralista, alguém com esse tipo de vínculo (a MSIa se associa à UDR) venha dizer que se pode desmatar a Amazônia que a mesma se regenera em vinte anos… É interessante que a acusação de uma agenda “ambientalista”, “comunista”, de “governança internacional” ou qualquer que seja o delírio que os negadores da mudança climática colocam ao tentarem politizar-ideologizar a questão apenas mostram de onde vem essa politização-ideologização e com que matiz.

Como costumo dizer, moléculas de CO2 não têm ideologia e absorvem radiação infravermelho, independente da existência não só de posições políticas, mas até dos humanos que as expressam. O aumento de suas concentrações na atmosfera terrestre não poderiam ter outro efeito que não o de aquecimento do sistema climático global. Negar uma verdade científica óbvia então só faz sentido para aqueles que têm interesses atingidos. E fica claro. Esse senhor, que academicamente é um farsante é, na verdade, um militante de direita. Parafraseando aqueles que tanto o admiram, precisa aparecer na mídia sem a máscara de “professor da USP”, “climatologista”, etc., mas sim com sua verdadeira face.

Alexandre A. Costa, Ph.D.
Professor Titular
Mestrado em Ciências Físicas Aplicadas
Universidade Estadual do Ceará

A Negação das Mudanças Climáticas e a Direita Organizada – Parte II: Mais Revelações (13 de maio de 2012 – postado no Facebook)

Não é difícil continuar a ligar os pontos, após a aparição do Sr. Ricardo Felício no programa do Jô Soares. Por que alguém se disporia a se expor ao ridículo daquela forma? Como alguém seria capaz de, na posição de doutor em Geografia, professor da USP e “climatologista”, assassinar não apenas o conhecimento científico recente, mas leis básicas da Física, conhecimentos fundamentais de Química, Ecologia, etc.? O que levaria alguém a insultar de forma tão grosseira a comunidade acadêmica brasileira e internacional, principalmente a nós, Cientistas do Clima?

O que pretendo mostrar é que para chegar a esse ponto, é preciso ter motivações. E estas, meus caros, não são de mera vaidade, desejo pelo estrelato, etc. É uma agenda.

Para os que quiserem continuar comigo a rastrear a motivação por trás dessa tal entrevista, peço que visitem, mesmo que isso dê a eles alguma audiência, o repositório dos vídeos do pop-star tupiniquim da negação das mudanças climáticas em http://www.youtube.com/user/TvFakeClimate. Lá, os links são para o conhecido site http://www.msia.org.br/ do “Movimento de Solidariedade Íbero-Americana”, cujo nome pomposo esconde o neo-fascismo LeRouchista, especializado em teorias conspiratórias e manipulação e inimigo visceral, como se pode ver em seu site, do MST, do movimento feminista, do movimento de direitos humanos, da Comissão da Verdade, etc; para o não menos direitoso http://www.midiaamais.com.br/, cujos artigos não consegui ler até o fim, mas que são de ataques de direita a Obama, de ridicularização do movimento dos moradores do Pinheirinho, em SJC, de combate à decisão do STF em considerar as cotas constitucionais e, claro, negação da mudança climática e ataques ao IPCC, etc,; um site anti-movimento ambientalista de nome http://ecotretas.blogspot.com/, que por sua vez contém links neo-fascistas como “vermelho não” (http://vermelhosnao.blogspot.com.br/search/label/verdismo), que por sinal está fazendo a campanha “Não Veta, Dilma”, ou especializados em teorias conspiratórias como http://paraummundolivre.blogspot.com.br/ e até diretistas exóticos, defensores da restauração da monarquia em Portugal (http://quartarepublica.wordpress.com/) ou neo-salazaristas (http://nacionalismo-de-futuro.blogspot.com.br/).

Como coloquei em diversos momentos, não é a escolha política-ideológica que faz com que alguém tenha ou não razão em torno da questão climática. Tenho colegas em minha comunidade de pesquisa que simpatizam com os mais variados matizes político-ideológicos (o que por si só já dificultaria que nos juntássemos numa “conspiração”… como é mesmo… ah!… para “conquistar uma governança mundial da ONU via painéis de clima”, tipo de histeria típico da direita mais tresloucada dos EUA). A questão do clima é objetiva. Os mecanismos de controle do clima são conhecidos, incluindo o papel dos gases de efeito estufa. As medições, os resultados de modelos (atacados de maneira desonesta pelo entrevistado), os testemunhos paleoclimáticos, todos convergem. E dentre todas as possíveis hipóteses para o fenômeno do aquecimento do sistema climático, a contribuição antrópica via emissão de gases de efeito estufa foi a única a permanecer de pé após todos os testes. Constatar isso independe de ideologia. Basta abrir os olhos. O tipo de política pública a ser aplicada para lidar com os impactos, a adaptação às mudanças e a mitigação das mesmas, aí sim… é um terreno em que as escolhas políticas adquirem grau de liberdade.

O problema é que, para uma determinada franja político-ideológica, no caso a extrema-direita, há realmente incompatibilidade com qualquer agenda ambiental que possa significar controle público sobre o capital privado. Há também uma necessidade de ganhar respaldos afagando desejos escondidos da opinião pública (como o de que nada precisa ser feito a respeito das mudanças climáticas) e fazendo apelos ao nacionalismo (típico dos Mussolinis, dos Hitlers, dos Francos, dos Salazares e de tantas ditaduras de direita na América Latina) – ainda que eventualmente isso signifique adotar um discurso falsamente antiimperialista. Com esses objetivos “maiores”, que incluem sabotar a campanha pelo veto presidencial sobre o monstro que é o Código Florestal aprovado pelos deputados, para que compromisso com a verdade científica? Para que ética e tratamento respeitoso em relação aos demais colegas de mundo acadêmico?

É impressionante como aqueles que nos acusam de “fraude”, “conspiração”, etc., na verdade são exatamente os que as praticam. Como coloquei em outros textos que escrevi sobre o assunto, é preciso desmistificar cientificamente os pseudo-argumentos apresentados pelos negadores (e isso tenho feito em outros textos), mas como bem lembra o colega Michael Mann, eles são como a hidra. Sempre têm mais mentiras na manga para lançarem por aí e não têm preocupação nenhuma em apresentarem um todo coerente em oposição aos pontos de vista da comunidade científica. Interessa a eles semearem confusão, ganharem espaço político, atrasarem ações de proteção da estabilidade climática, darem tempo para os que os financiam na base (ainda que possa haver negadores não ligados diretamente à indústria de petróleo e outras, mas já ficou evidente a ligação desta com a campanha articulada anti-ciência do clima em escala mundial). A pseudo-ciência e a impostura intelectual são as cabeças da hidra. O coração do monstro é a agenda político-ideológica. Mas a espada da verdade é longa o suficiente para ferir-lhe de morte!

Alexandre A. Costa, Ph.D.
Professor Titular
Mestrado em Ciências Físicas Aplicadas
Universidade Estadual do Ceará

Em Defesa da Ciência do Clima (10 de maio de 2012 – postado no Facebook)

Tenho me preocupado muito com os ataques feitos recentemente à Ciência do Clima, dentre outros motivos, porque estes tem se constituído num amálgama estranho que reúne o Tea Party, a indústria petroquímica e pessoas que parecem acreditar numa grande conspiração imperialista para, ao impedir que queimem suas reservas de combustíveis fósseis, a periferia do capitalismo se “desenvolva”, o que, com o perdão da palavra, já é per si uma visão absolutamente tacanha de “desenvolvimento”.

Mas essa não é uma questão ideológica, mesmo porque se o fosse estaria eu distante de Al Gore. É uma questão científica, pois moléculas de CO2 não têm ideologia. O que elas são dotadas, assim como outras moléculas (caso do CH4 e do próprio vapor d’água), é de uma propriedade da qual não gozam os gases majoritários em nossa atmosfera, que é a de um modo de oscilação cuja frequência coincide com a de uma região do espectro eletromagnético conhecida como infravermelho. A retenção do calor é uma consequência da presença desses gases (mesmo tão minoritários) na atmosfera terrestre. Não fosse por eles, a Terra teria temperatura média de -18 graus, em contraste com os moderados 15, para não falar do papel dos mesmos em mantê-la entre limites amenos. A Terra não é Mercúrio que, por não ter atmosfera, devolve livremente a energia absorvida do Sol na porção em que é dia, levando-o a contrastes de temperatura de 430 graus durante o dia e -160 graus à noite. Felizmente, tampouco é Vênus, cuja cobertura de nuvens faz com que chegue à sua superfície menos energia solar do que na Terra, mas cujo efeito estufa, causado por sua atmosfera composta quase que exclusivamente por CO2, eleva sua temperatura a praticamente constantes 480 graus.

Desconhecer essas idéias científicas simples, de que o CO2 é um gás de efeito estufa (conhecido e medido por Tyndall, Arrhenius e outros, desde o século XIX), com mecanismo bem explicado pela Física de sua estrutura molecular; ignorar o conhecido efeito global que o CO2 tem sobre um planeta vizinho, o que é bem estabelecido pela astronomia desde o saudoso Sagan, não faz sentido, especialmente no meio acadêmico, onde encontram-se alguns dos negadores mais falantes. A esses eu gostaria de lembrar de algo básico no método científico. De um lado, a ciência não tem dogma, nem verdades definitivas. Suas verdades são sempre, por construção, parciais e provisórias (que bom, senão viraria algo chato e tedioso como, digamos, uma religião). No entanto, por outro lado, o conhecimento científico é cumulativo e, nesse sentido, não se pode andar para trás! Só quando uma teoria falha, se justifica uma nova e esta não pode ser apenas a negação da anterior, pois precisa ser capaz de reproduzir todos os seus méritos (caso da Mecânica Clássica e da Relatividade, que se reduz à primeira para baixas velocidades).

Não é uma questão de crença. “Monotonia” à parte, é ciência bem estabelecida, bem conhecida. Tanto quanto a Gravitação Universal (que também é “apenas” uma teoria) ou a Evolução das Espécies.

INJUSTIÇA, DESRESPEITO E SUBESTIMAÇÃO

Os Cientistas do Clima tem sofrido ataques, com base em factóides que em nenhum momento se assemelham à realidade de nossa área. Nenhuma Ciência é hoje tão pública e aberta. Quem quiser, pode obter facilmente, na maioria dos casos diretamente pela internet, dados observados do clima, que demonstram claramente o aquecimento global (www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/data/ dentre outros), dados de modelagem que estão sendo gerados agora e que certamente subsidiarão o 5o relatório do IPCC (http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/data_portal.html) ou dados de testemunhos paleoclimáticos, que servem para analisar o clima do passado (www.ncdc.noaa.gov). Pode obter os relatórios do IPCC, emwww.ipcc.ch e seguir as referências, revisadas e publicadas em sua esmagadora maioria, principalmente no caso do Grupo de Trabalho que lida com as Bases Físicas do Sistema Climático, em revistas de grande impacto, sejam gerais (Science, Nature), sejam da área. Duvido que, em nossas universidades, cheias de laboratórios com convênios privados, sejam na engenharia de materiais ou na bioquímica, haja um segmento tão aberto, que tenha o desprendimento de sentar à mesa, compartilhar dados, levantar o estado-da-arte em sua ciência e elaborar coletivamente um relatório de síntese. Duvido! Desafio!

Os cientistas que participamos desses painéis não somos “representantes de governos”. Nada é criado ou inventado nesses painéis, além de uma síntese da Ciência que é produzida de maneira independente e publicada na literatura revisada por pares. Os que participam da comunidade acadêmica podem, inclusive, se informar melhor com facilidade, junto a colegas da comunidade científica brasileira que participaram e participam das iniciativas do IPCC e do PBMC sobre o funcionamento desses painéis, antes de emitir opinião, para que não terminem, na prática, difamando o que desconhece. Algumas pessoas, sem a menor conduta crítica em relação aos detratores do IPCC, repete-lhes a verborragia, quando poderiam ser céticos em relação aos “céticos”.

Mas não o são. Em nenhum momento, questionam as reais motivações de dois ou três (felizmente, são tão raros) que assumem a conduta lamentável da negação anti-ciência, ou por serem abertamente corruptos e serviçais da indústria petroquímica ou, simplesmente, por terem uma vaidade que não cabe no papel secundário que cumpririam caso estivessem, como nós, desprendendo, em geral quase anonimamente, enorme energia para colocar tijolo por tijolo no edifício da Ciência do Clima. É preciso saber distinguir entre o ceticismo honesto, genuíno, que é saudável em ciência, consonante com a dúvida sincera e a conduta crítica, da negação religiosa, baseada em fé e na necessidade cega de defender determinado ponto de vista, independente se o mesmo tem base real ou não e, principalmente, da canalhice pura e simples, que é o que é promovido por alguns dos negadores. O possível “sucesso” dessas idéias junto ao público, para mim, são terreno da psicologia social, mas a melhor analogia que tenho é a da popularidade de idéias religiosas, em geral mentiras reconfortantes que são preferidas em detrimento de verdades desagradáveis.

O verdadeiro ceticismo levou até onde os físicos de Berkeley foram (http://www.berkeleyearth.org/index.php). Inicialmente questionando os resultados obtidos por nossa comunidade, se municiaram de um enorme banco de dados de temperatura em escala mundial, mais amplo do que os que o Hadley Centre inglês e a NASA dispunham. Testaram outras metodologias, chegaram até a excluir as estações meteorológicas usadas por nossos centros de pesquisa. A postura inicial de Richard Muller, idealizador dessa iniciativa, era de tamanho questionamento em relação a nossos resultados que ele chegou a alavancar recursos da famigerada Fundação Koch, abertamente anti-Ciência do Clima. Mas o que Muller e seus parceiros encontraram? O mesmo resultado que já nos era conhecido. A Terra está aquecendo e este aquecimento se acelerou bastante nas últimas décadas do século XX. Este aquecimento se aproxima de um grau e portanto está muito acima de todas as flutuações naturais registradas desde que se tem registro instrumental. Aliás, confirmou o que também sabíamos: que os dados da Universidade de East Anglia (aqueles mesmos da farsa montada sob o nome altissonante de “climategate”, aqueles que foram perseguidos e cuja reputação foi ignominiosamente atacada, com repercussões em suas carreiras profissionais e vidas pessoais) contém um erro… para menos! O aquecimento sugerido pelos dados da CRU/UEA é um décimo de grau inferior aos das outras fontes de dados e, claro, entre nós, ninguém os acusa de desonestos por isso.

Outra impostura – e infelizmente, apesar da dureza do termo, acho que é neste caso em que ele se aplica – é a subestimação da inteligência de nossa comunidade, aliada ao desconhecimento dos materiais por ela produzidos. O 4o relatório do IPCC já contém um capítulo exclusivamente sobre Paleoclimatologia, isto é, sobre o clima do passado. Eu pessoalmente tenho dedicado grandes esforços na análise de testemunhos do clima passado e na modelagem das condições climáticas passadas. Existe uma preocupação permanente em discernir o sinal natural e separar, dele, o sinal antrópico, desde o primeiro relatório do IPCC. Para isso, avalia-se o papel das variações de atividade solar, as emissões dos vulcões, etc. Já avaliamos as possíveis influências naturais e as descartamos como possível causa para o aquecimento observado.

Nesse sentido, não há lugar para sofismas e tergiversações. Sobre os registros paleoclimáticos, que são capazes de recontar o histórico de temperatura e de concentração de gases de efeito estufa de 800 mil anos atrás até o presente, todos sabemos que, no passado, um pequeno aquecimento do planeta precedeu o aumento da concentração dos gases de efeito estufa. Isso se deu antes do encerramento de todas as eras glaciais. Mas é um raciocínio obtuso deduzir daí que o CO2 não exerce nenhum papel ou, nas palavras dos negadores “é consequência e não causa”. Existem diversos processos de retroalimentação no sistema climático e este é um dos melhores exemplos. As sutis variações da insolação e da distribuição desta sobre a superfície da Terra associadas aos ciclos orbitais são – e isto é do conhecimento de todos – muito pequenas para explicar as grandes diferenças de temperatura entre os períodos glaciais (“eras do gelo”) e os interglaciais (períodos quentes, mais breves, que as intercalaram). Mas um aquecimento sutil, após alguns séculos, mostrou-se suficiente para elevar a emissões naturais de CO2 e metano, que causam efeito estufa e amplificam o processo. Essa retroalimentação só era refreada, em condições livres da ação do homem, quando as condições orbitais mudavam novamente, levando a um resfriamento sutil, que induzia a captura de CO2 no sistema terrestre, que por sua vez amplificava o resfriamento e assim por diante.

Mas não é porque pessoas morrem de câncer e infarto que não se possa atribuir responsabilidades a um assassino! Porque pessoas morrem naturalmente de derrame, alguém acha possível dizer que “é impossível que um tiro mate alguém”? Ou que não se deva julgar mais ninguém por assassinato? Antes, era preciso um pequeno aquecimento para deflagrar emissões naturais e aumento de concentração de CO2, para daí o aquecimento se acelerar. Hoje, há uma fonte independente de CO2, estranha aos ciclos naturais e esta é a queima de combustíveis fósseis! Devo, aliás, frisar que até a análise isotópica (a composição é diferente entre combustíveis fósseis e outras fontes) é clara: a origem do CO2 excedente na atmosfera terrestre é sim, em sua maioria, petróleo, carvão, gás natural! Um mínimo de verdadeiro aprofundamento científico deixa claro que, hoje, o aumento das concentrações de CO2 na atmosfera é eminentemente antrópico e que é isso que vem acarretando as mudanças climáticas observadas. Não é possível mais tapar o sol, ou melhor, tapar os gases de efeito estufa com uma peneira! Os registros paleoclimáticos mostram que o aquecimento atual é inédito nos últimos 2500 anos. Mostram que a concentração atual de CO2 está 110 ppm acima do observado antes da era industrial e quase 100 ppm acima do que se viu nos últimos 800 mil anos. Mostram que esse número é maior do que a diferença entre a concentração de CO2 existente nos interglaciais e nas “eras do gelo” e que isso faz, sim, grande diferença sobre o clima.

QUAIS OS VERDADEIROS ERROS

Algumas pessoas se dizem céticas, críticas e desconfiadas em relação à maioria de nossa comunidade de cientistas do clima, mas não percebem o erro fundamental que cometem: a absoluta falta de ceticismo, criticidade e desconfiança em relação aos que nos detratam. A postura dos que combatem a Ciência do Clima sob financiamento da indústria petroquímica, ou em associação com setores partidários e da mídia mais reacionários é auto-explicativa. Interessa o acobertamento da realidade. Mas não só. Há desde essas pessoas que recebem diretamente recursos da indústria do petróleo a falastrões que há muito não têm atuação científica de verdade na área e, sem serem capazes de permanecer em evidência trabalhando seriamente para contribuir com o avançar de nossa ciência, debruçando-se sobre as verdadeiras incertezas, contribuindo para coletar dados, melhorar métodos e modelos, etc., apenas para manterem holofotes sobre si, têm atacado o restante da comunidade. Estranho e espalhafatoso como as penas de pavão. Prosaico como os mecanismos evolutivos que levaram tais penas a surgirem. Daí é preciso também combater o ponto de vista daqueles que dão a esse ataque um falso verniz “de esquerda”, pois lançam mão de teorias de conspiração, uma deturpação patológica do raciocínio crítico. Lutar com o alvo errado, com a arma errada, é pior do que desarmar para a luta.
O IPCC é perfeito? Não, é claro. Cometeu erros. Mas querem saber, de fato, quais são? Uma coisa precisa ficar claro a todos. As avaliações do IPCC tendem a ser conservadoras. As projeções de temperatura realizadas para após o ano 2000 estão essencialmente acertadas, mas sabe o que acontece com as projeções de elevação do nível dos oceanos e de degelo no Ártico? Estão subestimadas. Isso mesmo. O cenário verdadeiro é mais grave do que o 4o relatório do IPCC aponta. Mas de novo não é por uma questão política, mas pela limitação, na época, dos modelos de criosfera, incapazes de levar em conta processos importantes que levam ao degelo. Provavelmente, baseando-se em artigos que vêm sendo publicados nesse meio tempo, o 5o relatório será capaz de corrigir essas limitações e mostrar um quadro mais próximo da real gravidade do problema em 2013-2014 quando de sua publicação.

QUAL A VERDADEIRA QUESTÃO IDEOLÓGICA?

Não faz sentido “acreditar” ou não na gravidade, na evolução ou no efeito estufa. Não se trata de uma “opção ideológica” (apesar de haver, nos EUA, uma forte correlação entre ideologia e ciência junto ao eleitorado republicano mais reacionário, que dá ouvidos aos detratores da ciência do clima e que também querem ver Darwin fora das escolas).

A verdadeira questão ideológica, é que as mudanças climáticas são um processo de extrema desigualdade, da raiz, aos seus impactos. Quem mais se beneficiou das emissões dos gases de efeito estufa foram e continuam sendo as classes dominantes dos países capitalistas centrais. Juntamente com os mega-aglomerados do capital financeiro, a indústria petroquímica, o setor de mineração (que inclui mineração de carvão), o setor energético, etc. concentraram riquezas usando a atmosfera como sua grande lata de lixo. Mais do que a “pegada” de carbono atual (que é ainda extremamente desigual se compararmos americanos, europeus e australianos, de um lado, com africanos do outro), é mais díspar ainda a “pegada histórica” (isto é, o já emitido, o acumulado a partir das emissões de cada país), que faz da Europa e, em seguida, dos EUA, grandes emissores históricos.

Cruelmente, em contrapartida, os impactos das mudanças no clima recairão sobre os países mais pobres, sobre as pequenas nações, principalmente sobre os pobres dos países pobres, sobre os mais vulneráveis. Perda de territórios em países insulares, questões de segurança hídrica e alimentar em regiões semi-áridas (tão vastas no berço de nossa espécie, que é o continente africano), efeitos de eventos severos (que, com base física muito clara, devem se tornar mais frequentes num planeta aquecido), comprometimento de ecossistemas marinhos costeiros e florestas, atingindo pesca e atividades de coleta; inviabilização de culturas agrícolas tradicionais… tudo isso recai onde? Sobre o andar de baixo! O de cima fala em “adaptação” e tem muito mais instrumentos para se adaptar às mudanças. A nós, neste caso, interessa sermos conservadores quanto ao clima e frear esse “experimento” desastrado, desordenado, de alteração da composição química da atmosfera terrestre e do balanço energético planetário! Para a maioria dos 7 bilhões de habitantes dessa esfera, a estabilidade climática é importante!

Alguns dos mais ricos, na verdade, veem o aquecimento global como “oportunidade”… Claro, “oportunidade” de expandir o agronegócio para as futuras terras agricultáveis do norte do Canadá e da Sibéria e para explorar petróleo no oceano que se abrirá com o crescente degelo do Ártico.

Assim, é preciso perceber que há uma verdadeira impostura vagando por aí e a Ciência precisa ser defendida. Uma rocha é uma rocha; uma árvore é uma árvore; uma molécula de CO2 é uma molécula de CO2, independente de ideologia. Mas os de baixo só serão/seremos capazes de se/nos armarem/armarmos para transformar a sociedade se estiverem/estivermos bem informados e aí, é preciso combater os absurdos proferidos pelos detratores da Ciência do Clima.

Alexandre Costa é bacharel em Física e mestre em Física pela Universidade Federal do Ceará, Ph.D. em Ciências Atmosféricas pela Colorado State University, com pós-doutorado pela Universidade de Yale, com publicações em diversos periódicos científicos, incluindo Science, Journal of the Amospheric Sciences e Atmospheric Research. É bolsista de produtividade do CNPq e membro do Painel Brasileiro de Mudanças Climáticas.

Television Has Less Effect On Education About Climate Change Than Other Forms Of Media (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Oct. 16, 2009) — Worried about climate change and want to learn more? You probably aren’t watching television then. A new study by George Mason University Communication Professor Xiaoquan Zhao suggests that watching television has no significant impact on viewers’ knowledge about the issue of climate change. Reading newspapers and using the web, however, seem to contribute to people’s knowledge about this issue.

The study, “Media Use and Global Warming Perceptions: A Snapshot of the Reinforcing Spirals,” looked at the relationship between media use and people’s perceptions of global warming. The study asked participants how often they watch TV, surf the Web, and read newspapers. They were also asked about their concern and knowledge of global warming and specifically its impact on the polar regions.

“Unlike many other social issues with which the public may have first-hand experience, global warming is an issue that many come to learn about through the media,” says Zhao. “The primary source of mediated information about global warming is the news.”

The results showed that people who read newspapers and use the Internet more often are more likely to be concerned about global warming and believe they are better educated about the subject. Watching more television, however, did not seem to help.

He also found that individuals concerned about global warming are more likely to seek out information on this issue from a variety of media and nonmedia sources. Other forms of media, such as the Oscar-winning documentary “The Inconvenient Truth” and the blockbuster thriller “The Day After Tomorrow,” have played important roles in advancing the public’s interest in this domain.

Politics also seemed to have an influence on people’s perceptions about the science of global warming. Republicans are more likely to believe that scientists are still debating the existence and human causes of global warming, whereas Democrats are more likely to believe that a scientific consensus has already been achieved on these matters.

“Some media forms have clear influence on people’s perceived knowledge of global warming, and most of it seems positive,” says Zhao. “Future research should focus on how to harness this powerful educational function.”

Support for Climate Policy Linked to People’s Perceptions About Scientific Agreement Regarding Global Warming (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Nov. 21, 2011) — People who believe there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about global warming tend to be less certain that global warming is happening and less supportive of climate policy, researchers at George Mason, San Diego State, and Yale Universities report in a new study published in the journal Nature Climate Change.

A recent survey of climate scientists conducted by researchers at the University of Illinois found near unanimous agreement among climate scientists that human-caused global warming is happening.

This new George Mason University study, however, using results from a national survey of the American public, finds that many Americans believe that most climate scientists actually disagree about the subject.

In the national survey conducted in June 2010, two-thirds of respondents said they either believed there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about whether or not global warming is happening (45 percent), that most scientists think it is not happening (5 percent), or that they did not know enough to say (16 percent.) These respondents were less likely to support climate change policies and to view climate change as a lower priority.

By contrast, survey respondents who correctly understood that there is widespread agreement about global warming among scientists were themselves more certain that it is happening, and were more supportive of climate policies.

“Misunderstanding the extent of scientific agreement about climate change is important because it undermines people’s certainty that climate change is happening, which in turn reduces their conviction that America should find ways to deal with the problem,” says Edward Maibach, director of the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University.

Maibach argues that a campaign should be mounted to correct this misperception. “It is no accident that so many Americans misunderstand the widespread scientific agreement about human-caused climate change. A well-financed disinformation campaign deliberately created a myth about there being lack of agreement. The climate science community should take all reasonable measures to put this myth to rest.”

Large Gaps Found in Public Understanding of Climate Change (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Oct. 14, 2010) — Sixty-three percent of Americans believe that global warming is happening, but many do not understand why, according to a national study conducted by researchers at Yale University.

The report titled “Americans’ Knowledge of Climate Change” found that only 57 percent know what the greenhouse effect is, only 45 percent of Americans understand that carbon dioxide traps heat from the Earth’s surface, and just 50 percent understand that global warming is caused mostly by human activities. Large majorities incorrectly think that the hole in the ozone layer and aerosol spray cans cause global warming. Meanwhile, 75 percent of Americans have never heard of the related problems of ocean acidification or coral bleaching.

However, many Americans do understand that emissions from cars and trucks and the burning of fossil fuels contribute to global warming and that a transition to renewable energy sources is an important solution.

Americans also recognize their own limited understanding. Only 1 in 10 say that they are “very well-informed” about climate change, and 75 percent say they would like to know more about the issue. Likewise, 75 percent say that schools should teach children about climate change and 68 percent would welcome a national program to teach Americans more about the issue.

“This study demonstrates that Americans need to learn more about the causes, impacts and potential solutions to global warming,” said study director Anthony Leiserowitz of Yale University. “But it also shows that Americans want to learn more about climate change in order to make up their minds and take action.”

The executive summary and full report are available online:http://environment.yale.edu/climate/publications/knowledge-of-climate-change

The online survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks from June 24 to July 22, 2010, with 2,030 American adults 18 and older. The margin of sampling error is plus- or minus-2 percent, with 95 percent confidence.

Increased Knowledge About Global Warming Leads To Apathy, Study Shows (Science Daily)

ScienceDaily (Mar. 27, 2008) — The more you know the less you care — at least that seems to be the case with global warming. A telephone survey of 1,093 Americans by two Texas A&M University political scientists and a former colleague indicates that trend, as explained in their recent article in the peer-reviewed journal Risk Analysis.

“More informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming,” states the article, titled “Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the USA.”

The study showed high levels of confidence in scientists among Americans led to a decreased sense of responsibility for global warming.

The diminished concern and sense of responsibility flies in the face of awareness campaigns about climate change, such as in the movies An Inconvenient Truth and Ice Age: The Meltdown and in the mainstream media’s escalating emphasis on the trend.

The research was conducted by Paul M. Kellstedt, a political science associate professor at Texas A&M; Arnold Vedlitz, Bob Bullock Chair in Government and Public Policy at Texas A&M’s George Bush School of Government and Public Service; and Sammy Zahran, formerly of Texas A&M and now an assistant professor of sociology at Colorado State University.

Kellstedt says the findings were a bit unexpected. The focus of the study, he says, was not to measure how informed or how uninformed Americans are about global warming, but to understand why some individuals who are more or less informed about it showed more or less concern.

“In that sense, we didn’t really have expectations about how aware or unaware people were of global warming,” he says.

But, he adds, “The findings that the more informed respondents were less concerned about global warming, and that they felt less personally responsible for it, did surprise us. We expected just the opposite.

“The findings, while rather modest in magnitude — there are other variables we measured which had much larger effects on concern for global warming — were statistically quite robust, which is to say that they continued to appear regardless of how we modeled the data.”

Measuring knowledge about global warming is a tricky business, Kellstedt adds.

“That’s true of many other things we would like to measure in surveys, of course, especially things that might embarrass people (like ignorance) or that they might feel social pressure to avoid revealing (like prejudice),” he says.

“There are no industry standards, so to speak, for measuring knowledge about global warming. We opted for this straightforward measure and realize that other measures might produce different results.”

Now, for better or worse, scientists have to deal with the public’s abundant confidence in them. “But it cannot be comforting to the researchers in the scientific community that the more trust people have in them as scientists, the less concerned they are about their findings,” the researchers conclude in their study.